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In finding that PTAQ was not carrying on charitable activities thorough VPT, as its agent, and after stating (at para.44) that "the control over the agent's activities is a key element to establish that it maintained direction and control over its resources" (para. 44), Scott JA stated (at para. 46) that evidence did "not indicate any form of control over the choice of programs offered to PTAQ by its agent" and instead revealed "that VPT presented ‘predetermined packages' to PTAQ every year." Furthermore, PTAQ failed to establish "that it exercised monthly financial monitoring and control of expenditures… that it funded " (para. 48), and "the fundraising documents… indicated that VPT was conducting the fundraising activities on its own behalf" (para. 50). ...

. … Mr. Racine cannot be said to have sat in appeal from a decision he made. ... Sokol. … Dr. Sokol’s evidence was clear, compelling, and demonstrated the appellant’s knowing involvement in the scheme. … Although the above was sufficient in itself to result in the dismissal of this appeal, for the sake of completeness Gleason JA also addressed the other arguments, finding that the organization “had inadequate control over the distribution of funds in Israel” (para. 60); it did not ensure that that the agent used the charity’s resources to carry out activities on the charity’s behalf (paras. 63 and 44); it failed to keep accurate books and records by falsifying minutes of Board of Directors’ meetings and not maintaining documentation to support travel expenses, remuneration paid to fundraisers, activities in Israel and the donation scheme (para. 65); and it failed to file accurate information returns (paras. 74 and 75). ...

., 2018 FCA 166-- summary under Subsection 103(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- 101-110- Section 103- Subsection 103(1) s. 103(1) likely applies to the allocation of most of the partnership profits at year end to a lossco that never had significant economic interest or risk in the partnership business Income account treatment of the profits realized by a condo-project limited partnership was avoided by the corporate partners (the Partnercos) of the partnership paying safe income dividends (out of the realized but unallocated condo profits) to their respective Holdco shareholders through the payment of stock dividends of preferred shares followed by a redemption of those preferred shares – in turn, followed by a sale by the Holdcos of the Partnercos to a public company with substantial resource pools (Nuinsco). ...

While paragraph 149.1(6)(a) permits a charitable organization itself to carry on a related business without contravening the requirement to devote all its resources to charitable activities, the pastor’s private business does not come within this exception. Although it was unnecessary to decide on the further ground for revocation that Many Mansions was engaging in activities inconsistent with its registered object (of “advanc[ing] and teach[ing] the religious tenets, doctrines, observances and culture associated with the Christian faith”), Laskin JA nonetheless stated (at para. 6): Many Mansions submits that judgments on matters of religious doctrine or theology have no place in government …. ...

On May 29, 2006, each Holdco sold its shares of its Partnerco to an arm’s length public corporation (“Nuinsco”) with substantial resource pools (and Nuinsco acquired the shares of the general partner for $1.) ... In finding that such allocation defeated the object of s. 96(1) and thus was abusive for purposes of s. 245(4), Woods JA stated (at paras. 68-69, 71) that: [T]he allocation of the partnership’s income for tax purposes to Nuinsco, which became a partner one day before the end of the partnership’s fiscal period, frustrates the object, spirit or purpose of paragraph 96(1)(f) … by divorcing the economic consequences of the arrangement from the allocation of taxable income … [as] Nuinsco had virtually no economic interest or risk in the real estate development … except for a 10 percent “deal fee”. ... In also finding that there was an abusive circumvention of s. 160, i.e., avoidance of the application of s. 160 to the stock dividends and preferred share redemptions (viewed as being in combination a gratuitous transfer of property by the Partnercos to the Holdcos) as a result of the acquisition of control of the Partnercos (resulting in deemed taxation year ends of the Partnercos occurring before they had been allocated partnership income and, therefore, before they had incurred a tax liability) occurring shortly before the partnership fiscal period end, Woods JA stated (at paras. 123): [T]he acquisition of control of Partnerco arose as part of a series of transactions that was devoid of any purpose or effect except to obtain a tax benefit, or in this case, two tax benefits – the avoidance of tax by Partnerco and the avoidance of liability under section 160 by Holdco. … Landrus … makes it clear that abuse may be established by the vacuity of transactions. ...

The shareholder group consisted of (i) two unrelated individuals (Souty, and Foix – who held his shares through a passive portfolio company (“Virtuose”),) (ii) trusts for the two respective families (the Souty and Foix Trusts) and (iii) after giving effect to intricate preliminary transactions, two holding companies for Souty and Foix through which they held a portion of their shares of W4N (in the case of “Souty Holdco”) or of Virtuose (in the case of “Foix Holdco”). ... Noël C.J. essentially indicated that the final aggregate purchase price for the hybrid transaction had been increased by around the amount of the Balance Note but that the Balance Note was not repaid at any relevant time and that the payment of the cash sales proceeds in Step 4 essentially was funded by a diversion of cash resources of EMC that otherwise could have been used to repay the Balance Note. ... He went on to indicate (at para. 67) that “the scope of subsection 84(2) is sufficiently broad to counter this type of distribution when the property being distributed is fungible and a third-party facilitator is involved in the extraction process” and (at para. 69) that “it would be contrary to Parliament’s intention to turn a blind eye to the existence of a distribution or appropriation for the sole reason that, for example, the shareholder received the target corporation’s property as a creditor rather than as a shareholder … or, as in the present case, that the funds received by the shareholder originate directly from a third party but indirectly from the target corporation.” ...