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The Queen, 95 DTC 220, [1995] 1 CTC 2111 (TCC), aff'd 98 DTC 6007 (FCA)-- summary under Canadian Resource Property Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 66- Subsection 66(15)- Canadian Resource Property With respect to an "Acquisition Agreement" that the taxpayer entered into with the Alberta Crown, Bonner TCJ. found (at p. 224) that: "As a consequence of the Acquisition Agreement, the appellant was singled out as the possessor of the exclusive right to call on the Minister to accord to it, in respect of any bitumen which it encountered, any rights which the Minister, in the exercise of the discretion vested in him by the Mines and Minerals Act, might decide to issue." Accordingly, in the view of Bonner TCJ., the taxpayer disposed of "a right to a right" of the sort described in what then was s. 66(15)(c)(ii)(B) when under a "farmout agreement" with Esso Resources Canada Limited, the taxpayer received from Esso the sum of $4.5 million in consideration for "... the right, licence and privilege of earning an interest in oil sands rights... ... Accordingly, it had disposed of a Canadian resource property. In the Court of Appeal, Létourneau J.A. stated that "contrary to what the [taxpayer] contended, what was given to it under the agreement was more than a mere expectancy of acquiring property and also more than a right to negotiate". ...

Energy Resources of Australia Ltd., 94 ATC 4923, [1994] FCA 924 (Full Fed. ... In finding that foreign exchange gains or losses were realized by the taxpayer on capital account, Hill J. stated (p. 4954): "... ...

ConocoPhillips Canada Resources Corp. v. Canada (National Revenue), 2016 DTC 5016 [at 6588], 2016 FC 98, 2017 FCA 243 rev'd-- summary under Subsection 165(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 165- Subsection 165(1) Minister can consider reassessment without Notice of Objection Boswell J has found that s. 220(2.1) accords the Minister the discretion to waive the requirement to file a Notice of Objection, so that it was improper for CRA to peremptorily reject (on the grounds that it had no power to do so) a ConocoPhillips request that CRA waive a requirement for it to object to a reassessment which ConocoPhillips found out about well after the deadline for getting an extension to object to it. Respecting an argument of the Minister (at paras. 57-58) that “subsection 165(3) explicitly requires a notice of objection before there can be a reassessment” and that “the discretion to waive a notice of objection under subsection 220(2.1) would be nonsensical due to lack of a remedy,” he stated (at paras. 58-59): Subsection 165(3) does not state that without a notice of objection, the Minister shall not or cannot reconsider an assessment, and there are situations under the ITA where the Minister is explicitly given the power to reassess without a notice of objection. … Moreover, subsection 220(2.1) specifically enables the Minister to request a document that has been waived. ...

Resource Capital Fund IV LP v Commissioner of Taxation, [2018] FCA 41 (Federal Court of Australia), rev'd on various grounds [2019] FCAFC 51-- summary under Shares Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 9- Capital Gain vs. ... Pagone J stated (at para. 50): [T]he receipt will bear the stamp of income where the taxpayer, as here, did have the purpose of making profit from the ultimate disposal of investments. … Profitable realisation of the investment by disposal was an objective of the investment by the RCF partnerships from the beginning. ...

Resource Capital Fund IV LP v Commissioner of Taxation, [2018] FCA 41 (Federal Court of Australia), rev'd on various grounds [2019] FCAFC 51-- summary under Article 3 Summary Under Tax Topics- Treaties- Income Tax Conventions- Article 3 each U.S. ... The taxable activity in each case was an investment in … Talison Lithium which was carried out on their behalf by their respective General Partners. ...

Dare Human Resources Corporation v. Ontario (Revenue), 2019 ONCA 549-- summary under Employer Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Regulations- Regulation 100- Subsection 100(1)- Employer placement agencies were the workers’ employer The appellants were placement agencies who supplied temporary workers to the Public Service of Canada and federal agencies. ... The appeal judge did not … fail to consider any relevant factor. ...

Resource Capital Fund III LP v. Commissioner of Taxation, [2013] FCA 363 (Fed. ... In reaching this conclusion, he found that: the plant and equipment, to the extent it was fixtures, was fixtures to the land (which was not owned by SBM and, therefore, was not TARP of SBM) and not to its mining rights (which were TARP): para. 112 the mining information of SBM (which was not TARP) had a substantial value in light of the substantial exploration cost that would be required to reproduce this information, as well as the substantial present value of the mining production that would be foregone during the three to five year exploration and evaluation process (para. 105, 132) the question of what a hypothetical purchaser would pay for the mining information, being anything in the range of nil (being what it could be sold for by itself) to the full replacement cost (including foregone production as noted above), was indeterminate – however, "the fair valuation is one which shares equally between the holder, and the potential user, of the relevant asset the benefit to the user of immediate acquisition of the asset" (para. 157, see also 106, 129), so that the mining information was valued at the mid-point between the two extremes similarly, the plant and equipment should be valued "by dividing the notional ‘bargaining zone' equally" (para. 159, see also 107) between its replacement cost and its minimal scrap value it was not necessary to address whether any value should be assigned to goodwill as the SBM non-TARP assets were more valuable even without doing so it was inappropriate to add an asset value representing the excess of the market capitalization of SBM (which was a listed company) over its discounted cash flow valuation (para. 111, 121) ...

Resource Capital Fund III LP v. Commissioner of Taxation, [2013] FCA 363 (Fed. ... In reaching this conclusion, he found that: the plant and equipment, to the extent it was fixtures, was fixtures to the land (which was not owned by SBM and, therefore, was not TARP of SBM) and not to its mining rights (which were TARP): para. 112 the mining information of SBM (which was not TARP) had a substantial value in light of the substantial exploration cost that would be required to reproduce this information, as well as the substantial present value of the mining production that would be foregone during the three to five year exploration and evaluation process (para. 105, 132) the question of what a hypothetical purchaser would pay for the mining information, being anything in the range of nil (being what it could be sold for by itself) to the full replacement cost (including foregone production as noted above), was indeterminate – however, "the fair valuation is one which shares equally between the holder, and the potential user, of the relevant asset the benefit to the user of immediate acquisition of the asset" (para. 157, see also 106, 129), so that the mining information was valued at the mid-point between the two extremes similarly, the plant and equipment should be valued "by dividing the notional ‘bargaining zone' equally" (para. 159, see also 107) between its replacement cost and its minimal scrap value it was not necessary to address whether any value should be assigned to goodwill as the SBM non-TARP assets were more valuable even without doing so it was inappropriate to add an asset value representing the excess of the market capitalization of SBM (which was a listed company) over its discounted cash flow valuation (para. 111, 121) ...

Burlington Resources Finance Company v. The Queen, 2020 TCC 32-- summary under Section 132 Summary Under Tax Topics- Other Legislation/Constitution- Federal- Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure)- Section 132 in context, no formal admission made- and any admission could be withdrawn in the interests of justice Burlington, a Nova Scotia unlimited liability company, borrowed approximately U.S.$3 billion in 2001 and 2002 by issuing seven notes that were guaranteed by its non-resident parent (“BRI”). ... Before granting the amendments, D’Auray J indicated that Rule 132 applied only to “formal admissions” such as in pleadings Andersen Consulting ([1998] 1 FC 605 (FCA)) had established “that an application for leave to withdraw admissions did not require a separate form” (para. 75), so that the requested amendment to the Reply could constitute application to withdraw an admission In Burlington’s examination for discovery of the Crown’s nominee in 2014, “[n]umerous times the respondent’s counsel stated that it was the respondent’s position that no amounts were payable as guarantee fees” (para. 77) Although in an Amended Reply, the Crown had admitted that guarantee fees had been paid in the amounts stated in the Notice of Appeal, “the respondent did not make a clear and deliberate concession that the amounts paid to BRI were guarantees fees” (para. 80) in light of the point immediately above and denials made by the Crown elsewhere in the Reply Even if there had been such an admission, D’Auray J “would still have permitted the withdrawal of the admission since … there is a triable issue which ought to be tried in the interests of justice” (para. 82) “In addition, the purported withdrawal does not amount to an injustice to Burlington since it has been aware of the respondent’s position at least since its discovery of the respondent’s nominee in 2014.” ...