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Canada (National Revenue), 2016 FCA 94-- summary under Charitable Organization Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 149.1- Subsection 149.1(1)- Charitable Organization expending 70% of revenues on fund-raising and undue benefits inconsistent with wholly-devoted test Before dismissing the appellant’s appeal under s. 172(3)(a. 1) of the revocation of its registration as a charitable organization, Ryer JA noted that one of the grounds for revocation was that the Appellant had failed to devote all of its resources to charitable activities carried on by it (which were not considered to include amounts paid to disabled fundraisers), stating (at paras. 58, 59 & 61): …[O]nly one percent of the funds raised by the Appellant was deployed towards charitable activities in the period under review. ... …[A]pproximately 70% of the Appellant’s revenues for the relevant period were expended on fundraising. … …[F]undraising itself cannot become a raison d'être for a charity. …[T]he high level of fundraising activities undertaken … can reasonably be regarded as having become an end in itself. ...

. … As for the meaning of the verbs “to maintain” and “entretenir”, there is an overlap between the two versions, with the French verb emphasizing a meaning which is present in English, though not as the primary meaning. … As a result, I would conclude … that section 22 is broad enough to include the “operation” of the wastewater disposal facility by the City. ...

In this case … [a]s the Part I taxes were payable for the year ended August 27, 2004, these taxes were payable under section 157 by the balance-due date for that year. Therefore, they were outstanding immediately following that date and interest commenced to accrue immediately following the balance-due date and not from the date that the reassessment was actually issued. … Simard-Beaudry … confirmed that “the assessment does not create the debt, but is at most a confirmation of its existence”. ...

Jorré J below had found that the taxpayer’s teaching activities were a distinct source of income from her law practice and also made the factual finding that her part-time law practice verged on charitable volunteerism (“du bénévolat”) – and, more generally, found that as such practice had a personal aspect, the question as to whether her practice was a business could (consistently with Stewart) be tested through determining whether it had a reasonable expectation of profit, as to which there was none. ... In affirming the decision below, Nadon JA stated (at paras. 50-51, TaxInterpretations translation): [S]he invoiced her clients for the expenses related to the file as well as for honoraria adjusted as a function of the capacity of the client to pay and … her primary goal was to exercise her profession in a conscientious and professional manner without necessarily making money. … [T]here is no doubt that the law practice of the appellant, when the relevant circumstances are considered in their entirety, certainly qualifies as having a personal aspect. ...

Following the realization shortly thereafter by Newco of a taxable capital gain and recapture of depreciation on a sale of the building, Newco increased the adjusted cost base to Holdco of its shares by effecting a series of s. 84(1) dividends (including a capital dividend) – following which the individual sold his shares of Holdco to a third party for a sale price based on the amount of cash sitting in Newco. In connection with finding that the safe income of Newco was reduced by the amount of corporate income tax ultimately payable by it on its gain on the building sale, notwithstanding that at the time of sale, no income taxes had yet become payable, Webb JA first stated (at para. 39): I agree with … Deuce Holdings that it would only be logical that any arm’s length third party purchaser of shares would take into account any existing tax liability of the corporation, even though such liability may not be payable until a later date. He then stated (at para. 52): Both the fair market value of the shares and the portion of the resulting capital gain that would be attributable to the income earned or realized would reflect the tax liability that, although not payable immediately, would eventually have to be paid. … ...

., “the capital investments by the Loblaw group [,] were not part of Glenhuron’s conduct of business” Woods JA stated (at paras. 82, 84-85): For purposes of the ITA, the term “business” generally means “something occupying the time and attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit” …. ... [T]his approach is consistent with long-standing jurisprudence which draws a distinction between “capital to enable [people] to conduct their enterprises” and “the activities by which they earn their income” …. ...

Eisbrenner’s submission, … he only had to raise a prima facie case, which he submitted was a lower standard than the balance of probabilities. Therefore, … even though Mr. Eisbrenner had pled the fact that he owned the pharmaceuticals, he was not required to prove this fact on a balance of probabilities. ... Likewise, … Mr. Morrison…. ...

It has no application where, as here, each of the transactions was entered into in the pursuit of a bona fide non-tax purpose …. Beyond this, the concept of “series of transactions” is foreign to subsection 160(1). … [S]ubsection 160(1) contains no such specific language. Instead, Parliament resorted to the all-encompassing words set out in its introductory words …. ...

Burke was entitled to none of the benefits, she stated (at paras. 116-117): This, as well as other factors identified … at paragraph 142 of Vavilov such as concerns about delay, fairness to the parties, costs to the parties and the efficient use of public resources, support a finding that the matter should not be remitted to the Appeal Division for redetermination. … Declining to remit a matter to the administrative decision maker may also be appropriate where it becomes evident to the Court that a particular outcome is inevitable …. ...

This occurred – the offer of another public company (“Inco” – the 25% minority shareholder) was accepted by the Diamond Fields shareholders, thereby triggering the payment by Diamond Fields of the break fee. The break fee did not qualify as proceeds of disposition of a Falconbridge right to merge, as she did not consider there to be such a right: Diamond Fields could not promise the acceptance by its shareholders of the Falconbridge offer nor could it fetter the fiduciary obligations of its board – there was no capital gain. ...