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The remuneration would have been paid for services rendered as part of the commercial activities of Look or the termination of those activities …. … [T]here would be a connection between the litigation to establish (after the registrant has stopped making taxable supplies) that there was an amount of overpaid compensation (and collecting that amount) and the termination of the commercial activity of the registrant because that compensation would be related to services rendered while the registrant was making taxable supplies. Therefore, there is a connection between the termination of Look’s commercial activity and the legal services acquired in relation to the litigation against the Former Executives that would be sufficient to permit Look to claim the input tax credits …. ... Because subsection 141.1(3) of the Act is the more specific provision that only applies in certain situations, it will override subsection 141.01(2) …. ...

Furthermore, respecting the Crown’s argument that s. 150(2), which expressly provided that s. 150(1) did not apply to imported supplies, implied an intention the s. 150(1) would apply to the exported services of WMI, Noël C.J. stated (at para. 50): [S]ervices in contrast with tangible goods cross the border only in a virtual sense so that the exigible tax on imported services cannot be collected in the usual way – i.e., at the time of entry when the goods are released …. ... As explained in the commentaries which accompanied the amendment to subsection 150(2), “[a]pplying the closely-related group election to those supplies would result in both parties to the election avoiding tax altogether …” …. ...

Before dismissing the taxpayer’s appeal of 2009, Dawson JA stated (at para. 50): … [T]he use of the phrase “directly or indirectly” evidences Parliament’s intent “to capture any and all methods through which a transaction could increase” the fair market value of a TFSA. In allowing the Crown’s appeal of 2010 and 2012, she stated (at paras. 75, 82): [T]he Tax Court’s concern about “when or how far into the future an advantage … will be considered as attributable to” abusive transactions did not justify a restrictive interpretation of the definition of advantage. Such concern is intended to be addressed by other legislative provisions, including the Minister’s ability to waive or cancel advantage taxes (subsection 207.06(2) of the Act) and to determine the unused TFSA contribution room (subsection 207.01(1) of the Act and more particularly the definition of “unused TFSA contribution room” as enacted in S.C., 2010, c. 25, subsections 57(5) and 57(8). … The ability to waive an advantage tax and reset an individual’s unused TFSA contribution room are the mechanisms intended to address the future impact of abusive transactions. … [W]hile the increase in value in the TFSA in 2010 and 2012 was directly attributable to the performance of the shares held in the TFSA each year, it was indirectly attributable to the swap transactions which increased the number of shares held in the TFSA and their value. ...

This conclusion … necessarily flows from section 2.2 of the loan agreements which made each of the appellants’ entire donation conditional on the loan being approved by the lender …. ... [T]he Tax Court judge was also bound to hold that “no part of [the interconnected transaction] can be considered a gift that the appellant[s] gave in the expectation of no return” …. It follows that there was no gift whether the matter is considered from a common law or a civil law perspective. … In response to a further submission that “it is possible to make a ‘“profitable” gift’ due to the favourable tax consequences that some gifts provide” (para. 54), Noël CJ stated (at para 60): [T]the fact that a tax benefit is received as a result of making a gift cannot, in and of itself, invalidate the gift as to hold otherwise would mean that Parliament would have spoken in vain in providing for tax benefits consequential on making qualified gifts. ...

In finding that such requests could not succeed, Rivoalen JA stated (at paras. 35-37): … If an order setting aside the requirement for information is granted, the Minister will be prevented from properly exercising her powers under the Act. … The Minister has not yet assessed. ... In my view, Valero cannot stop the Minister from carrying out her statutory duty under the Act to assess income tax payable by way of an application for judicial review. … [T]he doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectations cannot be utilized to prevent the Minister from obtaining the necessary documents she requires to properly administer the Act and fulfill her obligations. … Furthermore, Valero’s alternative request was premature: Once the Minister receives the documents, if she assesses Valero for not withholding tax, Valero may have recourse in accordance with administrative law principles. ...

CRA assessed him advantage tax under s. 207.05 equalling 100% of the appreciation of the shares within his TFSA before the shares’ sale – and, following taxpayer submissions, proposed to waive a portion of the tax pursuant to s. 207.06 so as to reduce the effective rate of advantage tax to his marginal federal and provincial tax rate. ... However, he found that the Court should not so exercise its discretion, stating (at para. 18): [W]here the foundation supporting a ruling on a constitutional question is missing or faulty and we do not have to decide the question, we should not do so …. ... They would not fix the fatal problem: Parliament’s over-delegation of taxation power in the first place contrary to section 53 …. ...

After agreeing with Pamel J below that such documents were part of the court file and thus accessible to the public under Rule 26 unless a confidentiality order was obtained, Montigny JA went on to reject the taxpayer’s submission (in reliance on Gernhart) that making the certified record public as a matter of course violated section 8 of the Charter, stating (at para. 70, 72 and 75, TaxInterpretations translation): Anyone engaging the courts in an action … must expect that large parts of his or her private life will become publicly accessible. This is the case under Rule 26, as well as under paragraph 241(3)(b) of the ITA, which provides that the confidentiality of information provided to the Minister does not apply in legal proceedings relating to the administration or enforcement of the Act. … The documents were not transmitted by the Minister automatically but at the request of Mr. ... Rémillard's own request that the Minister transmitted the relevant documents to the Court Registry. … … Mr. ...

In finding that such CCA claims could not be treated as having been revised, Webb JA noted (at para. 36) that “ Nassau Walnut … drew a distinction between an election and a designation” and found (at para. 41) that “the comments in Nassau Walnut with respect to an election, and the inability of a taxpayer to change an election absent a specific provision in the Act permitting such a change, are applicable in this case.” He further stated (at paras. 38, 49): The choice made by the Trust in deciding what amount of CCA to claim in each year is akin to an election as described above by this Court. … If the Trust would have had sufficient income within the relevant time period to use the non-capital losses, then it would have benefited from carrying these non-capital losses forward to the year of profitability. In effect, the Trust would have been entitled to use several years of CCA to reduce its income, rather than only the CCA for the year in which it had a profit. … If the Trust is permitted to revise its earlier claims for CCA, this would defeat the purpose chosen by Parliament of having non-capital losses only available for a particular period of time. ...

In reversing the finding below that Emergis could not deduct such tax because such tax could (in accordance with the exception at the end of s. 20(12)) “reasonably be regarded as having been paid by a corporation [Emergis] in respect of income from a share … of a foreign affiliate [the LLC],” Webb JA and Goyette JA indicated: “[I]t would not be reasonable to regard the US Government as imposing a tax in respect of the income from the shares of LLC, as the US Government did not recognize the separate existence of LLC” (para. 28). ... It appeared that s. 20(12) was enacted “(a) because foreign taxes, not being incurred to earn income, are not deductible (paragraph 18(1)(a) …); and (b) to address the limitations in subsection 126(1) …, one of them being the unavailability of a credit when the income on which the tax imposed by the foreign government has no foreign source” – so that here, as Emergis did not have a source of income in the US “[a]llowing it to benefit from the subsection 20(12) deduction would therefore be in line with the purpose of this provision.” ...

Stratas JA noted that Rule 109 required that “the proposed intervener’s submissions … must be useful to ‘the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding’” (para. 6), that “[t]he originating document before the Court... defines the factual and legal issues in the proceeding” (para. 8) and that “[f]or this reason, interveners have to take the issues as they find them and cannot raise new issues” (para. 9). ... Here, the parties had not put in issue the Minister’s designation of DAC as a CCPC in its notice of reassessment (presumably a designation pursuant to s. 89(1) – public corporation – (c)(ii)), whereas QPG wished to intervene on the issue of whether such a designation overrode the legislative criteria imposed by the Act for determining CCPC status. ... Before dismissing the motion to intervene, Stratas JA stated (at paras. 25-27): The issue raised by QPQ … seeks to reinvent the theory of the case. ...