Search - стрим ешмек шешу

Leblanc JA noted: (at para. 46, TaxInterpretations translation) that the “text of subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 … does not provide further guidance on whether the unpaid or unpaid ‘amount’ on which interest and penalty may be charged is gross or net [of rebate entitlements]” (at para. 50) that the rebate provisions in this case were intended by “Parliament … to remedy a situation that would otherwise be inequitable to non-registrant ‘builders’" who were unable to claim input tax credits for their GST costs (see para. 68), (at para. 64) that if the respondent had not reported the transaction and instead been assessed by CRA under s. 191(3), CRA would have been required under s. 296(2.1) to grant the rebate amounts Leblanc JA then stated (at paras. 66, 69): To paraphrase … Humber College, it would be incongruous, to say the least, if provisions purporting to assist a taxpayer caused more harm to a well-meaning taxpayer than to a less well-meaning one …. This cannot be the result that Parliament intended in enacting subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 …. I do not believe that Parliament, in enacting subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 …, had in its mind that the determination of the "amount" to be paid or remitted for the purposes of calculating interest and penalty for late filing of the GST return could, in circumstances such as these …, be made without regard to any rebate otherwise payable to the taxpayer. ...

Its jurisdiction does not extend to judicial review of decisions of the Minister under discretionary relief provisions of the Act …. ... The problem with this reasoning is that this is exactly what the taxpayer relief provisions are intended to do — enable the Minister to provide relief from strict filing requirements. ... … …I would remit [the s. 220(3) matter] to the Minister for full consideration and decision. … ...

A subsequent settlement agreement provided for the reinstatement of much of the losses, did not explicitly address the treatment of the gains – but referenced an ability of CRA to reassess to make “consequential adjustments.” ... The taxpayer also submitted that s. 152(5) prohibited the implementing reassessment from including the 1998 net gains allocations in his income because, although such income had been included in the initial (pre- 2002) assessment of his 1998 return, such initial assessment was not a reassessment “made … before the end of the [normal reassessment] period” because such quoted language "refers to only the particular …assessment, reassessment or additional assessment that is valid as of the end of the normal reassessment period” – whereas here, the 2002 reassessment had nullified the initial assessment. ... Savics was reassessed in 2002, the initial assessment … was still an assessment that was made before the end of his normal reassessment period. … [T]he Minister is precluded from including a new amount in computing a taxpayer’s income that had not been previously disclosed in relation to an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment made during that taxpayer’s normal reassessment period. … I do not accept that the purpose of subsection 152(5) … is to prevent the Minister, in reassessing a taxpayer under subsection 165(3) … from restoring a taxpayer to their original filing position by reinstating a particular source and amount of income that had been reported by the taxpayer, assessed as filed, and then subsequently deleted as a result of a reassessment. ...

. … The appellant also argues that he was denied procedural fairness because he legitimately and reasonably expected that he would be provided the same process considerations as the successful SDL Optics employees. … I disagree. The doctrine of legitimate expectation permits a court to grant appropriate procedural remedies – it cannot give rise to substantive rights. … The decision-maker reasonably found that the appellant’s circumstances were not similar to employees of SDL Optics. … The decision-maker reasonably concluded that …there were no extenuating circumstances as required by the [Canada Revenue Agency Remission Guide] guidelines. … The decisions to exercise the option to purchase the ZCL shares and to hold those shares were within the appellant’s control. ...

Respecting the scope of s. 6, Noël C.J. further noted (at para. 12): [S]ection 6 does effectively amend the statutory time periods in federal legislation for starting proceedings in this Court: see, for example, subsection 27(2) of the Federal Courts Act … (the time limit for bringing appeals) and sections 18.1(2) and 28 [thereof] … (the time limit for bringing an application for judicial review). … Thus, if a party had thirty days to appeal a judgment of the Federal Court to this Court and twenty days had elapsed by March 13, 2020, the deadline for appealing the judgment would be September 23, 2020. ... For example, orders requiring a proceeding to be prosecuted urgently on shortened time limits to further the public interest and to avert some harm or prejudice would be invalidated with retroactive effect. … The Federal Courts Rules are not made “under an act of parliament” in the usual way in which this term is understood. … Beyond this, construing section 6 as allowing Parliament to unilaterally interfere with the management and governance of ongoing proceedings would invade a core judicial function …. ...

. … [T]he Tax Court concluded that leaving them as assumptions placed an onus on the respondents that they would not otherwise bear. ... An assumption that is a statement of mixed fact and law does not put any additional onus on the taxpayer … [since] “when the validity of the assessment is attacked in point of law…there is really no onus on either party ….” ... Further, the Tax Court did not consider whether leaving the assumptions as is would better serve the trial process. … [T]he Tax Court therefore erred in law …. ...

The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to the CCTB during those years, but referred the matter back to the Minister so that “taxpayer relief in the form of a waiver of any applicable interest and penalties under the Act and also a remission of taxes pursuant to the Financial Administration Act ” may be “seriously consider[ed].” In striking this referral part of the judgment, De Montigny JA stated (at paras 32, 33 and 36): … It is only when the Tax Court allows an appeal that it can refer the assessment back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment. Nor is it for the Tax Court to interfere with the discretion of the Minister, if only by suggesting that the Minister “may” seriously consider taxpayer relief in the form of a waiver of any applicable interest and penalty under the Act, and a remission of taxes pursuant to the Financial Administration Act …. … While he was entitled to express his views about the impact of the CRA’s error and the fact that relief should be considered in his reasons, he should have limited himself, in the judgment, to dismissing the appeal. … ...

After having noted (at para. 10) that ‘fundamental characteristics of religion include that the followers have a faith in a higher power such as God, entity, or Supreme Being; that followers worship this higher power; and that the religion consists of a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship,” Rivoalen JA found that the Minister’s denial of the appellant’s registration as a charity did not violate its rights under the Charter, stating (at paras. 15 and 16): Section 27 of the Charter is not a substantive provision that can be violated and is “relevant only as an aid to interpretation” …. The respondent, however, concedes that the state’s duty of religious neutrality under section 2(a) of the Charter relates to section 27, in part “with a view to promoting and enhancing diversity” …. … [S]ection 2 of the Charter protects the rights of the appellant’s members to practise their beliefs in Atheism and the Minister cannot interfere with the practice of these beliefs …. ... The appellant can continue to carry out its purpose and its activities without charitable registration …. ...

In confirming that the ecological gift instead was made in 2008 when the gifted property was disposed of, Noël CJ stated (at paras 39, 42, 44): [W]hen property is gifted … the disposition takes place when ownership of the gifted property is transferred from the donor to the donee … The question as to when a “gift was made” for purposes of paragraph 110.1(1)(d) is fully answered by paragraph 38(a.2). That paragraph provides, by referring specifically to ecological gifts, that “the disposition is the making of a gift” …. This is consistent with the wording used in subparagraph 69(1)(b)(ii) which speaks of a disposition “by way of gift inter vivos ”…. ...

In dismissing the Crown’s appeal, Woods JA stated (at paras. 35, 37-39, and 42): … Parliament’s intent must override O.A. Brown where legislative intent is clear as it is in the provisions applicable in this case. … The particular circumstances of this case clearly call into question the application of O.A. ... Further, the property has only one use – to move teeth or jaws. It is also relevant that the appliances provided to patients are almost invariably accompanied by orthodontic services. … [T]he listing of orthodontic appliances in Schedule VI would have very limited application if the Crown’s position were correct. ...