Teskey J.T.C.C.: - The Appellant in his Notice of Appeal wherein he appealed his assessment of income tax for the year 1988 elected to have his appeal heard pursuant to the Informal Procedure.

Hamlyn J.T.C.C.: — These appeals were heard under the Informal Procedure and relate to the Appellant’s 1990 and 1991 taxation years.

Sarchuk J.T.C.C.: — This is the matter of Susan Zlot. Ms Zlot has appealed from an assessment of tax for the 1990, 1991 and 1992 taxation years. Pursuant to the provisions of section 18.1 of the Tax Court of Canada

Archambault J.T.C.C.: — In 1990, Mr. Bertrand lived in a two- bedroom apartment situated in the Byward Market neighbourhood in Ottawa. He received a promotion from his employer Tele-Direct Publications Inc. (Tele-Direct) which required him to move to

Christie J.T.C.C.: - This is an application by Carma Developers Ltd. (the “applicant”) under paragraph 58(1 )(a) of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) (the “Rules”). It, together with paragraph

Bell J.T.C.C.: — The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the Appellant by Notices of Reassessment dated June 14, 1993 for its 1989, 1990 and 1991 taxation years disallowing dividend refunds to it as follows:

O’Connor J.T.C.C.: — These appeals were heard at Halifax, Nova Scotia on August 21 and 22, 1995 pursuant to the General Procedure of this Court. Written submissions of counsel were subsequently received by this Court, the last dated October 6,

Archambault J.T.C.C.: - This is an appeal by Flexi-Coil Ltd. (Flexi) from income tax assessments by the Minister of National Revenue (Minister) for the 1988 and 1989 taxation years. The Minister disallowed part of the amounts deducted by Flexi in

Mogan J.T.C.C.: — The Appellant (Henry Adams) is one of 12 medical doctors whose income tax appeals were heard together on common evidence. The other 11 Appellants whose appeals are determined by these reasons for judgment are (in the numerical

Bowman J.T.C.C.: — This appeal is from an assessment for the appellant’s 1988 taxation year. The sole question is whether the appellant is entitled to treat property sold by it as a “former business property” within the meaning of section 44