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Date: 20250507 |
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Docket: IMM-16340-23 |
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Citation: 2025 FC 777 |
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Ottawa, Ontario, May 7, 2025 |
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PRESENT: Madam Justice Azmudeh |
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BETWEEN: |
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B.Y. |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The Applicant seeks judicial review of a decision in which he was found to be inadmissible to Canada because there were reasonable grounds to believe that, as a former solder in the Sri Lankan Army [SLA], he had been complicit in the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
[2] For the reasons that follow, this application will be granted.
II. Background
A. Relevant Facts and Decision Under Review
[3] The Applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. In 1990, at the age of 18, he voluntarily joined the SLA for a period of 14 days, where he only went through basic military training at the Ambepussa Army Base, before deserting, due to being the victim of sexual harassment and sexual abuse by senior officers. Following his desertion in 1990, the applicant remained in hiding until April 1993.
[4] The Applicant struggled to survive in hiding, so in April 1993, he joined the army again as a “volunteer recruit”
, a separate and distinct channel into the SLA. Since everything was handwritten at the time, the Applicant suspected that his past desertion would go unnoticed, and he was proven right. The Officer, finding the Applicant inadmissible, made a negative credibility finding that the Applicant’s first desertion would not be discovered. However, this is immaterial to their overall findings or analysis. Credibility finding is a fact-finding exercise and not a general pronouncement on one’s character (Portillo de Jurado v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1108 at para 17). Crucially, the Officer accepted the fact that the fact that the Applicant had volunteered and served a second time, and based their decision on this.
[5] The Applicant underwent military training at the camp base from April 1993 to June 1993. He was later deployed as an infantry soldier from July 1993 to October 1995 when he deserted the army permanently. At no time while in the army, was the Applicant ever promoted or in acted in a supervisory/decision-making capacity.
[6] The Applicant’s second desertion took place after some untreated back injuries that he suffered following an attack on his camp by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Applicant’s supervisors had ordered him to sleep in an unlocked cell, unarmed and he feared that he would be captured and killed by the LTTE at night during a possible attack. He left at night and lived in hiding for 7 years until March 2, 2002, when he was captured and detained by the SLA and/or the Sri Lankan Military Police. The Applicant alleges to have been tortured by the SLA in detention.
[7] The Applicant fled Sri Lanka and went to Hong Kong in 2003 to seek refuge. He continues to reside in Hong Kong.
[8] In 2017, the Applicant applied for Canadian permanent residency in the Convention refugee abroad class, as part of a refugee sponsorship application submitted by the sponsorship organization “for the refugees.”
In October 2018, the Applicant had an interview with an IRCC officer in Hong Kong, and January 15, 2019, an officer conducted what they termed a ‘post-interview officer’s review’. This officer determined that the Applicant met the definition of a Convention refugee under s 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], given that he would be detained and possibly tortured for deserting the army should he return to Sri Lanka. This officer noted that there was no reasonable prospect of a durable solution in Sri Lanka, or any other country, other than Canada. This officer also indicated that they were satisfied that the Applicant could become successfully established in Canada within a reasonable period.
[9] However, the admissibility assessment of the Applicant remained pending. After the Applicant filed a mandamus application in Federal Court, on July 20, 2023, an officer wrote a procedural fairness letter [PFL] to the Applicant, highlighting concerns that there may be reasonable grounds to believe that he would be a member of inadmissible class of persons described in section 35(1)(a) of IRPA for his military service in SLA. The Applicant responded on November 14, 2023.
[10] On December 14, 2023, an IRCC officer [the Officer] decided that the Applicant’s refugee application was denied. The Officer concluded that during the 1993-1995 period, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Applicant had committed an act outside Canada that constituted an offence referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c.24 [CAHWCA]. Accordingly, the Applicant was found inadmissible for violating human or international rights pursuant to s 35(1)(a) of the IRPA. This is the decision subject to the current judicial review.
III. Legal Framework
[11] The legal framework is accurately summarized by my colleague Justice Grant in Muhmud v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 470 at paras 13–25 and I am adopting it here as follows.
[12] Section 35(1)(a) of the IRPA is the provision under which the Applicant was found to be inadmissible to Canada:
Human or international rights violations
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Atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux
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35 (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of violating human or international rights for
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35 (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux les faits suivants :
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(a) committing an act outside Canada that constitutes an offence referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act;
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a) commettre, hors du Canada, une des infractions visées aux articles 4 à 7 de la Loi sur les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre;
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[13] In terms of the definition of “crimes against humanity”
, subsection 6(3) of the CAHWCA sets out the current definition of the term as follows:
crime against humanity means murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that is committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group and that, at the time and in the place of its commission, constitutes a crime against humanity according to customary international law or conventional international law or by virtue of its being criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission.
[14] However, as in Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 [Mugesera], the events relevant to this matter occurred before the coming into force of the CAHWCA, during which time the definition of “crimes against humanity”
was somewhat different. It was set out at subsection 7 (3.76) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, as it appeared on June 1, 2000, as follows:
“crime against humanity” means murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that is committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of persons, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission, and that, at that time and in that place, constitutes a contravention of customary international law or conventional international law or is criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations;
(repealed by the CAHWCA, s 42 as it appeared on June 29, 2000).
[15] In Mugesera, the Supreme Court of Canada set out four elements that must be present in order to characterize an act as a crime against humanity (at para 119):
1. An enumerated proscribed act was committed;
2. The act was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack;
3. The attack was directed against any civilian population or any identifiable groups of persons; and
4. The person committing the proscribed act know of the attack and knew or took the risk that his or her act comprised a part of that attack.
[16] The Court in Mugesera also found that the widespread attack need not be carried out pursuant to a specific strategy, policy, or plan: para 154. However, in Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 [Verbanov], this Court recently found that the incorporation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. I-38544, [2002] Can. T.S. No. 13, into domestic legislation through the CAHWCA also imported a policy requirement into the definition of a “crime against humanity”
: Verbanov at paras 4, 57-58. Once again, however, the alleged crimes in this matter took place prior to the coming into force of the Rome Statute or the CAHWCA.
[17] With these definitions of “crimes against humanity”
in mind, the next question that often arises is how to assess criminal responsibility for these crimes. In Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 [Ezokola], the Supreme Court of Canada set out a contribution-based approach for determining whether an individual has been complicit in crimes against humanity. The test was formulated in the context of an exclusion case under article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention but is equally applicable to admissibility determinations under s.35(1)(a) of the IRPA (see Ezokola at para 2).
[18] Ezokola established that an individual may only be excluded from refugee protection where there are serious reasons for considering that the person has voluntarily made a significant and knowing contribution to an organization’s crime or criminal purpose. To assist decision-makers in considering whether these contribution-based factors are present, the Court in Ezokola set out six non-exhaustive factors for consideration:
- The size and nature of the organization;
- The part of the organization with which the applicant was most directly concerned;
- The applicant's duties and activities within the organization;
- The applicant's position or rank in the organization;
- The length of time the applicant was in the organization, particularly after acquiring knowledge of the group's crime or criminal purpose; and
- The method by which the applicant was recruited and the applicant's opportunity to leave the organization (see Ezokola at para 91).
[19] Under the Ezokola formulation, it is clear that passive acquiescence to, or mere association with, an organization that has committed international crimes is not sufficient to ground a finding of complicity. Rather, there must be a link between the individual and the crimes or the criminal purpose of the group (Ezokola at paras 8, 77). However, an individual may be complicit in a crime without being present at the crime and without having physically contributed to the crime (Ezokola at para 77).
[20] It is also worth noting that this link does not have to be “directed to specific identifiable crimes”
but may also relate to “wider concepts of common design”
(Ezokola at para 87, citing R. (J.S. (Sri Lanka)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] UKSC 15, [2011] 1 A.C. 184 at para 38. However, where, as here, an organization is multifaceted in nature – with both legitimate and (allegedly) criminal purposes – the link between an individual’s contribution and the criminal purpose may be more tenuous (Ezokola at para 94; Bedi v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2019 FC 1550 at para 26; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Singh, 2021 FC 993 at paras 30–32).
[21] With regard to the significance of an individual’s contribution, the Supreme Court cautioned in Ezokola at para 88, that:
Given that contributions of almost every nature to a group could be characterized as furthering its criminal purpose, the degree of the contribution must be carefully assessed. The requirement of a significant contribution is critical to prevent an unreasonable extension of the notion of criminal participation in international criminal law.
[22] The evidentiary burden for establishing the elements of complicity falls on the party seeking the exclusion (or, in this case, the finding of inadmissibility) (Ezokola at para 29).
[23] The standard of proof for establishing inadmissibility under s 35(1)(a) of the IRPA is “reasonable grounds to believe”
. This requires more than a mere suspicion, but less than proof on a balance of probabilities. There must be an objective basis for the belief, based on compelling and credible information (IRPA, s 33; Mugesera at paras 114 – 116).
[24] Subsection 11(1) of the IRPA provides that an officer may issue a visa if they are satisfied that a foreign national is not inadmissible and that he meets the requirements of the IRPA. The burden of proof rests with the Applicant. This is different than the admissibility hearings before the Immigration Division and the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board where the ultimate burden lies with the Minister.
IV. Issues
[25] This matter raises the following issues:
- Did the Officer breach procedural fairness by insufficiently putting the Applicant on notice of what their concerns were through the content of the PFL in July 2023?
- Was the determination that the Applicant is inadmissible under s 35(1)(a) of the IRPA reasonable?
V. Standard Of Review
[26] A breach of procedural fairness is considered reviewable in an administrative context on a correctness standard or subject to a “reviewing exercise … ‘best reflected in the correctness standard’ even though, strictly speaking, no standard of review is being applied”
(Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 54).
[27] The decision and this case turn on whether the Officer reasonably applied the Ezokola factors to the Applicant’s situation, to determine if the Applicant made voluntary, knowing and significant contribution to crimes against humanity.
[28] The Respondent correctly identifies that the foreign national, the Applicant, has the burden to prove they have sufficient evidence that they meet the requirements of admissibility (Bahna v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 838 (CanLII) at para 12).
[29] The parties submit, and I agree with them that the content of this matter should be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras 10, 16, 23, 25 [Vavilov]).
[30] In conducting a reasonableness review, a court “must consider the outcome of the administrative decision in light of its underlying rationale in order to ensure that the decision as a whole is transparent, intelligible and justified”
(Vavilov at para 15). It is a deferential standard but remains a robust form of review and is not a “rubber-stamping”
process or a means of sheltering administrative decision-makers from accountability (Vavilov at para 13).
[31] It should also be noted here that the rights at stake in cases such as this are significant. The Applicant has asserted a well-founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka, with which the Canadian officials agreed in 2019. In Vavilov, the Court noted that the reasons provided in support of a decision – the justification for that decision – must reflect the stakes, which in this matter are at the high end of the spectrum (Vavilov at para 133).
VI. Analysis
[32] I have concluded that the Officer’s decision in this matter was unreasonable for the following reasons. Given this conclusion, it is not necessary for me to analyse whether the decision was reached in a procedurally fair manner.
[33] There is no question that the Applicant was a low-ranking soldier in the SLA who spent approximately two years in the army. As the Officer knew, Ezokola established that an individual is inadmissible under section 35(1)(a) of IRPA for complicity in international crimes if there are serious reasons for considering that the person voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the crime or criminal purpose of group alleged to have committed the crime (my emphasis). The test is conjunctive, meaning that voluntariness, in and of itself would not suffice, and there must be a “knowing”
and “significant”
contribution to the alleged crimes. As already stated, to assist decision-makers in considering whether these contribution-based factors are present, the Court in Ezokola set out the six non-exhaustive factors for consideration.
[34] In Ezokola, the Supreme Court guided that the degree of contribution must be carefully assessed, and the requirement of a significant contribution is critical, that guilt by association would not suffice, given that a contribution of almost any nature to a group could be characterized as furthering its criminal purpose (Ezokola at para 88). In fact, it was for this purpose that the Supreme Court provided the non-exhaustive list of the six factors to serve as a guide in assessing “whether an individual has voluntarily made a significant and knowing contribution to a crime or criminal purposes.”
The factors were provided as a guidance to allow decision-makers to make contextual decisions (Ezokola at para 92) and to avoid guilt by association. The assessment is therefore highly factual.
[35] In this case, the most serious reason the Officer erred in finding that the Applicant committed war crimes or crimes against humanity is that it was based on a complete misreading of the material facts in the Applicant’s evidence and based their decision on assumptions not found in the evidence.
A. Misapprehension of material evidence: Potential disregard for civilians
[36] The Officer took issue with the Applicant’s reference to indiscriminate firing, when it was the Applicant’s evidence that he had used his gun only once and in the context of his army camp being attacked by the LTTE. In that context, everybody, including the Applicant, was firing. The Officer concluded that the Applicant had demonstrated disregard to the lives of the civilians by engaging in indiscriminate firing of his firearm:
During his interview, while discussing his second deployment, the applicant freely admitted that he and his unit indiscriminately fired at suspected terrorists while not knowing where the bullets he fired went. His personal experience here indicates that the applicant was aware that the army did not take adequate measures to avoid civilian killings.
[37] The only relevant evidence before the Officer was that the LTTE had attacked the army camp, and that the soldiers, including the Applicant, were trying to fight back by firing indiscriminately. The Officer made a comment in their review that civilian targeting was common by Sri Lankan security forces and that some reports indicated that SLA army personnel engaged in “major human rights violations”
against civilians around a similar time the Applicant was stationed there, based on their review of open-source material. However, there was no particular evidence of civilian shooting by the Applicant and “major human rights violations”
are not necessarily crimes against humanity. There is no other evidence to indicate any indiscriminate shooting occurred against civilians. At the judicial review hearing, I asked the Respondent’s counsel whether she could clarify whether the context was different, and she said she could not.
[38] It may have been open to the Officer to find the indiscriminate firing towards civilians to amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, even by a low-ranking soldier. However, it was not open to the Officer to make findings based on their own assumptions. The Officer had assumed that there were civilians around in an army camp when attacked by the LTTE, without evidence. I find that the conclusion that the Applicant was complicit in international crimes was, in part based on an unreasonable leap in reasoning.
[39] This misapprehension of evidence is also underlined by being a perceived credibility issue. The Officer also found the Applicant’s evidence contradictory on the use of his firearm. When asked whether the Applicant had ever shot anyone, he said that he had not, as seen in the exchange reproduced earlier in this decision. The Officer found this to be contradictory with this evidence of indiscriminate shooting when the LTTE attacked the army camp. I find this to be a perceived contradiction not grounded in evidence. An officer five years prior had asked whether Applicant had ever shot anyone, to which he had answered “no.”
Then, another Officer, some five years later sees this to contradict his evidence of shooting indiscriminately in the direction of LTTE attackers. The Officer took unclear interview answers and interpreted them in a way to diminish the Applicant’s credibility. Stated by the court in Vavilov at para 96
Even if the outcome of the decision could be reasonable under different circumstances, it is not open to a reviewing court to disregard the flawed basis for a decision and substitute its own justification for the outcome: Delta Air Lines, at paras. 26-28. To allow a reviewing court to do so would be to allow an administrative decision maker to abdicate its responsibility to justify to the affected party, in a manner that is transparent and intelligible, the basis on which it arrived at a particular conclusion. This would also amount to adopting an approach to reasonableness review focused solely on the outcome of a decision, to the exclusion of the rationale for that decision.
While this is presented a credibility issue, it is unclear what fact is accepted or rejected or why. Therefore, the credibility finding fails to assess how either version of the evidence, i.e., to have never shot anyone, or to shoot indiscriminately in the army camp during an attack, would amount to a knowing and significant international crime. I find that the Officer made unreasonable inferences because they were not clear contradictions that were grounded in the evidentiary record.
[40] I find that this erroneous finding on key evidence is sufficient to render the entire decision unreasonable. However, I will go further.
B. Misapprehension of Material Evidence: Night Ambush
[41] In assessing the significant contribution, the Officer focused on their understanding of the term “ambush,”
which the Applicant had used in the context of repulsing the LTTE on the occasion they had attacked. He also referred to night ambush as a term used by the SLA meanings to stop individuals at night on the road, and that if they possessed guns, the army considered them to be terrorist and would arrest them. If they resisted arrest, the army would shoot them below the knee. There was no evidence to suggest that the Applicant had engaged in this as his only evidence in the use of his gun was during the night attack by LTTE. While I understand that for inadmissibility, there is no need for the actual commission of the criminal act by the individuals, the Officer conflated the events in the two, and without much analysis found that it was enough to find the Applicant inadmissible under s 35(1)(a) of the IRPA:
While discussing your second deployment with the SLA during your interview, you declared that your unit would go to the road at night and would stop people passing by to see if they were terrorists or civilians.
Then, you declared that if they had guns, they would be considered terrorists and would be arrested or shot below the knees if they were refusing to surrender. You also declared that you and your unit indiscriminately fired at suspected terrorists while not knowing where the bullets you fired went.
Based on careful review of all the evidence and information available to me, I have concerns that there are reasonable grounds to believe that you made a voluntary, knowing, and significant contribution to the widespread and systematic human rights violations perpetrated by the Sri Lankan army during your years of service with this organization.
[42] The decision is unclear as to how the Applicant’s awareness of his unit’s role in the arrest of terrorist or inflicting non-life-threatening violence against them would amount to a significant violation of international crime.
[43] More importantly, it appears that the Officer reads into the term ambush their own unsubstantiated assumptions when the only evidence of the Applicant’s understanding of “night ambush”
was the term of art used by the SLA in the form of the above-referenced assignment. To defend the Officer’s interpretation, the Respondent provided the dictionary interpretation of the word “ambush.”
This is of little assistance because the only factual context referred to as “ambush”
by the Applicant was in the context his camp being attacked by the LTTE or the arrest and treatment of suspected terrorists. However, the Officer’s analysis conflates the two and reads into “ambush”
to mean more than the evidence before the Officer. Basing the decision on one’s own assumption and not the evidence is the break in the logical chain of reasoning. For greater clarity, here is the relevant portion of the Officer’s notes:
“Officer: You mentioned in your application that ambushing as part of your military duties, can you tell me more about that? Applicant: At the night sometimes, the officer would come and tell us we would have to go to the road to do an ambush, and at 6-7pm, when dark, we would take a pack of rice for nighttime eating, we would be 6-9 people moving slowly in the jungle, we would go to the road and keep one line, one person would watch, some people rest, and we would rotate every few hours.”
[44] This Court has frequently found that where an administrative decision-maker casts doubt on an individual’s credibility, it must do so in clear and unmistakable terms (Hilo v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 130 NR 236 (FCA) at para 6). I do not find that in making key findings based on their own assumptions, the Officer complied with that requirement in this case.
C. Unreasonable legal analysis: Not making any findings as to which international criminal law the Applicant was complicit in committing
[45] The Officer’s decision lacks clarity about the ground of inadmissibility found against the Applicant. It is not clear if the Officer meant to add the notion of “war crime”
in their conclusion, as it is only mentioned once and presented as an interchangeable term with “crimes against humanity,”
despite the facts that those terms refer to different legal concepts. Most of the assessment is done in the context of widespread human rights abuses committed by the army but then the Officer says “I am satisfied that the applicant’s contribution helped in the accomplishment of an organization’s purpose and commission of war crimes/crimes against humanity.”
[46] In short, the Officer engaged with general country conditions on the Sri Lankan conflict with the LTTE over the entire period of the conflict, i.e. From the 1980s until it ended in 2009 and concluded that the SLA had committed various forms of atrocities throughout the country. The use of generic terms like “human rights violations”
and “human rights abuses”
throughout the decision, without a focus on the actual period where the applicant served in the army, is also revealing of the Officer’s lack of proper legal assessment of highly technical legal concepts such as “war crimes”
or “crimes against humanity”
to the facts of the case. The overly broad and vague analysis of the case challenges the transparency and the intelligibility of the decision.
[47] The officer’s conclusion maintains the vagueness by referring to the Applicant as a “person described in para 35(1)(a)”
, without specifying the international crime committed.
[48] I agree with the Applicant’s submissions that not all crimes or human rights violations amount to crimes against humanity. This vagueness further contributes to the unreasonableness of the decision.
[49] Moreover, assuming that the SLA undertook both legitimate and illegitimate purposes, and further assuming that these illegitimate purposes constituted crimes against humanity, it was also incumbent on the Officer to explain why it came to the conclusion that the Applicant had made a serious, significant, and knowing contribution to the organization crime or criminal purpose. While the Officer stated that they were following the case under the principles set out in Ezokola, it did so on the basis that the Applicant was guilty by association with an army that had committed a lot of atrocities for a long period of time. This is the type of analysis Ezokola had warned against.
D. Unreasonable legal analysis: Not establishing knowing and significant contribution in assessing complicity
[50] In Ezokola, the Supreme Court expressly outlined a non-exhaustive list of factors to guide the assessment of the individual’s contribution to a group’s crime or criminal purpose. The purpose of these factors is to ensure that the focus remains on the individual's contribution to the criminal activity rather than solely on the criminal activities of the group that would lead to “guilt by association”
conclusions.
[51] Yet, the Officer engaged in a broad assessment of the SLA’s acts and omissions during the entire period of conflict with the LTTE to conclude that the Applicant was complicit. While the Applicant did not dispute that he had voluntarily joined, the Officer did not engage at all with the key factors that would enable them to analyze complicity, such as the size and nature of his unit, his low rank and length of time in service, his duties, etc.
[52] Assessing these criteria, and more because they are non-exhaustive, are not discretionary. If they are relevant, they must be assessed. This is not about disagreeing with how the Officer assessed them. The problem is that the Officer simply ignored them. Particularly when there is no specific evidence of any direct involvement in the international crime, it becomes determinative that the Officer engages with a full assessment of complicity (Habibi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 253 at para 24). The Officer’s failure to engage with the key factors prescribed in Ezokola made the Officer come to their conclusion without a chain of reasoning that would rationally connect the conclusion to the evidence. This resulted in an arbitrary decision.
[53] Another key deficiency with the “knowing”
part of the test is when the Officer referred to the treatment the Applicant had received at the hands of the army in 2002 and 7 years after he had deserted to conclude that he knew that the Army engaged in torture. In short, the Officer inferred the Applicant’s knowledge of the torture from events that only happened years after he had deserted. This is an unreasonable conclusion.
VII. Conclusion
[54] For the foregoing reasons, the application for judicial review is granted.
[55] The parties did not propose a question for certification, and I agree that none arises.
JUDGMENT in IMM-16340-23
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that
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The application for judicial review is granted.
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The matter is remitted to a different decision-maker for reconsideration in accordance with these reasons.
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There is no question for certification.
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"Negar Azmudeh" |
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Judge |
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