JUDGMENT AND REASONS

[1] Mr. Juker seeks a remedy from this Court after the Parole Board of Canada [Board] denied his application for a pardon of his criminal convictions under the Criminal Records Act, RSC, 1985, c C-47 [Act]. For the reasons that follow, I am granting this judicial review as the decision of the Board is not reasonably based upon any evidence.

I. Background

[2] Mr. Juker submitted a pardon application to the Board on May 31, 2022. Upon review the Board noted that he had completed all sentencing and had completed the eligibility period as set out in the Act. The Board conducted a search of the Public Safety Portal system (PSP) and located the following entry: “2023-06-04: Assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm – Charged”.

[3] On October 19, 2023, the Board sent a “Propose to Deny Pardon” letter to Mr. Juker informing him of the proposed denial of his pardon application based upon the “charge” they identified in the PSP system.

[4] On January 24, 2024, Mr. Juker responded to the Board stating: “First of all, I have never assaulted anyone, or used a weapon in my life.”

[5] On two occasions in February 2024, the Board contacted the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) to obtain the occurrence report for the 2023 Charge and to obtain the status of the charge. The VPD responded that the file was before Crown counsel for charge approval and the VPD refused to provide the occurrence report.

[6] On April 6, 2024, the Board denied Mr. Juker’s application for a pardon based on the 2023 Charge. The Board noted that Mr. Juker did not provide any information regarding the 2023 Charge and concluded that Mr. Juker had not provided a sufficient explanation to demonstrate that he had adopted and maintained a law-abiding lifestyle for a sufficiently lengthy period to warrant a pardon as set out in the Act. The Board states:

Following the receipt of your pardon application, the Board has caused inquiries to be made to ascertain your conduct since your most recent conviction. The Board's investigation revealed that you had contact with legal authorities in 2023 when you were charged with Assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm.

II. Issues

[7] As a preliminary issue, I will grant the Respondent’s request, with immediate effect, to have the Attorney General of Canada named as the Respondent in place of the Parole Board of Canada.

[8] On the Decision of the Board, the narrow issue is if it was reasonable for the Board to refuse the pardon application based upon the 2023 Charge. In reviewing the Board’s Decision, the Court asks if the decision is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 99 [Vavilov]).

III. Analysis

[9] The section of the Act that applies to Mr. Juker’s pardon application states as follows:

[10] The use of the word “may” in this section means the Board has discretion in making decisions on pardon applications, but the Board must nevertheless base a good conduct finding on the assessment of the facts (Paul v Canada (Attorney General), 2022 FC 1157 at para 35 [Paul]).

[11] As Mr. Juker has not been “convicted” of any offences in the last 5 years, the question for the Board was if he “has been of good conduct” in light of the 2023 charge that was found after a search of the PSP system.

[12] The Respondent relies upon Paul to argue that it is reasonable for the Board to take criminal charges into account when assessing good conduct, even where there is no evidence of convictions. They further argue that the Board can rely upon information contained in police reports and the presumption of innocence does not apply (Paul at para 22). I agree with the Respondent that those principles are confirmed in Paul. However, in Paul, the Board had the following information before them: tickets for provincial offences; investigation for gas theft; being a suspect on property damage; criminal charges of arson with disregard for human life and possession of incendiary materials in 2017; assaulting, obstructing and resisting a peace officer (Paul at para 2). In other words, the Board had details on criminal charges, among other information, upon which to assess good conduct. By contrast, here, the Board did not have any information in the form of a police report or information in relation to the 2023 Charge. The PSP system entry contains no details, and the VPD was not prepared to provide any details.

[13] In Foster v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 306 [Foster], the Court found it was reasonable for the Board to consider the circumstances that led to charges being laid in assessing “good conduct” under the Act (Foster at para 27). In Foster, similar to Paul but unlike this matter, the Board had information on several charges against the applicant to support their decision to deny the pardon. Here, there is a lack of any details or an occurrence report on the circumstances relating to the 2023 Charge.

[14] Further, although the Board does not have to look behind the information it receives from law enforcement to assess whether the allegations in the information are true (Jaser v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 4 at para 53), this principle presupposes that there is some information before the Board to justify its decision. In this case, there is simply no information for such an assessment to be made by the Board.

[15] I accept that the Board has the discretion to deny the pardon application based upon details or information about a criminal charge or police interaction. However, in this case, there is an absence of those details or information. Rather, the Board relied upon a single entry in the PSP system that contains no details. The VPD refused to provide any additional details or the actual “information”. Further, it is unclear why the PSP system notes that Mr. Juker was “charged” whereas the response from the VPD was that “the charge is pending approval”.

[16] Despite the lack of any details, the Board relied upon the PSP system entry that he was charged to make the following finding:

The Board reminds you that when assessing whether you meet the good conduct criterion, it is not required to meet the same standards as the Court. More specifically, the presumption of innocence and the rights related to it do not apply in the context of a pardon decision. Although the 2023 charges have yet to result in further criminal convictions, the fact that you were charged suggests your behaviour may not have been reflective of good conduct.

[17] Given the complete lack of any information and considering the importance of the decision to Mr. Juker, the Board did not render a reasonable decision. The focus of reasonableness review includes both the decision maker’s reasoning and the outcome of the decision itself (Vavilov at para 83). In this case, the outcome was the refusal of a pardon. It was clear that obtaining a pardon is very important to Mr. Juker who wishes to move on with his life.

[18] In these circumstances, the Board’s Decision to deny the pardon because Mr. Juker was not of good conduct is unintelligible, unjustifiable, and lacks transparency, as the underlying information or lack thereof does not support the conclusions drawn.

IV. Conclusion

[19] This Application for judicial review is granted, and Mr. Juker’s application for a pardon shall be reconsidered.

[20] I award Mr. Juker costs in the amount of $500.00.

JUDGMENT IN T-1010-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that :

1. The style of cause is amended, with immediate effect, to have the Attorney General of Canada named as the Respondent in place of the Parole Board of Canada.

2. This Application for judicial review is granted, and Mr. Juker’s pardon application shall be reconsidered.

3. Mr. Juker is entitled to costs of $500.00.

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

APPEARANCES :

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: