Docket: T-390-21
Citation: 2021 FC 1086
Ottawa, Ontario, October 15, 2021
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Bell
BETWEEN: |
WILLIAM JAMES MCCOTTER |
Applicant |
and |
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
Respondent |
ORDER AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] William James McCotter (the “Applicant”
) is currently an inmate at a Federal Institution under the care and control of Correctional Service of Canada (“CSC”
). He made an application for day parole before the Parole Board of Canada (“PBC”
) which was dismissed on October 5th, 2020. The Parole Board of Canada Appeal Division confirmed PBC’s decision on January 20, 2021. The Applicant filed an application for judicial review from that decision on February 19, 2021. In the same Notice of Application, the Applicant also seeks to review several other decisions from PBC and CSC, including their decisions not to prepare Community Release Plans and to rate his Reintegration Potential as “low”
. Those judicial review matters are not before me on this motion.
[2] On May 14, 2021, the Applicant filed an Ex Parte Motion for an Order of Confidentiality under Rule 151 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [“Rules”
]. Before me, he seeks the following interlocutory relief:
(1)An order of confidentiality under s. 151 of the Rules ;
(2)An order that the upcoming judicial review hearing be held in-camera ;
(3)An order in the nature of mandamus to require the Parole Board of Canada and Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) not disclose information they hold regarding the applicant and to seal his files ;
(4)An order in the nature of mandamus to compel the Parole Board of Canada, should his parole be granted, to release him to a Private Home Placement.
[3] For the reasons set out below, I am of the view that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy in the circumstances and that all of the requests made should be dismissed.
II. Analysis
A. Should this Court grant an order of confidentiality under s. 151 of the Rules and should it order an in-camera session for the hearing of the judicial review application
[4] The Applicant contends that in 2006, while in prison, a family member of the victim of his crime assaulted him. He also contends he has received threatening letters from family members and friends of the victim of his crime. He says those same people threaten to cause him harm upon his release from prison. He says that his rights to privacy and confidentiality, and by extension, his safety, outweigh the public’s right to open and accessible court proceedings.
[5] The Respondent contends that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the granting of the confidentiality order and the order to proceed in camera are necessary and proportional, when considered in the context of the two-part test set out in Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance) 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 [“Sierra Club”
] at para 53. The Respondent contends the test is the same for both orders sought (Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. The Queen, 2011 SCC 3, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 65 at para 13); namely:
A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest […] because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.
[6] The Respondent contends the assault and the threats of assault are dated. It also says that any risk of retribution from the family members of the Applicant’s victim exists independently of these judicial proceedings. Furthermore, the Respondent contends that the Applicant has not met the onus upon him to demonstrate that information before this Court could put him at risk, or why public access to the hearing must be restricted.
[7] With respect to the second part of the test, the Respondent contends that the deleterious effects of the proposed orders outweigh any salutary effects. Confidentiality orders and orders for an in-camera hearing would result in restrictions on the public’s access to the courts, limits on freedom of expression and would violate the open court principle, all being concepts fundamental to the administration of justice (Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v. Ontario, 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 at para 1-2).
[8] “Confidentiality will not be lightly ordered […], the moving party bears a heavy onus and must present evidence demonstrating the need for such an order”
(Canada (Attorney General) v. Almalki, 2010 FC 733, 372 FTR 309 at para 17). In order to obtain a confidentiality order under s. 151 of the Rules, an applicant must meet the two-part test set out by the Supreme Court in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 120 DLR (4th) 12 [“Dagenais”
] and R. v. Mentuck [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 205 DLR (4th) 512 [“Mentuck”
] and later modified in Sierra Club, as identified by the Respondent.
[9] I am of the opinion the Applicant has failed to meet either part of this test. While I disagree with the Respondent’s assertion that the threats are “general in nature”
, they clearly being specific and on at least one occasion acted upon, the risk of retribution from the family members and friends of the Applicant’s victim, exists independently of the within judicial proceedings. The Applicant does not provide any evidence to demonstrate how keeping documents or information relating to these judicial proceedings in the public domain would put his safety any more at risk than it already is.
[10] The Applicant must also establish that at all relevant times the information he wishes to keep confidential was previously treated in that manner (Teva Canada Limited v. Janssen Inc., 2017 FC 437 at para 6; Desjardins v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 123 at para 85). PBC’s proceedings are open to the public (Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20 [“CCRA”], s. 140(4)). Furthermore, information about an offender, in circumstances similar to those of the Applicant, can be provided to victims, and others, without the offender’s consent (CCRA ss. 26, 144.1, 142; Privacy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-21, s. 8). The Applicant seeks a confidentiality order for documents and information that is already publicly available.
[11] I would add that because the risk of physical harm faced by the Applicant exists independently of these judicial proceedings, there would be little to no salutary effects to granting the confidentiality order.
[12] With respect to the request for an in-camera hearing, it is well established that the Dagenais / Mentuck / Sierra Club test applies to all discretionary actions that might affect the open and accessible court principle (Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 at para 31; Mahjoub (Re), 2013 FC 1097, at para 36-37). Therefore, for the reasons already provided, the Applicant fails to meet the applicable test for an in-camera hearing.
B. Application for an order in the nature of mandamus to prevent the Parole Board of Canada and the Correctional Service of Canada from disclosing information regarding the Applicant and an order sealing his files.
[13] The Applicant correctly asserts that he failed to obtain a prohibition on publication of his application for day parole before the PBC. As a result, PBC and CSC may provide disclosure of his personal information. See, s. 24(a) of the Privacy Act; s. 26(1), 142(1) and 144(2) of the CCRA.
[14] The Respondent submits that this Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought by the Applicant, as a writ of mandamus cannot be obtained on an interlocutory motion (Kellapatha v Canada (MIRC), 2017 FC 739 [“Kellapatha”
] at para 17 ; Clifton v Hartley Bay Village Council, 2005 FC 1594 at para 3-5).
[15] The Respondent submits that even if the Court possessed the jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus on an interlocutory motion, this remedy would not be available in the circumstances. It asserts the Applicant fails the test set out in Apotex Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 FC 742, 69 FTR 152 [“Apotex”
] at para 55, the components of which are:
(1)there is a public legal duty to act;
(2)the duty must be owed to the applicant;
(3)there is a clear right to the performance of that duty;
(4)where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, certain additional rules apply;
(5)no other adequate remedy is available to the applicant
(6)the order sought will be of some practical value or effect;
(7)the Court in the exercise of its discretion finds no equitable barto the relief sought; and
(8)on a balance of convenience an order of mandamus should be issued
[16] I agree with the Respondent that there is no public legal duty to act owed to the Applicant. To the contrary, there is a public legal duty imposed on both the PBC and CSC to provide certain information about an offender, at the request of a victim or others (Canadian Victim’s Bill of Rights, SC 2015, c 13, ss. 2, 8(a); CCRA ss. 26, 142, 144.1; Privacy Act s. 8; Access to Information Act, RSC, 1985, c A-1, s. 19).
[17] Regardless of whether or not the Applicant meets the test set out in Apotex, I am satisfied his motion for mandamus cannot be granted on an interlocutory motion. In the present matter, this Court does not have the power to prevent the PBC and CSC from disclosing information regarding the Applicant, or to compel them to seal the Applicant’s files.
C. Request for Mandamus to compel the Parole Board of Canada to release the Applicant to a Private Home Placement
[18] The Applicant also requests an order in the nature of mandamus, that, in the event parole is granted, he be released to a Private Home Placement. The Applicant says this would best mitigate the opportunities for risk to the public and enhance his reintegration into society.
[19] The Respondent says such a motion is premature. In addition, it adds that it seeks to compel the exercise of PBC’s discretion in a particular way. Mandamus cannot be used to compel the exercise of discretion in such fashion (Apotex at para 55; CCRA ss. 133(3), 133(3.1), 133(4)).
[20] Furthermore, as previously indicated, mandamus cannot be obtained on an interlocutory motion. Such a remedy can only be obtained on an application for judicial review under s. 18.1 of the Rules (Kellapatha, at para 17; Wasylynuk v. Canada (Royal [Canadian] Mounted Police), 2020 FC 962, at para 67). It follows, on that basis alone both mandamus applications brought by Applicant should be dismissed.
[21] Again, even if this Court had jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought by the Applicant, there are several reasons why the mandamus order sought by the Applicant should be dismissed. Parole conditions are at the entire discretion of the PBC (CCRA, ss. 133(2) to 133(7)). As set out in Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) v. Callaghan, 2011 FCA 74, [2011] 2 FCR 80 at para 126, mandamus cannot be sought to compel the exercise of discretion in a particular way. Furthermore, the Applicant is seeking an order that is conditional upon the granting of parole. Mandamus cannot be issued to enforce a conditional or future obligation (Mensinger v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (TD), [1987] 1 FC 59, 5 F.T.R. 64).
III. Conclusion
[22] The Applicant has not met the onus upon him to demonstrate he meets the requirements necessary to obtain a confidentiality order under s. 151 of the Rules or an in-camera hearing. Furthermore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the mandamus orders sought by him. The motion for interlocutory relief is dismissed.