TOP SECRET

Date: 20210806

Docket: A-243-20

Citation: 2021 FCA 165

CORAM:

DE MONTIGNY J.A. LASKIN J.A. MACTAVISH J.A.

 

IN THE MATTER OF an application by |||||||||||||||||||| for warrants pursuant to sections 16 and 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 AND IN THE MATTER OF |[a foreign state, group of states or person]

Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on February 10, 2021.

Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on August 6, 2021.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:	LASKIN J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY:	DE MONTIGNY J.A.
	MACTAVISH J.A.

 

TOP SECRET

Date: 20210806

Docket: A-243-20

Citation: 2021 FCA 165

CORAM:		DE MONTIGNY J.A. LASKIN J.A. MACTAVISH J.A.
	IN THE MATTER OF an application by |||||||||||||||||||| for warrants pursuant to sections 16 and 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 AND IN THE MATTER OF |[a foreign state, group of states or person]

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LASKIN J.A.

I. Overview

[1] At issue in this appeal are the meaning and application of the words “within Canada” (and their French counterpart, “dans les limites du Canada”) in subsection 16(1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23. Subsection 16(1) empowers the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of international affairs, to assist the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, within Canada, in the collection of information relating to foreign states and persons. By subsection 21(1) of the Act, the Service may apply to a designated judge of the Federal Court for a warrant to enable it to carry out its duties and functions under subsection 16(1).

[2] Do the words “within Canada” preclude the Service from obtaining a warrant under these provisions to collect electronic information |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| outside Canada? And, more particularly, do they do so where that information would be requested by Service personnel in Canada [and received in Canada]|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||?

[3] In the judgment under appeal (2020 FC 757 (public version)), the designated judge of the Federal Court, Gleeson J., answered “yes” to these questions. He rejected the submission of the Attorney General that the words “within Canada” should be interpreted to require only that the assistance and the collection of information take place “from within Canada.” He held that on a textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation, the words “within Canada” mean “only in Canada.” He determined that, in this case, the activity for which the warrant was sought – the covert collection by Service personnel located in Canada of information that he concluded was ||||||||||||||||||||||||[in a foreign state or states]||||| – would involve an impermissible [collection]| that would not be “within Canada.” He therefore dismissed an application for a warrant authorizing the Service to carry out that activity to assist the Minister | under subsection 16(1).

[4] The Attorney General of Canada now appeals to this Court. He submits that the decision of the designated judge wrongly impedes the Service’s ability to carry out its assistance mandate under subsection 16(1). He maintains the position that the “within Canada” condition is met where the request for and receipt of information take place “from within Canada.” He submits that the designated judge incorrectly failed to do what other courts in Canada and elsewhere have properly done – recognize | [the jurisprudence relating to information accessible through the Internet,] | and interpret statutory language in a manner that takes account of technological change. He also submits that the issuance of a warrant under section 21 of the Act overcomes any non-compliance with |[foreign domestic and/or international law and/or the international law principle of non-intervention.]

[5] The amici curiae appointed by the Court respond that the designated judge correctly interpreted and applied subsection 16(1). They also say that the authorities on which the Attorney General relies for his submissions regarding technological change are all distinguishable, and that the activity for which the warrant was sought would breach [foreign domestic and/or international |law and/or the international law principle of non-intervention.] |||| They further submit that granting the warrant would expose the Service and Canada to the very risks that underlay Parliament’s decision to include the territorial restriction in subsection 16(1).

[6] For the reasons set out below, I would dismiss the appeal. While I have carefully considered the submissions of the Attorney General, in my view this is not a proper case in which to rely on the |||[jurisprudence relating to information accessible through the Internet]|| or the principle that statutory interpretation should take account of technological change. I agree with the designated judges who have considered the scope of section 16 that, in the uniquely important and sensitive domain of national security, recalibrating the investigative techniques open to the Service in light of significant technological change is a matter for Parliament and not the courts.

[7] In explaining why I reach these conclusions, I will first review the relevant provisions of the Act. Next, I will describe the evidence that was put before the designated judge, and his findings as what |||||[the proposed collection method for information outside of Canada]|||| would entail. I will then set out the reasons why, in my view, the designated judge did not err in the manner alleged by the Attorney General in determining, given that evidence and those findings, that a warrant ||||[[to collect this information]||||||||||| should be refused.

II. Statutory framework

[8] Subsection 16(1) of the Act includes among the duties and functions of the Service assisting the Minister of National Defence, in relation to the defence of Canada, or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in relation to the conduct of Canada’s international affairs, in the collection of information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of any foreign state or group of foreign states. By subsection 16(3), the Service may provide this assistance only on that Minister’s personal written request, and the personal consent in writing of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Subsection 16(1) specifies that the assistance provided to the Minister is to be “within Canada,” or in the French version, “dans les limites du Canada.”

[9] The most relevant text of subsection 16(1) is as follows (underlining added):

Collection of information concerning foreign states and persons	Assistance
16 (1) Subject to this section, the Service may, in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada, assist the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, within Canada, in the collection of information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of	16 (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, la Service peut, dans les domaines de la défense et de la conduite des affaires internationales du Canada, prêter son assistance au ministre de la Défense nationale ou au ministre des Affaires étrangères, dans les limites du Canada, à la collecte des informations ou de renseignements sur les moyens, les intentions ou les activités :
(a) any foreign state or group of foreign states […].	a) d’un État étranger ou d’un groupe des États étrangers […].

[10] Sections 16 and 21, as well as sections 12 and 21.1, are reproduced in full in the appendix to these reasons.

[11] In including a “within Canada” limitation, section 16 differs from provisions of the Act that set out other duties and functions of the Service. No other provision includes an express “within Canada” limitation. On the contrary, other provisions of the Act expressly authorize the Service to discharge other duties and functions both within and outside Canada. These provisions reflect amendments made in 2015 (S.C. 2015, c. 9; S.C. 2015, c. 20). No similar amendments were made to section 16.

[12] Subsection 12(1) of the Act sets out the Service’s duties and functions in relation to the collection, analysis and retention of information and intelligence respecting threats to the security of Canada. Subsection 12(2) specifies that, “[f]or greater certainty,” the Service may perform these duties and functions “within or outside Canada.” Subsection 12.1(1) authorizes the Service, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a particular activity constitutes a threat to the security of Canada, to take measures, “within or outside Canada,” to reduce the threat. Section 13 authorizes the Service to provide security assessments, and section 14, to advise ministers of the Crown on matters relating to the security of Canada or to provide ministers with information relating to security matters or criminal activities relevant to the Minister’s duties or functions under the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, or the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. Subsection 15(2) states, “for greater certainty,” that the Service may conduct investigations for these purposes “within or outside Canada.” The French counterpart to this phrase in all of these provisions is “même à l’extérieur du Canada.”

[13] The warrant provisions of the Act also differentiate, in describing their territorial reach, between the Service’s threat mandate and its mandate to assist Ministers under section 16. Subsection 21(1) authorizes the Director or a designated employee of the Service, with the approval of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, to apply to a designated judge for a warrant where the Director or the designated employee believes on reasonable grounds that a warrant is required to enable the Service “to investigate, within or outside Canada, a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties and functions under section 16 […].” Here the French counterpart to the expression “within or outside Canada” is “au Canada ou à l’extérieur du Canada.”

[14] There is no “within or outside Canada” provision applicable to applications for a warrant to enable the Service to perform its duties and functions under section 16. Rather, the “within Canada” limitation in subsection 16(1) applies where a warrant is sought to enable the Service to perform its section 16 duties and functions.

[15] Subsection 21(3.1) provides that a warrant may authorize activities “outside Canada” (“à l’extérieur du Canada”) to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada, and may do so “[w]ithout regard to any other law, including that of any foreign state.” Again, this provision does not apply to a warrant granted to enable the Service to carry out its mandate under section 16. Similarly, subsections 21.1(1) and (3) provide for the issuance of a warrant, “[d]espite any other law but subject to the Statistics Act,” authorizing the Service to take measures “within or outside Canada” (“au Canada ou à l’extérieur du Canada”) to reduce a threat to the security of Canada. By subsection 21.1(4), a warrant issued under subsection 21.1(3) may authorize measures outside Canada “[w]ithout regard to any other law, including that of any foreign state.” A warrant under section 21.1 is available only for the purposes of the Service’s mandate to reduce threats to the security of Canada, and not for the purposes of its mandate under section 16.

[16] Subsection 21(2) sets out the matters to be specified in an application for a warrant under subsection 21(1) (the warrant provision available for purposes of section 16). It requires that an application for a warrant for those purposes be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant deposing to certain specified matters. These include the facts relied on to justify the belief on reasonable grounds that a warrant is necessary to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties and functions under section 16 (paragraph (a)), that without a warrant it is likely that information of importance with respect to the threat or the duties and functions under section 16 would not be obtained (paragraph (b)), “the type of communication proposed to be intercepted, [and] the type of information, records, documents or things proposed to be obtained […],” (paragraph (c)), and “a general description of the place where the warrant is to be executed, if a general description of that place can be given” (paragraph (f)).

[17] By subsection 21(3), where the judge to whom an application is made is satisfied of the matters referred to in paragraphs 21(2)(a) and (b), the judge may, “[n]otwithstanding any other law but subject to the Statistics Act,” issue a warrant. A warrant granted under section 21 authorizes the persons to whom it is directed “to intercept any communication or obtain any information, record, document or thing.” For that purpose, they may “enter any place or open or obtain access to any thing; […] search for, remove or return, or examine, take extracts from for make copies of or record in any other manner the information, record, document or thing; or […] install, maintain or remove any thing.”

III. Prior proceedings

[18] The meaning of the words “within Canada” in subsection 16(1) first came before a designated judge in an application by the Service for warrants against |[a foreign state, group of| |states or person]||. The warrants sought included a warrant authorizing ||||| ||||||[the collection of |electronic information]|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.

[19] The designated judge who heard that application, Noël J., dismissed the application insofar as it sought a warrant to |||||||||||[collect the electronic information in a foreign state or states]||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (2018 FC 738). He undertook a detailed review of the text, context and purpose of section 16, and (at paras. 72-100) traced the legislative history of the provision, as well as various proposals to amend it by eliminating the “within Canada” limitation.

[20] In doing so, the designated judge sought to identify the perceived risks that underlay the inclusion of the limiting words in section 16. He noted (at para. 74) that the McDonald Commission (Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), whose 1981 report led to the establishment of the Service, had warned of the “clear political risk in a government directing espionage activities against other states,” and suggested that “[t]he image of honesty and straight forwardness in the conduct of international affairs may produce benefits to this country […].” It had also pointed out what it described as the “serious moral issue involved in a government employing a secret agency whose modus operandi requires it necessarily to break the laws of other nations.”

[21] The designated judge also quoted (at paras. 78-79) from testimony given by the Honourable Robert Kaplan, then Solicitor General, before the Senate committee studying the bill that was a precursor to the Act as adopted. He pointed out that Mr. Kaplan had stated, among other things, that the Service would be “an intelligence gathering agency and its mandate [would be] different from the mandate of a pro-active arm of government, such as the CIA in relation to the American government,” and that “[a]nother important difference [was] that this agency [would] perform its functions within Canada.” That testimony, the judge stated, made it clear that the government had made the decision that the Service would “not become an agency like the CIA, which can go abroad in a covert fashion to influence foreign events and activities.”

[22] The designated judge held that “within Canada” means “only in Canada,” and that to adopt a more expansive meaning would amount to rewriting the legislation, a task reserved to Parliament. He found that even if |[the collection] would be performed “from Canada,” a substantial part of ||||[the collection would occur outside Canada]|. He therefore concluded that he had no jurisdiction to issue a warrant authorizing |[the proposed collection of information in a foreign state or states.]| ||||||||||

[23] The Attorney General appealed the judgment of Noël J. to this Court. This Court dismissed the appeal (2018 FCA 207 (public version)). It did so solely on the basis that the evidence in the record as to how the |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| collection |[of information outside Canada]| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| would be carried out was not sufficiently informative to permit the Court to properly address the grounds argued in the appeal. It set out a list of 13 questions it considered important for this purpose, but that the record left unanswered. However, it expressly did not foreclose the possibility that in a future warrant application, the evidence might be sufficient to show that granting the authority refused by the designated judge would be consistent with the “within Canada” requirement of subsection 16(1).

[24] The Service subsequently applied for further warrants to obtain information or intelligence relating to ||[foreign state, group of states or person.]|| In doing so, it asked the designated judge who heard the application, Gleeson J., to provide more clarity on the “within Canada” issue, taking into account the further evidence submitted by the Service aimed at responding to this Court’s decision. It expressed what it was seeking as “clarity on whether section 16 allows the Service to provide assistance to the requesting minister by collecting |[electronic information| |without regard to whether the information is inside or outside Canada.”]|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| It is the judgment addressing that issue that is now on appeal to this Court. It is common ground that the result in this appeal will also apply in respect of the warrants sought |||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.

IV. Prior warrants against ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

[25] For most of the period between |||||||| and 2018, when the application that has led to this appeal was made, the Service applied for and was granted, for purposes of carrying out its duties and functions under section 16, warrants to collect information about the capabilities, intentions, or activities of |[a foreign state, group of states or person.] These warrants authorized the Service, among other things, to |||||||||[collect the information of foreign persons]|||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| in Canada. The warrants were sought and granted despite |||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||[laws that might prohibit the collection.]|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| But as noted above, a warrant may be issued under section 21 “notwithstanding any other law.”

[26] The ||[electronic information]| subject to the warrants included |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| The warrants could be executed by means including |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

[27] Reports based on information obtained through these warrants were regarded as having high value in illuminating |[the foreign state’s, group of state’s or person’s]| capabilities, intentions, and activities, and in managing |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| In the request for the Service’s assistance that led to the most recent warrant application, the Minister |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| noted among other things that ||[it would be difficult to obtain the| ||desired information from open source channels.]|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| In setting out why the information sought was important in relation to ||[the statutory basis for the collection]|, the Minister referred to, among other things|||||||||||[, the issues that engaged Canada’s interest in the collection.]|||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| The Minister asked that the Service employ the full range of investigative techniques available to it, including warrants under section 21.

[28] However, the Service has found that |[some collection is no longer practical using| |||||prior methods, as was also the case in Within Canada FC.]|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

V. The proposed ||[method of collection]||

[29] [Because some collection is no longer practical using prior methods, the Service proposed to gain access to the information it seeks using the proposed collection method. The information collected would be that which is] responsive to the Minister’s request for assistance under subsection 16(1) ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||　|　 　|　 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||

[30] [The proposed collection method would be initiated, and the information received by the Service, within Canada.] | |

[31] In the affidavit evidence submitted in support of the warrant application, the Service provided further details on | |[the proposed collection method and the impacts of the| |||collection method inside and outside of Canada.]||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||

VI. |[Evidence on the location of the collection]

[32] In cross-examination, the amici raised with the Service’s deponent on technical matters [information indicating that the information would be collected within specific, knowable states.]|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 　||||||

[33] The Service’s deponent ultimately acknowledged that, while the Service was unable to verify ||[all the particulars of the information, it was very likely from the evidence |that the collection occurs in a specific state or states.]||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||

VII. The decision of the designated judge

A. Factual findings

[34] The designated judge set out in the following terms (at paragraph 75 of his reasons) what he described as his “key factual findings reached on a balance of probabilities standard.”

A. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

B. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

C. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

D. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

E. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

F. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

G. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

H. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it] is undertaken from within Canada;

I. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

J. Once [factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it] within Canada, no further human intervention need occur until ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||;

K. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

L. The |[proposed method of collection]| results in |||||||||||||||||| access to the information |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| and it can be reasonably inferred, in this particular case, that access is also contrary too [foreign domestic and/or international law and/or the international law principle of non-intervention;]　 ||

M. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

N. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it;]

O. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it] and no other information |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| is accessible or otherwise impacted; and

P. [Factual finding regarding technological and/or geopolitical issues related to the information sought and/or the proposed method of obtaining it.]

[35] The Attorney General does not take issue with these findings. They all, in my view, find support in the record. Finding L reflects the agreement of the Attorney General and the amici (recited in paragraph 42 of the designated judge’s reasons) that “[t]he Court can reasonably infer that the collection of information in the manner described in the question before the Court will violate ||[foreign domestic and/or international law and/or the international law principle of non-intervention]| ] over the location in which [aspects of the collection will occur.]

[36] Having set out these findings, the designated judge proceeded to adopt in large measure the analysis of Noël J., referred to above at paragraphs 18 to 22. In the view of the designated judge, the Attorney General had not put this analysis in issue, and adopting it was also consistent with the principle of judicial comity as between judges of the same court. In light of this Court’s decision on appeal from the judgment of Noël J., the designated judge saw the issue he had to decide as whether the more detailed record before him led to a different conclusion than that of Noël J. He agreed with the amici’s submission that, to reach a different conclusion, he would have to determine both that (1) the collection of |]=[electronic information]|| without regard to whether ||[the information is]|| inside or outside Canada, [using the proposed method]|, satisfies the “within Canada” limitation in subsection 16(1) of the Act, and that (2) section 21 of the Act gives the Court jurisdiction to issue a warrant authorizing the Service to engage in activity that, in providing assistance under subsection 16(1), breaches foreign domestic or international law.

B. “Within Canada”

[37] In addressing the first of these two issues (beginning at paragraph 82 of his reasons), the designated judge began by considering the Attorney General’s submission that section 16 must be interpreted so as to give effect to its relationship with section 21. This submission relied on, among other things, what the Attorney General characterized as the broad language of section 21. The Attorney General submitted, for example, that in providing (in paragraph 21(2)(c) and subsection 21(3)) for a judge to authorize the Service to |[collect] information, section 21 does not limit the judge to authorizing |[a particular type of collection]| and that in stating (in paragraph 21(2)(f)) that even a general description of the place where the warrant may be executed need be given only if it can be given, section 21 de-emphasizes the importance of the place [where information will be collected]|. The designated judge (at paragraphs 88 to 91) saw this submission as inconsistent with the evidence before him – evidence that [the proposed collection [] ||||method]|| amounted, in the absence of judicial authorization, to an unauthorized |　 ||||||||||||||||||||[collection of information.]|||||||||

[38] The designated judge went on to state (at paragraphs 93 and 94) that he saw section 21 of the Act, together with sections 12 and 12.1, as assisting in interpreting section 16 for another reason. They showed that Parliament had taken a “distinctly different approach” in defining the geographic scope of the Service’s separate mandates and the Court’s authority to authorize extraterritorial action.

[39] The designated judge then turned (at paragraph 95) to the interpretation of section 16 itself, and to the Attorney General’s submission that the phrase “within Canada” should be interpreted to mean “from within Canada.” The designated judge could see no persuasive argument in support of that interpretation. It was in his view inconsistent with the literal meaning of “within Canada,” which he saw as clear and unambiguous: the assistance authorized by section 16 must occur within the geographic boundaries of Canada.

[40] The Attorney General’s interpretation, the designated judge observed (at paragraph 99), was also inconsistent with what he saw as the limited and controlled nature of the mandate conferred by Parliament in section 16. This “legislative principle of limits and controls” was reflected not only in the words “within Canada,” but also in the prerequisite that the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs personally request the Service’s assistance in writing, and in the limitation on the assistance that the Service can provide to the collection of information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign states or persons.

[41] The designated judge also found support for the literal interpretation of “within Canada” in the legislative context. He took note again of the contrast between the authority to act extra-territorially specifically provided for in sections 12, 12.1, 15, 21, and 21.1 and the language of subsection 16(1). He found himself, like Noël J., “left to conclude that Parliament intended there to be a meaningful difference between the ‘within or outside Canada’ mandates [granted to the Service] and the ‘within Canada’ mandate found in section 16” (at paragraph 104).

[42] As the final element in his interpretation of “within Canada,” the designated judge turned (at paragraphs 105 to 108) to the purposive analysis undertaken by Noël J., with which he saw the Attorney General as taking no issue. That analysis concluded that section 16 and its geographic limitation represent Parliament’s balancing of Canada’s need for high quality foreign intelligence at home and abroad with the protection of Canada’s diplomatic and international reputation and continued ability to obtain sensitive security information from cooperative foreign governments. This balance resulted in Parliament conferring on the Service a limited foreign intelligence capability, one that “excludes aggressive ‘covert’ and ‘offensive’ activities abroad,” so as “to mitigate the political diplomatic and moral risk of conducting foreign intelligence collection, which [has] the potential to breach foreign international law [and] foreign domestic law and bring disrepute to Canada’s international reputation […].” Therefore a purposive analysis, the designated judge concluded, also did not support giving the phrase “within Canada” a broader meaning than its literal meaning would suggest.

[43] The designated judge then set out his conclusion on the interpretation of section 16 in these terms (at paragraphs 110 and 111):

Reading the words of section 16 in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme and object of the Act and the intention of Parliament, I am unable to conclude that assistance “within Canada … in the collection of information and intelligence” can be interpreted as meaning that the assistance |||||||||||||||||| need only occur “from” within Canada. The words in context require the assistance |||||||||||||||||| occur within Canada.

Justice Noël concluded that the correct interpretation of the words “within Canada” means “only in Canada”. I agree with that conclusion.

[44] However, the designated judge added a qualification (at paragraph 112). “The restriction ‘only in Canada,’” he stated, “does not […] require that every step, action or element of the proposed collection activity occur within Canada.” Referring back to his conclusion that Parliament’s intention in imposing the geographic limitation in subsection 16(1) was to avoid “aggressive ‘covert’ and ‘offensive’ activities abroad,” he stated that “section 16, properly interpreted, prohibits collection activities that involve extraterritorial actions that run contrary to Parliament’s intent or attract the risks that Parliament sought to mitigate.” “This,” he added, “must be determined on a case by case basis.”

[45] In the case before him, he went on to state (at paragraph 113), the |||||||||||||||||||||| evidence showed that the [proposed collection method] would be used to access |||||||||| information that |||||||||||[is outside Canada.]|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| His conclusion that the use of [the proposed collection method] would be contrary to section 16 was limited to the facts he had found. These facts did not, he stated, “disclose a situation where [the information is known to be outside of any state.”] ] | Without commenting further on those possible scenarios, he “[acknowledged] that other circumstances might allow one to conclude the employment of |[the proposed collection method] | would be consistent with the within Canada requirement at section 16 but [expressed] no opinion in this regard.”

C. The |[jurisprudence relating to information accessible through the Internet]

[46] Having reached his conclusion on the meaning and application, on the facts before him, of the words “within Canada” in section 16, the designated judge nonetheless went on to consider (beginning at paragraph 115) the Attorney General’s submission that the proposed use of ||||[the collection method] could be authorized based on what was referred to as the |[jurisprudence relating to information accessible through the Internet.] This is a body of case law that recognizes that ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

[47] In considering the Attorney General’s submission, the designated judge discussed ||||||||||[Canadian case law.] ||||||||||||||| He made no mention of the analogous case law developed by courts in the United States, on which the Attorney General also relied.

[48] [Paragraphs 48 and 49 are a discussion of jurisprudence relating to information accessible through the Internet.] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||　|　 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

[49] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

[50] In this case, the designated judge expressed the view (at paragraphs 126 to 130) that the |||||||||||||||||||||| jurisprudence did not assist the Attorney General. Among other things, it was reasonable to infer that the use of 　[the proposed collection method involved elements that would violate foreign domestic and/or　 international law and/or the international law principle of non-intervention.][The proposed collection method] | was not the kind of international practice, and did not reflect the international comity, relied on [in the jurisprudence relating to information accessible through the Internet]. Nor either in [the jurisprudence] did the relevant legislation include an express limit on extraterritorial activity of the kind found in section 16.

[51] On the facts before him, the designated judge stated (at paragraph 129), he could not find the real and substantial connection that would be necessary to bring the |||||||||||||||||||||| jurisprudence into play. While courts must recognize technological change and interpret legislation so as to reflect current day technological reality, advancements in technology were, he stated (at paragraph 130), not a basis on which a court could adopt an interpretation that ran counter to the plain meaning or the underlying purpose of the statute.

D. The designated judge’s conclusion

[52] The designated judge thus concluded (at paragraphs 131 and 132) that section 16 limits assistance to that which occurs within the geographic limits of Canada, and that assistance will conform to this limitation where “all ‘significant assistance or collection activity occurs only’ within Canada.” While what is “significant” is to be assessed on a case by case basis, it would “minimally include,” he stated, “(1) all legally relevant and consequential activity; and (2) all activity that attracts the very risks Parliament has sought to mitigate in adopting the geographic limitation found at section 16 of the Act.” This would ordinarily include, absent some indication by Parliament otherwise, activity that is contrary to international law and the principle of non-intervention. Here, the designated judge determined,[the proposed collection method] would involve significant activity outside Canada that is legally relevant and that also invites the very risks that Parliament sought to mitigate.

[53] It followed for the designated judge that, on the facts before him, the proposed use of [the collection method] would not satisfy the “within Canada” limitation, so that the authorization sought must be refused. The designated judge agreed with Noël J. that to conclude otherwise would usurp the role of Parliament. He also held that there is no authority under section 21, where a warrant was sought to enable the Service to provide assistance under section 16, to approve activity in a foreign state that would breach [[foreign domestic and/or international law and/or the international law principle of non-intervention in respect of specific foreign countries.]　

VIII. Issues and standard of review

[54] The core issue in this appeal is whether the designated judge erred in determining that the “within Canada” limitation in subsection 16(1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act precludes a judge acting under section 21 of the Act, in an application for a warrant to enable the Service to perform its duties and functions under section 16, from issuing a warrant authorizing persons who are located in Canada to 　[use the proposed collection method to obtain information] 　 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| outside Canada.

[55] Depending in part on the disposition of the first issue, a second issue may also require consideration: whether, in the same circumstances as those contemplated by the first issue, the designated judge erred in determining that a judge acting under section 21 may not issue a warrant authorizing section 16 activity|[outside Canada] that breaches 　[foreign domestic and/or international law and/or the international law principle　 of non-intervention.]|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

[56] The designated judge’s determinations of these issues raise questions of law, which are subject to review on the correctness standard. First, as the Attorney General submits, in the analogous criminal law context, whether on the facts [a collection]| meets the legal prerequisites to be authorized by law is treated as a question of law: R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50 at para. 54. Second, the designated judge’s determinations raise questions of statutory interpretation, and therefore questions of law: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 at para. 8; TELUS Communications Inc. v. Wellman, 2019 SCC 19 at para. 30. Third, to the extent that the determinations in issue can be characterized as raising questions of mixed fact and law, the Attorney General does not challenge any factual findings of the designated judge, but submits that the judge erred in his interpretive approach to section 16. A challenge of this nature raises an extricable question of law.

IX. Analysis

A. The first issue: the “within Canada” limitation

[57] The Attorney General submits that the designated judge erred in law in deciding the first issue. The principal errors, the Attorney General submits, were in (1) failing to recognize 　[the difficulty of assigning a location to information in this context;]　|; (2) failing to find that conduct undertaken “from within Canada” satisfies the “within Canada” requirement of section 16; (3) failing to follow the |[jurisprudence relating to information accessible through the Internet;] and (4) failing to take account of technological change in assigning meaning to the phrase “within Canada.”

[58] I will consider each of these arguments in turn.

(1) ||[The location of the collection]||

[59] The Attorney General submits that the designated judge erred in 　[assigning a location to a certain aspect of the collection.] 　 | | On a proper understanding of what would occur, he submits, the [location of the collection]| was irrelevant, because the Service’s focus was on accessing [the information]|.

[60] I see no error by the designated judge in this respect. The characterization of [some aspects of the collection]| specified in the warrant application cannot be determinative. On the record before him, the designated judge found, among other things, that [the successful employment of the collection method results in access ||||||||||||||to information in a specific and knowable place or places]||||||||||||||||| see paragraph 34 above, finding K. The |||||||||||||||||| |||[evidence] further demonstrates that　|　 ||||[the location of the collection]|| is far from irrelevant, whatever the Service’s focus might be.

(2) “From within Canada”

[61] The Attorney General submits that the designated judge erred in failing to find that “within Canada” should be interpreted to mean “from within Canada.” On this interpretation, he submits, the facts found by the designated judge would be sufficient to meet the “within Canada” requirement: see paragraph 34 above, findings H and J.

[62] I would not give effect to this submission. As Professor Sullivan points out, there is a significant difference between reading down a statute found to be over-inclusive and reading additional words in to that statute – as the Attorney General proposes – to address what is considered under-inclusion. The general rule is that “reading down to cure over-inclusion is considered interpretation, provided it can be justified, whereas reading in to cure under-inclusion is considered amendment and must be left to the legislature”: Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed. (LexisNexis Canada Inc. 2014) at §12.16; see also R. v. Shubley, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3 at 26; Canada (Attorney General) v. Vorobyov, 2014 FCA 102 at para. 33. In this sense, as Professor Sullivan goes on to say, the words of a statute “impose an outer limit on meaning, and normally there is only limited room for expansion between the ordinary meaning of a provision and the outer limit fixed by its words.”

[63] I appreciate that there might be seen to be some support for the “from within Canada” interpretation in the decision of Mosley J. sitting as a designated judge in X (Re), 2009 FC 1058 (public version) at para. 60. There he stated his agreement with the proposition that “the jurisdictional requirements for the issuance of a warrant under section 21 are satisfied where the authorization sought is to obtain information from within Canada.” But the activities for which a warrant was sought in that case were for purposes of the Service’s section 12 mandate, not its duties and functions under section 16. Therefore, no interpretation of “within Canada” or consideration of its limits was called for or conducted.

[64] I would accordingly reject the Attorney General’s second submission.

(3) Failing to apply the |[jurisprudence relating to information accessible through the Internet]

[65] I agree with the Attorney General that the |||||||||||||||||||||| case law establishes a rule of general application. 　[Discussion of the Canadian jurisprudence.] 　 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||　 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

[66] But I agree with the designated judge that the |||||||||||||||||||||| case law does not in the end assist the Attorney General. | [Discussion of why the Canadian jurisprudence is not applicable in this context.] ||　|　 ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||

[67] The Attorney General is also critical of the designated judge for failing to refer to the jurisprudence in the United States that takes an approach similar to that reflected in the |||||||||||||||||||||| case law. But as the Attorney General recognizes, the American case law is at most of persuasive value. In any event, the fact that no express reference was made to it does not mean it was not considered: Mahjoub v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 157 at paras. 67-69.

[68] Before leaving the |[jurisprudence relating to information accessible through the Internet]|, I should note that the premise, put forward by the Attorney General, that the principle could establish a “real and substantial connection” |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| sufficient to meet the “within Canada” requirement of section 16 is, in any event, questionable. As the amici submit, “real and substantial connection” and “within Canada” are very different. The former is a threshold test, grounded in international comity, that sets a necessary minimum connection to Canada that a matter must have in order to justify Canada’s exercise of jurisdiction. The latter is a statutory territorial restriction, which limits the Service’s foreign intelligence assistance mandate under section 16 regardless of the degree of connection with the |||||||||||||||| from which intelligence is sought. And as the designated judge observed (at paragraph 128 of his reasons, |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| “[t]he real and substantial connection test is intended to prevent overreach in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction […], not to promote it.”

[69] However, based on my conclusions above, nothing more need be said on this issue to dispose of the Attorney General’s submission based on the |[jurisprudence relating to information accessible through the Internet.]

(4) Failing to take account of technological change

[70] There is no dispute that the “modern approach” to statutory interpretation should be applied in interpreting the expression “within Canada” in section 16. This approach requires that these words “be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 1998 CanLII 837.

[71] Interpretation of the language of a federal statute should also take into account, except where a contrary intention appears, the rules set out in the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, as well as any applicable common law rules of statutory interpretation: Canada Post Corp. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2019 SCC 67 at para. 42; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras. 117-118; Interpretation Act, s. 3(1).

[72] One interpretive rule that requires consideration here is the rule, codified in section 10 of the Interpretation Act, that “[t]he law shall be considered as always speaking […]:”

[73] A corollary of this rule is that “[p]reserving the original intention of Parliament or the legislatures frequently requires a dynamic approach to interpreting their enactments, sensitive to evolving social and material realities”: R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., 2001 SCC 81 at para. 38; R. v. Stucky, 2009 ONCA 151 at paras. 29-30, 49, leave to appeal granted, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 186; Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes at §6.6).

[74] These “evolving social and material realities” may include advances in technology that did not exist when the provision to be interpreted was enacted: see, for example, 　|　 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| John v. Ballingal, 2017 ONCA 579 at para. 24, leave to appeal refused [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 377; Bell Canada v. 7265921 Canada Ltd., 2018 FCA 174 at para. 125. Here, of course, the modern internet had not yet been created, [and other advances in technology|that had not occurred]|| when sections 16 and 21 were enacted in 1984.

[75] In urging on us that the designated judge failed to interpret “within Canada” in a manner that took account of technological change, the Attorney General relies in particular on two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada: |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

[76] As the Attorney General acknowledged in oral argument, these cases are not entirely analogous to the case before us. For one thing, they involve the impact of technological developments on privacy interests, a subject which is not directly in issue here. For another, they reflect judicial adaptation of |||||||||||||||||||||||||| doctrine that is largely judge-made, rather than a discrete question of statutory interpretation.

[77] The question nonetheless remains whether, as the Attorney General submits, the designated judge erred in failing to take account of technological change, and in so doing took an inappropriately static, rather than a dynamic, approach to the interpretation of “within Canada.” I would answer this question in the negative.

[78] It is not every interpretive exercise that calls for a dynamic approach. Courts have declined to take this approach where, for example, doing so would raise issues of policy more suited for legislative resolution: see Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76 at para. 155; Bishop v. Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467 at 483-484; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Kandola, 2014 FCA 85 at paras. 75-80; Bell ExpressVu Inc. v. City of Winnipeg, 2010 MBQB 26 at paras. 62-64. They will also be reluctant to do so when Parliament has already addressed, albeit in a different manner, the “new social realities” on which the party seeking a dynamic interpretation relies: Symes v. Canada, [1991] 3 F.C. 507 at 522-523, 529 (C.A.), affirmed [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695.

[79] As noted above, the “within Canada” restriction on the Service’s section 16 mandate was left unchanged in 2015 when amendments were made that expressly authorized the Service to discharge other duties and functions both within and outside Canada. I agree with the amici that whether the “within Canada” limitation should be relaxed engages policy issues. They include whether Canada should engage in the collection of foreign intelligence involving extraterritorial activity, and if so what department or agency of government should be authorized to conduct it. These issues have persisted at least since the McDonald Commission Report was published in 1981. Their presence, and their complexities, counsel caution on the part of the courts.

[80] Judicial caution is all the more appropriate, in my view, now that Parliament has established a mechanism for identifying, and recommending measures to address, any perceived deficiencies in the legislative framework governing security and intelligence. In 2017, Parliament enacted the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15 (the “NSICOP Act”). The NSICOP Act establishes a committee comprising a chair and up to 10 other members, each of whom must be a member of either House of Parliament other than a minister of the Crown, a minister of state or a parliamentary secretary. By paragraph 8(1)(a) of the NSICOP Act, the Committee’s mandate includes reviewing “the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative and financial framework for national security and intelligence.” By paragraph 8(1)(c), it is also charged with reviewing any matter relating to national security or intelligence referred to it by a minister of the Crown.

[81] As the Committee itself has described it, its “unprecedented” review mandate is a broad one; it extends to “identifying where gaps may exist in legislation, policies, or governance,” and “[looking] at issues from a government-wide perspective”: Canada, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, Annual Report 2018 at paras. 25-26. In its 2019 Annual Report, the Committee identified the impact of evolving information technology as a potential subject for review, noting that “[t]he ability of police and intelligence organizations to obtain information under existing legal authorities has steadily diminished with the evolution of information technology […]”: Canada, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, Annual Report 2019, Chair’s Message.

[82] As noted above, the designated judge (at paragraph 130 of his reasons) took no issue with the need for courts to interpret legislation in light of technological change. However, he concluded that in this case, given the plain meaning, purpose and context of the legislation, technological change could not provide a basis for interpreting “within Canada” as the Attorney General proposed. I see no reversible error in this conclusion, especially when the issue is policy-laden and the NSICOP Act provides a mechanism to identify and propose means to address perceived legislative deficiencies.

B. Authorizing breaches of ||[foreign domestic and/or international law and/or the international law principle of non-intervention]|

[83] I do not propose to address the question of non-compliance with ||[foreign domestic and/or international law and/or the international law principle of non-intervention.]| If the Service lacks in the first place the authority to carry out the activity for which the warrant was sought, the question does not arise. If in the future Parliament should consider it appropriate to grant the Service this authority, it can address the question of compliance with ||[foreign domestic and/or international law and/or the international law principle of non-intervention]| in the context of legislative change, as it did, for example, in enacting subsection 21(3.1) of the Act in 2015. As noted above, this subsection expressly provides for the issuance of a warrant authorizing activities outside Canada to enable investigation of a threat to the security of Canada “[w]ithout regard to any other law, including that of any foreign state.”

X. Proposed disposition

[84] I would dismiss the appeal.

“J.B. Laskin”

“I agree

Yves de Montigny J.A”

“I agree

Anne L. Mactavish J.A”

APPENDIX

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23, ss. 12, 16, 21 and 21.1

 

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

	Docket:		A-243-20
STYLE OF CAUSE:		IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY |||||||||||||||||||||||| FOR WARRANTS PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 16 AND 21 OF THE CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 AND IN THE MATTER OF [a foreign state, group of states or person]
PLACE OF HEARING:			Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING:			FEBRUARY 10, 2021
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:			LASKIN J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY:			DE MONTIGNY J.A. MACTAVISH J.A.
DATED:			august 6, 2021

APPEARANCES:

|||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||	For The Appellant
Gordon Cameron Shantona Chaudhury	AMICI CURIAE

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Nathalie G. Drouin Deputy Attorney General of Canada	FOR THE APPELLANT	For The Appellant
Blake Cassels & Graydon LLP Ottawa, Ontario Pape Chaudhury Toronto, Ontario	AMICI CURIAE	For The Respondent