Docket: A-162-17
Citation: 2018 FCA 16
CORAM:
|
RENNIE J.A.
GLEASON J.A.
LASKIN J.A.
|
BETWEEN:
|
NAVDEEP KAUR
SRAN
|
Appellant
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
|
Heard at Calgary, Alberta, on January 17, 2018.
Judgment delivered from the Bench at Calgary, Alberta, on January
17, 2018.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:
|
GLEASON
J.A.
|
Docket: A-162-17
Citation:
2018 FCA 16
CORAM:
|
RENNIE J.A.
GLEASON J.A.
LASKIN J.A.
|
BETWEEN:
|
NAVDEEP KAUR
SRAN
|
Appellant
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Calgary, Alberta, on
January 17, 2018).
GLEASON J.A.
[1]
We are of the view that this appeal must be
dismissed as the Federal Court erred in certifying the question it certified,
although in a proper case there might well be grounds for this question to be
certified.
[2]
A properly certified question is a necessary
precondition to this Court’s having jurisdiction to hear an appeal under the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the IRPA). Section 74 of
that Act sets out the conditions necessary for this Court to have jurisdiction
to hear an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court under the IRPA and
provides in relevant part that an appeal to this Court may only be made if, in
rendering judgment, the Federal Court “certifies that a
serious question of general importance is involved and states the question”.
[3]
The case law of this Court establishes that in
order for a question to be properly certified under section 74 of the IRPA, and
therefore for this Court to have jurisdiction to hear an appeal, the question
certified by the Federal Court must be dispositive of the appeal, must
transcend the interests of the parties and must raise an issue of broad
significance or general importance. In consequence, the question must have been
dealt with by the Federal Court and must necessarily arise from the case itself
(as opposed to arising out of the way in which the Federal Court may have
disposed of the case): Lewis v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
2017 FCA 130 at paras. 35-36; Mudrak v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2016 FCA 178 at para. 16, 485 N.R. 186; Zhang v. Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FCA 168 at para. 9, [2014] 4 F.C.R. 290;
Varela v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FCA 145
at paras. 28-29, [2010] 1 F.C.R. 129; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Zazai, 2004 FCA 89 at paras. 11-12, 318 N.R. 365; and Liyanagamage
v. Canada (Secretary of State), 176 N.R. 4 at para. 4, [1994] F.C.J. No.
1637 (A.D.).
[4]
Here, the question certified provided as
follows:
Given that s 133(1)(j) and s 34 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations were amended and came into force on
January 2, 2014, should the [Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada (the IAD)] have retroactively applied the amended
version of these regulations given that the Applicant’s sponsorship application
for permanent residence on behalf of her father and her brother was received on
June 5, 2008?
[5]
This question is not dispositive as the
appellant met neither the previous nor the amended income requirements for
sponsorship. The visa officer determined that the appellant did not meet the
previous version of these requirements, and the IAD held that this
determination was correct in law – as it is. There is no dispute that the
appellant did not meet the more stringent amended income requirements that came
into force in January of 2014. Thus, it matters not which version of the requirements
was applied, and the certified question is therefore not dispositive of the
appeal as the appellant has no entitlement to favourable humanitarian and
compassionate consideration.
[6]
This appeal must accordingly be dismissed as we
have no jurisdiction to hear it.
“Mary J.L. Gleason”