Docket: IMM-2009-17
Citation:
2018 FC 25
Ottawa, Ontario, January 11, 2018
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
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BETWEEN:
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JENECIA MECIAH
CAMPBELL
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application under s 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [Act], for judicial review
of the decision of an immigration officer in the Montreal Backlog Reduction
Office [Officer], dated April 27, 2017 [Decision], which refused the
Applicant’s application for permanent residence on humanitarian and
compassionate [H&C] grounds.
II.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The Applicant is a citizen of St. Vincent and
the Grenadines. She arrived in Canada on April 11, 2011 and has remained in
Canada since then.
[3]
After the Applicant arrived in Canada, she met
Withfield Graham. The couple moved in together in November of 2011. Their
daughter, Kianna, was born in 2013. Twin boys, Ayden and Jayden, followed in
2015. Tragically, Mr. Graham was diagnosed with cancer in 2015 and died in
December of that year.
[4]
Mr. Graham was a permanent resident of Canada
and had completed an application to sponsor the Applicant for permanent
residence in 2014. The application, however, was never submitted.
[5]
In Canada without status, the Applicant applied
for H&C relief under s 25(1) of the Act in 2016.
III.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[6]
The Officer determined that the Applicant had failed
to demonstrate circumstances that justify an exemption from the Act based on
H&C considerations.
[7]
The Officer evaluates the Applicant’s
establishment in Canada and notes the letters of support from members of the
community and considers them a positive consideration. Regarding employment,
the Officer references a letter from the Applicant’s former employer that
confirms employment from 2011 to 2014, but the Officer notes that the letter is
not on company letterhead and misspells the word “corporation.” More
importantly, the Applicant did not provide proof of employment after 2014. The
Applicant’s bank statements provide proof of savings, but “submissions concerning the applicant’s fiscal management”
were not provided. The Decision acknowledges the Applicant’s volunteer work at
a salon and that the owner of the salon is prepared to offer her a job if she
obtains a work permit. The Officer also notes the sponsorship application
signed by Mr. Graham and that it was not submitted because of Mr. Graham’s
death.
[8]
The Officer assesses the Applicant’s employment as
a positive factor, but points out that the Applicant has been working without
authorization. The Officer also finds that the Applicant’s five years in Canada
have led to a measure of establishment, but points out that she has not “demonstrated that significant obstacles exist that preclude
her from being employed in St. Vincent.”
[9]
The Officer acknowledges the Applicant’s
statement that she has “no meaningful family support”
in St. Vincent, but points out that she grew up in St. Vincent and has parents
and siblings who reside there. The Officer finds that, absent evidence to the
contrary, it is reasonable to believe that the Applicant’s family could
facilitate her readjustment to life in St. Vincent. The Officer states that
evidence of loss of social ties in St. Vincent is limited to the Applicant’s
declaration. On the other hand, the Applicant only has a sister-in-law, Mr.
Graham’s sister, in Canada who states that “she is
unable to assist the applicant with the care of the children due to her work
obligations.”
[10]
The Officer finds that the evidence does not
support a finding that the Applicant has been involved in the community through
religious, social, cultural or charitable organizations. Nor does the evidence support
a finding that the Applicant has attempted to upgrade her skills while in
Canada.
[11]
The Officer accepts that the Applicant does not
want to return to St. Vincent, but notes that s 25(1) of the Act is meant to
allow for exceptional circumstances not anticipated by the Act. The measure of
establishment the Applicant has achieved in Canada is offset by her staying in
Canada without authorization, and the Officer finds that the Applicant has not
demonstrated that she is unable to leave Canada due to exceptional
circumstances.
[12]
The Officer then evaluates the best interests of
the children, and states that this is an important factor that is given
significant weight and consideration.
[13]
The Officer notes the Ontario birth certificates
the Applicant submitted for each of her children, their date of birth, and
their age at the time of the Decision.
[14]
The Officer states that there is limited
evidence on file in relation to where the children go to school or whether they
are attending daycare. The Officer finds that it is in the best interests of
the Applicant’s children to gain an education and have their mother’s support,
but the Officer finds that the evidence “does not
support that this cannot be achieved by the applicant returning with her
children to St. Vincent.” The evidence is unclear about whether the
children have experienced the Canadian school system but the Officer is
satisfied that, given their ages, they “are young
enough to adapt to the culture and school structure in St. Vincent.”
Absent evidence to the contrary, the Officer finds that the children will have
the support of family and friends in St. Vincent. Given that their mother is
their primary caregiver, the Officer finds “that the
general consequences of the applicant relocating and resettling back to her
home country would not be contrary to the children’s best interests.”
[15]
The Officer finds that the evidence does not
demonstrate that: the children will have no future in St. Vincent; the children
will be unable to access good education in St. Vincent; or that the Applicant
would be unable to support them in St. Vincent. The Decision notes that the
children will retain their Canadian citizenship even if they reside in St.
Vincent and may return to Canada in the future. The Officer accepts that it is
in the best interests of most children to be with their parent, but states that
the decision whether the children should accompany the Applicant to St. Vincent
would be a parental decision. The Officer concludes that the evidence does not
support a finding that the Applicant “returning to St.
Vincent with her children would be contrary to the best interest of the
children.”
[16]
Giving a global assessment to all the factors
raised by the Applicant, the Decision finds that her case is empathetic but
does not justify an exemption on H&C grounds.
IV.
ISSUES
[17]
The Applicant submits that the following are at
issue in this application:
- Does the Officer
apply the wrong test for the best interests of the children?
- Is the Officer’s
assessment of the best interests of the children unreasonable?
- Is the Officer’s
assessment of the Applicant’s establishment in Canada and risk if returned
to her country of origin unreasonable?
V.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[18]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir], held that a standard of review
analysis need not be conducted in every instance. Instead, where the standard
of review applicable to a particular question before the court is settled in a
satisfactory manner by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that
standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless, or where the
relevant precedents appear to be inconsistent with new developments in the
common law principles of judicial review, must the reviewing court undertake a
consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of review analysis: Agraira
v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at para
48.
[19]
The Applicant submits that the Officer applied
the wrong test when considering the best interests of the children. The
Applicant says that this is a question of law and reviewable under the
correctness standard. The Applicant accepts that an officer’s assessment of the
best interests of a child is a question of mixed fact and law, reviewable on
the reasonableness standard, and ordinarily afforded considerable deference by
the Court. See Tesheira v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC
1417 at para 10. But the Applicant goes on to say “[t]here
is no deference to factual determinations where the officer applied the wrong
test to assess the best interests of the child” and that “the Court ought to reweigh the best interest factors.”
[20]
In reviewing the Applicant’s submissions,
however, his concern is with how the Officer applies the best interests of the
child test. For instance, the Applicant says that “[t]he
officer considered what would not be contrary to their best interest and did
not consider what is in their best interest.” And later, that the
Officer “applied a test of whether Canadian born
children will have a future in a different country” and “assessed the application with an erroneous emphasis.”
In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that deference “must apply to the review of questions where the legal
and factual issues are intertwined with and cannot be readily separated”
(emphasis added). See Dunsmuir, above, at para 53.
[21]
Further, Dunsmuir also shows that simply
labelling a question a question of law does not automatically render it a
question subject to correctness review. The categories of questions of law
always subject to correctness review are constitutional questions, true
questions of jurisdiction, questions of general law both central to the
importance of the legal system as a whole and outside the decision-maker’s
specialized expertise, and questions regarding the jurisdictional lines between
two or more specialized tribunals. See Dunsmuir, above, at paras 58-61.
The Applicant has not explained how the test for the best interests of the
child, even if it is an extricable question of law, fits into one of these
categories.
[22]
The conclusion that reasonableness is the
standard of review to be applied to the Officer’s consideration of relief on
H&C grounds under s 25(1) of the Act is supported by Kanthasamy v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61 [Kanthasamy]. There, the
Supreme Court of Canada held the reasonableness standard applied to an H&C
determination despite the existence of a certified question regarding the
proper interpretation of s 25 of the Act. See Kanthasamy, above, at
paras 43-44. While certification under s 74(d) of the Act does not expressly
require a question of law, “to be certified, a question
must (i) be dispositive of the appeal and (ii) transcend the interests of the
immediate parties to the litigation, as well as contemplate issues of broad
significance or general importance”: Zhang v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2013 FCA 168 at para 9. For recent authority in this Court
following Kanthasamy’s direction that reasonableness review applies to
review of H&C determinations, see Regalado v Canada (Immigration,
Refugees and Citizenship), 2017 FC 540 at para 5 [Regalado] and Madera
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 108 at para 6.
[23]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of
reasonableness, the analysis will be concerned with “the
existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the
decision-making process [and also with] whether the decision falls within a
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law.” See Dunsmuir, above, at para 47, and Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 59. Put another
way, the Court should intervene only if the Decision was unreasonable in the
sense that it falls outside the “range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”
VI.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[24]
The following provisions of the Act are relevant
in this application:
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Humanitarian
and compassionate considerations — request of foreign national
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Séjour
pour motif d’ordre humanitaire à la demande de l’étranger
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25 (1)
Subject to subsection (1.2), the Minister must, on request of a foreign
national in Canada who applies for permanent resident status and who is
inadmissible — other than under section 34, 35 or 37 — or who does not meet
the requirements of this Act, and may, on request of a foreign national
outside Canada — other than a foreign national who is inadmissible under
section 34, 35 or 37 — who applies for a permanent resident visa, examine the
circumstances concerning the foreign national and may grant the foreign
national permanent resident status or an exemption from any applicable
criteria or obligations of this Act if the Minister is of the opinion that it
is justified by humanitarian and compassionate considerations relating to the
foreign national, taking into account the best interests of a child directly
affected.
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25 (1) Sous
réserve du paragraphe (1.2), le ministre doit, sur demande d’un étranger se
trouvant au Canada qui demande le statut de résident permanent et qui soit
est interdit de territoire — sauf si c’est en raison d’un cas visé aux
articles 34, 35 ou 37 —, soit ne se conforme pas à la présente loi, et peut,
sur demande d’un étranger se trouvant hors du Canada — sauf s’il est interdit
de territoire au titre des articles 34, 35 ou 37 — qui demande un visa de
résident permanent, étudier le cas de cet étranger; il peut lui octroyer le
statut de résident permanent ou lever tout ou partie des critères et
obligations applicables, s’il estime que des considérations d’ordre
humanitaire relatives à l’étranger le justifient, compte tenu de l’intérêt
supérieur de l’enfant directement touché.
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VII.
ARGUMENT
A.
Applicant
(1)
Best Interests Test
[25]
The Applicant submits that the Officer applied
the wrong test when considering the best interests of the children. Rather than
considering what is actually in the best interests of her children, the
Applicant says that the Officer considered what would not be contrary to her
children’s best interests. See Judnarine v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2013 FC 82 at paras 45-47 [Judnarine]. This amounts to
the Officer applying a test of whether the Applicant’s Canadian children will
have a future in St. Vincent. The Applicant also says that, as part of this
evaluation, the Officer assumed that her children are not Canadians by birth.
[26]
The Applicant further submits that the Officer
misconstrued his jurisdiction and mandate by asserting that the H&C process
is not designed to eliminate all difficulties.
[27]
The Applicant says that the Decision does not
adequately consider the impact on her children of their father’s death. See Judnarine,
above, at para 48.
(2)
Best Interests Assessment
[28]
The Officer acknowledges the limited information
on file with respect to the Applicant’s children. The Applicant submits that
the Officer’s failure to request additional information indicates that the
Decision was made based on incomplete information and therefore failed to
properly assess the best interests of her children. Factors such as whether the
children go to school, what languages they are learning, and whether they
attend daycare were not assessed. The Applicant says that the Officer’s failure
to discuss the relationship between the limited evidence on file and the other
factors being assessed is unreasonable. See Okafor v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2010 FC 652 at para 8.
[29]
The Applicant submits that the Officer applied a
generic test that does not consider the individual needs of each child based on
their particular age. She says that when concluding that there is no evidence
that her children cannot receive education in St. Vincent comparable to Canada the
Decision ignores her evidence that she is from a poor community in St. Vincent.
See Ranji v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 FC
521 at paras 36-37 [Ranji].
[30]
The Applicant submits that the Officer does not
consider the bonds that the children have formed in Canada, whether the
children attend daycare in Canada, and the medical care the children receive in
Canada. The Applicant says that the impact of different standards of living
between Canada and St. Vincent is considered as part of her establishment in
Canada, but not with respect to the best interests of her children.
[31]
The Applicant submits that the Officer
misconstrues the evidence by indicating that the children’s home country is St.
Vincent and finding that they will have a family support system there. The
evidence shows that she severed her ties with St. Vincent, that her only
meaningful ties are with Canada, and that she lacks a support structure in St.
Vincent.
[32]
The Applicant says the Officer’s indication that
there are empathetic aspects of her application without explanation of why the
negative factors outweigh the positive factors is unreasonable. This is
exacerbated by the Officer’s failure to assess the impact the “emotional hole” left by the death of the children’s
father will have on her and her ability to support her children. See Paul v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1081 at para 4.
(3)
Establishment Assessment
[33]
The Applicant submits that the Officer shows no
awareness of the degree of her establishment. See El Thaher v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1439 at paras 52, 56, 71. She says
that a typographical error in her letter of employment and that she worked in
Canada without authorization are irrelevant to the assessment of her
establishment in Canada. The Officer also misconstrues evidence about her
unemployment status and level of savings while finding that she did not make
submissions about her fiscal management. The Applicant points out that the Officer
finds she made minimal efforts to regularize her status despite acknowledging
her husband’s sponsorship application. She says personal circumstances that should
have been evaluated include: caring for a husband with cancer; his subsequent
death; and her care for three young children. See Ranji, above, at paras
19-20.
[34]
The Applicant says that after her husband’s
death an H&C application was the only appropriate application she could
pursue and that the emotional effects she would suffer upon removal are
particularly acute.
[35]
The Applicant requests that the Decision be set
aside and that the Court make an order in the nature of mandamus
directing that her H&C application be reconsidered to arrive at a different
result not inconsistent with the Court’s reasons for setting aside the
Decision.
B.
Respondents
(1)
Best Interests Test
[36]
The Respondents submit that the Officer did not
apply the wrong test when considering the best interests of the children. The
Respondents say that there is no difference between what is contrary to the
best interests of the child and what is in the best interests of the child as
those are simply different sides of the same coin. Judnarine is
distinguishable because in that case the officer decided the best in interests
of the child solely as an element of whether there was “undue,
undeserved and disproportionate” hardship. See Judnarine, above,
at para 47.The Respondents say that in the present case the Officer does not
measure the best interests of the Applicant’s children in terms of that test.
[37]
The Respondents submit that hardship only plays
a partial role and point to instances where the Officer explicitly looks at
what is in the children’s best interests. The Respondents say that it is not a
fair reading of the Decision to suggest that the Officer evaluates whether the
children could barely survive in St. Vincent.
[38]
The Respondents say that the Applicant’s
submission that the Officer unreasonably evaluates whether the children can
live in St. Vincent instead of evaluating whether they should live in Canada is
not supported by case law endorsing her position. And the Applicant’s
suggestion that the Officer commits a jurisdictional error by stating that the
H&C process is not designed to eliminate all difficulties contradicts the
accepted proposition that H&C applications are designed to respond to
exceptional circumstances. See e.g. Adams v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2009 FC 1193 at para 30.
(2)
Best Interests Assessment
[39]
The Respondents say that it is clear from the
Decision that the Officer understands that the Applicant’s children are
Canadian and were born in Canada. The suggestion that the Officer did not
understand the children’s place of birth arises from the incorrect usage of the
word “their” when describing the Applicant’s
country of origin as St. Vincent. This is corrected in the Decision shortly
afterwards and the Officer notes that the children were born in Ontario. The
Respondents submit that the mistaken use of the word “their”
does not amount to a reviewable error or indicate that the Officer
misunderstood the children’s place of birth.
[40]
The Respondents submit that there is no evidence
regarding how Mr. Graham’s death has affected the children. The assertion that
the children’s grief would be exacerbated by their removal from Canada comes
from the Applicant’s counsel and she cites case law reflecting different
circumstances. In this case, there was no real evidence for the Officer to
consider on this matter.
[41]
The Respondents submit that the onus was on the
Applicant to submit a complete application and that it was not unfair for the
Officer not to request further documentation. It was not the responsibility of
the Officer to address the interests of the children not apparent on the face
of the record. See Suleiman v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017
FC 395 at paras 80-82. Similarly, absent evidence, the Officer could not
speculate on how the Applicant’s past poverty would impact the children’s
educational future.
[42]
The Respondents say that the Officer considers
the Applicant’s children’s ages and whether it would be in their best interests
to be educated in Canada. The Applicant’s argument that St. Vincent is a third world
country is similarly addressed. The Respondents say that the Decision
implicitly addresses the children’s relationships in Canada when it finds that
they would have a support system in St. Vincent. Other factors such as the
children’s daycare arrangements and lack of need for special medical care are
not significant to the Decision. The Respondents submit that the Officer is not
obliged to mention every fact in the Decision. See Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 157 FTR 35 at paras 15-17
(TD).
[43]
The Respondents point out that the Officer is
not incorrect about the existence of the Applicant’s family in St. Vincent; the
H&C application lists those family members. The Respondents say that, given
the existence of these family members, it is reasonable for the Officer to
require more than the Applicant’s bare denial of links to her home country.
Further, the Officer did not find that the Applicant could support herself in
St. Vincent with the help of family and friends. Instead, the Officer finds
that the Applicant did not establish that she could not live in St. Vincent
while her permanent residence application is processed.
[44]
The Respondents say that the Officer was not
required to explicitly state why empathy for the Applicant was insufficient to
outweigh the negative factors that prevent approval of her H&C application.
An H&C application is the result of weighing different factors and does not
require further gloss on how or why those factors balance out in favour of the
result.
(3)
Establishment Assessment
[45]
The Respondents submit that the Applicant does
not identify where the Officer failed to appreciate the difficulties she faces
and what unreasonable inferences the Officer drew. The typographical error on
the Applicant’s letter of employment was relevant as the letter was also missing
proper letterhead. Regardless, this was a minor point that did not play a
significant role in the assessing the Applicant’s establishment. And the
Respondents say that working illegally in Canada is relevant to the
determination of the undeserved hardship element applicable to H&C
applications. See Regalado, above, at paras 9-11.
[46]
The Respondents say that the Decision is not
inconsistent when finding a lack of evidence of fiscal management. Evidence of
current savings is not the same as historical fiscal management. Similarly, the
Officer’s finding that the Applicant made minimal efforts to regularize her
status is reasonable considering that the Applicant’s only effort was the
sponsorship application that was interrupted by Mr. Graham’s death.
[47]
The Respondents submit that the Officer does not
ignore factors when assessing the Applicant’s establishment. In addition to
presuming that the Officer considered all of the evidence, the Decision is
detailed and articulate. Factors that were not mentioned were not significant
considering the evidence available.
VIII.
ANALYSIS
[48]
The Applicant has put forward a plethora of
alleged errors, most of which are refuted by a simple reading of the Decision
in its entirety.
[49]
For example, the Applicant alleges that the
Officer found, mistakenly, that her “children are not
Canadians by birth and that they have a different country of origin” in
St. Vincent.
[50]
This allegation appears to be based upon the Officer’s
finding that the “applicant does not submit any objective
evidence to demonstrate that her children would have no future in their country
of origin.” The word “their” in this finding is obviously a typo for
“her” because the Officer repeatedly states throughout the Decision that the
three children are all Canadian citizens who were born in Canada. An obvious
typographical error is not a reviewable error when the Decision as a whole
makes it clear that the Officer was well aware that the children are Canadian and
this fact was taken into account in assessing the Applicant’s H&C application.
[51]
The Applicant also attempts to fault the Officer
for noting the incompleteness of the evidence filed by the Applicant on
important matters that needed to be assessed, and she complains that the “officer did not request for [sic] additional
information in respect of these and simply made a decision on the basis of what
the officer allegedly has on file.” The Applicant then asserts that:
The Officer’s reasons show that the officer
failed to assess the necessary factors, with the assessment done on limited
evidence. Implicit in the officer’s decision is that the officer failed to
consider whether the children go to school, what languages they are learning
and whether they attend daycare.
[52]
In other words, the Applicant is here asserting
that it is the Officer’s responsibility to fill any gaps in her evidence and,
if he does not do so, this in itself is a demonstration that the Officer has
failed to assess the necessary factors and was not alert, alive and sensitive
to the best interests of the children.
[53]
It is the Applicant’s responsibility, however,
to place before the Officer the evidence needed to make the assessment and
establish her case for an H&C exemption. The Applicant is, and was,
represented by counsel who knows this full well. The Officer cannot be faulted
for gaps in the Applicant’s evidence that are the responsibility of the
Applicant and her counsel. See Owusu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2004 FCA 38 at para 5. In addition, the Applicant’s assertion
in this application that there were significant gaps in her evidence that the
Officer was obliged to fill is a clear admission that her evidence was not
sufficient for a full and meaningful assessment. The failure of an applicant to
provide an adequate evidentiary base for an H&C application is not a basis
for reviewable error on the part of the decision-maker.
[54]
I have carefully reviewed all of the Applicant’s
assertions of reviewable error and find all of them unconvincing. The only ones
that require further comment from the Court are set out below.
[55]
The Applicant says that the Officer applied the
wrong legal test in analyzing the best interests of the children in that the “officer considered what would not be contrary to their best
interest and did not consider what is in their best interest” and at no
time “did the officer consider the application from the
standpoint of what would be in the children’s best interest but rather
considered other unrelated factors.” This means, she says, that the “officer simply applied a test of whether Canadian born
children will have a future in a different country of origin.”
[56]
As I have already pointed out, the Officer
assessed the best interests of the children from the perspective of their
Canadian birth and citizenship.
[57]
The Officer’s best interests of the child
analysis reads as follows:
With respect to the best interests of the
child, I am aware that it is an important factor and I have given significant
weight and consideration to this factor. I have considered the children’s age,
their degree of establishment, their emotional, social and physical welfare,
the level of dependency between mother and child and whether the children’s
wellbeing would be significantly negatively affected should the requested
exemption be denied.
In support of her application the applicant
submits Ontario birth certificates for her 3 children:
> Kianna Jenecia Graham Campbell (daughter) 2013-03-07 aged 4 years
old
> Ayden Omar Abraham Graham Campbell (son) 2015-04-02 aged 2 years
old
> Jayden Omarie Ezekiel Graham Campbell (son) 2015-04-02 aged 2 years
old
The applicant declares that the best
interests of her Canadian children will be served if she remains in Canada. She
states that leaving Canada will be “psychologically and emotionally damaging” for
her children. She comes from a “poor community in a third world country”, “she
does not want to uproot her children from the life they are accustomed to” and
taking them away from Canada is “killing their dreams in life”.
There is limited evidence on file in
relation to the children, whether they go to school, are learning French or
English or attend daycare. For Kianna, Ayden, and Jayden, I find that it is in
their best interest to gain an education and have their mother’s constant love
and support as they journey through life. The evidence before me does not
support that this cannot be achieved by the applicant returning with her
children to St. Vincent. It is unclear whether her children have experience in
the Canadian school system, and I find that given the children’s age, they are
young enough to adapt to the culture and school structure in St Vincent. I also
note that the children’s maternal grandparents and several aunts and uncles
reside in St. Vincent, and it is reasonable to expect, absent evidence to the
contrary, that they have an established support system of family and friends in
their home country. As the children are still quite young and solely dependent on
their primary care-giver, their mother, it is reasonable to expect that the
general consequences of the applicant relocating and resettling back to her
home country would not be contrary to the children’s best interests.
The applicant does not submit any objective
evidence to demonstrate that her children would have no future in their country
of origin. She does not demonstrate that her children are unable to access good
education in St Vincent, or that she could not support her children in her
country of origin. I find that even if the family returned to St Vincent, her
children will be well cared for and loved by their mother.
Furthermore, I note that the children will
retain their Canadian citizenship regardless of where they reside and may
return to Canada in the future should they choose. It is acknowledged that it
is in the best interest of most children to remain with their parents and family.
Ultimately, the decision as to whether the children accompany the applicant to
St Vincent or remain in Canada would be a parental one.
I am satisfied that the applicant only wants
the best for her children, this is a desire shared by most parents around the
world; however, the evidence before me does not support that returning to St.
Vincent with her children would be contrary to the best interest of the children.
[58]
Once again, it is noteworthy that the Officer is
obliged to conduct the best interests analysis against a background of limited
evidence from the Applicant. There is nothing to suggest that the Applicant,
represented by counsel, could not have provided the Officer with a better
evidentiary basis, yet she chose not to and now seeks to hold the Officer
responsible for her own omissions. The Officer here acknowledges the
Applicant’s position that the “best interests of her
Canadian children will be served if she remains in Canada.” The
jurisprudence of this Court is that this is an assumption that can be made in
the majority of cases. See Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
v Hawthorne, 2002 FCA 475 at para 5. The Officer is not saying here that
the children would not be better off in Canada, but this assumption has to be
assessed and weighed in the context of what they will face if they return with
their mother to St. Vincent, at least until such time as they are old
enough to exercise their rights as Canadians. The Officer’s analysis and
conclusions are that, on this side of the ledger, the Applicant has failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to establish that these very young children will
suffer any material, cultural or health care deprivations in St. Vincent, and
that they will continue to enjoy their mother’s constant love and support there
and, in addition, will enjoy the support of an extended family.
[59]
In other words, the Officer did not, as the
Applicant alleges, consider “what would not be contrary
to their best interest and did not consider what is in their best interest.”
The Officer is fully aware of the Applicant’s view that “the best interests of her Canadian children will be served if
she remains in Canada,” but, in order to assess what weight should be
given to the best interests of these young children, the Officer has to address
what will happen to them if they return to St. Vincent with their mother. The
Officer never says it is not in their best interests to remain with their
mother in Canada. But what is important in assessing the weight to be given to
this factor is the extent to which the children will suffer any deprivations if
they return with their mother to St. Vincent. This is why the emphasis in the
analysis is upon what the children face in St. Vincent and the lack of evidence
provided by the Applicant on this issue.
[60]
There was also a paucity of evidence about the
children’s situation in Canada, at least as regards their experience in the
Canadian school system. I think it can be safely assumed that the Officer is
fully aware that Canada can offer these children more opportunities than St.
Vincent. The Officer fully acknowledges that there are “different
standards of living between countries.” But their return to St. Vincent
does not deprive them of their rights as Canadians so that the Officer is only
concerned with any deprivations they might face until they are able to choose
whether they wish to reside in Canada. In this regard, the Applicant did not
adduce evidence to suggest that “the general
consequences of the applicant relocating and resettling back to her home
country would not [sic] be contrary to the children’s best interests,”
obviously meaning that there was nothing in the general consequences of
relocation that would be contrary to their best interests.
[61]
The Applicant also says that, in assuming there
was a family support system available to them in St. Vincent, the Officer
overlooked her evidence that she had severed all ties with her home country and
that the only meaningful ties she has left are in Canada. The Applicant’s
saying that she has severed ties with family in St. Vincent is not evidence,
without more, that those ties cannot be re-established, particularly when she
now has children. The evidence was that the Applicant has parents and siblings
living in St. Vincent. Hence, further explanation and evidence would be
required to demonstrate why this group of people would not support a daughter
and grandchildren. In this situation, more is required of the Applicant than a
statement that she has cut ties with her family in St. Vincent. The Officer
compares the family support system in St. Vincent with the evidence of what is
available to the Applicant and her children in Canada:
Although [the] applicant states she has no
“meaningful family support” anywhere other than in Canada, I note she spent the
majority of her life in St Vincent. The applicant’s parents and siblings reside
in St. Vincent, and it is reasonable to believe, absent evidence to the
contrary, that they could facilitate her readjustment to her home country.
Other than the applicant’s declaration, I have limited details on any loss of
social or family ties to St. Vincent and, in this regard, I find insufficient
evidence to indicate why the applicant’s family could not assist her with the
re-integration process or to indicate that in doing so either she or her family
members could be subjected to difficulties. Moreover submissions demonstrate
that the sole family member in Canada is Ann Marie Graham, her sister in law,
and she states she is unable to assist the applicant with the care of the
children due to her work obligations.
[62]
The Applicant’s failure to provide sufficient
objective evidence on the best interests factors is a general problem with her whole
H&C submission. For example, she now claims that “the
officer failed to adequately or reasonably consider the impact of the father’s death
on the children or the hardship to be faced by the children with the death of their
father,” and “failed to assess any emotional
hole left in the lives of the children by the death of their father,” but
she fails to point to any evidence that she submitted on this issue that the Officer
overlooked.
[63]
In this application, the Applicant consistently
faults the Officer for not providing a more thoroughgoing analysis on issues for
which she did not provide evidence permitting any further analysis than the
Officer provided. She refuses to acknowledge the inadequacies of her own
H&C application and blames the Officer for not remedying those inadequacies.
[64]
The Applicant faults the Officer for not taking
into account the differences in general living standards between St. Vincent
and Canada, and how this will impact the Applicant and the three children. But
the Officer shows that she is fully alive to this factor and provides the following
response:
With regard to the potential difficulties
the applicant may experience upon her return to St. Vincent, it is acknowledged
that there are different standards of living between countries. It is noted
that many countries are not as fortunate to have the same social, including
financial and medical, supports which can be found in Canada. The purpose of
invoking subsection 25(1) of the IRPA is not to compensate for the difference
in a standard of living, but rather to allow for an exceptional response to a
particular set of circumstances which are unforeseen by the IRPA and where
humanitarian and compassionate grounds justify the granting of relief. I do not
find that the applicant’s personal circumstances justify such an exemption.
[65]
The Officer does not say that the Applicant and
her children will experience standards of health, education and general living
conditions in St. Vincent comparable to what they would experience if they
remained in Canada. That is not the point of an H&C analysis.
[66]
On the establishment side of the Decision, the
Applicant makes two allegations that require mention here.
[67]
First of all, the Applicant says that the
Officer made no attempt to appreciate the difficulties the Applicant was facing
and drew unreasonable inferences about the options that were available to her.
She says that the Officer “showed no awareness of the
degree of the applicant’s establishment in this case, or the degree of hardship
that was likely to be suffered by the applicant if she was required to leave Canada.”
In particular, the Applicant alleges as follows:
35. While disregarding evidence that
the applicant was earning an income (deposited bi-weekly directly into her bank
account) as recently as August 2015, [the Officer] alleged that the applicant
did not submit updates on her employment situation past 2014. This is [in]
direct contradiction to the evidence before the Officer. Establishment was not
appropriately dealt with by [the Officer] as a factor on this application. The
officer erred in failing to analyze the degree of the applicant’s establishment.
36. While disregarding evidence of the
applicant’s financial savings, [the Officer] alleged that there is no evidence
of her fiscal management. The Officer clearly ignored evidence that the
applicant was working as a cleaner (with evidence of her income being deposited
into her bank account) and a hairdresser, while volunteering as a hairdresser
and taking care of her three children. She has evidence of her declared income,
confirmation from her previous employer, confirmation from her volunteering
experiences and an offer of employment. She also has significant savings in her
bank account. Throughout these, she was not on social assistance. The officer
disregarded evidence of her fiscal management. The officer erred in failing to
analyze the degree of the applicant’s establishment.
37. [The Officer] erroneously assumed
that fiscal management is shown by income tax assessment and ignored evidence
of the applicant’s financial savings in excess of $12,000.00. The officer
misconstrued evidence of fiscal management. The officer erred in failing to
analyze the degree of the applicant's establishment.
38. While acknowledging that there is
evidence of her financial savings, the officer stated that submissions were not
made with respect to the applicant’s fiscal management. The statement is not
only internally inconsistent but also shows there was no consideration to the
applicant’s establishment. While acknowledging that there was a sponsorship
application that was to be made by her spouse before his death, the officer
stated that the applicant made minimal efforts to regularize her status. The
statement is equally internally inconsistent but also shows inadequate consideration
to the applicant’s situation. The officer did not at any time consider the application
within the context of the applicant’s particular circumstances or examine the
unique circumstances of this particular applicant.
[Citations omitted.]
[68]
First of all, notwithstanding the Applicant’s
criticisms of the Officer’s establishment analysis, the Officer makes it clear
in the Decision that “employment is a positive element”
even though the Applicant has been working without authorization.
[69]
There are bank statements in the name of the
Applicant and her deceased husband that show financial savings and two entries
that appear to represent income deposits. These are not the same thing as
evidence of the Applicant’s own income or her fiscal management history such as
would be shown in income tax statements. Contrary to the Applicant’s assertion,
the Officer does not disregard evidence of the Applicant’s financial savings.
They are specifically referred to and taken into account. But the evidence she
offers on her assertions of personal income are not proved by a copy of a bank
statement in the name of her deceased husband. And the bank statement from 2015
in the Applicant’s name shows no evidence of income, while the 2016 statement
in her name, shows no evidence of income, but does show savings.
[70]
On the employment situation, the Officer has the
following to say:
With regard to employment, the applicant
provides a letter dated October 8 2015 from a former employer, “Bata Group of
Companies Corporation” which confirms she was in the company’s employ from 2011
to 2014. The letter explains she was a “great individual and a great worker”
and that she earned $18,000 yearly. I note that the applicant has not submitted
updates concerning her employment beyond 2014. In addition, the aforementioned
letter from the employer is not prepared on company letter-head and the word
“corporation” is misspelled.
[71]
There is no indication that any of this counted
against the Applicant. The Officer makes it clear that “employment
is a positive element,” even though it has to be borne in mind that the
Applicant did not have the proper authorization to work.
[72]
On the other hand, the Officer had to examine
the Applicant’s prospects in St. Vincent. The Applicant alleges that the
Officer finds she has positive prospects in St. Vincent and there is no
evidence to this effect. But this is not the Officer’s finding. The Officer
says that “the applicant has not demonstrated that
significant obstacles exist that preclude her from being employed in St
Vincent. I am not persuaded that the applicant would not be able to support
herself and her children if she returns to her country of origin.”
[73]
So, once again, what tells against the Applicant
is that, notwithstanding a positive finding for employment in Canada, the
Applicant did not submit sufficient information to demonstrate a lack of employment
opportunities in St. Vincent. She blames the Officer for this, but the problem
is that she fails to appreciate that the onus was upon her to provide evidence
to support her position.
[74]
The Applicant’s other significant complaint is
characterized as follows in her written submissions:
39. Nowhere in the decision did the
officer really consider the personal situation of the applicant, and the
circumstances under which the applicant is able to demonstrate her
self-sufficiency. The officer did not consider her care for a spouse with
cancer, the impact on her that the spouse died, their failed proposed
sponsorship application, her care of three very young children and the contest
of her still being self-sufficient. The officer did not at any time consider
the application within the context of the applicant’s particular circumstances
or examine the unique circumstances of this particular applicant. The officer
did not even consider the impact of the spouse’s death on the applicant or the
hardship faced by the applicant since and with the death of her spouse. The
applicant’s particular circumstances were not well-identified or defined by the
Officer. Nowhere in the decision did the officer consider the impact on the
applicant that she recently lost her spouse, or that the last few years have
been extremely difficult ones for the applicant with a lot of time spent going
back and forth between home and the hospital. The officer did not consider
that, removing the applicant from Canada soon after the death of her spouse
would render the emotional effects on her especially acute. This is a
reviewable error.
[75]
Many of the factors referred to here are, in
fact, referred to in the Decision. What the Applicant appears to be complaining
about is a general lack of sympathy for her personal loss of her husband and
the supportive things she did for him while he was ill. The Applicant, of
course, deserves everyone’s sympathy and respect for her conduct in this
regard, but she fails to explain how this personal suffering should have
impacted the Officer’s analysis of her establishment in Canada, the best
interests of her children, and what they face in St. Vincent if returned. And
a full reading of the Decision makes it clear that the Officer does acknowledge
and take into account the Applicant’s personal situation when it is relevant to
the analysis.
[76]
For example, the Officer acknowledges and
accepts that the “applicant currently finds herself
alone in Canada with 3 young children and no status” and then goes on to
compare “family support” available to the
Applicant in Canada and St. Vincent. The Officer points out that there is
extensive family in St. Vincent, while “submissions
demonstrate that the sole family member in Canada is Ann Marie Graham, her
sister in law, and she states she is unable to assist the applicant with the
care of the children due to her work obligations.”
[77]
The Officer clearly demonstrates awareness that
the Applicant is a recent widow with three very young children. This is why she
compares family support available in Canada and St. Vincent. Once again,
the difficulty for the Officer was a lack of evidence as to how the difficult
and sad experience that the Applicant and the children have been through
affected the important H&C factors of establishment, conditions in St.
Vincent and the best interests of the children.
[78]
The Officer could have been more effusive in her
sympathies for what the Applicant has been through, but that is not the
Officer’s job. She clearly acknowledges the sadness of the Applicant’s present
situation, but has to assess and analyse that situation in terms of the
prevailing H&C factors, the evidence submitted by the Applicant, and the
governing jurisprudence.
[79]
The same goes for the Court, of course. With all
sympathy for the Applicant and her children, I must, nevertheless, assess the
Officer’s Decision objectively in terms of the governing jurisprudence. When I
do so, I can find no reviewable error with this Decision that requires it to be
returned for reconsideration. As is so often the case in immigration matters,
my sympathies are totally with the Applicant and her children, but my duty is
to assess whether the Decision contains a reviewable error. Unfortunately, I regret
to say that I cannot find one.
[80]
Counsel agree there is no question for
certification and the Court concurs.