Docket: IMM-4416-16
Citation:
2017 FC 452
Ottawa, Ontario, May 5, 2017
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Boswell
BETWEEN:
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SNEZANA
TOSIC-KRAVIC
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
The Applicant, Snezana Tosic-Kravic, is a
Canadian citizen who arrived in Canada in the 1990s. On December 27, 2015, she
completed an application to sponsor her parents to become permanent residents
under the family class; her spouse co-signed the sponsorship application.
Pursuant to section 133 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [Regulations], the Applicant was required
to meet various requirements in order to sponsor her parents, one of which was
to meet a minimum necessary income level. An officer at Immigration, Refugees
and Citizenship Canada [the Officer] refused the Applicant’s application to
sponsor her parents because she failed to meet the minimum necessary income
requirements. She has now applied under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c-27 [IRPA], for judicial
review of the Officer’s decision.
I.
Background
[2]
In order to sponsor her parents as permanent
residents, the Applicant was required, pursuant to clause 133(1) (j) (i)(B) of
the Regulations, to have “a total income that is
at least equal to the minimum necessary income, plus 30%, for each of the three
consecutive taxation years immediately preceding the date of filing of the
sponsorship application.” Since the Applicant’s spouse co-signed the
application, his income could be included in the income calculations pursuant
to sections 132(5) and 134 of the Regulations. The minimum necessary
income for each year is equal to the “low income
cut-off amount” based on the size of the sponsor’s family, plus 30%. The
low income cut-off amount is Statistics Canada’s determination of the minimum
amount of before-tax annual income necessary to support a group of persons.
[3]
It warrants note in the context of this case
that, by virtue of subparagraph 134(1.1) (b) (iv) of the Regulations, a
sponsor’s income cannot include “any amounts paid to
the sponsor under the Employment Insurance Act, other than special
benefits.” Subsection 2(1) of the Employment Insurance Act, SC
1996, c 23, defines “special benefits” as
benefits paid for any reason mentioned in subsection 12(3); namely, benefits
paid because a claimant is pregnant, is caring for one or more new-born
children of the claimant or one or more children placed with the claimant for
the purpose of adoption, has a prescribed illness or injury or is in
quarantine, or is providing care or support to one or more family members or to
one or more critically ill children.
[4]
The sponsorship application form required the
Applicant to outline the different sources of her income, and explicitly asked
whether any amounts had been paid under the Employment Insurance Act,
other than special benefits. The Applicant indicated in her application that
she had not received any payments under the Employment Insurance Act and
that her total income, including the income of her spouse, exceeded the minimum
necessary income for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014. Since the Applicant’s
family consisted of five individuals (i.e., the Applicant, her spouse, child,
and two parents), the minimum necessary income was $62,023 for 2012, $63,833
for 2013, and $64,791 for 2014. The Applicant stated in the application that
she exceeded the minimum necessary income as her total income was $83,505 in
2012, $71,188 in 2013, and $77,558 in 2014; she submitted her and her spouse’s
Notices of Assessment from the Canada Revenue Agency [CRA] to support these
amounts of income.
[5]
An officer from Immigration, Refugees and
Citizenship Canada sent the Applicant a letter dated May 17, 2016, indicating
that her sponsorship application was incomplete. The officer requested that the
Applicant and her spouse submit the original Option C printouts of their 2012,
2013, and 2014 tax assessments from the CRA. This additional documentation
showed that the Applicant’s total income in 2013 was processed as being
$23,837, and of that amount $19,408 was Employment Insurance [EI] benefits
comprised of $14,162 for “Regular EI benefits”
and $5,246 for “Financial assistance to re-enter
workforce.”
II.
The Officer’s Decision
[6]
In a letter dated September 28, 2016, the
Officer advised the Applicant that she was not eligible to sponsor her parents
because, pursuant to subparagraph 133(1) (j) (i), she did not meet the minimum
necessary income requirement. The Officer’s letter included calculations of the
total eligible income of the Applicant and her spouse. These calculations
showed that the Applicant did not meet the minimum necessary income requirement
in the 2013 taxation year. The Officer calculated the Applicant’s eligible
income as $4,429 and her spouse’s income as $49,169, for a total eligible
income of only $53,598, and not $71,188 as indicated in the Applicant’s
application. Since the minimum necessary income requirement in the 2013
taxation year was $63,833, the Applicant’s total eligible income fell below the
required amount by $10,235. The Officer’s notes in the Global Case Management
System show that the “EI regular benefits and Financial
assistance to re-enter workforce income were removed from sponsor’s 2013
income.”
III.
Issues
[7]
This application raises the following issues:
1.
What is the appropriate standard of review?
2.
Was the Officer’s decision unreasonable?
3.
Was the duty of procedural fairness breached by
the Officer?
IV.
Analysis
A.
Standard of Review
[8]
Whether an applicant meets the financial
requirements for sponsorship under the IRPA and its Regulations
is a factual determination and, therefore, is reviewed under the standard of
reasonableness (Pospelova v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013
FC 555 at para 12, [2013] FCJ No 623; Dokaj v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2009 FC 847 at para 18, 180 ACWS (3d) 483).
[9]
Under the reasonableness standard, “reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making
process … also … with whether the decision falls within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”
(Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 [Dunsmuir]).
Those criteria are met if “the reasons allow the
reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it
to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes”:
Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury
Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para 16, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708 [Newfoundland Nurses].
Additionally, “as long as the process and the outcome
fit comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency and
intelligibility, it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its own view
of a preferable outcome”; and it is also not “the
function of the reviewing court to reweigh the evidence”: Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at paras 59, 61, [2009]
1 SCR 339 [Khosa].
[10]
The standard to review issues of procedural
fairness is correctness (Kaur Sidhu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2010 FC 1272 at para 18, 195 ACWS (3d) 1123 [Kaur Sidhu]; Mission
Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24 at para 79, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502; Khosa
at para 43). Under the correctness standard, a reviewing court shows no
deference to the decision maker’s reasoning process and the court will
substitute its own view and provide the correct answer if it disagrees with the
decision maker’s determination (see: Dunsmuir at para 50). Moreover, the
Court must determine whether the process followed in arriving at the decision
under review achieved the level of fairness required by the circumstances of
the matter (see: Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2002 SCC 1 at para 115, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3).
[11]
When applying a correctness standard of review,
it is not only a question of whether the decision under review is correct, but
also a question of whether the process followed in making the decision was fair
(see: Hashi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 154 at
para 14, 238 ACWS (3d) 199; and Makoundi v Canada (Attorney General),
2014 FC 1177 at para 35, 249 ACWS (3d) 112). The content of the duty of
procedural fairness owed by an officer in deciding whether to grant or dismiss
an application to sponsor a family member is low (Kaur Sidhu at paras 26-27).
B.
Was the Officer’s decision unreasonable?
[12]
The Applicant contends that the EI payments in
this case constituted “special benefits”
payments under subparagraph 134(1.1) (b) (iv) of the Regulations because
they were provided to further the Applicant’s education and, consequently,
should not have been deducted from the Applicant’s 2013 eligible income. At the
hearing of this matter, the Applicant argued that the Officer’s decision was
not reasonable because the Officer should have looked to subsection 25(1)
of the IRPA and applied humanitarian and compassionate considerations to
allow the Applicant to sponsor her parents since the shortfall in eligible
income was only a few thousand dollars and only for one year.
[13]
The Respondent argues that the Officer’s
decision was reasonable because the Applicant’s tax return documents indicated
that she did not satisfy the minimum necessary income requirement. The
Respondent notes that the Applicant’s reported income in 2013 consisted of EI
benefits totaling $19,408, and it was reasonable for the Officer to deduct the
EI benefits because subparagraph 134(1.1) (b) (iv) of the Regulations
says a sponsor’s income cannot include “any amounts
paid to the sponsor under the Employment Insurance Act, other than
special benefits.” According to the Respondent, the Officer reasonably
deducted this amount and determined that the Applicant’s eligible income for
the 2013 taxation year was only $4,429.
[14]
None of the arguments advanced by the Applicant
undermine the reasonableness of the Officer’s decision. In this case, the
Officer reasonably determined that the Applicant’s payments under the Employment
Insurance Act, for both regular EI benefits and the financial assistance to
re-enter the workforce, were to be excluded from the Applicant’s eligible
income for her sponsorship application. These payments were not “special benefits” as contemplated by subsections 2(1)
and 12(3) of the Employment Insurance Act. Subparagraph 134(1.1) (b)
(iv) of the Regulations explicitly stipulates that a sponsor’s minimum
necessary income cannot include “any amounts paid to
the sponsor under the Employment Insurance Act, other than special
benefits.” It is clear and transparent that the Officer applied this
provision to exclude the Applicant’s EI benefits from her eligible income.
[15]
Moreover, the Officer’s reasons enable the Court
“to understand why the tribunal made its decision and
permit it to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable
outcomes” (Newfoundland Nurses at para 16). The Officer
reasonably determined that the $19,408 paid to the Applicant under the Employment
Insurance Act did not constitute special benefits and, therefore, this
amount was excluded from the calculation of her income for the purpose of the
sponsorship application.
C.
Was the duty of procedural fairness breached by
the Officer?
[16]
The Applicant says the Officer should have
sought her input and explanation in the case of any material discrepancy with
respect to the income in the CRA documents. The Applicant also says the Officer
failed to request information from her about the full breakdown and nature of
the EI payments. According to the Applicant, the Officer breached the duty of
procedural fairness by failing to comply with the requirements of paragraph
134(2) (a) of the Regulations, which provides:
134 (2) An officer may request from
the sponsor, after the receipt of the sponsorship application but before a
decision is made on an application for permanent residence, updated evidence
of income if
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134 (2)
L’agent peut demander au répondant, après la réception de la demande de
parrainage mais avant qu’une décision ne soit prise sur la demande de
résidence permanente, une preuve de revenu à jour dans les cas suivants :
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(a) the officer receives information indicating that the sponsor is
no longer able to fulfil the obligations of the sponsorship undertaking;
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a) l’agent reçoit des renseignements
montrant que le répondant ne peut plus respecter les obligations de son
engagement à l’égard du parrainage;
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In the Applicant’s
view, the Officer’s failure to provide her with an opportunity to respond to
the EI payments prevented her from being able to assess any errors in the EI
payments or apply under section 25 of the IRPA for relief from the
minimum necessary income requirements based on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds.
[17]
The Applicant’s arguments that the Officer
breached the duty of procedural fairness are without merit. The content of the
duty of procedural fairness is not as high as the Applicant contends. As stated
in Kaur Sidhu: “the decision to grant or dismiss
an application to sponsor a family member is obviously important, but it is not
such as to affect the fundamental rights of an individual” (at para 26).
The duty of fairness owed to the Applicant in this case falls on the lower end
of the spectrum.
[18]
Furthermore, the Applicant was well-aware of the
financial obligations to sponsor her parents and that she received EI payments.
The sponsorship application form required the Applicant to outline the
different sources of her income, and explicitly asked the Applicant to indicate
any amounts “paid to you under the Employment
Insurance Act, other than special benefits.” The Applicant completed
this form and indicated that she had not received any payments under the Employment
Insurance Act. However, after an officer requested additional CRA
documents, the Applicant submitted documents which clearly indicated that she
received $19,408 in EI payments for “regular benefits”
and “assistance to re-enter workforce.”
[19]
The Officer in this case did not breach the duty
of procedural fairness by assessing the Applicant’s sponsorship application
based on the information she submitted. The Officer did not consult any
external sources or address any issues not already known to the Applicant. The
Officer was not required to provide the Applicant with a further opportunity to
provide submissions; nor was the Officer required to request “updated evidence of income” from the Applicant
pursuant to paragraph 134(2) (a) since the Applicant had already provided
evidence of her income on two prior occasions. The Officer had the necessary
information to make a decision and did not breach any duty of fairness by not
providing the Applicant with a third opportunity to submit information about
her income.
V.
Conclusion
[20]
For the reasons stated above, this application
for judicial review is dismissed. The Officer’s decision in this case is
justifiable, transparent, and intelligible, and is an acceptable outcome
defensible in respect of the facts and law.
[21]
Neither party proposed a question for
certification, so no such question is certified.