Docket: IMM-3466-16
Citation:
2017 FC 406
Ottawa, Ontario, July 20, 2017
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice McVeigh
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BETWEEN:
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LOTERIO BROWN
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP
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Respondent
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AMENDED JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
Loterio Brown is a failed refugee claimant in
Canada because he did not complete a Basis of Claim [BOC] form within fifteen
days of arrival as required. His refugee claim was considered abandoned after he
failed to appear at a scheduled hearing. Mr. Brown applied to have his claim
re-opened but was rejected. He applied a second time to have his claim
re-opened and was again rejected. This first second rejection
forms the decision under judicial review.
II.
Background
[2]
Mr. Brown is a citizen of the Bahamas. On May
21, 2016, he arrived in Canada as a tourist. He informed Canada Border Services
Agency [CBSA] that he wished to go shopping, ride a train and visit the zoo.
[3]
The officer interviewing Mr. Brown was concerned
that his stated purpose for visiting Canada was not genuine and that he would not
leave on his stated departure date. The officer told Mr. Brown that he would
draft a report for review by a senior immigration official. Before the report
could be completed Mr. Brown approached the officer and claimed refugee status.
As a result, Mr. Brown was given a number of documents including a BOC package
and a Notice to Appear before being allowed to leave the airport. Mr. Brown
signed an acknowledgment of conditions which detailed deadlines for undergoing
a medical exam and submitting his BOC form.
[4]
Mr. Brown dutifully attended his medical exam
but failed to submit his BOC form or attend a hearing to explain why he had not
submitted his BOC form. Mr. Brown’s claim was considered abandoned and he was
notified of the decision.
[5]
Upon receiving notice of this decision, Mr.
Brown filed to have his case re-opened. He claimed to have never been told
about the BOC form or of the mandatory hearing despite having signed an
acknowledgment that he was told.
[6]
On August 12, 2016, the Refugee Protection
Division [RPD] determined that Mr. Brown’s evidence was not reliable and that
the CBSA officer clearly wrote in his notes that Mr. Brown had been provided
with both the BOC package and Notice to Appear detailing his hearing date and
time. The application was dismissed for failing to disclose a breach of natural
justice.
[7]
Mr. Brown then made a second application to
re-open his claim. In a decision dated November 7, 2016, the RPD found that
there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant re-opening Mr. Brown’s file.
New evidence was presented in the form of a report dated September 2, 2016,
by Jena Ledson, registered psychotherapist and an affidavit from Mr. Brown
himself. However, the RPD found that there was no persuasive evidence
to show that any psychological or language problems were the cause of Mr.
Brown’s failure to follow instructions. To the contrary, the RPD found that Mr.
Brown was educated in an English speaking country with ten years of education
and a diploma.
[8]
In her report, after a 60-90 minute
interview, the psychotherapist acknowledged that testing would be required to
determine the extent and severity of any disabilities Mr. Brown may have.
[9]
The RPD concluded that the evidence with
respect to the extent of an alleged disability was contradictory and the new
evidence presented did not explain Mr. Brown’s failure to comply with refugee
claimant requirements. The level of disability claimed by Mr. Brown did not
correspond to clear answers provided by Mr. Brown during intake with CBSA. As
a result, the RPD determined that no exceptional circumstances existed and the
application to re-open Mr. Brown’s refugee claim was rejected.
III.
Issue
[9]
The issue in this case is whether the RPD’s
decision to not re-open Mr. Brown’s refugee claim was reasonable?
IV.
Standard of Review
[10]
The standard of review applicable to this
decision is reasonableness.
V.
Analysis
[11]
Subsection 62(2) of the Refugee Protection
Division Rules, SOR/2012-256 [RPD Rules] states: The division must not
allow the application unless it is established that there was a failure to
observe a principle of natural justice.
[12]
Subsection 62(8) of the Refugee Protection
Division Rules, SOR/2012-256 [RPD Rules], reads as
follows :
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Subsequent application
(8) If the party made a previous
application to reopen that was denied, the Division must consider the reasons
for the denial and must not allow the subsequent application unless there are
exceptional circumstances supported by new evidence.
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Demande subséquente
(8) Si la partie a déjà présenté
une demande de réouverture qui a été refusée, la Section prend en
considération les motifs du refus et ne peut accueillir la demande
subséquente, sauf en cas de circonstances exceptionnelles fondées sur
l’existence de nouveaux éléments de preuve.
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[13]
Mr. Brown’s judicial review is for his first
second application to re-open a claim. The legal test is different for
the first application to re-open. A first application to re-open a claim
focuses on a breach of natural justice (s.62(6) of the RPD Rules) as opposed to
a second application which requires exceptional circumstances (s.62(8) of the
RPD Rules) for a file to be re-opened. The initial decision found no breach of
natural justice and is not under review.
[14]
The RPD has no discretion to re-open a file
unless there is new evidence that indicates exceptional circumstances. The
first decision was not judicially reviewed and many of the same issues are used
to try and open the decision on the second attempt. This Court has held that a party
cannot re-litigate a final decision which they chose not to judicially review
(Tumanova v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1240 at
paras 19-21).
[15]
The decision maker reviewed the new evidence
and did not find there were exceptional circumstances and I must agree that the
decision was reasonable.
[16]
The decision maker considered Mr. Brown’s
allegation that he was not aware he had to submit a BOC. This argument was
rejected as it is standard operating practice by CBSA intake to provide
instructions for submitting a BOC. Mr. Brown’s argument that he thought the BOC
was only needed for the hearing was also reasonably rejected. Mr. Brown
attended his medical appointment which is part of the CBSA instructions so he
knew of and followed some directions, just not all of them.
[17]
The RPD in Mr. Brown’s first application to
re-open had the allegation that he has difficulty reading and understanding
English. In that decision, it was confirmed that Mr. Brown was educated in an
English speaking country and held a supervisory position before coming to
Canada. The RPD reasonably concluded that Mr. Brown could read and understand
English.
[18]
I find that it was reasonable that the RPD found
there was no failure to observe a principle of natural justice.
[19]
Mr. Brown presented a psychotherapist report
to the RPD in his second application which was not before the board in his
first application. The report indicates that he suffers from several emotional
and psychological problems. Nevertheless, the RPD noted a marked difference
between the answers provided at the CBSA intake and the alleged confusion and
lack of focus now being exhibited by Mr. Brown. It found that these newly
alleged psychological problems did not explain why Mr. Brown followed some
directions (such as attending his medical appointment) but not others.
[20]
The RPD noted that some of Mr. Brown’s recent
emotional stress may be attributed to his recent HIV positive diagnosis. The psychotherapist
equally acknowledged that the present circumstances could have an influence on
how he now presents. The RPD reasonably found that there was contradictory
evidence regarding Mr. Brown’s failure to comply and that the new evidence did
not explain why he did not comply with the board’s requirements. They reasonably
concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances present in this case.
[21]
This decision exhibits justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision making process and the
decision is within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes, defensible in
fact and law (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9; Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12). For those reasons I
will dismiss the application for judicial review.
[22]
No question was presented for certification.