REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
Jorré J.
Introduction
[1]
The Appellant, Chantal Cyr, runs a music school.
The issue before the Court is whether five music teachers were engaged in
insurable employment. Specifically, during the period from January 1, 2013
to March 19, 2014 were Amélie Poupart, Jessica Muneret, Kim Derome, Maxime Capuano and
Lionel Charles engaged in insurable employment?
[2]
The Appellant’s position is that the teachers
were independent contractors. The position of the Minister of National Revenue is
that they were employees of the Appellant.
The Law
[3]
While there are well‑established
principles for distinguishing a contract of employment from a contract of
enterprise or for services, an independent contractor, the variety of
employment and business arrangements are such that in some cases the
application of those principles can be difficult.
[4]
Paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Employment
Insurance Act says that insurable employment is “employment
in Canada by one or more employers, under any express or implied contract of
service”.
[5]
The paragraph does not define a contract of
service. To determine if there is a contract of service, one must turn to the
general civil law in the relevant province to determine whether there is a
contract of employment.
[6]
The Civil Code of Québec (Civil Code)
provides as follows:
2085. A
contract of employment is a contract by which a person, the employee,
undertakes, for a limited time and for remuneration, to do work under the
direction or control of another person, the employer.
[7]
In this case, the teachers perform work and are
paid for it. The key question is whether the teachers worked under the
direction or control of the Appellant, the third element required in a contract
of employment.
[8]
The Civil Code defines a contract of
enterprise or for services as follows:
2098. A
contract of enterprise or for services is a contract by which a person, the
contractor or the provider of services, as the case may be, undertakes to
another person, the client, to carry out physical or intellectual work or to
supply a service, for a price which the client binds himself to pay to him.
[9]
The main principles of law in distinguishing
these two kinds of relationship have been reviewed in numerous decisions
including the Federal Court of Appeal decisions in Grimard v. Canada and 1392644 Ontario Inc.
(Connor Homes) v. Canada (National Revenue)
as well as the Supreme Court of Canada decision in 671122 Ontario Ltd. v.
Sagaz Industries Canada Inc.
[10]
I do not propose to do any extensive review of
these cases. The key points of the jurisprudence are as follows:
1. As with all
contracts, intention of the parties is always a factor but the intention cannot
override the actual arrangements between the parties if those arrangements are inconsistent
with the intention.
2. The key test of
employment in the civil law is control or subordination of the worker, the
judicial subordination of the worker. What matters is not whether the control
is exercised but whether the payer has the right to exercise that control.
3. The civil law
indicia of control are discussed by the author Robert Gagnon in his book Le
droit du travail du Québec where he says:
[TRANSLATION]
92 — Concept — Historically, the civil law
first developed a so-called strict or classical concept of legal subordination
that was used as a test for the application of the principle of the civil
liability of a principal for injury caused by the fault of his agents and
servants in the performance of their duties (art. 1054 C.C.L.C.; art. 1463
C.C.Q.). This classical legal subordination was characterized by the immediate
control exercised by the employer over the performance of the employee’s work
in respect of its nature and the means of performance. Gradually, it was
relaxed, giving rise to the concept of legal subordination in a broad sense. The
diversification and specialization of occupations and work techniques often
mean that the employer cannot realistically dictate regarding, or even directly
supervise, the performance of the work. Thus, subordination has come to be
equated with the power given a person, accordingly recognized as the employer,
of determining the work to be done, overseeing its performance and controlling
it. From the opposite perspective, an employee is a person who agrees to be
integrated into the operating environment of a business so that it may receive
benefit of his or her work. In practice, one looks for a number of indicia of
supervision that may, however, vary depending on the context: compulsory
attendance at a workplace, the fairly regular assignment of work, imposition of
rules of conduct or behaviour, requirement of activity reports, control over
the quantity or quality of the work done, ownership of tools, chance of profit,
risk of loss and so on. Work in the home does not preclude this sort of
integration into the business.
4. In Grimard,
above, Justice Létourneau of the Federal Court of Appeal explained that there
is no antinomy between the Quebec civil law and the common law in determining
whether or not there is a contract of employment. The conceptual approaches of
the two legal systems differ, but as a practical matter the indicia used to
determine whether or not there is control or subordination in the civil law and
the indicia used in the common law are much the same.
5. The kinds of
considerations mentioned by Robert Gagnon, above, are comparable to those used
in the common law.
6. For example, in Connor
Homes, above, the Federal Court of Appeal says:
41 The central question at issue remains
whether the person who has been engaged to perform the services is, in actual
fact, performing them as a person in business on his own account. As stated in
both Wiebe Door and Sagaz, in making this determination no
particular factor is dominant and there is no set formula. The factors to
consider will thus vary with the circumstances. Nevertheless, the specific
factors discussed in Wiebe Door and Sagaz will usually be
relevant, such as the level of control over the worker’s activities, whether
the worker provides his own equipment, hires his helpers, manages and assumes
financial risks, and has an opportunity of profit in the performance of his
tasks.
7. This is similar
to the following statements of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Sagaz,
above:
47 Although there is no universal test to
determine whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor, I agree
with MacGuigan J.A. that a persuasive approach to the issue is that taken by
Cooke J. in Market Investigations, supra. The central question is
whether the person who has been engaged to perform the services is performing
them as a person in business on his own account. In making this determination,
the level of control the employer has over the worker’s activities will always
be a factor. However, other factors to consider include whether the worker provides
his or her own equipment, whether the worker hires his or her own helpers, the
degree of financial risk taken by the worker, the degree of responsibility for
investment and management held by the worker, and the worker’s opportunity for
profit in the performance of his or her tasks.
48 It bears repeating that the above
factors constitute a non‑exhaustive list, and there is no set formula as
to their application. The relative weight of each will depend on the particular
facts and circumstances of the case.
8. Consequently, in
determining whether or not there is a contract of employment, the following
principles are to be applied:
(a) One considers the
parties’ intention and whether the actual contract is consistent with that
intention.
(b) To determine the
nature of the contract, one looks for the presence or absence of indicia of control
or subordination. What matters is the power to control, whether or not it is
exercised.
(c) There is no
fixed list of indicia, all relevant factors are to be considered; the relevance
and weight of the indicia will vary with the context.
(d) Among the matters
to be considered are compulsory attendance at a workplace, the fairly regular
assignment of work, imposition of rules of conduct, responsibility for
management, requirement of activity reports, control over the quantity or
quality of the work done, the ability to hire helpers, ownership of tools, the
investment made by the worker, chance of profit or loss and the degree of risk.
[11]
With these principles in mind, let us turn to
the evidence.
The Facts
[12]
The Minister made his determination on the
following basis:
The Appellant
(a) the
Appellant operated a music school;
(b) the
Appellant operated as sole-proprietor;
(c) the
Appellant registered the business on October 15, 1998;
(d) the
Appellant operated under the name Vimont Musique;
(e) the
Appellant had 350 to 400 students;
(f) the
business hours were Monday to Friday from 2:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. and Saturday
from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.;
(g) the
Appellant hired 20 teachers and 4 to 5 administrative employees;
(h) the Appellant
sold books and materials related to the courses;
The Workers
(i) the
Workers were hired as music teachers by the Appellant;
(j) Lionel
Charles gave lessons in bass, guitar and ukulele;
(k) Maxime
Capuano gave guitar lessons;
(l) Kim
Derome gave piano lessons;
(m) Jessica
Muneret gave guitar lessons;
(n) Amélie
Poupart gave piano lessons;
(o) the
Workers gave lessons to the clients of the Appellant;
(p) the
Workers and the Appellant were dealing with each other at arm’s length;
(q) the
Workers gave lessons at the Appellant’s business location;
(r) the
Workers performed their duties during the business hours of the music school;
(s) the
Appellant established the schedule for the lessons;
(t) the
Appellant managed the Workers’ schedules;
(u) the
Workers and the Appellant entered into written contracts;
(v) the
Appellant provided the Workers with specific instructions on the work to be
completed;
(w) the
Appellant required that the material covered in the lessons included solfeggio
(note reading), ear training and music theory;
(x) the
Appellant imposed a dress code;
(y) the
Workers were required to keep the students’ parents up to date on their
progress;
(z) the
Workers required the Appellant’s permission if they needed to be absent;
(aa) the
Workers provided their own musical instruments;
(bb) certain
instruments such as the piano and drums were provided by the Appellant, to
facilitate teaching;
(cc) the
Appellant provided the premises where the music lessons took place;
(dd) the
Workers were paid between $16.00 to $20.00 dollars per hour by the Appellant;
(ee) the
Workers’ hourly rate was determined by the Appellant;
(ff) the
hourly rate was based on experience, seniority and education;
(gg) the
Workers were paid by cheque;
(hh) the
Workers were paid every two weeks;
(ii) the
Appellant established the fee for the lessons;
(jj) the
clients paid about $40.00 per hour for the lessons;
(kk) the
clients paid the Appellant for the lessons;
(ll) the
Workers did not invoice the Appellant;
(mm) the
Appellant provided a pay slip to each worker for the period from January to
June and another for the period from September to December for each year;
(nn) the
Workers had to sign the pay slip;
(oo) the
clients were exclusively the Appellants;
(pp) the
Appellant prohibited the exchange of phone numbers or contact information
between the Workers and the clients;
(qq) the
Workers did not incur expenses;
(rr) the
Appellant considered the Workers to be self-employed; and
(ss) the Appellant
issued T4 slips to the Workers in 2012.
[13]
The Appellant disagrees with many of the factual
assumptions.
[14]
The Appellant testified as well as two of the
workers, Amélie Poupart and Kim Derome.
Intention
[15]
After this section I examine the indicia of
supervision as shown by the actual behaviour.
That examination leads to a clear conclusion as to the nature of the
contractual relationship even if I assume that in this case the intention was
to have a contract for services.
[16]
As a consequence it is not necessary for me to
decide the intention although some of the discussion and some of the evidence
referred to in this section are relevant to the following sections.
[17]
Prior to 2013 the school had treated all the
teachers as employees.
[18]
It was clear from the Appellant’s testimony that
some time towards the end of 2012 she made a decision that, as of the beginning
of 2013, the school would treat the teachers as independent contractors. She
testified that the school advised the teachers of this change by a letter that
went out with the last pay cheque for 2012. Unfortunately, the letter is not in
evidence.
[19]
She explained the reasons for the change. When
she started the school she had a particular vision of how music should be
taught and wanted the school to operate in accordance with that vision. However,
the industry was changing and she decided that the school would operate
differently.
[20]
Nothing in the evidence suggests that there was
any discussion with the teachers before the school made the decision to change
the status of the employees. The new arrangement appears to have simply been
imposed by the payer without negotiation.
[21]
On the other hand, there is no suggestion that
any teachers objected to the new contracts and the teachers signed the new
contracts.
[22]
The two signed contracts in evidence, Exhibits R‑1
and R‑2 are identical one‑page documents except for the teacher who
signed and the fact that one teacher was paid $0.25 more than the other for
each 30‑minute class.
[23]
The contracts are consistent with the school
being behind the change; they are entitled “Procedures and Regulations
2013-2014” and say, just below the heading “Please read and sign your
acceptance”.
[24]
Given that the teachers accepted the terms in Exhibits
R‑1 and R‑2, there is a common agreement upon those terms and as a
result a common intent in respect of the terms reflected in that document.
[25]
I will paraphrase or describe the agreement:
The agreement is entitled “Procedures and Regulations
2013-2014” with the subtitle “For all the independent teachers of Vimont
Musique”.
There are then the following clauses to the
agreement:
1. Teachers should
be punctual and advise the school of any changes to the teaching schedule.
2. The teachers are
to provide their own teaching material including the musical instrument (except
for pianos and drums) as well as the musical scores for the students.
3. We ask you to
give a complete course including note reading, ear training and music theory.
Students were advised that this would be included in the course.
4. It is important
to keep parents informed of the progress of their child. It is essential to
talk to the parents after the course and advise them of the homework.
5. There should be
no personal telephone calls, other than emergencies, during class hours.
6. Even though it
is sometimes difficult to remain patient, no rudeness towards students, their
parents or other teachers will be tolerated.
7. No solicitation
of students will be tolerated. There will be no sale of any kind between the
teachers and the students at the school. Students who wish to purchase a
product will do so using the school as an intermediary.
8. Professors and
students may not exchange telephone numbers and contact information. Students
having questions related to their course must do so by contacting the school
reception by telephone. The exchange of information using Myspace, Facebook or
similar sites is prohibited.
9. The ninth clause
imposes a dress code to further the professional image of the school.
10. Each student is
to be given two makeup classes per year provided they advised that they would
be absent at least 24 hours in advance. The clause continues by suggesting
teachers plan to do work or to practise during periods when they do not have a
class.
11. This clause
provides a pay rate of $9.50 (or $9.75 in the other contract) for each 30‑minute
class with a single student and a pay rate of $8 per student for group classes.
12. Each independent
teacher is required to provide a receipt for payments received at Christmas
time, at the end of the school year and, if he leaves before then, on his last
day of work. Payments will be made by cheque every two weeks.
13. This clause
requires the teachers to keep the classrooms clean and prohibits the teachers
from wearing boots in the classroom in winter time.
14. This clause says
that the kitchen is available for teachers, but it is their responsibility to
properly wash up and clean up. It also says that pianos are not to be used as
tables.
[26]
Finally, after these clauses is a statement just
before the signature lines where it is stated that the teacher agrees that he
or she has read the document and understands that failure to conform to the
regulations in the document can lead to the loss of the teacher’s students
without notice.
[27]
It must be remembered that what matters in the
contract are the terms and conditions agreed to by the parties and not simply
the words chosen by the parties to characterize the nature of the contract. As Justice
Mainville of the Federal Court of Appeal puts it in Connor Homes, above:
“In other words, it is insufficient to simply state in
a contract that the services are provided as an independent contractor to make
it so.”
[28]
While the references to independent teacher in
the second line and at the beginning of clause 12 are consistent with a
contract for services, the actual terms of the agreement are not so clear.
[29]
The terms and conditions impose many rules on
the teachers including the teaching of musical notation, ear training and
musical theory and a dress code. Without the word “independent”, these look a
lot like rules applied to teachers under a contract of employment.
[30]
On the other hand, a number of terms which
suggest control can equally be seen as consistent with the teachers working
under a contract for services; for example, given that the school provides the
premises it is normal for it to be advised of schedule changes so it can
allocate a classroom and for it to impose conditions on the use of its
facilities (clean them up after use).
[31]
Similarly, the requirement for teachers to
provide their own musical instrument — except for drums and pianos — is, by
itself, consistent with either a contract of employment or a contract for
services. It is common for musicians to own their instrument whether they are employees
or self‑employed.
[32]
Overall, the terms of the agreement look more
like a contract of employment than a contract for services; however, it is
clear that much of the actual arrangement is not expressed in the agreement
and, depending on the totality of the terms of the actual agreement, the terms of the agreement could
be consistent with either contract of employment or a contract for services. In
that sense, the actual terms of the written agreement are inconclusive.
[33]
The two other factors to note in relation to
intention are the following:
1. In testifying,
Kim Derome mentioned that one thing that had changed was the expenses she could
deduct for income tax purposes. I take this to be a reference to her claiming
additional expenses as an independent contractor. This is conduct consistent
with an intention to be an independent contractor. It does not change the terms
of the contract.
2. Ms. Derome
testified with regard to the receipts shown in Exhibit R‑4. She testified
that these two receipts had been prepared by the school and given to her. Amélie
Poupart testified that in years subsequent to the period in issue she provided
invoices sporadically. For the periods in question she was less certain, but
thought that the receipts may have been provided at the end of the year.
Normally one would expect a person providing a service to invoice the customer
on or before payment. Providing receipts after the fact is not consistent with
that.
[34]
To summarize:
1. There
was an intention initiated by the Appellant to have the workers engaged under a
contract of service and the Appellant drafted an agreement that she believed
reflected that intention.
2. The employees
accepted the agreement and signed it.
3. However, the
terms of the written agreement are, in themselves, inconclusive as to the
nature of the agreement.
[35]
As I said earlier, it is unnecessary for me to
reach a conclusion on intention.
Indicia of Supervision, the
Objective Reality — Evidence and Analysis
Control
[36]
The students were clients of the school and paid
the school for the music lessons. Classes were held at the school’s premises.
[37]
During the period in question, the school
operated during fixed hours. Within the framework of those fixed hours, the
teachers would advise the school of the days and hours during which they were
available for the particular session.
[38]
However, although the teachers made themselves
available for certain hours and had more flexibility than in the past, it was
the school that assigned the work by assigning students to specific teachers at
certain times. There was also no guarantee that there would be work during all
the hours proposed by the teacher and there were some class periods when a
teacher was available but was not assigned a student. Whether work was assigned
was, of course, a function of the student demand for music lessons.
[39]
Before 2013 the school had imposed much more of
the class content than after 2012 when teachers became relatively free to
decide how to teach and what music to choose for the lessons. The teachers were
contractually bound to include musical notation, ear training and music theory
in their classes although the evidence suggested that if a student resisted
these subjects the teacher might de‑emphasize them. The teachers were
also subject to the dress code. This contractual requirement does indicate the
right to exercise some control
[40]
The Appellant explained that when hiring
teachers the school ensured that the individual had appropriate experience and
qualifications. She also explained that they would ask potential teachers how
they would conduct the class so as to ensure that the teachers fit within one
of the teaching philosophies accepted by the school.
[41]
By choosing to contract with teachers whose
teaching philosophy is aligned with one of the philosophies accepted by the
school, one is reducing the need to actually exercise control.
[42]
Overall, holding classes at the school, the Appellant
assigning the work and setting some content requirements directly are all
indicia of control that point in the direction of a contract of employment,
although not strongly so.
Ownership of the Tools/Investment
[43]
The school premises where classes are held are a
significant investment.
[44]
Apart from the school the main tools used for
the classes were musical instruments. When the student studied playing drums or
the piano the school provided the instrument.
[45]
For other instruments the evidence was that the
students would have their own instrument and the teachers would also have their
own instrument.
[46]
Given that the teachers are musicians they would
own at least one instrument that they played; this would typically be whether
they are students, employees or independent contractors or any combination of
the three. There is no suggestion that they specifically bought an instrument
just for the purpose of a music teaching business.
[47]
Ms. Derome was a piano teacher; in her
case, unlike the four other teachers, she taught using a school instrument.
[48]
It also came out in evidence that the teachers
would use their own computer, for example to get musical scores. Again there
was no suggestion that these computers were bought specifically for a teaching
business.
[49]
Overall, the school’s investment in its premises
is a greater investment than that of the teachers. This points somewhat towards
a contract of employment.
Helpers
[50]
There was evidence that if teachers could not
make a class they could arrange for someone else to replace them. The evidence
I heard from the two teachers who testified suggests that the first thing that
teachers who could not make a class did was to see if they could reschedule the
class, something that might not be that difficult where they were teaching a
single student. If they could not do that, they would find a substitute, often
another teacher at the school but also, sometimes, someone who is not a current
teacher. That teacher was paid either by the teacher or the school.
[51]
No one suggested that the substitute was ever
paid less than the teacher would have earned for teaching the particular class
if the teacher had been present.
[52]
Apart from the fact that here the substitute was
sometimes paid by the worker, this is not all that different from what often
happens in employment situations. It is not uncommon for employers to
accommodate employees’ need to change their schedule in circumstances where the
employee arranges for an alternate replacement employee, normally another
existing employee.
[53]
While the school’s practice gave a certain
additional flexibility to the workers, this is not the same as a situation
where the contractor is free to hire workers to do part or even all of the work
he was contracted to do and where their rate of pay is set so as to increase
the contractor’s profitability. I am quite satisfied that had a teacher who had
been just engaged by the school to teach during the next semester turned around
immediately after his engagement and hired someone else to teach all his
classes, the school would have, to say the least, been surprised and would have
vigorously opposed the subcontracting of the entire session; it is clear that
the school was concerned with the quality of the teaching, something it cared
about when choosing teachers.
[54]
What we have here is an ability by each teacher
to arrange a replacement teacher when circumstances make it necessary. This is
not a full‑fledged ability to hire helpers. Overall, it is not a clear
indicator one way or another.
Chance of Profit/Risk of
Loss
[55]
The arrangement does not give the teachers any
real possibility to increase profitability.
[56]
If they teach for more hours they can earn more
but that is no different from any employee. Because they are paid by the
quantity of time spent teaching, they cannot increase their revenue per hour
even if they find a way to achieve a given result in training students more
quickly than previously.
[57]
As we have seen in the discussion on helpers,
they cannot cut costs by hiring lower cost workers to do all or part of the
work they have contracted to do.
[58]
There is very little in the way of other costs
that they could reduce to increase their profits.
[59]
I note that because, normally, they already own
their musical instrument that cost is relatively fixed and relatively modest
and, in any event, depending on the circumstances of the individual teacher not
all of its cost necessarily relates to the individual’s teaching.
[60]
Thus, the teachers have no material chance of
profit or risk of loss and, as a result, this clearly points in the direction
of a contract of employment.
Other Factors
[61]
The Appellant points out that the teachers had
other opportunities to earn income at the school. For example, they could teach
what was referred to as a “master class” for any interested students; where
they did this they would be paid by the students and not by the school. They
could also earn money as accompanists to students doing recitals. They were
also free to sell recordings of their own music.
[62]
The evidence does not reveal how often a master class
occurred or whether this represented significant revenues for the teachers in
issue. The teachers who testified both said they had never taught a master
class.
[63]
These opportunities do not appear to be
significant. I do not see how allowing teachers to sell their own recordings
helps qualify the relationship. I am not satisfied these events make much of a
difference for the issue here. Also, when a teacher accompanied a student at a
recital, he was hired by the student; this is outside the contractual
relationship with the school.
[64]
Usually a person running a business has to
invest a certain amount of effort managing it. The five teachers in issue here
do not really manage much; once they have advised the school of their
availability, it is pretty much the school that makes the management decisions.
[65]
It is true that once the students and the time are
assigned, the teachers, within the very general framework set out by the
employer,
will in very large measure exercise their own skill, experience and judgment in
carrying out the musical training but that is not unique to an independent
contractor; skilled workers and professionals commonly do this, whether they
are employees or performing a contract for services. When teaching and when
preparing for classes, the workers are carrying out the work; they are not
managing it.
[66]
In the period, on the evidence before me, while
teachers appear to have other activities as musicians and while the teachers
were free to teach elsewhere or privately as long as they did not teach
students from the school, there is little evidence on the extent this was done
by the five teachers and little reason to conclude that the five teachers were
doing a significant amount of teaching elsewhere. Further, the fact of teaching
at another school does not tell us in what capacity it is done; it may be under
a contract of employment or a contract for services.
Overall Assessment of the Indicia
[67]
When one ways up the indicia, particularly the
absence of any real chance of profit or risk of loss, investment and who is
doing the management, and the fact that the school assigns the students to the
teachers,
it is clear that the workers giving music classes for the Appellant are doing
so under a contract of employment. The lessons given at Vimont are not part of
a teaching business of the workers.
[68]
As a result, it is clear that the Minister came
to the correct determination and I must dismiss the appeal.
[69]
Before concluding I would like to discuss the
two cases relied on by the Appellant: Wincza v. M.N.R. and Lomness-Seely v. M.N.R.
[70]
In Lomness-Seely, the Appellant was a
professional dancer who took the position that she was not an employee of a
dance school. There are a number of parallels with the situation here; however,
there are a number of important differences regarding control. In Lomness-Seely,
the Appellant’s “control of the classroom was absolute”. That is not the case here
where, for example, there is the contractual obligation to teach musical
notation, ear training and music theory and there are a number of rules such as
the dress code imposed by the contract on the teachers. Another important
difference is that Ms. Lomness-Seely was in fact able to increase her
revenues. Not only did Ms. Lomness-Seely negotiate her hourly rate, but
she was able to renegotiate her hourly rate upward if the success of her class
resulted in more students enrolling in it.
Thus, she was able to increase her profitability per teaching hour, giving her
a chance of profit.
[71]
That is a different situation from here. I am
satisfied that Lomness‑Seely does not apply to the circumstances
here.
[72]
Wincza is an interesting
case involving music teachers at the Hamilton Conservatory for the Arts. In
some ways I find that decision surprising given that the contract reproduced appears to impose a lot of
control on the teachers.
[73]
It is less surprising when I consider the
conclusions the Court reached in respect of what it viewed as the most
important characteristics.
These include, notably, that the workers established the fees to be paid by the
students, that the workers paid to the Conservatory a fixed amount per hour of
lessons, that the teachers paid their own expenses to advertise for students
and that the Conservatory collected the workers’ pay (i.e. the student fee)
from the students on behalf of the workers while only retaining its fixed fee
of $10 per hour.
It appears that it is as if, in essence, the Court viewed the Conservatory as a
service provider to the teachers — although it did not express itself in such
terms.
[74]
This case is rather different and Wincza
is not applicable to the circumstances here.
Conclusion
[75]
For these reasons, I conclude that the Minister
correctly determined that the workers were engaged under a contract of service
and the appeal will be dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Ontario, this 13th day of February 2017.
“Gaston Jorré”
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