Docket: A-481-14
Citation:
2016 FCA 82
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CORAM:
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NOËL C.J.
STRATAS J.A.
RENNIE J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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GORDON TETI
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Appellant
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on
March 14, 2016).
STRATAS J.A.
[1]
The appellant asks this Court to set
aside a judgment of the Federal Court dated October 16, 2014 (per Hughes
J.), grant his application for judicial review, and quash an adjudicator’s
decision dated September 19, 2013: 2013 PSLRB 112. The adjudicator, acting
under the Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2,
dismissed the appellant’s four grievances.
[2]
At the outset of this appeal, the
appellant sought to introduce evidence that was not before the adjudicator, as
he did in the Federal Court and as he did in interlocutory motions in this
Court. This new evidence is not admissible: Connolly v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2014 FCA 294, 466 N.R. 44; Bernard v. Canada (Revenue Agency),
2015 FCA 263; Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v. Access
Copyright, 2012 FCA 22, 428 N.R. 297 at paragraph 11; Collins v. Canada,
2014 FCA 240, 466 N.R. 127.
[3]
The Federal Court properly selected
reasonableness as the standard of review. The adjudicator’s decision is a
factually-suffused one made under his home statute and protected by a strong
privative clause: Public Service Labour Relations Act, ss. 51(1); Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at paras. 52-54; Exeter
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 251, 465 N.R. 346.
[4]
Our remaining task on appeal is to assess
whether the Federal Court properly conducted reasonableness review. The Federal
Court found that the adjudicator acted within his margin of appreciation with
an acceptable and defensible basis for dismissing each of the four grievances
before him. We agree with the Federal Court.
[5]
Administrative decision-makers, such as
the adjudicator in the circumstances of this particular case, normally enjoy a
relatively broad margin of appreciation when they make factually-suffused
decisions within a specialized employment context: Canada (A.G.) v. Kane,
2012 SCC 64, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 398; Canada (Attorney General) v. Boogaard,
2015 FCA 150. In conducting reasonableness review, we are not to make the
decision the adjudicator should have made or assess what the Tribunal did
against what we might have done. Parliament has given the adjudicator—not
us—the responsibility of determining cases like this one. Thus, we are
restricted to merely a reviewing role and, in cases such as this, that role is
a deferential one.
[6]
In careful, detailed reasons the
adjudicator applied the statutory standards and criteria in the Act and the
jurisprudence of other adjudicators to the evidence before him and dismissed
the grievances. The appellant has not persuaded us that the dismissal of the
grievances was unreasonable.
[7]
Before us, the appellant submits that the
Federal Court erred in not dealing with particular submissions he made on the
standard of review. We disagree. It seems clear that by selecting
reasonableness as the standard of review, the Federal Court rejected the
appellant’s submissions that it should review the adjudicator’s decision for
correctness.
[8]
Much of the appellant’s memorandum
attacks certain interlocutory decisions in the Federal Court, on occasion
relying upon constitutional provisions. Those interlocutory decisions—not
appealed—are now final. They cannot be the subject of debate in this appeal.
[9]
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we
will dismiss the appeal. Fairly, in light of the “no
costs” disposition of the Federal Court, the respondent does not ask for
costs on appeal. Thus, none shall be awarded.
“David Stratas”
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