Docket: A-520-15
Citation:
2016 FCA 195
CORAM:
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GAUTHIER J.A.
SCOTT J.A.
DE MONTIGNY J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
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Appellant
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and
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ABDULLAH
ALMALKI, KHUZAIMAH KALIFAH, ABDULRAHMAN ALMALKI, by his Litigation Guardian
Khuzaimah Kalifah, SAJEDA ALMALKI, by her Litigation Guardian Khuzaimah
Kalifah, MUAZ ALMALKI, by his Litigation Guardian Khuzaimah Kalifah, ZAKARIYY
A ALMALKI, by his Litigation Guardian Khuzaimah Kalifah, NADIM ALMALKI,
FATIMA ALMALKI, AHMAD ABOU-ELMAATI, BADR ABOU-ELMAATI, SAMIRA AL-SHALLASH,
RASHA ABOU-ELMAATI, MUAYYED NUREDDIN, ABDUL JABBAR NUREDDIN, FADILA SIDDIQU,
MOFAK NUREDDIN, AYDIN NUREDDIN, YASHAR NUREDDIN, AHMED NUREDDIN, SARAB
NUREDDIN, BYDA NUREDDIN
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Respondents
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REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
GAUTHIER J.A.
[1]
The Attorney General of Canada (AGC) appeals
from the decision of Justice Richard Mosley of the Federal Court (the judge),
who concluded that the application of section 18.1 of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 [CSIS Act] in the
particular circumstances of this case would be “invalid”
(2015 FC 1278). More particularly, the judge found that section 18.1 was not
merely a procedural rule of evidence, that it would have a retrospective
application, and that applying it would affect the vested rights of the
respondents in the disclosure of the information identifying the human source
involved in this matter, subject only to the weighing of the factors provided
for at section 38 and following of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-5 [CEA]. I note that reference in these reasons to section 38
encompasses sections 38 to 38.16 of the CEA.
[2]
The finding of the judge in respect of the
application of subsection 18(1) of the CSIS Act is not the subject of
the appeal. Thus, the question involving the redacted information relating to Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) employees will be dealt with in the
section 38 proceeding in accordance with the judge’s finding at paragraph 55 of
his reasons.
[3]
It is worth mentioning immediately that this
appeal only requires the application of well-established principles of
statutory interpretation to the particular provision under review. That said, this
does not mean that the question before us is easy, for it concerns the temporal
application of the new statutory class privilege given to CSIS human sources
pursuant to section 18.1 of the CSIS Act. As noted by Professors Côté,
Beaulac and Devinat in Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 2011) at 116, transitional law is one of the most difficult fields in
law.
[4]
For the reasons that follow, I would allow the
appeal.
I.
Background
[5]
The general background and relevant procedural
history of the civil proceedings instituted by Messrs. Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad
Abou-Elmaati, Muayyed Nureddin and certain family members (collectively
referred to as the respondents), and the ensuing applications made by the AGC
under section 38 of the CEA, are fully set out in the judge’s reasons (see
paragraphs 14 to 36).
[6]
For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that more
than ten years ago, the respondents instituted civil proceedings before the
Ontario Superior Court to claim damages arising from an alleged breach of their
rights and freedoms protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to
the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
[7]
In the context of mediation attempts, as well as
in the course of the pre-trial discovery process after the mediation failed,
the AGC produced many redacted documents but refused to produce information
that would tend to identify covert human sources of CSIS. Among other things, the
AGC invoked the national security privilege.
[8]
As a result, the AGC commenced two applications
pursuant to section 38 of the CEA. The first application, which related
to documents provided in contemplation of mediation, was addressed in file
DES-1-10. The second application, which related to the respondents’ request for
disclosure of all relevant documents after the mediation failed, was addressed in
DES-1-11. The DES-1-10 application was disposed of in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Almalki et al, 2010 FC 1106, [2012] 2 FCR 508 [Almalki 2010]
and Canada (Attorney General) v. Almalki, 2011 FCA 199, [2012] 2 FCR
594 [Almalki 2011].
[9]
It is over the course of the current section 38
proceeding in DES-1-11, in October 2014, that Bill C-44, an Act to Amend the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and other Acts, was introduced. It
came into effect on April 23, 2015 as the Protection of Canada from
Terrorists Act, S.C. 2015, c. 9. It is generally understood and agreed that
the amendments at issue in this appeal were made in response to recent
jurisprudential developments which indicated that contrary to CSIS’s belief, their
human sources did not benefit from the common law absolute privilege afforded
to police informers. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, 2014 SCC 37 at para. 87, [2014] 2
S.C.R. 33 [Harkat] that if this was felt to be desirable, only the
legislator could create such a new class privilege. A similar message had been
sent by our Court in Almalki 2011 at para. 34.
[10]
Consequently, the parties, including the duly
appointed amici, made oral and written submissions to the judge with
regard to the interpretation and application of the new and revised legislation,
which could impact on the judge’s ability to weigh the factors set out in
section 38 of the CEA with respect to information that could identify
human sources.
II.
The Federal Court decision
[11]
On November 23, 2015, the judge issued
what he characterized as an interlocutory decision on this important and
distinct question. Indeed, the judge notes at paragraph 63 of his reasons that
if section 18.1 applied to the case, “it [would] effectively
oust [his] jurisdiction […] to adjudicate the disclosure of information which
may identify a human source under s 38 of the CEA.”
[12]
The judge starts his analysis by stating that
there is a strong presumption that the legislator does not intend its laws to
apply either retroactively or retrospectively. He mentions that the distinction
between retrospectivity and retroactivity can be difficult to ascertain. He
then explains that while the parties agree that section 18.1 should not apply
retroactively or retrospectively, they differ on whether its application in the
proceeding before him would be prospective (see judge’s reasons at para. 63).
[13]
It appears that the debate before the judge was
focused on whether section 18.1 was meant to apply to all proceedings,
regardless of when they had started, provided there had been no disclosure of
the human source information prior to that date. The judge appears to have
accepted the arguments of the respondents that the focus should be on the
definition of “human source” at section 2 of the
CSIS Act (see para. 23 below), because when one applies the definition
to this case, it refers to events that took place well before the amendments
were adopted. Thus, the respondents argued that the application of section 18.1
would make it at least retrospective, if not retroactive.
[14]
Interestingly, the judge notes that the
respondents argued that the AGC seeks to confer new legal status on past events
(see judge’s reasons at para. 67), but does not discuss this argument any
further before concluding that to apply section 18.1 to a human source that
provided information thirteen or fourteen years before the date of the
enactment would be to give the legislation a retrospective effect (see judge’s
reasons at para. 72).
[15]
In his view, the only question left to be
resolved was whether the legislation affects substantive or vested rights. The
judge’s approach appears to have been based on paragraph 10 of R. v. Dineley,
2012 SCC 58, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 272 [Dineley] (see judge’s reasons at para.
61; see also my comments in that regard at paragraphs 30-31).
[16]
The judge concludes that section 18.1 established
a new class privilege that creates, in his view, substantive rights for human
sources. The respondents and the amici contended that the right to
confidentiality conferred to human sources is substantive, because it stems
from a person’s status as a source, which is attained as soon as certain
events occur (see judge’s reasons at para. 84). They submitted that both the
right and status exist irrespective of whether there is litigation. It is on this
basis that the judge finds that section 18.1 could not merely be a rule of
evidence or procedure.
[17]
Although he does not clearly explain why this is
necessary in the context of his analysis, the judge then goes on to say that
without expressing a view on the merits of the allegations in the respondents’
civil actions, the court “could reasonably infer”
that the application of section 18.1 “could have”
an adverse effect on the respondents’ ability to establish their claims before the
Ontario Superior Court (see judge’s reasons at para. 92).
[18]
In the last part of his reasons, the judge considers
an alternative basis for the conclusion that section 18.1 should not be
applied. He goes on to review the application of the presumption against
interference with vested rights and whether the respondents had a vested right
in the disclosure of human source information subject only to a section 38
balancing assessment. At paragraphs 95-98, he sets out the legal principles
that he intends to follow. However, it is difficult to ascertain the judge’s
reasoning in respect of the weight given to the presumption, since he mainly
discusses arguments dealing with the nature of the rights that would be vested
in the respondents, including the fact that his earlier decision in DES-1-10
could not be considered res judicata in respect of the new documents
involved in DES-1-11. There is little discussion of the legislator’s intent to
rebut the presumption.
[19]
The judge mentions that he could not accept that
in a section 38 review, the right to information is not vested until the very
moment it is disclosed. Rather, in his view, the respondents had a right to
discovery as part of the civil trial process “from the
outset” (see judge’s reasons at para. 107). In a section 38 review, the
question is whether the information which would normally be disclosed during
discovery can be protected from disclosure on public interest grounds.
[20]
The judge then mentions that in his view, he is
not dealing with the repeal of an existing statute or even of an existing
common law privilege. He found that Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v.
Minister of National Revenue, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 271 [Gustavson] was of
little help given that it was dealing with an income tax issue and the analogy
with this case was weak. For him, it was overreaching to compare the right to
disclosure in an ongoing proceeding with the right to a specific tax exemption
where annual changes ought to have been anticipated by taxpayers.
[21]
On that basis, he concludes that he is satisfied
that, at the time section 18.1 of the CSIS Act was brought into force,
the respondents had a vested right to the established disclosure regime for the
duration of the section 38 proceeding (see judge’s reasons at para.110).
III.
Legislation
[22]
The new section 18.1 reads as follows:
Purpose of
section — human sources
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Objet de l’article — sources humaines
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18.1 (1) The
purpose of this section is to ensure that the identity of human sources is
kept confidential in order to protect their life and security and to
encourage individuals to provide information to the Service.
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18.1 (1) Le
présent article vise à préserver l’anonymat des sources humaines afin de
protéger leur vie et leur sécurité et d’encourager les personnes physiques à
fournir des informations au Service.
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Prohibition
on disclosure
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Interdiction
de communication
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(2) Subject
to subsections (3) and (8), no person shall, in a proceeding before a court,
person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information,
disclose the identity of a human source or any information from which the identity
of a human source could be inferred.
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(2) Sous
réserve des paragraphes (3) et (8), dans une instance devant un tribunal, un
organisme ou une personne qui ont le pouvoir de contraindre à la production
d’informations, nul ne peut communiquer l’identité d’une source humaine ou
toute information qui permettrait de découvrir cette identité.
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Exception
— consent
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Exception
— consentement
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(3) The
identity of a human source or information from which the identity of a human
source could be inferred may be disclosed in a proceeding referred to in
subsection (2) if the human source and the Director consent to the disclosure
of that information.
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(3)
L’identité d’une source humaine ou une information qui permettrait de
découvrir cette identité peut être communiquée dans une instance visée au
paragraphe (2) si la source humaine et le directeur y consentent.
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Application
to judge
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Demande à un juge
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(4) A party
to a proceeding referred to in subsection (2), an amicus curiae who is
appointed in respect of the proceeding or a person who is appointed to act as
a special advocate if the proceeding is under the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act may apply to a judge for one of the following orders if it
is relevant to the proceeding:
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(4) La partie à une instance visée au paragraphe (2), l’amicus
curiae nommé dans cette instance ou l’avocat spécial nommé sous le régime de
la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés peut demander à un
juge de déclarer, par ordonnance, si une telle déclaration est pertinente
dans l’instance :
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(a) an
order declaring that an individual is not a human source or that information
is not information from which the identity of a human source could be
inferred; or
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a) qu’une
personne physique n’est pas une source humaine ou qu’une information ne
permettrait pas de découvrir l’identité d’une source humaine;
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(b) if the
proceeding is a prosecution of an offence, an order declaring that the
disclosure of the identity of a human source or information from which the
identity of a human source could be inferred is essential to establish the
accused’s innocence and that it may be disclosed in the proceeding.
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b) dans le
cas où l’instance est une poursuite pour infraction, que la communication de
l’identité d’une source humaine ou d’une information qui permettrait de
découvrir cette identité est essentielle pour établir l’innocence de l’accusé
et que cette communication peut être faite dans la poursuite.
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Contents
and service of application
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Contenu et
signification de la demande
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(5) The
application and the applicant’s affidavit deposing to the facts relied on in
support of the application shall be filed in the Registry of the Federal
Court. The applicant shall, without delay after the application and affidavit
are filed, serve a copy of them on the Attorney General of Canada.
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(5) La
demande et l’affidavit du demandeur portant sur les faits sur lesquels il
fonde celle-ci sont déposés au greffe de la Cour fédérale. Sans délai après
le dépôt, le demandeur signifie copie de la demande et de l’affidavit au procureur
général du Canada.
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Attorney
General of Canada
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Procureur
général du Canada
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(6) Once
served, the Attorney General of Canada is deemed to be a party to the
application.
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(6) Le
procureur général du Canada est réputé être partie à la demande dès que celle-ci
lui est signifiée.
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Hearing
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Audition
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(7) The
hearing of the application shall be held in private and in the absence of the
applicant and their counsel, unless the judge orders otherwise.
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(7) La
demande est entendue à huis clos et en l’absence du demandeur et de son
avocat, sauf si le juge en ordonne autrement.
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Order —
disclosure to establish innocence
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Ordonnance
de communication pour établir l’innocence
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(8) If the
judge grants an application made under paragraph (4)(b), the judge may order
the disclosure that the judge considers appropriate subject to any conditions
that the judge specifies.
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(8) Si le
juge accueille la demande présentée au titre de l’alinéa (4)b), il peut
ordonner la communication qu’il estime indiquée sous réserve des conditions
qu’il précise.
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Effective
date of order
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Prise
d’effet de l’ordonnance
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(9) If the
judge grants an application made under subsection (4), any order made by the
judge does not take effect until the time provided to appeal the order has
expired or, if the order is appealed and is confirmed, until either the time
provided to appeal the judgement confirming the order has expired or all
rights of appeal have been exhausted.
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(9) Si la
demande présentée au titre du paragraphe (4) est accueillie, l’ordonnance
prend effet après l’expiration du délai prévu pour en appeler ou, en cas
d’appel, après sa confirmation et l’épuisement des recours en appel.
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Confidentiality
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Confidentialité
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(10) The
judge shall ensure the confidentiality of the following:
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(10) Il
incombe au juge de garantir la confidentialité :
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(a) the
identity of any human source and any information from which the identity of a
human source could be inferred; and
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a) d’une
part, de l’identité de toute source humaine ainsi que de toute information
qui permettrait de découvrir cette identité;
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(b)
information and other evidence provided in respect of the application if, in
the judge’s opinion, its disclosure would be injurious to national security
or endanger the safety of any person.
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b) d’autre
part, des informations et autres éléments de preuve qui lui sont fournis dans
le cadre de la demande et dont la communication porterait atteinte, selon
lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la sécurité d’autrui.
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Confidentiality
on appeal
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Confidentialité
en appel
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(11) In the
case of an appeal, subsection (10) applies, with any necessary modifications,
to the court to which the appeal is taken.
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(11) En cas
d’appel, le paragraphe (10) s’applique, avec les adaptations nécessaires, aux
tribunaux d’appel.
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[23]
“Human Source” is defined as follows at section 2:
human source means an individual who, after having received a promise of
confidentiality, has provided, provides or is likely to provide information
to the Service;
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source humaine Personne physique qui a reçu une promesse
d’anonymat et qui, par la suite, a fourni, fournit ou pourrait
vraisemblablement fournir des informations au Service.
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IV.
Analysis
A.
Standard of review
[24]
The only question before us is the temporal
application of section 18.1. This is a question of law, which is subject to the
standard of review of correctness (Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33,
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 235).
[25]
However, the respondents and amicus (only
one appeared before us) take the position that the distinct question of whether
or not the respondents have a vested right is a question of mixed fact and law
subject to the standard of palpable and overriding error. The AGC argues that
this question is an integral part of the interpretation of section 18.1 and
thus only involves a pure question of law. In my view, which standard of review
applies in respect of whether the respondents have a vested right is of no
consequence in this case (see para. 57 below).
B.
Preliminary remarks
[26]
Before starting my analysis, I would like to
make a few preliminary remarks that are important to keep in mind when
reviewing the case law relied upon by the parties as well as any case law
dealing with the difficult question of temporal application of statutes.
[27]
The first hurdle, as mentioned by the judge, is
the difficulty created by the inconsistent use of terminology in older
textbooks and in the case law. Second, we ought to keep the various applicable
principles of statutory construction distinct.
[28]
The meaning of “retrospective”
is not always clear, not only in the older authorities, but in modern
authorities as well. In fact, it is often used as synonymous of “retroactive”. This problem, as I said, persists to
this very day despite consistent efforts by authors such as Elmer A. Driedger, Ruth
Sullivan and P.A. Côté to warn against it. This is unfortunately compounded by
the fact that distinct presumptions, such as those against the retroactive and
the retrospective application of statutes (as defined and discussed by Driedger
in “Statutes: Retroactive Retrospective Reflections”
(1978) Can. B. Rev. 265 [Retroactive Retrospective Reflections], and by
Côté in Interpretation of Legislation in Canada at 140-144), are often insufficiently
distinguished from the presumption against interference with vested rights. The
latter generally applies to all statutes, not only those that are retroactive
or retrospective.
[29]
It is obviously tempting to write more concisely
in an attempt to summarise our thinking by merging various elements of these
very distinct principles of construction. However, the risk in doing so is to
unintentionally conflate presumptions that do not have the same strength and
that may be rebutted by different methods.
[30]
One such presumption provides that procedural
provisions apply immediately to all proceedings under way in respect of all future
steps taken. It may well be accurate to say that this presumption will not
apply if the procedural provisions in question create or infringe upon
substantive rights. However, this is not because it is an exception to the
application of the presumption; rather, it is simply because a provision, by
its very nature, is not merely or solely a procedural provision if it affects
substantive rights. Thus, the presumption is simply not in play in such cases. In
a different but related vein, even provisions that are of immediate or
prospective application are subject to the presumption against interference with
vested rights.
[31]
As noted by Driedger, it is wrong to hold that a
statute is either retroactive or retrospective simply because it interferes
with vested rights (Retroactive Retrospective Reflections at 266).
Indeed, once again, the presumption against interference with vested rights is quite
distinct and does not have the same weight as the presumption against
retroactivity or the presumption against retrospectivity. It may be that in practice,
the same result is achieved. Still, because of the difficulty involved in
temporal application in the absence of clear transitional provisions, one should
keep those concepts separated to ensure that proper weight is given throughout
the purposive analysis. For example, it is clear that Justice Deschamps did not
mean to change the applicable rules of interpretation at paragraph 10 of Dineley.
Such rules are more fully described by Justice Cromwell at paragraph 35 of the
same decision (see also Justice Bastarache in Dikranian v. Quebec (Attorney
General), 2005 SCC 73 at paras. 45-51, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 530 [Dikranian]).
[32]
Vested rights are necessarily substantive rights,
for there is no vested right in a mere process or procedure. Thus, in that
sense only, if a new provision interferes with vested rights it is an
indication that it is not merely procedural. This explains the wording used by
Justice Deschamps at paragraph 10 of Dineley in reference to Wildman
v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 311, in which Justice Lamer was dealing with whether
or not the rule of evidence in question involved substantive rights or was
merely procedural.
[33]
I will now turn to my analysis.
[34]
In this appeal, the parties have raised
arguments that are intended to address the following four distinct
presumptions:
- The presumption that the legislature does not
intend legislation to be applied retroactively, that is, applied so as to
change the past legal effect of a situation that has occurred completely
in the past. This presumption is strong (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the
Construction of Statutes, 6th ed. (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis, 2014)
at 761, para. 1);
- The presumption that the legislature does not
intend legislation to be applied retrospectively (as that term is defined
by Driedger in Retroactive Retrospective Reflections), that is,
applied so as to change the future legal effect of a situation that has
occurred completely in the past, unless it is enacted to protect the
public. The weight of this presumption is variable (Ibid at 761,
para. 2); it thus cannot simply be described as “strong”,
like the presumption against retroactivity;
iii.
The presumption that the legislature intends
procedural legislation to apply immediately to any ongoing proceeding and in
respect of steps to be taken in the future (Ibid at 761, para. 5);
iv.
The presumption that the legislature does not
intend to interfere with vested rights. Again, the weight of this presumption
varies depending on factors such as the nature of the protected right and how
unfair or arbitrary it would be to abolish or curtail that right. The
presumption is often rebutted without reference to express legislative language
(Ibid at 761, para. 3; see also Interpretation of Legislation in
Canada at 167).
[35]
I do not intend to deal in much detail with the
first or third presumption referred to above for in my view, they simply have
no application here.
[36]
Indeed, it is clear, in my view, that section
18.1 of the CSIS Act is not intended to have retroactive effect, i.e., to
affect the past legal effects of a situation that has completely arisen in the
past.
[37]
I also agree with the respondents and the amicus
that section 18.1 is not merely a procedural rule of evidence. As noted in Application
under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 2004 SCC 42 at para. 56, [2004] 2
S.C.R. 248, “[…] for a provision to be regarded as
procedural, it must be exclusively so.” The judge’s comment that the
application of section 18.1 would oust his jurisdiction under section 38 in
respect of information tending to identify human sources (see judge’s reasons at
para. 63) lends additional support to the other arguments discussed herein in
respect of the substantive nature of section 18.1.
[38]
Although some of the provisions in section 18.1
deal with the applicable procedure (see subsections 18.1 (4) to (7)), it does
create a substantive right in favour of human sources based on the status of
the individuals and their special relationship with CSIS. The class privilege
created at section 18.1 is akin (albeit somewhat different) to the common law
class privilege applicable to police informers which is described by this Court
in Almalki 2011 as “a legal rule of public order
by which a judge is bound” (see paragraphs 15-18). This is consistent
with the AGC’s contention that the adoption of Bill C-44 resulted from the
comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in Harkat SCC, where the
Court confirmed that only the legislator could create such a class privilege
for CSIS human sources if deemed desirable.
[39]
Section 18.1 thus creates an exception to the
right of the public “to every person’s evidence”
(R. v. National Post, 2010 SCC 16 at para. 1, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477). It
trumps the public interest in the disclosure of all the evidence by taking it
out of the Federal Court jurisdiction under section 38 of the CEA.
[40]
This interpretation is the only one consistent
with the legislator’s choice to include a specific paragraph spelling out very
clearly that the purpose of the provision is to protect the life and security
of human sources and to encourage individuals to provide information to CSIS
(see subsection 18.1(1)). It would make little sense to make such a declaration
if the provision dealt with a mere process or procedure.
[41]
The next question is thus whether the second
presumption is in play (because section 18.1 deals with the future legal effect
of a situation that has completely arisen before its enactment) or whether
section 18.1 is simply prospective (i.e., whether it deals with the future legal
effect of an ongoing situation, including an individual’s status as a human
source).
C.
Is the presumption against retrospectivity in
play?
[42]
As mentioned at paragraph 16 above, when
presenting their arguments to the judge, the respondents and the amicus
argued that the right set out in section 18.1 is based on the status of an
individual as a human source. I agree.
[43]
Although this was meant to address the third
presumption, this is an important point to consider when identifying the “situation” to which the statutory provisions under
review are intended to apply or to which they attach legal consequences.
[44]
Indeed, as both Côté and Driedger note, the most
important step in applying the various presumptions is to correctly
characterise the situation to which the statute applies: Pierre-André Coté, “La position temporelle des faits juridiques et l’application
de la loi dans le temps” (1988) 22 R.J.T. 207 at 210-211 [Position
temporelle des faits juridiques]; Interpretation of Legislation in
Canada at 135. This is rarely an easy task and it requires a purposive interpretation
of the provision. As mentioned by Justice Iacobucci, writing for the Court in Benner
v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 at paras. 45-46, 208
N.R. 81 [Benner]:
The question […] is one of characterization
[…].
[M]any situations may be reasonably seen to
involve both past discrete events and on-going conditions. A status or
on-going condition will often, for example, stem from some past discrete
event. A criminal conviction is a single discrete event, but it gives rise to
the on-going condition of being detained, the status of “detainee”. Similar
observations could be made about a marriage or divorce. Successfully
determining whether a particular case involves applying the Charter to a
past event or simply to a current condition or status will involve determining
whether, in all the circumstances, the most significant or relevant feature of
the case is the past event or the current condition resulting from it. This
is, as I already stated, a question of characterization, and will vary with the
circumstances. Making this determination will depend on the facts of the case,
on the law in question, and on the Charter right which the applicant
seeks to apply.
[45]
That a statutory provision is meant to attach
consequences to a status or an ongoing situation is very different from when it
is intended to deal with the future or past legal effect of an event that has
completely arisen in the past: see Benner at para. 42, where Justice
Iacobucci relies on Driedger’s proposition as reasserted in Construction of
Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983). It appears that
this important step was not considered by the judge, who focused on the fact
that in this case the individual events that brought about the relationship
between an individual and CSIS took place long before section 18.1 was enacted.
At the same time, the judge accepted that it is the ongoing status of the
individual as a human source that gives rise to the so-called class privilege.
[46]
The expression “human
source” or “CSIS human source” is not
new. It has often been used in the past (see for example Canada (Attorney
General) v. Telbani, 2014 FC 1050 at paras. 45-47). It has even been used
by the respondents in this very case well before the drafting of Bill C-44 (see
the part entitled Human Source Information in the judge’s decision in Almalki
2010 at paras. 163-170; see also Almalki 2011 at paras. 10-34).
In Harkat SCC at paras. 78-87, the same expression was also used where a
different statutory regime was in play.
[47]
There was no real need to include a definition
of “human source” in the CSIS Act.
Without one, there would be little doubt that the Act was meant to apply to the
ongoing status (or the “state of being”) of a
human source. However, given the various jurisprudential comments about the
past interpretation of this term by CSIS itself, one can surmise that the
legislator found it desirable to define the “ingredients”
that establish the relationship giving rise to the status of human source.
[48]
When one considers the wording of the definition
(see paragraph 23 above) in context, including the wording of paragraph
18.1(4)(a) which gives the right to argue that “an
individual is not a source”, the intention of the legislator is
clear. Once an individual meets the criteria set out at section 2, he or she is
a source and he or she keeps that status on an ongoing basis. To use the words
of Driedger, it is “being” a source that brings
about the legal consequences set out in section 18.1, even if the relationship
which brought about this status was created before the enactment of the CSIS Act
(see also Position temporelle des faits juridiques at 215-219, 228-29
and 236-237).
[49]
At the hearing, the amicus agreed that
the Court could reach such a conclusion. He noted that, in his view, the
crucial question in this appeal was really the application of the presumption
against interference with vested rights. I agree and will address this
principle next.
[50]
To conclude this part, considering that the new
provisions are meant to apply to an ongoing situation, that is, the status as a
human source, the presumption against the retrospective application of the
statutory provisions under review is not in play.
[51]
As the presumptions against retrospectivity and
retroactivity are not in play, it is unnecessary to deal with the judge’s
finding that section 18.1 “could” ultimately
have adverse effects on the respondents’ ability to establish their claims in
the Ontario Superior Court (see judge’s reasons at para. 92).
[52]
Indeed, he only appears to have considered
necessary to deal with this issue, which he characterized as distinct from the
one of whether the respondents had vested rights in the disclosure of the human
source identifying information subject to section 38 (Part V.B.(3) of his
reasons), because of his understanding that this made section 18.1
retrospective in its application (see judge’s reasons at para. 61).
[53]
In any event, given the limited nature of the
information protected by section 18.1, the type of information that has been
disclosed in section 38 proceedings in the past, and without knowing all the
information that is already available to the respondents, it is impossible to assess
the basis for this inference “of a possible impact.”
D.
The presumption against interference with vested
rights
[54]
Throughout my analysis, I have obviously followed
the modern approach to statutory interpretation which requires one to read the
words of the Act in their entire context (which includes the applicable
presumptions), in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the
scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. As
noted by Justice Bastarache in Dikranian, it is particularly important
in respect of the presumption against interference with vested rights to avoid
falling into the trap of literal construction of the statutory provision: Dikranian
at para. 36.
[55]
Although this is the last part of the analysis,
I thought that it would be more appropriate to discuss the purpose and the
legislative evolution and history of the provision under review in more detail
in this part to avoid repetition. I will do so after determining whether or not
the respondents have a vested right that puts in play the presumption against
interference with such rights.
[56]
Except for the issue of res judicata, the
arguments of the parties were substantially the same as those mentioned in Part
V.B.(3) of the judge’s reasons.
[57]
As I noted earlier (see para. 25 above), I do
not believe that the standard of review to be applied to this question is
relevant, for I believe that the judge correctly decided that the right of the
respondents to the disclosure of all relevant information subject to the
application of section 38 is not merely a right to a process.
[58]
In Abou-Elmaati v. Canada (Attorney General),
2011 ONCA 95 at paras. 17-21, 330 D.L.R. (4th) 69 (a decision issued in the
civil proceedings instituted by some of the respondents), the Ontario Court of
Appeal found that the scheme established by section 38 of the CEA is in
fact a liberalization of the common law Crown privilege based upon
international relations, national security and national defence which had
previously been absolute and not open to any scrutiny.
[59]
As alluded to earlier, the new section 18.1
effectively replaced the former rule that applied to CSIS human sources by
deleting the reference to such sources in former subsection 18(1) of the CSIS
Act. Indeed, former subsection 18(2) allowed the application of section 38
of the CEA up until the amendments were introduced in April 2015 (the
former provisions are reproduced in Appendix A).
[60]
Thus, when one considers the historical context
and the legislative evolution of section 38 of the CEA and of section 18.1
of the CSIS Act, it is evident that the new provision deprives
the respondents of the benefit of the more liberal version of the privilege set
out in section 38 of the CEA pursuant to which the question of the
identity of sources and information tending to identify them was dealt with up
until now.
[61]
In that sense, I agree with the amicus
that the recent amendments change the “rules of the
game to the disadvantage of the respondents” (Memorandum of Fact and Law
of the Amicus Curiae at para. 29). This means that I must proceed to
determine whether the presumption that the legislator did not intend such a
result has been rebutted.
[62]
As mentioned earlier at paragraph 34, the weight
of this last presumption depends on various factors such as the nature and
importance of the right the respondents seek to protect and how unfair or
arbitrary it would be to deprive them of such a right. The Court must also try
to determine through purposive interpretation whether such unwanted
consequences are necessary or warranted by the goal(s) the legislator sought to
achieve.
[63]
As noted by the judge at paragraph 43 of
his reasons, “[i]n the words of the Bill’s sponsor, the
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the purpose of this
amendment [new section 18.1] was to give greater protection to CSIS’s human
sources.”
[64]
Subsection 18.1(1) expressly provides that:
Purpose of
section — human sources
|
Objet de
l’article — sources humaines
|
18.1 (1) The
purpose of this section is to ensure that the identity of human sources is
kept confidential in order to protect their life and security and to
encourage individuals to provide information to the Service.
|
18.1 (1) Le
présent article vise à préserver l’anonymat des sources humaines afin de
protéger leur vie et leur sécurité et d’encourager les personnes physiques à
fournir des informations au Service.
|
[65]
The respondents say that, in respect of “true” human sources, the amendments are redundant and
bring nothing over and above the protection afforded pursuant to section 38. In
their memorandum, the respondents also say that to encourage individuals to
provide information does not necessarily warrant an interference with their
vested rights.
[66]
I cannot accept those arguments. The legislator does
not speak unnecessarily and the new legislation is presumed to be remedial. As
argued by the AGC, the new statutory provisions were meant to fill a perceived
gap after it was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada that the absolute
common law privilege protecting police informers did not apply to CSIS human
sources. This meant that, in theory, a judge could decide to release
information identifying such sources if he or she felt that the public interest
in the disclosure prevailed. The adoption of section 18.1 signals that the
legislator has balanced all the relevant factors and found that the public
interest in the non-disclosure of this specific and somewhat limited type of
information must trump all other rights, subject to paragraph 18.1(4)(b).
[67]
It is also important to keep in mind that the
legislator is presumed to know the law and how it has been applied. This means
that the legislator, before adopting section 18.1, is presumed to have been
aware of how section 38 has been applied and how the balancing between public
interest in a disclosure versus the public interest in non-disclosure has been carried
out. Indeed, the following remarks are also useful to assess the parameters of
the vested right here in play.
[68]
There was general agreement before us that as of
now, the identity of human sources or of information tending to identify human
sources has never been disclosed in the context of section 38 proceedings. This
includes the section 38 proceeding in DES-1-10: the judge expressly notes at
paragraph 25 of his reasons that no such information was disclosed to the
respondents in DES-1-10.
[69]
The judge also stated in his decision in Almalki
2010 that the primary public interest in disclosure, which exists to ensure
that the trial court has the fullest possible access to all relevant material,
is not an overriding consideration that will compel a decision to disclose when
national security is at stake (see Almalki 2010 at para. 178). It
is also relevant to mention that in Almalki 2010, the judge was very
well aware of the public interest in holding government accountable for the
alleged action and omission referred to in the respondents’ civil proceedings.
He noted however that despite the alleged breaches of their Charter
rights, the security and Charter rights of the respondents are not
presently at stake in the underlying proceedings (see judge’s reasons; Almalki
2010 at paras. 181-185; see also the comments of this Court in Almalki
2011 at paras. 32-33).
[70]
When one considers the short delay between the
Supreme Court decision in Harkat (May 2014) and the filing of Bill C-44
(October 2014), one can assume that Parliament saw the need to deal with the
mischief addressed by the adoption of section 18.1 as urgent. That mischief was
the perception that CSIS human sources were not automatically protected by a
privilege of confidentiality akin to that of police informers, and that their
protection was thus left entirely to the process set out in section 38.
[71]
From this, I can only conclude that inasmuch as
the respondents still have a “possibility” –
albeit a remote one – of obtaining the disclosure of information identifying
human sources under section 38, it is that very possibility that the legislator
was addressing in adopting section 18.1.
[72]
I agree with the amicus that section 18.1
would have been clearer and certainly made our task easier if the legislator
had added, after “a proceeding before the Court”
in subsection 18.1(2), the words “commenced before or after the coming into force of this
subsection” (i.e., something similar to a transitional provision). However,
when the actual words of the section are read in their proper context in
accordance with the principles of purposive interpretation, the absence of this
additional wording is not sufficient in my view to avoid the conclusion that
the legislator intended to protect the disclosure of the information described
in section 18.1 in all proceedings.
[73]
I agree with the AGC that when one considers the
slight possibility of the respondents obtaining information that would identify
human sources in the context of their section 38 proceeding, against the clear
intention of Parliament to protect the life and security of every individual
who is a human source (ongoing status), it is difficult, if not
impossible, to conclude that Parliament would have intended to leave the
possibility of a disclosure open. This is so because in the legislator’s view, disclosure
could have a direct impact on the life and security of human sources. Moreover,
in my view, if it became known that the life of a human source was actually
threatened or lost, regardless of when that person became a source, it could
have an impact on CSIS’ ability to recruit new human sources.
[74]
Although this is not decisive, I also consider
that the interference with the rights under review is not in this case
arbitrary, nor is it unduly unfair. Under section 38, the judge would still
ensure that the respondents get as much information as possible in respect of
the substance of the information that was actually conveyed by the source. Further,
subsection 18.1(4) sets out a number of protections to which the respondents
may resort to, if necessary.
[75]
Indeed, it is important to recall that the new
scheme set out in section 18.1 includes the ability for parties like the
respondents or the amicus to apply to the Court to challenge whether an
individual is a human source within the meaning of the CSIS Act and
whether information said to tend to identify such a source actually does.
[76]
I also have some reservations with the view that
the definition of “human source” in the CSIS
Act is much broader than the definition of human source used by judges in
the past. It may well be that CSIS has not been discriminate enough in the past
in determining whether an individual is a “true”
human source or not, but given the impact of section 18.1, I am confident that
the courts will now very carefully monitor this process. It is too early to assume
that the definition in section 2 of the CSIS Act will be construed
broadly. One must wait for the jurisprudence to develop in the context of
applications under subsection 18.1(2).
[77]
I am satisfied that the presumption against
interference with vested rights is rebutted in this case.
[78]
For all the foregoing reasons, I conclude that
section 18.1 is applicable to the section 38 proceeding in DES-1-11 and I
propose to allow the appeal. I would set aside the judgment of the Federal
Court and, rendering the decision that should have been made, I would declare that
section 18.1 of the CSIS Act applies in the proceeding in DES-1-11.
"Johanne Gauthier"
“I agree
|
A.F. Scott
J.A.”
|
“I agree
|
Yves de
Montigny J.A.”
|
APPENDIX A
18. (1) Subject to subsection (2), no
person shall disclose any information that the person obtained or to which
the person had access in the course of the performance by that person of
duties and functions under this Act or the participation by that person in
the administration or enforcement of this Act and from which the identity of
|
18. (1)
Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), nul ne peut communiquer des informations
qu’il a acquises ou auxquelles il avait accès dans l’exercice des fonctions
qui lui sont conférées en vertu de la présente loi ou lors de sa
participation à l’exécution ou au contrôle d’application de cette loi et qui
permettraient de découvrir l’identité :
|
(a) any other
person who is or was a confidential source of information or assistance to
the Service, or
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a) d’une autre
personne qui fournit ou a fourni au Service des informations ou une aide à
titre confidentiel;
|
(b) any person
who is or was an employee engaged in covert operational activities of the
Service can be inferred
|
b) d’une
personne qui est ou était un employé occupé à des activités opérationnelles
cachées du Service.
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Exceptions
|
Exceptions
|
(2) A person may
disclose information referred to in subsection (1) for the purposes of the
performance of duties and functions under this Act or any other Act of
Parliament or the administration or enforcement of this Act or as required by
any other law or in the circumstances described in any of paragraphs 19(2)(a)
to (d).
|
(2) La communication visée au paragraphe (1) peut se faire dans
l’exercice de fonctions conférées en vertu de la présente loi ou de toute
autre loi fédérale ou pour l’exécution ou le contrôle d’application de la
présente loi, si une autre règle de droit l’exige ou dans les circonstances
visées aux alinéas 19(2)a) à d).
|
Offence
|
Infraction
|
(3) Everyone who
contravenes subsection (1)
|
(3) Quiconque contrevient au paragraphe (1) est coupable :
|
(a) is guilty of
an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
five years; or
|
a) soit d’un
acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans;
|
(b) is guilty of
an offence punishable on summary conviction.
|
b) soit d’une
infraction punissable par procédure sommaire
|
19. (1) Information obtained in the performance of the duties and
functions of the Service under this Act shall not be disclosed by the Service
except in accordance with this section.
|
19. (1) Les informations qu’acquiert le
Service dans l’exercice des fonctions qui lui sont conférées en vertu de la
présente loi ne peuvent être communiquées qu’en conformité avec le présent
article.
|
Idem
|
Idem
|
(2) The Service
may disclose information referred to in subsection (1) for the purposes of
the performance of its duties and functions under this Act or the
administration or enforcement of this Act or as required by any other law and
may also disclose such information,
|
(2) Le Service
peut, en vue de l’exercice des fonctions qui lui sont conférées en vertu de
la présente loi ou pour l’exécution ou le contrôle d’application de celle-ci,
ou en conformité avec les exigences d’une autre règle de droit, communiquer
les informations visées au paragraphe (1). Il peut aussi les communiquer aux
autorités ou personnes suivantes :
|
(a) where the
information may be used in the investigation or prosecution of an alleged
contravention of any law of Canada or a province, to a peace officer having
jurisdiction to investigate the alleged contravention and to the Attorney
General of Canada and the Attorney General of the province in which
proceedings in respect of the alleged contravention may be taken;
|
a) lorsqu’elles
peuvent servir dans le cadre d’une enquête ou de poursuites relatives à une
infraction présumée à une loi fédérale ou provinciale, aux agents de la paix
compétents pour mener l’enquête, au procureur général du Canada et au
procureur général de la province où des poursuites peuvent être intentées à
l’égard de cette infraction;
|
(b) where the
information relates to the conduct of the international affairs of Canada, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs or a person designated by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs for the purpose;
|
b) lorsqu’elles
concernent la conduite des affaires internationales du Canada, au ministre
des Affaires étrangères ou à la personne qu’il désigne à cette fin;
|
(c) where the
information is relevant to the defence of Canada, to the Minister of National
Defence or a person designated by the Minister of National Defence for the
purpose; or
|
c) lorsqu’elles
concernent la défense du Canada, au ministre de la Défense nationale ou à la
personne qu’il désigne à cette fin;
|
(d) where, in
the opinion of the Minister, disclosure of the information to any minister of
the Crown or person in the federal public administration is essential in the
public interest and that interest clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy
that could result from the disclosure, to that minister or person.
|
d) lorsque,
selon le ministre, leur communication à un ministre ou à une personne
appartenant à l’administration publique fédérale est essentielle pour des
raisons d’intérêt public et que celles-ci justifient nettement une éventuelle
violation de la vie privée, à ce ministre ou à cette personne.
|
Report to
Review Committee
|
Rapport au
comité de surveillance
|
(3) The Director
shall, as soon as practicable after a disclosure referred to in paragraph (2)
(d) is made, submit a report to the Review Committee with respect to the
disclosure.
|
(3) Dans les
plus brefs délais possible après la communication visée à l’alinéa (2) (d),
le directeur en fait rapport au comité de surveillance.
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