Williston v. Canada, 2006 FCA 316

Date: 20060926

Dockets: A-396-05/A-411-05

Citation: 2006 FCA 316

CORAM:       LINDEN J.A.

                        NADON J.A. 

                        SEXTON J.A.

BETWEEN:

GERALDINE M. WILLISTON

Appellant

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA,

AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER OF INDIAN

AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

and

THE CHIPPEWAS OF RAMA INDIAN BAND

(aka THE CHIPPEWAS OF MNJIKANING FIRST NATION)

Respondents

Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on September 26, 2006.

Judgment delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on September 26, 2006.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:                                                   SEXTON J.A.

Date: 20060926

Dockets: A-396-05/A-411-05

Citation: 2006 FCA 316

CORAM:       LINDEN J.A.

                        NADON J.A. 

                        SEXTON J.A.

BETWEEN:

GERALDINE M. WILLISTON

Appellant

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA,

AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER OF INDIAN

AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

and

THE CHIPPEWAS OF RAMA INDIAN BAND

(aka THE CHIPPEWAS OF MNJIKANING FIRST NATION)

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(Delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on September 26, 2006)

SEXTON J.A.

[1]               This is an appeal from the decision of Layden-Stevenson J. of the Federal Court in Williston v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2005 FC 829. Layden-Stevenson J. dismissed an action by Geraldine M. Williston (the “Appellant”), in which she sought a declaration that Her Majesty the Queen (the “Crown”) and the Chippewas of Rama Indian Band (the “Band”) were required to renew her lease.

[2]               The Appellant held a leasehold interest in a portion of the Band’s reserve lands (the “Moonlight Bay Lands”) that had been surrendered otherwise than absolutely for the purpose of being leased out by the Crown. The lease expired on March 31, 2002. Before Layden-Stevenson J., the Appellant raised two sets of claims. First, she claimed proprietary estoppel and an order or declaration that her lease be renewed for not less than twenty years. Secondly, she asserted a claim as a public interest litigant seeking various orders and declarations intended to set aside the decision of the Chief and Councillors of the Band not to renew the leases of the Moonlight Bay Lands.

[3]               In dismissing the action, Layden-Stevenson J. held that the elements of proprietary estoppel were not met, that the Appellant’s claim as a public interest litigant should have been brought by way of an application for judicial review, and that even if brought in the proper form, the public interest claim would have been dismissed.

[4]               In this court, the Appellant argues that Layden-Stevenson J. failed to properly apply the test for proprietary estoppel and that pursuant to subsection 53(3) of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 she is entitled to a declaration that the Chief and Councillors and the Band of which they are members are prohibited from using, occupying and taking possession of the lands.  The Appellant does not seek to overturn the decision of the Ministry to delegate the power to manage the lands.

[5]               With respect to the issue of proprietary estoppel, we are of the view that Layden-Stevenson J. identified the correct test for proprietary estoppel and she made no error in applying that test to the facts. The Appellant’s husband, who acted as agent for the Appellant, was told prior to his wife’s purchase of the lands that the lease would not automatically be renewed and that the decision as to the renewal of a lease was a business proposition.  Further, at the time of entry into the lease, the Appellant requested an extension of the lease for 12 years beyond its term.  This request was refused. 

[6]               It appears to us that the Band and the Crown were simply preserving their options as to what decision would be taken at the expiry of the Appellant’s lease as to whether the lands would be leased and to whom.  There does not appear to be any evidence that the Respondents misled the Appellant in any way or resiled from any position previously taken.  The Appellant’s husband, a lawyer, was told that for the Band, leasing was a business proposition.  It was not reasonable for the Appellant to conclude that the only reasonable business proposition for the Band was to renew the Appellant’s lease, nor can it be said that the conduct of the Respondents would lead to a reasonable belief on the part of Appellant that her lease would be renewed.

[7]               Without a reasonable belief that the lease would be renewed, the Appellant could not succeed on a claim for proprietary estoppel. We can find no palpable and overriding error in the conclusion of Layden-Stevenson J. that the Appellant neither held a reasonable belief nor was induced to hold such a belief by the Band or the Crown.

Section 53 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c I-5

[8]               With respect to the claim by the Appellant for a declaration pursuant to Section 53(3) of the Indian Act, the trial judge found that there was no evidence that the Band was using, occupying or taking possession of any of the lands in question.  We can find no palpable and overriding error in this conclusion.  The Appellant has not shown to us convincing evidence that there is a firm intention of the Band to use the lands.  These conclusions alone are sufficient to dispose of this argument.

[9]               We should point out, however, that the delegation itself, while it delegates to the Chief and Councillors the right to manage the lands, prohibits the Chief and Councillors from acquiring directly or indirectly any interest in the lands.  This is in conformity with subsection 53(3).

[10]           Furthermore, the purpose of subsection 53(3) of the Indian Act is to protect Aboriginal peoples. It seeks to ensure that those appointed by the Crown do not take advantage of their position for personal gain at the expense of the relevant Indian Band. Subsection 53(3) cannot be used to preclude Indian Bands from using, occupying or taking possession of their own lands.

[11]           In conclusion, we find no basis for interfering with Layden-Stevenson J.’s decision. The appeal is dismissed with costs to the Respondents.  

“J. Edgar Sexton”

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKETS:                                                                            A-396-05/A-411-05

(APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF MADAM JUSTICE LAYDEN-STEVENSON, FEDERAL COURT DATED JUNE 10, 2005 IN FILE T-383-02)

STYLE OF CAUSE:                                                              GERALDINE M. WILLISTON v. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN ET AL

PLACE OF HEARING:                                                        Toronto, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING:                                                          September 26, 2006

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:       (LINDEN,  NADON,

                                                                                                SEXTON JJ.A.)                                                                                                                                                                

DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY:                            SEXTON J.A.

APPEARANCES:

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: