Date: 20080624
Docket: A-532-07
Citation: 2008 FCA 224
CORAM: SHARLOW
J.A.
PELLETIER
J.A.
RYER
J.A.
BETWEEN:
CANADIAN FOOD INSPECTION
AGENCY
Applicant
and
EDWARDS LIVESTOCK HAULING LTD.
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PELLETIER J.A.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
Edwards
Livestock Hauling Ltd. (Edwards) was issued with a Notice of Violation pursuant
to the Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act,
S.C. 1995, c. 40 (the Act) alleging that it had transported animals without
segregating them by age or weight contrary to subsection 141(1) of the Health
of Animals Regulations, C.R.C., c. 296 (the Regulations). Edwards believed
that the animals it was transporting were more appropriately segregated by
family group. Officials of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (the Agency)
issued a Notice of Violation to Edwards which it brought forward for review to
the Review Tribunal, which set the Notice of Violation aside. The Agency now
seeks judicial review of the Review Tribunal's decision. The issue in this
application for judicial review is whether the Review Tribunal has correctly
interpreted the applicable regulations.
THE
FACTS
[2]
Edwards
was hired to transport a load of domestic wild boars from Canadian Classic Wild
Boars near Melfort, Saskatchewan, to Trochu Meat Processors,
in Trochu, Alberta, for slaughter. When
the load arrived in Trochu, some eight hours later, the Agency's inspectors
noted that two of the 162 animals being transported were dead upon arrival. This
was not considered to be outside the normal range of fatality in the course of
transportation but what did concern the Agency's personnel was that the boars
were not segregated by age or weight as they believed subsection 141.(1) of the
Regulations, reproduced below, required:
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141.(1)
Subject to this section, no person shall load on any railway car, motor
vehicle, aircraft or vessel and no carrier shall transport animals of
different species or of substantially different weight or age unless those
animals are segregated.
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141.(1) Sous
réserve du présent article, il est interdit à quiconque de charger dans un
wagon de chemin de fer, un véhicule à moteur, un aéronef ou un navire, ou à
un transporteur de transporter, des animaux d'espèces différentes ou de poids
ou d'âge sensiblement différents sans les avoir séparés.
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[3]
The
following extracts from the decision of the Review Tribunal succinctly set out
the competing viewpoints which give rise to this dispute:
The Applicant [Edwards]
indicated that animals are brought from different producers to Canadian Classic
Wild Boars (CCWB) and remain in segregated pens at CCWB according to producer. At
the time the animals are loaded, CCWB tells the transporter which segregated
animals come from which producer and whether or not there are problem animals
that need to be further segregated for transport. The animals are then loaded
on the trailer, segregated by producer in the same way they were segregated by
CCWB.
…
Mr. Carson Richardson is
the President of the CCWB and he confirmed the evidence of Mr. Edwards that
CCWB sorted and segregated animals exclusively by producer. The reason is that
the animals are raised by each producer communally in a group, and the group
has already sorted out its pecking order. It is natural for a group (each
member's status in the group having been defined) to protect itself from
strangers. If a strange animal came into their territory, it was his view the
group would kill the stranger. He also indicated that wild boars of the same
size were more likely to fight each other than boars of different sizes as the
larger animals would naturally protect the smaller ones.
[4]
Edwards
relies upon subsection 141.(4) of the Regulations which contemplates
segregation on a basis other than age or weight:
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141.(4) Animals of the
same species that are incompatible by nature shall be segregated during
transport.
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141.(4) Les animaux de la même
espèce, inconciliables de nature, sont isolés.
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[5]
The Agency
issued a Notice of Violation to Edwards as provided in section 7 of the Act,
alleging that Edwards had violated subsection 141.(1) of the Regulations. The
Agency's position, in brief, is that subsections (1) and (4) are to be read
cumulatively, that is, even when animals of the same species are segregated
from other animals of the same species by reason of incompatibility, the
compatible groups must also be segregated by age or weight as well.
[6]
Edwards
sought review of the Notice of Violation from the Review Tribunal. The latter
reviewed the evidence, the material parts of which have been quoted above. It
noted that Edwards had transported animals without segregating them by age or
weight which, on the face of it, was in contravention of subsection 141.(1). But
the Review Tribunal concluded that subsection 141.(1) was subject to the
remaining provisions of the section, including subsection 141.(4) quoted above.
[7]
The Review
Tribunal's statement of its legal reasoning is found in the following passage:
Since I consider
subsection 141(4) to be the operative subsection in this case, and since the
Applicant complied with it, the Applicant cannot be found to being in violation
of subsection 141(1).
[Applicant's Record, at
p. 9.]
[8]
As for the
practical application of this reasoning, the Review Tribunal found that:
There was ample space on
the trailer for 162 wild boars and sows, and taking into consideration the
overall welfare of the animals, it was necessary to segregate animals that were
incompatible and would be more likely to fight with each other, than to
segregate them by weight or age.
[Applicant's Record, at
p. 10.]
[9]
As a
result, the Review Tribunal set aside the Notice of Violation.
ANALYSIS
[10]
In Dunsmuir
v. New
Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, at paragraph 57, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that guidance as to cases where the correctness standard applies can be
found in the existing jurisprudence. The Agency relies on this Court's decision
at paragraph 7 of Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency) v.Westphal-Larsen,
2003 FCA 383, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1536 (Westphal-Larsen), where it was
held that the standard of review of the Review Tribunal on a question of law is
correctness, to argue that the standard of review in this case is correctness. Westphal-Larsen
has been applied by this Court in Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency) v. Porcherie des Cèdres
Inc., 2005
FCA 59, [2005] 3 F.C.R. 539 (Porcherie des Cèdres Inc.). This Court
applied the correctness standard as well in Samson v. Canada (Canadian Food
Inspection Agency), 2005 FCA 235, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1090 and in Fermes
G. Godbout & Fils Inc v. Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency), 2006
FCA 408, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1967, two cases which applied Porcherie des
Cèdres Inc.. As a result, it appears to have been decided that the standard
of review of the Review Tribunal on a question of law is correctness, a
conclusion which Dunsmuir invites us to adopt. Consequently, I shall
proceed on the basis that the standard of review is correctness.
[11]
The Agency
cites a number of cases in which the phrase "Subject to…" has been
interpreted: Massey-Harris Co. Ltd. v. Strasbourg, [1941] 4 D.L.R. 620 (Sask. C.A.) ("Subject to paragraph 5 of
subsection (1) of section 504…"), Trent University Faculty Assn. v.
Trent University, [1997] O.J. No. 3417 (C.A.) ("Subject to articles
7.4 and 7.6"), Menzies v. Manitoba Public Insurance Corp., [2005]
M.J. No. 313 (C.A.) ("Subject to the Regulations") and Schnell v.
Schnell, [2001] S.J. No. 704 (C.A.) ("Subject to sections 17 to 20").
The common element in these cases is the use of the phrase "subject to"
but not in the context of "subject to this section".
[12]
The Agency's
argument is that the subsections following subsection 141.(1) are intended to
be applied cumulatively so that a requirement in a later subsection is intended
to be in addition to the requirement imposed in subsection 141.(1). This amounts
to reading each succeeding subsection as though it began with the words "Subject
to subsection (1)…".
[13]
This
construction cannot have been intended because a number of the subsections
which follow subsection (1) have nothing at all to do with segregating animals
by age or weight. The full text of section 141 is reproduced below:
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141.(1)
Subject to this section, no person shall load on any railway car, motor
vehicle, aircraft or vessel and no carrier shall transport animals of
different species or of substantially different weight or age unless those
animals are segregated.
(2)
Subsection (1) does not apply to a female animal and its suckling offspring.
(3)
Every cow, sow or mare with its suckling offspring shall be segregated from
all other animals during transport.
(4)
Animals of the same species that are incompatible by nature shall be
segregated during transport.
(5)
Groups of bulls, de-tusked boars, rams and goat bucks, if mature, shall be
segregated from all other animals during transport.
(6)
Every mature boar that has not been de-tusked and every mature stallion shall
be segregated from all other animals during transport.
(7) An
equine shall, unless its hind feet are unshod, be segregated from other
equines during transport.
(8)
Every equine over 14 hands in height shall be segregated from all other
animals during transport by air.
(9)
Every mature bull shall be securely tied during transport by air.
(10) Every horse shall
be segregated from all other animals during transport by sea.
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141.(1)
Sous
réserve du présent article, il est interdit à quiconque de charger dans un
wagon de chemin de fer, un véhicule à moteur, un aéronef ou un navire, ou à
un transporteur de transporter, des animaux d'espèces différentes ou de poids
ou d'âge sensiblement différents sans les avoir séparés.
(2)
Le paragraphe (1) ne s'applique pas à une femelle allaitante accompagnée de
son petit.
(3)
Chaque vache, truie ou jument allaitante et son petit sont isolés.
(4)
Les animaux de la même espèce, inconciliables de nature, sont isolés.
(5)
Les groupes de taureaux, de verrats désarmés, de boucs ou de béliers adultes
sont isolés.
(6)
Chaque verrat adulte aux défenses non enlevées et chaque étalon adulte sont
isolés.
(7)
Un équidé dont les pattes postérieures sont ferrées est isolé des autres
équidés.
(8)
S'il s'agit de transport aérien, chaque équidé de plus de 14 mains de hauteur
est isolé des autres équidés.
(9)
S'il s'agit de transport aérien, les taureaux adultes sont solidement
attachés.
(10) S'il s'agit de
transport maritime, chaque cheval est isolé.
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[14]
It is
apparent that the requirement of subsection (1) and subsections (6), (8), (9)
and (10) are not cumulative since the latter deal with cases of individual
segregation as opposed to grouping animals of the same species by age or weight.
Those subsections are clearly exceptions to the rule set out in subsection (1).
The obvious intent of the legislative draftsman is that animals are to be
grouped by age or weight unless some other subsection provides more specific
guidance as to their treatment. This can be achieved by making subsection (1)
subject to the subsections which follow it as suggested by the expression "Subject
to this section…".
[15]
If one
looks for other examples of how the legislative draftsman has employed the
expression "Subject to this section…", this point of view is
confirmed. While there are too many examples to list them all, the following
are sufficient to make the point.
[16]
Section 11
of the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1, provides as
follows:
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11.(1) Subject to this section, a person
who makes a request for access to a record under this Act may be required to
pay
(a) at the time the
request is made, such application fee, not exceeding twenty-five dollars, as
may be prescribed by regulation;
(b)
before any copies are made, such fee as may be prescribed by regulation
reflecting the cost of reproduction calculated in the manner prescribed by
regulation; and
(c)
before the record is converted into an alternative format or any copies are
made in that format, such fee as may be prescribed by regulation reflecting
the cost of the medium in which the alternative format is produced.
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11.(1)
Sous
réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, il peut être exigé que la
personne qui fait la demande acquitte les droits suivants :
a) un versement initial accompagnant la demande
et dont le montant, d’un maximum de vingt-cinq dollars, peut être fixé par
règlement;
b) un versement prévu par règlement et exigible
avant la préparation de copies, correspondant aux frais de reproduction;
c) un
versement prévu par règlement, exigible avant le transfert, ou la production
de copies, du document sur support de substitution et correspondant au coût
du support de substitution.
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[17]
Subsection
11.(1) provides a general rule as to the fees payable with respect to an access
request. The following subsections either provide specific exceptions to that
rule (subsection (2), (3) and (6)), or provide the means by which the rule is
to be applied (subsections (4) and (5)). Subsection (2) provides for an
additional fee for document searches which exceed five hours while subsection
(3) provides for an additional fee for documents produced from machine readable
records. Subsections (4) and (5) deal with the mechanics of payment. Subsection
6 provides for the possibility of fees being waived in certain circumstances.
The structure of the section, then, is of a general rule which is subject to
the exceptions, or the means of application, provided in the following
subsections.
[18]
The same
is true of he Currency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-52, subsection 8.(1) of
which provides as follows:
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8.(1) Subject to this section, a
tender of payment of money is a legal tender if it is made
(a) in coins that
are current under section 7; and
(b) in notes issued
by the Bank of Canada pursuant to the Bank of Canada Act intended for
circulation in Canada.
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8.(1) Sous
réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, ont pouvoir libératoire :
a) les
pièces qui ont cours légal en vertu de l’article 7;
b) les
billets destinés à circuler au Canada et émis par la Banque du Canada aux
termes de la Loi sur la Banque du Canada.
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[19]
Subsection
8.(1) provides that payment in coins is legal tender but subsection (2) limits
the amounts in respect of which certain denominations of coins are legal tender.
Subsections (2.1) and (3) provide rules by which the amount of legal tender is
to be calculated and subsection (4) provides an exception to the rule in
subsection (1). Once again, the same structure is apparent.
[20]
Finally,
section 53.(2) of the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21, provides as
follows:
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53.(2) Subject to this section, the Privacy
Commissioner holds office during good behaviour for a term of seven years,
but may be removed for cause by the Governor in Council at any time on
address of the Senate and House of Commons.
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53.(2) Sous
réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, le Commissaire à la
protection de la vie privée occupe sa charge à titre inamovible pour un
mandat de sept ans, sauf révocation motivée par le gouverneur en conseil sur
adresse du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes.
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[21]
Subsection
(2) fixes the term of office of the Privacy Commissioner, while subsection (1)
deals with the mechanics of the appointment (by Governor in Council under the
Great Seal of Canada), subsection 3 with a clarification of the rule (a
Commissioner can be reappointed for a second term) and subsection(4) deals with
an exception to that rule (interim appointment).
[22]
The
examples could be multiplied but they would not make the point any clearer than
do these three examples. The expression "Subject to this section" is
a means of setting out a rule, and within the same section, setting out the
exceptions to that rule or the means of application of that rule.
[23]
Section
141 of the Regulations is a clear application of this legislative drafting technique.
Animals are to be segregated by age or weight unless some other form of
segregation is provided within the section. Subsection 141.(4) provides another
basis of segregation. It is interesting to note that section 141.(4) carries
within it the possibility of individual segregation as well as segregation by
affinity groups. This is consistent with the evidence given by Edwards, as
recounted by the Review Tribunal, that:
At the time the animals are loaded, CCWB tells
the transporter which segregated animals come from which producer and whether
or not there are problem animals that need to be further segregated for
transport.
[My emphasis.]
CONCLUSION
[24]
I am
satisfied that the interpretation which the Review Tribunal gave to subsection
141.(4) is correct as it is consistent with the language used by the draftsman
as well as being consistent with other examples of the use of the phrase "Subject
to the section" as a legislative drafting technique.
[25]
Since the
Review Tribunal's decision was correct, there is no basis for our intervention.
[26]
I would
therefore dismiss this application for judicial review with costs.
"J.D.
Denis Pelletier"
"I
agree
K.
Sharlow J.A."
"I
agree
C. Michael Ryer J.A."