Date: 20100707
Docket: A-303-09
Citation: 2010 FCA 178
CORAM: NOËL
J.A.
NADON
J.A.
DAWSON J.A.
BETWEEN:
IN THE MATTER
OF THE
BROADCASTING ACT, S.C. 1991, c. 11;
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION
AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION’S
BROADCASTING
REGULATORY POLICY CRTC 2009-329 AND
BROADCASTING
ORDER CRTC 2009-452
AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY WAY OF A
REFERENCE TO THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
PURSUANT
TO SECTIONS 18.3(1) AND 28(2) OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS ACT,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
NOËL J.A.
[1]
This is an
application for a reference by the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission (the CRTC). The question being referred is:
Do retail Internet
service providers (ISPs) carry on, in whole or in part, “broadcasting
undertakings” subject to the Broadcasting Act, [S.C. 1991, c. 11 (the Broadcasting Act)] when, in their role as
ISPs, they provide access through the Internet to “broadcasting” requested by
end-users?
The terms “broadcasting”
and “broadcasting undertaking” are as defined in the Broadcasting Act as
amended.
[2]
Two groups take
opposite views as to how this question should be answered. The Coalition,
composed of Bell Aliant Regional Communications, LP, Bell Canada, Cogeco Cable
Inc., MTS Allstream Inc., Rogers Communications Inc., Telus Communications
Company and Videotron Ltd., along with Shaw Communications Inc. (Shaw) submit
that the question should be answered in the negative.
[3]
The Cultural Group,
composed of the Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television & Radio Artists
(ACTRA), Canadian Film & Television Production Association (CFTPA),
Directors Guild of Canada (DGC) and Writers Guild of Canada (WGC) argues that
the question should be answered in the affirmative.
[4]
In conformity with the
order issued by this Court on July 31, 2009, the supporting affidavits and
documentary exhibits filed by the members of the two groups, along with the
affidavit of Namir Anani, Executive Director, Policy Development and Research
at the CRTC, filed by the CRTC, are the materials that constitute the case to
be determined on the reference pursuant to Rule 322 of the Federal Courts
Rules, SOR/98-106.
[5]
The statutory
provisions that are relevant to the analysis are set out in the Annex appended to
these reasons.
RELEVANT FACTS
[6]
On May 17, 1999, the
CRTC issued a report of broadcasting in new media: New Media,
Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 1999-84; Telecom Public Notice CRTC 99-14,
Notice of Application of the CRTC, Tab A (the New Media Report). It concluded
that while some new media services fell within the meaning of “broadcasting” in
the Broadcasting Act, their regulation was not necessary to implement
the Act’s broadcasting policy. By CRTC Public Notice 1999-197 (the New Media Exemption
Order), the CRTC exempted those undertakings, classified as “new media
broadcasting undertakings”, from any or all of the requirements of Part II of
the Broadcasting Act and Regulations, pursuant to its powers
under subsection 9(4) of the Broadcasting Act.
[7]
On October 15, 2008,
the CRTC issued Broadcasting Notice of Public Hearing CRTC 2008-11, initiating
a public proceeding to determine, amongst other things, whether the New Media
Exemption Order continued to be appropriate or needed to be revised.
[8]
Having reviewed the
legal opinions filed by the interested parties, the CRTC issued Broadcasting
Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009-329 detailing its findings on June 4, 2009 (the
2009 CRTC Policy). In this Policy, the CRTC did not determine the issue as to whether
ISPs are subject to the Broadcasting Act when they provide access to
broadcasting through the Internet. Rather, the CRTC decided that it would refer
the question to this Court for determination. The CRTC noted that the outcome
of the reference is important to determine whether ISPs are subject to the New
Media Exemption Order and whether the proposed amendments to impose reporting
requirements and undue preference provisions would apply to them.
[9]
On July 28, 2009, the
CRTC issued Broadcasting Order CRTC 2009-452 (the Reference Order) ordering the
referral of the question currently before this Court. The Reference Order also
clarifies the context for the referral:
4. With respect to its
determination to refer this matter to the Court, the Commission stated the
following in its regulatory policy:
The issue of the applicability of the Act to
ISPs was raised primarily in relation to the proposal by cultural groups in the
Proceeding for a levy on ISPs to create a fund to support the creation and presentation
of Canadian new media broadcasting content. Although the Commission has
determined that funding (and, consequently, a levy) is neither necessary nor
appropriate at this time, it considers that the question as to whether ISPs are
subject to the Act must be resolved. If ISPs were subject to the Act, they
would fall within the scope of the New Media Exemption Order given that it was
intended to encompass all broadcasting undertakings whose services are
delivered and accessed over the Internet. Accordingly, legal certainty with
respect to the status of ISPs under the Act is necessary in order to know
whether ISPs are subject to the New Media Exemption Order and, as such, whether
the proposed amendments to that order to impose reporting requirements and undue
preference provisions for new media broadcasting undertakings will apply to
them.
The Commission notes that, pursuant to
subsection 4(4) of the Broadcasting Act, a telecommunications common
carrier, as defined in the Telecommunications Act, when acting solely in
that capacity, is not subject to the Broadcasting Act. Likewise,
pursuant to section 4 of the Telecommunications Act, that statute does
not apply in respect of broadcasting by a broadcasting undertaking. The legal
issue as to whether ISPs are subject to the Broadcasting Act raises
fundamental questions regarding the distinction, for the purpose of the Broadcasting
Act and the Telecommunications Act, between telecommunications
common carriers and broadcasting undertakings.
[10]
The CRTC, in referring
the question to the Court, made a number of findings as to the workings of the
Internet and the role of ISPs. The
CRTC describes the Internet as a network of networks that allows for the
communication of digital information. It is composed of interconnected
computers usually called “hosts” and “routers”. Hosts, such as Internet users
and content providers such as website servers, are end-systems that send and
receive data while routers are network computers that relay data from host to
host.
[11]
Network providers,
such as retail ISPs, are entities that deploy routers and other network infrastructure
to interconnect their subscribers with the other networks that make up the
Internet. In addition, ISPs generally provide their subscribers with hardware
such as a modem and/or router to connect them to their network, as well as
customer authentication (e.g. username and password).
[12]
The CRTC defined ISPs
in the Glossary of New Media Terms appended in the New Media Report:
A company or other
organization which provides access to the Internet to its customers via one or
a combination of dial-up lines (similar to telephone service), coaxial cable
ISDN, xDSL or other dedicated lines. The most typical example is a home user
who pays a fee to connect to the ISP’s server. The connection is made by a
“modem” which makes the electronic data from the home user’s computer
transmittable over a telephone line. The data then passes through the telephone
company’s facilities in the same way as a normal telephone call. The “call” is
received by the ISP which “routes” the user’s requests for information to the
server that is “hosting” the desired data.
[13]
In other words, ISPs
provide the infrastructure to enable end-user subscribers to access the
content, applications and services made available by others on the Internet. In order to access “broadcasting”
through the Internet, the end-user must make use of the services of an ISP. In
addition, content-providers depend on ISPs’ services for the delivery of their
content to end-users. In their role as providers of “access through the
Internet to “broadcasting” ”, ISPs do not select or originate programming or
package or aggregate programming services.
[14]
Although
ISPs may perform these functions when they operate their own websites, the CRTC
emphasized (Referral Order, paragraph 10) that this activity is separate and
distinct from their role as ISPs which is to provide for the transmission of
content requested by their end-users. The focus of the reference is restricted
to this last function. ISPs fulfill
this function using either their own facilities or facilities leased from
another ISP, or a combination of both.
[15]
ISPs which qualify as
telecommunication common carriers are currently regulated under the Telecommunications
Act, S.C.
1993, c. 38 (the Telecommunications Act) as providers of telecommunications services. The issue
underlying the referred question is whether ISPs should be considered a
“broadcasting undertaking” and regulated under the Broadcasting Act when
they provide access to “broadcasting”.
[16]
In the New Media
Report which led to the New Media Exemption Order, the CRTC made a number of specific
findings which support the assumption that “broadcasting” takes place on the
Internet:
a. Information
transmitted on the Internet is not thereby displayed in a public place and is
not therefore excluded from the definition of “broadcasting”:
36. [The Commission] considers that the Internet
is not in and of itself a "public place" in the sense intended by the
Act. Programs are not transmitted to cyberspace, but through it, and are
received in a physical place, e.g. in an office or home.
b. The fact that
programs are transmitted to end-users by means of the Internet does not exclude
the activity from the definition of “broadcasting”:
38.
The Commission notes that the definition of "broadcasting" includes
the transmission of programs, whether or not encrypted, by other means of
telecommunication. This definition is, and was intended to be, technologically
neutral. Accordingly, the mere fact that a program is delivered by means of the
Internet, rather than by means of the airwaves or by a cable company, does not
exclude it from the definition of "broadcasting".
c. The delivery of
content over the Internet from a host server to end-users involves the
“transmission” of the content:
39. The fact that an end-user activates the
delivery of a program is not, in the Commission's view, determinative. As
discussed below, on-demand delivery is included in the definition of
"broadcasting". Further, the Commission considers that the particular
technology used for the delivery of signals over the Internet cannot be
determinative. Based on a plain meaning of the word, and recognizing the intent
that the definition be technologically neutral, the Commission considers that
the delivery of data signals from an origination point (e.g. a host server) to
a reception point (e.g. an end-user's apparatus) by means of the Internet
involves the "transmission" of the content.
d. The words
“broadcasting receiving apparatus” include personal computers of Web TV boxes
when used to access the Internet:
40. The Commission notes that the definition of
"broadcasting receiving apparatus" includes a "device, or
combination of devices, intended for or capable of being used for the reception
of broadcasting". The Commission considers that an interpretation of this
definition that includes only conventional televisions and radios is not
supported by the plain meaning of the definition and would undermine the
technological neutrality of the definition of "broadcasting". In the
Commission's view, devices such as personal computers, or televisions equipped
with Web TV boxes, fall within the definition of "broadcasting receiving
apparatus" to the extent that they are or are capable of being used to
receive broadcasting.
e. Programs which may
be accessed by the end-user as and when the end-user accesses them are “for
reception by the public”:
44.
In the Commission's view, there is no explicit or implicit statutory
requirement that broadcasting involve scheduled or simultaneous transmissions
of programs. The Commission notes that the legislator could have, but did not,
expressly exclude on-demand programs from the Act. As noted by one party, the
mere ability of an end-user to select content on-demand does not by itself
remove such content from the definition of broadcasting. The Commission
considers that programs that are transmitted to members of the public on-demand
are transmitted "for reception by the public".
f. Digital audio and
video services transmitted over the Internet are “broadcasting”:
46.
By contrast, the ability to select, for example, camera angles or background
lighting would not by itself remove programs transmitted by means of the
Internet from the definition of "broadcasting". The Commission notes
that digital television can be expected to allow this more limited degree of
customization. In these circumstances, where the experience of end-users with
the program in question would be similar, if not the same, there is nonetheless
a transmission of the program for reception by the public, and, therefore, such
content would be "broadcasting". These types of programs would
include, for example, those that consist of digital audio and video services.
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
The Coalition’s Position
[17]
The Coalition submits
that the reference question should be answered in the negative. It argues that
the definition of “broadcasting undertaking” is to be interpreted in light of
the object of the Broadcasting Act and it is evident that, by enabling
end-users to access “broadcasting” through the Internet, ISPs fall outside of
this definition. The definition of “broadcasting undertaking” is not
exhaustive. However, unlike distribution and programming undertakings and networks,
ISPs do not exercise any control over creating, choosing, or acquiring rights
to the content that end-users receive. ISPs play no editorial role nor do they
“receive” programs; rather, they simply provide a passive connection through
which “programs” may travel. Indeed, the courts have consistently found ISPs to
be mere conduits, analogous to telephone lines, and therefore not liable for
copyright-infringing or defamatory content that is sent or accessed using their
facilities.
[18]
As the primary focus
of the Broadcasting Act is to foster the enrichment of Canada via the broadcasting of programs that promote Canadian
artistic creativity, expression and talent, the Coalition is of the view that
its interpretation is in line with Parliament’s intent. As mere conduits, ISPs
have no meaningful role to play in ensuring the attainment of these objectives.
Parliament could not have intended to capture undertakings with the
characteristics of ISPs. Rather, it is submitted that the function of the ISPs
are at the core of the policy objectives of the Telecommunications Act.
[19]
As recognized at
section 28 of the Telecommunications Act, telecommunications carriers
(including satellite carriers) may transmit broadcasting programming in their
capacity as telecommunications carriers. The Coalition argues that the services
offered by the ISPs are much like the satellite services provided by Telesat Canada or the Video Dial Tone services which the CRTC has
maintained should be regulated under the Telecommunications Act. The
Coalition submits that the function performed by ISPs in providing Internet
access to end-users is consistent with the objectives of the Telecommunications
Act to ensure the efficiency, accessibility and reliability of Canadian
telecommunications and infrastructure.
Shaw’s Position
[20]
Like the Coalition,
Shaw also submits that the reference question should be answered in the
negative. Broadcasting is restricted to the “transmission of programs, whether
or not encrypted, by radio waves or other means of telecommunication for
reception by the public by means of broadcasting receiving apparatus”. As ISPs
do not engage in the “transmission of programs” for “reception by the public”,
they do not engage in broadcasting.
[21]
Shaw relies on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004]
2 S.C.R. 427, (CAIP). The Court found that, given their role as a mere
conduit of information, ISPs do not communicate to the public pursuant to
paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42
(the Copyright Act). The Court also noted that its approach
was comparable to that taken in Electric Despatch Co. of Toronto v. Bell
Telephone Co. of Canada, (1891), 20 S.C.R. 83. (Electric Despatch)
where the owner of the mode of transmission, in this case Bell, was found not to be engaged in the transmission itself.
Shaw submits that, in accordance with the rules of statutory interpretation,
since the acts deal with the same subject-matter and no contrary intention is apparent,
the same interpretation of the word “transmission” is applicable under the Broadcasting
Act.
[22]
ISPs also do not
telecommunicate for “reception by the public”. Indeed, the data conveyed by
ISPs is done so exclusively to the user to whom the individual data packets are
addressed. This is contrasted with content providers who typically make website
content available to multiple users. Shaw relies on the Supreme Court’s
decision in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC
13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 wherein the Court concluded that a single transmission
to a single individual is not a communication to the public.
[23]
More broadly, Shaw
argues that ISPs are not “broadcasting undertakings” because there is no
“broadcasting” when a content provider makes program content available over the
Internet. Contrary to the unidirectional sending of telecommunications signals
by a source to multiple passive recipients which constitutes the essence of
broadcasting, Internet users request and receive data via an individualized
communication with the source. Shaw relies on this Court’s decision in WIC
TV Amalco Inc. v. ITV Technologies, Inc., 2005 FCA 96, (2003) 29 C.P.R. (4th)
182 where the distinction between broadcasting and web casting was recognized.
[24]
Shaw argues that the
Internet is not part of the “Canadian broadcasting system” that Parliament
intended to regulate with the Broadcasting Act. Pursuant to paragraphs 3(1)(a)
and (b) of the Broadcasting Act, the Canadian broadcasting system
“shall be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians” and “makes use of
radio frequencies that are public property”. Canadians do not “effectively own
and control” the Internet and the Internet does not make use of “radio frequencies
that are public property”. Furthermore, the express limitation that
broadcasting be confined to the transmission of programs by means of
“broadcasting receiving apparatus” excludes computers as found in R. v. Bahr,
2006 ABPC 360, 434 A.R. 1. The technological neutrality argument raised by the
Cultural Group cannot override the legislative language or intent: Canadian
Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media Alliance, 2004 FCA
424, [2005] 2 F.C.R. 654 at paragraphs 153 to 164.
[25]
In any case, a
finding that ISPs engage in broadcasting would be, it is argued, an untenable
interpretation of the Broadcasting Act. Highly customizable content has
been recognized by the CRTC not to constitute broadcasting. ISPs are unaware of
the content of the data packets being relayed and have therefore no knowledge
of whether the programs are customizable to a significant degree. They would
have no idea when they were broadcasting and when they were not.
[26]
As for the scope of
the definition of “broadcasting undertakings”, Shaw contends that the use of
the word “include” within this definition was not intended to permit the
creation of undertakings beyond those already enumerated: “distribution
undertaking”, “programming undertaking” and “network”. In light of their content-neutral
role, Shaw, like the Coalition, argues that ISPs constitute none of those
undertakings and that their traffic management practices do not change the
nature of the transmission nor alter this conclusion.
The Cultural Group’s Position
[27]
The Cultural Group contends
that the reference question should be answered in the affirmative. It submits
that, as assumed in the question posed by the CRTC, the delivery of audio and
audiovisual content to ISP subscribers through the Internet is “broadcasting”
as it involves the transmission of programs by means of telecommunications.
Contrary to Shaw’s assertion, the fact that the Internet makes no use of public
owned radio frequencies does not exclude it from the scope of the Broadcasting
Act. Indeed, Parliament’s intent that the Broadcasting Act be
technologically neutral was made clear during its review of Canadian
broadcasting and telecommunications policy in the late 1980s.
[28]
This transmission of
programs is “for reception by the public” by a computer, or “broadcasting
receiving apparatus” as recognized by the CRTC in the New Media Report at
paragraphs 2 to 5. Furthermore, as evidenced by the deletion of the words “made
on demand of a particular person for reception only by that person” in the
final enactment of Bill C-40, the subscriber’s demand for the program does
nothing to change the fact that its subsequent transmission constitutes
broadcasting.
[29]
Turning to the issue
of whether ISPs can come within the definition of “broadcasting undertaking”,
the Cultural Group notes that the word “includes” indicates that the definition
is not limited to the undertakings enumerated. The CRTC need not bring ISPs within
any particular class of broadcasting undertaking. ISPs need only constitute
“undertakings” that engage in “broadcasting”, a criterion which they satisfy.
Nevertheless, ISPs could be said to constitute “distribution undertakings”,
“new media broadcasting undertakings” or be part of some new class of
undertaking that the CRTC could create.
[30]
With regard to the
alleged passive nature of ISPs, the Cultural Group notes that subsection 2(1)
of the Broadcasting Act makes no distinction between the active or
passive nature of a “distribution undertaking” or “programming undertaking”.
The underlying principles in the Supreme Court decisions Capital Cities Comm.
v. C.R.T.C., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 (Capital Cities) and Public
Service Board et al. v. Dionne et al., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 191 demonstrate
that, as part of the single system which is the broadcasting system, ISPs are
regulated by the Broadcasting Act along with the content of the programs
they transmit. Parliament has not excluded transmission intermediaries from the
definition of “broadcasting” based on their passive or active role. As such,
the ISPs’ passive role is irrelevant to the application of the Broadcasting
Act.
ANALYSIS
[31]
The
question as framed is based on the assumption that “broadcasting” takes place
on the Internet. This
assumption is based on a number of prior findings made by the CRTC, i.e. that the
delivery of content on the Internet involves the “transmission” of the content;
that computers constitute a “broadcasting receiving apparatus”; that the
content transmitted on the Internet can be a “program” and that such
transmission is “for reception by the public”.
[32]
In its
memorandum of fact and law, Shaw took issue with these findings. In particular Shaw
challenged the fundamental assumption that “broadcasting” takes place on the
Internet. However, at the hearing of the appeal, counsel for Shaw acknowledged
that in dealing with the question, the Court must accept the assumption on
which it is framed. He nevertheless expressed the concern that the Court might
be viewed as sanctioning the underlying findings.
[33]
To be
clear, neither the assumption that “broadcasting” takes place on the Internet
nor the underlying findings made by the CRTC are in issue in this proceeding with
the result that the Court in answering the referred question cannot be viewed
as making any pronouncement with regard to the assumption or any of these
findings.
[34]
Turning to
the question, the parties expressed the common view during the hearing that the
answer turns on whether ISPs, when providing access to “broadcasting”, are
themselves “broadcasting”. Counsel for Shaw and for the Coalition conceded that
if ISPs are thereby “broadcasting”, they must be viewed as “broadcasting
undertakings”. If not, counsel for the Cultural Group agreed that the opposite
conclusion must be reached.
[35]
When
regard is had to the wording of the definition, the issue to be decided is
whether, when providing access to the “transmission of programs …”, ISPs are
broadcasting. The answer to this question hinges on a consideration of the
findings of the CRTC as to how programs are transmitted on the Internet on the
one hand, and the exact purport of the definition of the word “broadcasting”,
on the other.
[36]
In the Reference
Order, the CRTC provides a detailed explanation as to how “transmission” takes
place on the Internet (Reference Order, paragraphs. 12 to 16):
12. For the purposes of transmission on the
Internet, content is broken down into data packets. In order for an end-user to
access content on the Internet, the end-user must send a request to a host
server or network device. Data packets are transmitted from host servers
or network devices via switches and routers, which examine the header
information and determine the appropriate transmission route for the packets.
Packets are transmitted through multiple routers until they reach the
end-user’s ISP for delivery to the computer or other Internet
aware device operated by the end-user.
13. ISPs enable end-users to access the Internet and enable
the delivery of content through the Internet to end-users, as described above.
To that end, the ISPs’ routers respond to end-user activity by routing data
packets using Internet protocol. The functions and operations of ISPs do not
generally differ according to the type of content being delivered to the
end-user – whether it be alphanumeric, audio or audiovisual.
14. Source and destination Internet addresses for each packet
are assigned by the end-user device and are not generally modified by
ISPs. The ISP reads the packet’s header to determine the most appropriate
transmission route. The ISP’s routers route packets of data sourced from
or destined to an end-user’s computer or
other Internet aware device. Upon reception of packets, the end-user
device reassembles the packets of data and translates the data into a format
which will be accessible to the end-user.
15. ISPs deploy routers and other network infrastructure to
interconnect their subscribers with the other networks that make up the
Internet. In addition, ISPs generally provide their subscribers with hardware
such as a modem and/or router to connect them to their network, as well as
customer authentication (e.g. username and password).
16. In order to access broadcasting through the Internet, the
end-user must make use of the services of an ISP. In addition, content
providers depend on ISPs’ services for the delivery of their content to
end-users. In their role as providers of access to broadcasting, ISPs do not
select or originate programming or package or aggregate programming services.
While ISPs may perform these functions when they operate their own websites, this
activity is separate from their role as ISPs, which is to provide for the
transmission of content requested by their end-users.
[Emphasis added.]
[37]
Relying on these
findings, Shaw and the Coalition emphasize the fact that the role of ISPs is
restricted to the provision of the mode of transmission and is content-neutral.
They argue that only content providers, who place content on a server with the
view that it be accessed by end-users, transmit the content and can be said to
be “broadcasting”. The Cultural Group for its part contends that transmission
cannot take place without ISPs and that by enabling the delivery of the content
from content providers to end-users, ISPs partake in the transmission even if
their role is content-neutral. According to the Cultural Group, both ISPs and
content providers transmit the content.
[38]
The referred question
assumes that programs are transmitted on the Internet. The issue which must be
elucidated is by whom? The answer turns on whether the definition of
“broadcasting”, beyond being aimed at the person who transmits the program,
extends to the person whose sole involvement is to provide the mode of
transmission.
[39]
I agree with the
Cultural Group that the definition of “broadcasting” when read on its own can
include a person whose sole involvement is to provide the mode of transmission
since no distinction is made as to the active or passive nature of the
involvement. However, this ceases to be the case when the definition is
considered contextually having regard to the scheme and purpose of the Broadcasting
Act.
[40]
The distinction
between the person providing the mode of transmission and the person making the
transmission was examined by the Supreme Court in Electric Despatch in a
context which, although involved with dated technology, remains relevant (Electric
Despatch, page 91):
The wires constitute the
mode of transmission by which the one lessee transmits the message along the
wires to the other. It is the person who breathes into the instrument the
message which is transmitted along the wires who alone can be said to be the
person who "transmits" the message. The owner's of the telephone
wires, who are utterly ignorant of the nature of the message intended to be
sent, cannot be said within the meaning of the covenant to transmit a message
of the purport of which they are ignorant.
[Emphasis added.]
[41]
More than a century
later, the Supreme Court relied on this interpretation in CAIP
(paragraph 96). The issue in CAIP was whether ISPs – referred to in that
case as “Internet intermediaries” – were shielded from copyright infringement
liability by virtue of paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act. This
provision makes it clear that such liability cannot be visited upon persons
whose only involvement is providing the means of telecommunication of an infringing
work to the public:
2.4
(1) For the purposes of communication to the public by telecommunication,
…
(b) a person whose only act
in respect of the communication of a work or other subject-matter to the
public consists of providing the means of telecommunication necessary for
another person to so communicate the work or other subject-matter does
not communicate that work or other subject-matter to the public;
…
|
2.4 (1) Les règles qui suivent
s’appliquent dans les cas de communication au public par
télécommunication :
[…]
b) n’effectue pas
une communication au public la personne qui ne fait que fournir à un tiers
les moyens de télécommunication nécessaires pour que celui-ci l’effectue;
[…]
|
[Emphasis added.]
[42]
After an extensive
analysis, the Supreme Court held that Internet intermediaries came within this
exception. In coming to this conclusion Binnie J., writing for a unanimous
Court, relied on the Copyright Board’s assessment of the workings of the
Internet which, in all essential aspects, is the same as that made by the CRTC
in this case, and recognized the content-neutral role of Internet
intermediaries. Although the Internet intermediaries were providing the means
of communication, they were not “communicating” the infringing work as they had
nothing to do with the content (CAIP, paragraphs. 92 and 95):
92. So long as an
Internet intermediary does not itself engage in acts that relate to the content
of the communication, i.e., whose participation is content neutral, but
confines itself to providing “a conduit” for information communicated by
others, then it will fall within [paragraph] 2.4(1)(b). The appellants
support this result on a general theory of “Don’t shoot the messenger!”
….
95. Having properly
instructed itself on the law, the Board found as a fact that the “conduit”
begins with the host server. No reason has been shown in this application for
judicial review to set aside that conclusion.
[43]
The
Cultural Group argues that the decision in CAIP has no bearing on the
referred question because it was reached on the basis of paragraph 2.4(1)(b)
of the Copyright Act and no such provision exists under the Broadcasting
Act. According to the Cultural Group, if Parliament had wished to similarly
exclude re-transmitters or other transmission intermediaries from the
definition of “broadcasting”, it could have done so. The fact that Parliament
did not do so is a clear sign that it intended such intermediaries to be
included within the definition.
[44]
However,
the distinction between the means of communication and the communication itself
is as fundamental to the Broadcasting Act as it is to the Copyright
Act. In this respect, subsection 4(4) of the Broadcasting Act bears
resemblance to subsection 2.4(1) of the Copyright Act in that it provides:
4. (4) For greater certainty,
this Act does not apply to any telecommunications common carrier, as defined
in the Telecommunications Act, when acting solely in that capacity.
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4. (4) Il demeure entendu que la présente loi ne s’applique pas
aux entreprises de télécommunication – au sens de la Loi sur les
télécommunications – n’agissant qu’à ce titre.
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[Emphasis
added.]
[45]
A “telecommunications
common carrier” is in turn, defined in subsection 2(1) of the Telecommunications
Act as:
2. (1) a person who owns or operates a transmission
facility used by that person or another person to provide telecommunications
services to the public for compensation.
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2. (1) propriétaire ou
exploitant d’une installation de transmission grâce à laquelle sont
fournis par lui-même ou une autre personne des services de télécommunication
au public moyennant contrepartie.
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[Emphasis
added.]
[46]
It is
apparent that subsection 4(4) of the Broadcasting Act also excludes from
the operation of the Act transmission intermediaries when working solely in
that capacity. Furthermore, while CAIP involved the Copyright Act,
the reliance placed on Electric Despatch and in particular the finding
that content-neutral transmission intermediaries cannot be said to “transmit”
the content can have a wider applicability.
[47]
Both the Copyright
Act and the Broadcasting Act – like the covenant at issue in Electric
Despatch – are concerned with the content being transmitted rather than the
means of conveying this content. As the owners of the telephone wires in Electric
Despatch, ISPs are “utterly ignorant” of the nature of the message intended
to be sent, and therefore cannot be said to “transmit” a “program” the purport of
which they have no knowledge (Electric Despatch, p. 91).
[48]
Relying on
the logic adopted by Binnie J. in CAIP in construing the word
“communicate” under the Copyright Act, I am of the view that the
definition of “broadcasting” is also directed at the person who transmits a
program and that a person whose sole involvement is to provide the mode
of transmission is not transmitting the program and hence, is not
“broadcasting”.
[49]
This
interpretation is consistent with the policy objectives set out in subsection
3(1) of the Broadcasting Act. The primary focus is on the cultural
enrichment of Canada through the broadcasting of programs which involve a
significant amount of Canadian artistic creativity in their production,
encourage Canadian expression and the use of Canadian talent, and which reflect
Canada’s linguistic duality and
multicultural society. The Broadcasting Act sets out specific provisions
on programming content to achieve these objectives such as the allocation of
broadcasting time, the character and volume of advertising, and the carriage of
foreign programming (subsection 10(1) of the Broadcasting Act).
Furthermore, in setting out the manner in which the Broadcasting Act is
to be interpreted, subsection 2(3) refers to the “freedom of expression and journalistic,
creative and programming independence enjoyed by broadcasting undertakings”.
[50]
Because ISPs’
sole involvement is to provide the mode of transmission, they have no control
or input over the content made available to Internet users by content producers
and as a result, they are unable to take any steps to promote the policy
described in the Broadcasting Act or its supporting provisions. Only
those who “transmit” the “program” can contribute to the policy objectives.
[51]
Nevertheless,
the Cultural Group argues that the ISPs’ inability to contribute to the
achievement of the policy objectives is no basis for excluding them from the
definition of “broadcasting”. In support of this contention, the Cultural Group
points to the power given to the CRTC pursuant to subsection 9(4) of the Broadcasting
Act to exempt by order those who carry on broadcasting undertakings from
compliance with the Act or a regulation made thereunder, where such compliance
would not contribute to the implementation of the broadcasting policy.
Subsection 9(4) provides:
9. (4) The Commission
shall, by order, on such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate, exempt
persons who carry on broadcasting undertakings of any class specified in the
order from any or all of the requirements of this Part or of a regulation
made under this Part where the Commission is satisfied that compliance with
those requirements will not contribute in a material manner to the
implementation of the broadcasting policy set out in subsection 3(1).
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9. (4) Le Conseil soustrait, par
ordonnance et aux conditions qu’il juge indiquées, les exploitants
d’entreprise de radiodiffusion de la catégorie qu’il précise à toute
obligation découlant soit de la présente partie, soit de ses règlements
d’application, dont il estime l’exécution sans conséquence majeure sur la
mise en oeuvre de la politique canadienne de radiodiffusion.
|
[52]
According to the
Cultural Group, this shows that the definition of “broadcasting” was intended
to be broad, reaching all those who partake in the transmission including entities
whose sole function is to provide the mode of transmission. To the extent that in
performing this function ISPs cannot contribute to the policy objectives, Parliament
has given the CRTC the power to issue the appropriate exemptions.
[53]
This argument might
have some weight were it not for the fact that, as we have seen, the Broadcasting
Act specifically provides that it does not apply to a telecommunications common
carrier when acting solely in that capacity. Furthermore, it would be
highly unusual for a statute to be construed in a manner that overshoots its
objects. The Cultural Group has not identified any logic or reason that could
possibly justify such an odd result.
[54]
Properly understood,
subsection 9(4) allows the CRTC to exempt broadcasting undertakings from
compliance with the Act where, for instance, the programs which they broadcast
by reason of their type or nature do not contribute in a material manner to the
broadcasting policy. The existence of this power does not suggest, as the
Cultural Group contends, that Parliament contemplated that “broadcasting” should
be given a meaning that extends to those who cannot contribute to the policy
objectives.
[55]
The
Cultural Group further argues that the role of ISPs and content providers are
insegregable, and that, as such, both are “transmitting” programs. In this
respect, the Cultural Group relies on the decision of the Supreme Court Capital
Cities for the proposition that the Broadcasting Act was intended to
capture all transmitters as part of the single system that is the Canadian
broadcasting system. It emphasizes the following words found at page
162 of this decision:
… Programme content
regulation is inseparable from regulating the undertaking through which
programmes are received and sent on as part of the total enterprise. …
[56]
In
Capital Cities there was no question that the entities concerned were
involved in broadcasting: they were cable television companies. The question
before the Court was whether the provinces ought to retain regulatory control over
cable television stations and their programming because the cable
infrastructure was located wholly within the province. The Court’s conclusion
that the cable infrastructure fell within federal jurisdiction stemmed from the
fact that the signals that were received and retransmitted by the companies
were extra provincial in origin and the technology involved did not change that
fact.
[57]
I
do not see how this decision can be of assistance to the Cultural Group. It was
reached at a time when the regulatory scheme did not include the Telecommunications
Act and once the Court found that the undertaking fell within federal
jurisdiction, it was assumed that the Broadcasting Act would apply. The
most that can be taken from this decision is that undertakings that receive
broadcasting signals and send them to their subscriber by a different
technology are properly regulated by the federal government as interprovincial
undertakings.
[58]
Finally,
throughout its submissions, the Cultural Group has emphasized the fact that the
Broadcasting Act was meant to be technologically neutral. The suggestion
is that the Broadcasting Act should evolve with the development of new
means of transmission and apply regardless of the technology used to broadcast
programs. The assumption made by the CRTC that “broadcasting” takes place on
the Internet supports this view (New Media Exemption Order, para. 39). However,
this does not assist in determining who is doing the “broadcasting”.
[59]
In
providing access to “broadcasting”, ISPs do not transmit programs. As such,
they are not “broadcasting” and therefore they do not come within the
definition of “broadcasting undertaking”. In so holding, I wish to reiterate as
was done in CAIP that this conclusion is based on the content-neutral
role of ISPs and would have to be reassessed if this role should change (CAIP,
para. 92).
[60]
I would therefore
answer the reference question as follows: Retail ISPs do not carry on, in whole
or in part, “broadcasting undertakings” subject to the Broadcasting Act when,
in their role as ISPs, they provide access through the Internet to
“broadcasting” requested by end-users.
“Marc Noël”
“I agree
M.
Nadon J.A.”
“I agree
Eleanor R. Dawson J.A.”