Date: 20120529
Docket: A-327-11
Citation: 2012 FCA 158
CORAM: LÉTOURNEAU
J.A.
SHARLOW
J.A.
DAWSON J.A.
BETWEEN:
DOUGLAS TIPPLE
Appellant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SHARLOW J.A.
[1]
This appeal involves
an order made by an adjudicator, Mr. D.R. Quigley, under the Public Service
Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22 (2010 PSLRB 83) awarding approximately
$1.4 million to the appellant Mr. Douglas Tipple in respect of the
termination of his appointment as Special Advisor to the Deputy Minister, Real
Property Business Transformation, Public Works and Government Services Canada.
[2]
The order is set out
in paragraphs 358 to 362 of the adjudicator’s reasons, and reads as follows:
358.
The objection to an
adjudicator's jurisdiction to hear this grievance is dismissed, and I declare
that Mr. Tipple's grievance was properly referred to adjudication.
359.
I further declare that
the termination of Mr. Tipple's employment was not effected under the [Public
Service Employment Act] but that it was a sham or a camouflage and that
the deputy head was not justified in terminating Mr. Tipple's employment.
360.
I further declare that
I have no jurisdiction under the [Public Service Labour Relations Act]
to entertain Mr. Tipple's $10 000.00 claim for relocation and moving expenses
from Toronto to Ottawa.
361.
I order the deputy
head to pay Mr. Tipple the following amounts, by August 16, 2010:
Damages
for lost wages $ 688 751.08
Damages
for lost performance bonus $ 109 038.46
Damages
for lost employee benefits $ 109 038.46
Interest
on damages for lost wages, performance
bonus
and employee benefits $ 54 209.40
Damages
for psychological injury $ 125 000.00
Interest
on damages for psychological injury $ 7 472.39
Damages
for loss of reputation $ 250 000.00
Interest
on damages for loss of reputation $ 14 944.79
TOTAL $1
358 454.58
362.
I further declare that
Mr. Tipple incurred additional legal costs caused by the deputy head's
continued failure to comply with the disclosure orders issued in this case
and that the deputy head is liable for those additional costs. To determine
the value of damages for obstruction of process, I order Mr. Tipple's counsel
to provide the deputy head's counsel, by July 30, 2010, a detailed statement
of all reasonable steps taken on Mr. Tipple's behalf as a result of the
deputy head's continued failure to comply with the disclosure orders issued
in this case. I further order the parties to meet with a view to agreeing on
the value of damages for obstruction of process that the deputy head owes Mr.
Tipple. I remain seized of this issue should the parties not agree on the
value of damages for obstruction of process. The hearing will reconvene only
for that purpose on October 5, 2010, if necessary.
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[3]
With respect to
paragraph 362 of the adjudicator’s order, the parties have agreed that the
amount of damages for obstruction of process, assuming the award stands after
this appeal, is $45,322.03. The total award is therefore $1,403,776.61.
[4]
Both parties applied
for judicial review of the adjudicator’s order. There was no challenge to the
awards for lost wages, benefits, and bonuses. The Attorney General of Canada,
on behalf of the Department of Public Works and Government Services (“PWGSC”),
challenged the award of damages for psychological injury, loss of reputation
and obstruction of process. Mr. Tipple challenged the decision of the
adjudicator that he had no jurisdiction to award costs, and also raised an
issue as to the determination of the period for which interest was payable on
the award.
[5]
A judge of the
Federal Court disposed of both applications in a single judgment (2011 FC 762).
He allowed the Attorney General’s application and set aside the award of
damages for psychological injury, loss of reputation, and obstruction of
process. He allowed Mr. Tipple’s application on the issue relating to the
determination of the period for which interest was payable and dismissed Mr.
Tipple’s application on the issue relating to the adjudicator’s jurisdiction to
award costs. He referred the matter back to the Public Service Labour Relations
Board for re-determination of two matters, a redetermination of the quantum of
the award for psychological damages, and a redetermination of the period for
which interest was payable. As Mr. Quigley has retired, that re-determination
will be conducted by a different adjudicator.
[6]
Mr. Tipple now
appeals to this Court, seeking an order that the adjudicator has the
jurisdiction to award costs (including, if successful on that point, an order
determining the amount of costs to which he is entitled), and an order
reinstating the adjudicator’s award for damages for loss of reputation and
obstruction of process.
Standard of review
[7]
In an appeal from a
judgment on an application for judicial review, the appeal court must determine
if the judge selected the correct standard of review and applied it correctly.
Generally, reasonableness is the standard of review for decisions of federal
decision makers in statutory positions requiring special expertise, like that
of an adjudicator of the Public Service Labour Relations Board. That is the
standard of review for all issues in this case.
Facts
[8]
The evidence is
summarized in considerable detail in the adjudicator’s decision. The parties
take no issue with the summary of the relevant facts in paragraphs 3 to 20 of the
judge’s reasons, which I gratefully adopt:
[3]
Mr. Tipple is an executive with a specialty in real property. In 2004, PWGSC
undertook a new strategy known as “The Way Forward,” which was implemented to
reduce costs relating to accommodation for the federal public service. I.
David Marshall, the Deputy Minister of PWGSC at the time, decided to recruit
executives from the private sector to act as “special advisors” to accomplish
this goal. PWGSC hired Mr. Tipple to be responsible for real property, and
David Rotor to be responsible for procurement. Mr. Tipple signed a three-year
contract (from October 11, 2005 to October 6, 2008) at an annual salary of
$360,000.00 and with a performance bonus of 15% if certain benchmarks were
met. His letter of offer also provided that “Your services may be required
for a shorter period depending upon the availability of work and continuance
of the duties to be performed …”
[4]
Mr. Tipple began working in his new position in October 2005 and ultimately
relocated his family from Toronto to Ottawa.
In his first year, he met the target objectives and saved PWGSC $150 million.
[5]
During his time at PWGSC Mr. Tipple advocated for the transformation of PWGSC
into a Crown corporation. However, the government did not envision PWGSC as a
Crown corporation or anticipate any major outsourcing of jobs, and PWGSC
employees were preparing a campaign to challenge any such outsourcing. From
April to June 2006, Deputy Minister Marshall had discussions with Yvette D.
Aloïse, Acting Associate Deputy Minister, during which she
expressed her view that Mr. Tipple’s
role as special advisor was “not working out.”
[6]
Nonetheless, in June 2006, Mr. Tipple received a performance review which
rated his performance at the highest possible rating (“surpassed”) and he was
paid his negotiated 15% bonus. The comments attached to the review were
highly complimentary. Furthermore, Mr. Marshall approved the payment of Mr.
Tipple’s upcoming membership fee for the National Club in Toronto in June 2006.
[7]
Then, from June 25 to 30, 2006, Mr. Tipple and Mr. Rotor traveled to the United Kingdom to meet with officials regarding that
country’s approach to business transformation. Mr. Tipple was accompanied by
his wife and he added some vacation days to the business trip, all at his own
expense and with the approval of Mr. Marshall.
[8]
PWGSC made the plans for the trip and arranged meetings with UK officials. Catherine Dickson, an employee of the Canadian
High Commission in the UK, was responsible for arranging the
meetings. There were problems with the planning of Mr. Tipple’s schedule
resulting, it appears, from miscommunication between PWGSC and the Canadian
High Commission. During his time in the UK Mr. Tipple was invited to attend
procurement-related meetings, but given that procurement was Mr. Rotor’s
responsibility, Mr. Tipple decided to attend only the real estate-related
meetings within his area of expertise.
[9]
Subsequent to the trip it was suggested that Mr. Tipple had missed meetings.
Mr. Tipple maintained that the trip was a success, that he attended all
meetings relating to real estate, and that the procurement meetings he did
not attend were not the focus of his trip or part of his mandate.
Notwithstanding Mr. Tipple’s contention that he had not missed meetings, the
Government of Canada sent letters of apology to the Government of the UK on July 12, 2006. The letters suggested the missed
meetings were the fault of Mr. Tipple and Mr. Rotor. One letter, for example,
which was sent by the Acting High Commissioner of Canada to the UK, stated
that “I would like to apologize most sincerely for the behaviour of Messrs.
David Rotor and Douglas Tipple …” Letters of apology were also sent by Yvette
D. Aloïse, Acting Associate Deputy Minister, on behalf of Mr. Marshall.
[10]
On July 12, 2006, Mr. Marshall and Mr. Tipple met to discuss the trip;
however, at that time Mr. Tipple was not informed about the letters of
apology and it was not until August 9, 2006, that he became aware of them. On
the same day he learned that the trip report he had prepared had been leaked
to Daniel Leblanc, a reporter at The Globe and Mail. Mr. Leblanc made
allegations that parts of the report had been plagiarized; they had not been.
The version of the report leaked to Mr. Leblanc was a preliminary version
which had not included the references contained in Mr. Tipple’s final report.
The letters of apology and a number of emails were also leaked to The
Globe and Mail.
[11]
From August 15 to 18, 2006, The Globe and Mail published a series of
articles suggesting that Mr. Tipple and Mr. Rotor had “left a trail of
cancelled meetings” and raised allegations of plagiarism and unethical
behaviour. Mr. Tipple felt that the articles contained “a number of false,
disparaging and defamatory statements and imputations” which caused emotional
distress and were damaging to his personal well-being and reputation.
[12]
Throughout the ensuing media storm, Mr. Tipple repeatedly requested that
PWGSC defend him against the allegations in the media and that he be allowed
to respond personally to them. Mr. Tipple insisted that he had not missed any
meetings, but PWGSC representatives told the media that the meetings were
“cancelled because of logistical problems.” PWGSC refused to allow Mr. Tipple
to speak to the media and assured him it would develop a media plan. Mr.
Tipple wanted PWGSC to take a more proactive approach, and repeatedly
expressed dissatisfaction with its actions vis-à-vis the media. Mr. Tipple
claims PWGSC never developed a media plan but instead sacrificed his
reputation in the interest of “damage control.”
[13]
In response to the media attention, PWGSC launched an internal investigation
into the UK trip. The investigation (the Minto
Report) exonerated Mr. Tipple. The Minto Report found, among other things,
that despite the administrative confusion, “… both advisors appear to have
used their time in a responsible and productive manner … [and] that all
expenses claimed and approved will be reasonable and approved in accordance
with prescribed rules.” The report was not made public.
[14]
On Friday, August 25, 2006, Mr. Marshall met with the Minister of PWGSC. They
discussed Mr. Tipple’s work and whether the hiring of the private sector
executives was working effectively. Mr. Marshall reflected on their
conversation over the weekend and by Monday, August 28, 2006 had decided to
terminate Mr. Tipple’s employment, allegedly because Mr. Tipple had delivered
his key commitments, The Way Forward was ahead of schedule, PWGSC could not
absorb further changes, no major initiatives were left for Mr. Tipple, and
because Mr. Tim McGrath, Acting Assistant Deputy Minister for Real Property
at PWGSC, was sufficiently up to speed to assume any further work required
for The Way Forward.
[15]
At the hearing before the PSLRB Mr. Marshall testified that no integration or
organizational structure analysis was done prior to Mr. Tipple’s dismissal.
Mr. Tipple testified that prior to his dismissal, he was never told that his
performance was unsatisfactory, that The Way Forward had reached its
saturation point, or that there was a possibility he could be laid off.
[16]
On August 31, 2006, Mr. Marshall terminated Mr. Tipple’s employment. Mr.
Rotor was dismissed on the same day. Mr. Tipple was given compensation equal
to one month’s pay. He was not given any reasons for the termination other
than that Mr. Marshall had accepted a recommendation from his staff that the
special advisors’ responsibilities be transferred to and merged with those of
the respective Assistant Deputy Ministers. Mr. Tipple testified that his
termination was highly unusual given that there was no transition plan for
transferring responsibilities from him to Mr. McGrath, no analysis of the
work plan, and no briefing of his staff, and that he was asked to leave the
premises immediately. Mr. Tipple also testified that he had been hired to
complete the implementation as well as the planning of The Way Forward, and
that the implementation phase was not yet complete. Mr. Tipple testified that
if he had been hired as an “idea person” and only for planning and not
implementation, he would not have relocated his family to Ottawa.
[17]
The next day The Globe and Mail reported on the dismissal and
suggested it was caused by Mr. Tipple’s misconduct during the UK trip.
[18]
Mr. Tipple filed Statements of Claim in the Ontario Superior Court commencing
actions against both PWGSC and The Globe and Mail. The wrongful
dismissal action against PWGSC was stayed; the defamation action against The
Globe and Mail continues. He also filed a grievance with PWGSC regarding
his dismissal which he subsequently referred to adjudication under the PSLRA.
The Adjudicator upheld Mr. Tipple’s grievance, in part. It is that decision
that is under review in these applications.
[19]
Mr. Tipple was unable to secure permanent employment after his termination.
He had no income in 2007 and only $38,172.00 of income in 2008. This was not
due to a lack of effort on his part as he contacted 15 executive recruiters
and 37 consulting firms attempting to obtain work. He was told by recruiters
that until he was vindicated, he was “basically off limits,” and that a
search of his name on the internet brought up unflattering and damaging
articles that questioned his integrity. Mr. Tipple did attempt to obtain a
position with a private firm to pursue real-property assets that might be
offered for sale by the Government of Canada, but PWGSC refused to grant him
permission to pursue the opportunity due to its post-employment policy that imposed
a 12-month waiting period on accepting employment in the private sector of
the sort he considered.
[20]
Mr. Tipple testified that as a result of his termination he suffered “bouts
of low self esteem, lack of confidence, stress, anxiety, feelings of betrayal,
humiliation and hurt feelings” and that the ordeal had been “very emotional
and traumatic and my mental and physical health have been affected.”
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Issues
[9]
Mr. Tipple raises
three issues in this appeal, which I summarize as follows:
(a)
whether the judge
erred in setting aside the adjudicator’s award of damages to Mr. Tipple for
loss of reputation;
(b)
whether the judge
erred in upholding the adjudicator’s decision that he had no jurisdiction to
award Mr. Tipple costs of the adjudication; and
(c)
whether the judge
erred in setting aside the adjudicator’s award of damages for obstruction of
process.
[10]
It is convenient to
deal with the first issue by itself, and then to deal with the second and third
issues together.
Issue
1: Did the judge err in setting aside the award of damages for loss of
reputation?
[11]
Of the total award of
approximately $1.4 million, $250,000 was awarded for loss of reputation. The
judge set aside that part of the award because he concluded that the
adjudicator had erred in law by creating a new legal duty owed by an employer
to an employee – a duty to protect the employee’s reputation – and awarding
compensation for a breach of that duty.
[12]
I do not agree that
the adjudicator established or attempted to establish a new head of damages or
a new legal duty of employers. As I read the adjudicator’s reasons, the
$250,000 award for loss of reputation reflects a reasonable application of
established legal principles to the unique facts of this case. I reach that
conclusion for the following reasons.
[13]
The adjudicator’s
reasons must be read in their entirety, in light of the evidence before him and
the jurisprudence to which he was referred. In this case, the submissions of
the parties included references to the jurisprudence relating to damages for
wrongful termination of employment where the quantum is increased because of
the manner of the termination. The leading cases are Keays v. Honda Canada
Inc., 2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362, and Wallace v. United Grain
Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701.
[14]
It is not suggested
that the adjudicator made any error in finding that the employer misrepresented
the reason for Mr. Tipple’s termination (see the adjudicator’s reasons,
paragraphs 284-8). Further, the record supports the adjudicator’s description,
at paragraph 323 of his reasons, of the manner in which the termination
occurred:
As the
evidence reveals, Mr. Marshall acted in a disingenuous and callous manner in
terminating Mr. Tipple's employment. The evidence shows that Mr. Marshall had
lulled Mr. Tipple into a false sense of security. I find that such conduct
was unfair or was in bad faith by being untruthful, misleading and unduly
insensitive to Mr. Tipple.
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[15]
A bad faith termination
of employment may, in certain circumstances, justify an award of damages in
addition to the damages relating solely to the wrongful loss of employment. The
relevant circumstances are present if the termination affects the employee’s ability
to find new employment because unwarranted allegations made or condoned by the
employer have unjustly harmed the employee’s reputation. This is explained in
the following excerpts from the reasons of Justice Iacobucci, writing for the
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Wallace (the underlining is
mine):
103. It has long been accepted that a dismissed employee is
not entitled to compensation for injuries flowing from the fact of the
dismissal itself: see e.g. Addis, supra. Thus, although the
loss of a job is very often the cause of injured feelings and emotional
upset, the law does not recognize these as compensable losses. However, where
an employee can establish that an employer engaged in bad faith conduct or
unfair dealing in the course of dismissal, injuries such as humiliation,
embarrassment and damage to one's sense of self-worth and self-esteem might
all be worthy of compensation depending upon the circumstances of the case.
In these situations, compensation does not flow from the fact of dismissal
itself, but rather from the manner in which the dismissal was effected by the
employer.
104. Often the intangible injuries caused by
bad faith conduct or unfair dealing on dismissal will lead to difficulties in
finding alternative employment, a tangible loss which the Court of Appeal
rightly recognized as warranting an addition to the notice period. It is
likely that the more unfair or in bad faith the manner of dismissal is the
more this will have an effect on the ability of the dismissed employee to
find new employment. However, in my view the intangible injuries are
sufficient to merit compensation in and of themselves. I recognize that bad
faith conduct which affects employment prospects may be worthy of
considerably more compensation than that which does not, but in both cases
damage has resulted that should be compensable.
…
107. In my view, there is no valid reason why the scope of
compensable injuries in defamation situations should not be equally
recognized in the context of wrongful dismissal from employment. The law
should be mindful of the acute vulnerability of terminated employees and
ensure their protection by encouraging proper conduct and preventing all
injurious losses which might flow from acts of bad faith or unfair dealing on
dismissal, both tangible and intangible. I note that there may be those who
would say that this approach imposes an onerous obligation on employers. I
would respond simply by saying that I fail to see how it can be onerous to
treat people fairly, reasonably, and decently at a time of trauma and
despair. In my view, the reasonable person would expect such treatment. So
should the law.
108. In the case before
this Court, the trial judge documented several examples of bad faith conduct
on the part of UGG. He noted the abrupt manner in which Wallace was dismissed
despite having received compliments on his work from his superiors only days
before. He found that UGG made a conscious decision to "play
hardball" with Wallace and maintained unfounded allegations of cause
until the day the trial began. Further, as a result of UGG's
persistence in maintaining these allegations, "[w]ord got around, and it
was rumoured in the trade that he had been involved in some wrongdoing"
(p. 173). Finally, he found that the dismissal and subsequent events were
largely responsible for causing Wallace's depression. Having considered the
Bardal list of factors, he stated at p. 170:
Taking [these] factors into account, and particularly the
fact that the peremptory dismissal and the subsequent actions of the
defendant made other employment in his field virtually unavailable, I conclude
that an award at the top of the scale in such cases is warranted.
109. I agree with the
trial judge's conclusion that the actions of UGG seriously diminished
Wallace's prospects of finding similar employment. In light of this fact, and
the other circumstances of this case, I am not persuaded that the trial judge
erred in awarding the equivalent of 24 months' salary in lieu of notice. It
may be that such an award is at the high end of the scale; however, taking
into account all of the relevant factors, this award is not unreasonable and
accordingly, I can see no reason to interfere. Therefore, for the reasons
above, I would restore the order of the trial judge with respect to the
appropriate period of reasonable notice and allow the appeal on this ground.
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[16]
In my view, this
principle may be applied if, in connection with a wrongful termination of
employment: (a) the employee’s reputation is damaged by public knowledge of
false allegations relating to the termination, (b) the employer fails to take
reasonable corrective steps and offers no reasonable excuse for such failure,
and (c) the damage to the employee’s reputation has impaired his ability to
find new employment. That is what happened here. The factual basis for the
adjudicator’s award of damages for loss of reputation is set out in paragraphs
330 to 349 of his reasons:
330.
Mr. Tipple, as part of
his corrective action, is seeking damages in the amount of $250 000.00 for
loss of reputation.
331.
In assessing Mr.
Tipple's claim, I must keep in mind that his reputation may have been
affected not only by the PWGSC's handling of the situation but also by
comments made in the House of Commons by the Parliamentary Secretary to the
Minister and by the media coverage. Therefore, my analysis will focus only on
how PWGSC handled the situation.
332.
On July 12, 2006, Mr.
Tipple advised Mr. Marshall [Deputy Minister, PWGSC] that he did not miss or
cancel any scheduled meetings dealing with real-property issues while he was
in the UK. Despite this fact, on July 17, 2006,
Ms. Aloisi [Acting Associate Deputy Minister, PWGSC], on behalf of Mr.
Marshall, sent letters of apology to Mr. Saint-Jacques [the Acting High
Commissioner of Canada] and to the UK agencies involved for meetings that Mr.
Tipple had allegedly missed. The letter sent to the NAO [the UK National
Audit Office] specifically apologized for Mr. Tipple's behaviour. The media
later requested copies of those letters.
333.
At some point between
August 2 and 9, 2006, Mr. Leblanc [the reporter from The Globe and Mail]
obtained a copy of Mr. Tipple's draft UK trip report. It was not the first time
that an internal document prepared by Mr. Tipple suspiciously ended up in the
hands of the media.
334.
On August 9, 2006, Mr.
Tipple became aware that Mr. Marshall had sent letters of apology and that
Mr. Leblanc had obtained a copy of his draft UK
trip report. That same day, Mr. Baril [Manager, Media Relations, PWGSC] asked
Mr. Tipple to comment on a draft of key messages that he had prepared for an
interview relating to the UK trip that was requested by Mr.
Leblanc. Mr. Tipple provided his comments and advised Mr. Baril that he had
not missed any scheduled meetings and asked him to inquire into how Mr.
Leblanc had obtained a copy of his trip report. Mr. Baril agreed and informed
Mr. Tipple that he would get back to him. He did not. Later that same day,
Mr. Anderson [Acting Director, Strategic and Business Communications] replied
that he would provide Mr. Tipple with copies of email exchanges with Mr.
Leblanc and media reports (a synopsis of conversations with Mr. Leblanc). Mr.
Tipple was not provided with those email exchanges or media reports. Mr.
Tipple asked Mr. Baril if he could attend the interview with Mr. Leblanc;
however, Mr. Loiselle [Chief of Staff to the Minister, PWGSC] refused the
request.
335.
On August 10, 2006,
Mr. Tipple requested that the leak of his draft UK trip report to the media be investigated by PWGSC. The
Desmarais Report later found as follows:
In
summary, Ms Thorsteinson was the only PWGSC employee identified during the
investigation to have provided a copy of the trip report to Catherine Dickson
a person outside the department [an employee of the High Commission of Canada]. Catherine Dickson ... admit [ted] to having had any
communication with the journalist, Daniel Leblanc. Evidence was not uncovered
which would link Ms. Thorsteinson directly to the delivery of the trip report
to the journalist, however she did provide a copy of the document to Ms.
Dickson ...
336.
On August 15, 2006,
Mr. Leblanc contacted Mr. Tipple's assistant. Mr. Tipple asked Mr. Baril if
he could speak with Mr. Leblanc. He was advised that all calls from reporters
had to be handled by PWGSC's Media Relations Branch. Mr. Tipple asked Mr.
Baril for the media plan, which he stated that he possessed. However, Mr.
Trépanier [Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services, Policy and
Communications Branch] instructed Mr. Anderson not to respond to Mr. Tipple's
request. Mr. Tipple also asked Mr. Baril if he could meet with the Minister
to explain his side of the story. Again, his request was denied.
337.
On August 16, 2006,
Mr. Tipple emailed Mr. Marshall, stating that his reputation was being
tarnished.
338.
On August 17, 2006,
Mr. Tipple emailed Messrs. Trépanier and Loiselle and Ms. Aloisi and again
requested the media plan. The media plan was not provided. Later that day,
Mr. Tipple requested a meeting with the Communications Branch to develop a
proactive approach to protect his reputation. Mr. Trépanier replied that Mr.
Tipple had approved the media lines, and as such, PWGSC had conveyed its
response to Mr. Leblanc in clear terms. Mr. Trépanier also advised Mr. Tipple
that the newspaper article raised issues relevant to the Government of
Canada, that the Minister was accountable for PWGSC's actions and that the
Minister had the ultimate responsibility for communications. Mr. Trépanier
also stated that the communications strategy chosen was the best option to
communicate the position of the Government of Canada and that, as the situation
evolved, the approach would be continually re-evaluated. He advised Mr.
Tipple that he would be kept informed of developments. Mr. Tipple was not
advised of any re-evaluation of the strategy or any developments.
339.
Mr. Tipple stated that
he felt hopeless as he was not permitted to defend himself, he never received
any media plan, media reports, email exchanges or the communications
strategy, and he was not being kept informed. He also stated that, although
he approved the original media lines, they dealt with the original enquiry by
Mr. Leblanc. However, numerous newspaper articles were subsequently published
with new allegations that were tarnishing his reputation, and he was not
being protected by PWGSC. Mr. Tipple testified that Mr. Baril's comments to
the media after the August 15, 2006, Globe and Mail article were
misleading and that they did not specify that he had not cancelled any
scheduled meetings in the UK.
340.
On August 22, 2006,
Mr. Marshall met with Mr. Minto [Chief Risk Office, PWGSC] and directed him
to investigate the UK trip. On August 25, 2006, Mr. Minto
advised Mr. Marshall that Mr. Tipple had used his time in a productive
manner. As argued by counsel for the respondent, the Minto Report exonerated
Mr. Tipple from any wrongdoing.
341.
On September 18, 2006,
Ms. Lorenzato [Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, Human Resources Branch,
PWGSC] prepared the suggested response and background for the Minister, and
Mr. Trépanier approved them. The suggested response and background were used
by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for his response to Ms. Nash
in Question Period in the House of Commons on November 9, 2006, and read as
follows: "... the Canadian High Commission in London advised us that three of the meetings were not attended.
Letters of apology were forwarded to U.K. officials... " The Parliamentary
Secretary to the Minister was not provided with a background and suggested
responses that were specific to Mr. Tipple. Had he been, his unfortunate
response to Ms. Nash's question would hopefully have been accurate. The Minto
Report established that Mr. Tipple was exonerated from any wrongdoing and
that he had attended all meetings related to his portfolio while in the UK.
342.
In the circumstances
of this case, I find that, once PWGSC told Mr. Tipple that it was handling
external communications, and especially after Mr. Tipple had expressed
concerns about his reputation being tarnished and had been directed not to
speak to the media, the respondent had an obligation to protect Mr. Tipple's
reputation.
343.
Mr. Marshall testified
that it was PWGSC's policy not to fight a war of words with the media over an
event and that, if the event reported in the media was of major significance,
the Minister's office developed the media and communications strategy. I
agree with Mr. Marshall that the media reports on events in a way that it
thinks will interest the public. However, it was incumbent on PWGSC not only
to protect its own interests and reputation but also to protect those of Mr.
Tipple. An employer that decides to provide information to the media, in
circumstances where the reputation of one of its employee is at stake, has an
obligation to provide information that is both relevant and accurate. At a
minimum, the respondent had an obligation to ensure that Mr. Tipple was
informed of the communications strategy that it chose to employ.
344.
It is safe to say that
the respondent was in damage control. PWGSC had recently been subjected to
intense media coverage over the sponsorship scandal, and Mr. Marshall was to
lead PWGSC and its employees out of the fallout from that scandal.
345.
I was provided with no
evidence that demonstrated that the respondent ever had any concrete media
plan or communications strategy. I saw no evidence that it shared the Minto
Report with the media or that it included the report's findings in the
suggested response or background documents used by the Parliamentary
Secretary to the Minister. Mr. Tipple did agree to the first draft of the
media lines; however, as the situation escalated and his reputation was being
tarnished, no revised strategy appeared. Mr. Tipple was entitled to have his
reputation protected by the respondent. He was not afforded that right.
346.
I believe that PWGSC
knew that not providing relevant and accurate information to the media would
result in a failure to protect Mr. Tipple's reputation. Mr. Marshall
testified that Ms. Aloisi had informed him that Mr. Tipple considered that
his reputation was being tarnished and that he was expecting PWGSC to protect
him. Also, on August 16, 2006, Mr. Tipple directly informed Mr. Marshall by
email that his reputation was being tarnished. Further, Mr. Marshall admitted
in his testimony that the leak of the draft UK
trip report may have damaged Mr. Tipple's reputation and that such damage
could have been minimized by informing Mr. Leblanc that Mr. Tipple did attend
all meetings relating to his portfolio.
347.
The communications
strategy used by the respondent was self-serving and had only one specific goal:
to protect its own interests by ensuring there would be no scandal that would
embarrass either itself or the Government of Canada. Unfortunately, this was
done at the expense of Mr. Tipple's reputation. Mr. Tipple's 23-year
unblemished reputation as a senior executive was tarnished in a 6-week
period. He now can find some solace in this decision that recognizes that his
reputation was sacrificed to salvage that of PWGSC.
348.
The most troubling
aspect of the respondent's conduct is that, despite Mr. Tipple's requests
that PWGSC protect his reputation, it failed both when the first article was
published by The Globe and Mail and subsequently. PWGSC did nothing to
minimize the damage caused to Mr. Tipple's reputation. In fact, Mr. Marshall
worsened the situation by unlawfully terminating Mr. Tipple's employment in
an atmosphere of scandal. Therefore, I find that the respondent failed in its
obligation to protect Mr. Tipple's reputation.
349.
Damages can be awarded
where a party incurs a loss as a result of the actions of another. In
assessing the amount of damages to which Mr. Tipple is entitled for loss of
reputation, I must, once again, take into account his position within the
executive community and recognize the impact of his damaged reputation on his
ability to successfully market his senior executive skills with potential
employers and business relations. In the circumstances of this case, I have
no reservations in accepting that Mr. Tipple is entitled to his claim of
$250 000.00. …
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[17]
In these paragraphs
the adjudicator focuses on the facts relating to the manner in which various
PWGSC officials dealt with the press during the relevant period, and the manner
in which they dealt with Mr. Tipple in relation to various press reports during
that same period. These facts must be understood in the context of the other
facts previously established by the adjudicator: Mr. Tipple’s trip to London in
June of 2006 to meet with UK officials, the subsequent complaints about missed
meetings in London, Mr. Tipple’s denial on July 12, 2006 that he had missed any
relevant meetings, the employer’s apologies on July 17, 2006 for Mr. Tipple’s
behaviour during the London trip, the Minto Report presented to Deputy Minister
Marshall on August 25, 2006 that exonerated Mr. Tipple of any allegation that
he had missed relevant meetings in London, and the bad faith termination of Mr.
Tipple’s employment on August 31, 2006.
[18]
The first sentence of
paragraph 349 of the adjudicator’s reasons is an overly broad statement of the
relevant legal principle. He also uses some language in his reasons that, read
in isolation, could suggest that he considered loss of reputation to be a
separate cause of action. But in my view it is sufficiently clear from the
quoted excerpt, read in the context of the remainder of the adjudicator’s
reasons, that the adjudicator awarded $250,000 for loss of reputation on the
basis of the principles stated in Wallace.
[19]
As I understand the
adjudicator’s reasons, he did not conclude that PWGSC as Mr. Tipple’s employer had
a free-standing duty to protect his reputation. Rather, he found that the law
imposed on PWGSC a duty of good faith when terminating Mr. Tipple’s employment.
When PWGSC decided to terminate Mr. Tipple’s employment in the midst of press
reports impugning his integrity on the basis of information leaked from PWGSC
which senior officials of PWGSC knew to be false, the duty of good faith
included the duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that the termination did
not cause undue and unjustified harm to Mr. Tipple’s reputation. In my view,
the adjudicator’s conclusion is well within the scope of the Wallace
principle, and is reasonable. I conclude that the judge erred in setting aside
the award of $250,000 for loss of reputation.
Issues 2 and 3: Mr. Tipple’s legal
expenses
[20]
In most grievance
adjudications under the Public Service Labour Relations Act, the grievor
is represented by his or her bargaining agent, or is self-represented. Mr.
Tipple’s position was not covered by any collective agreement, and he chose to
be represented by counsel in pursuing his grievance. That was his right.
[21]
Before the
adjudicator, Mr. Tipple asked for full indemnification of the legal costs he
had incurred in pursuing his grievance up to and including adjudication. The
adjudicator concluded that subsection 228(2) of the Public Service Labour
Relations Act, which authorizes an adjudicator to order a remedy upon
determining that a grievance is well founded, is not broad enough to give an
adjudicator the authority to order an employer to indemnify the grievor for the
expenses incurred in the adjudication. Subsection 228(2) reads as follows:
228. (2) After considering the
grievance, the adjudicator must render a decision and make the order that he
or she considers appropriate in the circumstances. ...
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228. (2) Après étude du grief, il
tranche celui-ci par l’ordonnance qu’il juge indiquée. [...]
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[22]
However, the
adjudicator held that he had the authority to provide Mr. Tipple some relief
for PWGSC’s obstruction of the adjudication process. The obstruction was the
repeated failure of PWGSC to fully disclose relevant documents in a timely
manner, which required Mr. Tipple’s counsel to engage in correspondence and
case management conferences that should not have been necessary, and in turn caused
Mr. Tipple to incur legal expenses that should not have been necessary.
[23]
Mr. Tipple argued in
the Federal Court, and in this Court, that the adjudicator’s statutory remedial
authority is sufficiently broad to permit him to award legal costs. The judge
reviewed the adjudicator’s decision in this issue on the standard of
correctness, following the decision of this Court in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat, 2009 FCA 309. He concluded that the
adjudicator’s statutory remedial authority did not authorize an award of costs.
He also concluded that the adjudicator’s award of damages for obstruction of
process was a disguised costs award, and on that basis, he set aside the award
for obstruction of process.
[24]
The judge rendered
his judgment before the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada
(Attorney General) v. Mowat, 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471, which
determined that the standard of review of a tribunal’s determination of the
scope of its remedial authority is reasonableness. Therefore, the judge applied
the wrong standard of review on this issue, which means that this Court must
consider it de novo based on the reasonableness standard of review.
[25]
The specific question
raised in Mowat was whether the statutory authority of the Canadian
Human Rights Tribunal to order the payment of compensation to a victim of a
discriminatory practice implicitly includes the authority to award the victim
legal costs incurred in the Tribunal proceedings. The Tribunal had concluded that
the answer was yes. The Court held that the Tribunal’s interpretation of its
statutory authority was not reasonable.
[26]
Nothing in the Public
Service Labour Relations Act expressly provides adjudicators with the
authority to award “costs” within its usual legal meaning, and subsection
228(2) is similar enough to the provision considered in Mowat that it
was reasonable for the adjudicator to give it a similar meaning with respect to
costs. I refer in particular to paragraph 40 of the reasons of Justice LeBel
and Justice Cromwell, writing for the Court in Mowat (citation omitted):
40. Moreover, the term "costs", in
legal parlance, has a well-understood meaning that is distinct from either
compensation or expenses. It is a legal term of art because it consists of
"words or expressions that have through usage by legal professionals
acquired a distinct legal meaning"….
Costs usually
mean some
sort of compensation for legal expenses and services incurred in the course
of litigation. If Parliament intended to confer authority to order costs, it is difficult to
understand why it did not use this very familiar and widely used legal term
of art to implement that purpose. As we shall see shortly, the legislative
history of the statute also strongly supports the inference that this was not
Parliament's intent.
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[27]
However, the adjudicator’s
decision to require PWGSC to compensate Mr. Tipple for legal expenses that he
was forced to incur because of PWGSC’s obstruction of the adjudication process
stands on a different legal footing.
[28]
I note that an award
of legal costs by a court can and sometimes does include an amount for costs
thrown away because of obstructive conduct by an opposing party. However, a
court does not necessarily need to rely on its authority to make a traditional
award of costs in order to ensure that a party is compensated for financial
losses incurred as a result of the obstructive conduct of an opposing party in
the course of the proceedings.
[29]
As a general rule, courts
and adjudicative decision makers have the inherent authority to control their
own process and to remedy its abuse. This inherent authority includes, in an
appropriate case like this one, the right to require the reimbursement of
expenses necessarily incurred by a party as the result of abusive or
obstructive conduct by an opposing party.
[30]
In this case, the
adjudicator found that PWGSC had engaged in obstructive conduct by failing
repeatedly to comply with orders for the disclosure of information, causing Mr.
Tipple to incur unnecessary legal expenses to enforce the adjudicator’s orders.
PWGSC argued in this Court that it did comply, and so it did, eventually.
However, the record justifies the adjudicator’s conclusion that PWGSC displayed
a pattern of late and insufficient compliance, which was remedied only after
constant pressure from Mr. Tipple’s counsel.
[31]
In my view, it was
reasonable for the adjudicator to find as a fact that the failure of PWGSC to
comply on a timely basis with the adjudicator’s disclosure orders resulted in
an unwarranted financial burden on Mr. Tipple, and to conclude that the burden
should in fairness be borne by PWGSC. In the highly unusual circumstances of
this case, the adjudicator’s award of damages for obstruction of process was a
lawful and reasonable exercise of the adjudicator’s authority to control the
adjudication process.
Costs
in this Court and the Federal Court
[32]
In the Federal Court,
the parties agreed that an appropriate amount for an award of costs for both
applications together would be $7,500. However, as success in the Federal Court
was divided, no costs were awarded.
[33]
In this Court, Mr.
Tipple has succeeded in defending his award of damages except the $125,000 awarded
for psychological injury which was set aside by the Federal Court and was not
in issue in this appeal. However, some or all of that amount may yet be
restored after the rehearing ordered by the Federal Court. Mr. Tipple did not
succeed in obtaining a decision that the adjudicator has the jurisdiction to
award costs, or in his claim for a general award of costs, but he succeeded in
defending the award of $45,322.03 as damages for obstruction of process, and in
extending the period for which interest was awarded. Taking all of this into
account, it appears that Mr. Tipple has been substantially successful in these
proceedings. I would award him his costs in this Court and in the Federal
Court, the total amount fixed at $12,000 including disbursements and taxes.
Conclusion
[34]
I would allow the
appeal in part, with costs in this Court and in the Federal Court fixed at
$12,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax. I would vary the judgment of the
Federal Court so that paragraphs 1 and 2 read as follows:
1.
The
application of the Attorney General in Court File T-1295-10 is allowed in
part. The award of damages of $125,000.00 for psychological injury is set
aside and the quantum of such damages is referred back to the Public Service
Labour Relations Board for re-determination.
2.
The
application of Mr. Tipple in Court file T-1315-10 is allowed in part. The
award of interest ending October 6, 2008, is set aside and is referred back
to the Public Service Labour Relations Board for re-determination in keeping
with the submissions previously made by Mr. Tipple that the interest continue
until the date of the decision of the Public Service Labour Relations Board.
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“K.
Sharlow”
“I
agree
Gilles Létourneau J.A.”
“I
agree
Eleanor R. Dawson J.A.”