Date: 20111104
Docket: A-471-10
Citation:
2011 FCA 302
CORAM: NOËL J.A.
TRUDEL J.A.
MAINVILLE J.A.
BETWEEN:
SYNDICAT
DES AGENTS DE SÉCURITÉ GARDA,
SECTION CPI-CSN
Applicant
and
GARDA CANADA SECURITY CORPORATION
and
UNION
DES AGENTS DE SÉCURITÉ DU QUÉBEC –
UNITED STEELWORKERS, LOCAL 8922
Respondents
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
Interested
Party
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MAINVILLE J.A.
[1]
This is an application for judicial review in
which the Court must consider the jurisdiction of the Canada Industrial
Relations Board (the “Board”) over the labour relations of the security guards
who ensure the detention of foreign nationals at the Montréal area Immigration
Prevention Centre. Do those labour relations fall within federal jurisdiction,
and are they consequently governed by the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C.,
1985, c. L‑2?
[2]
In a decision dated October 18, 2009 (Garda
Canada Security Corporation, [2009] CIRB 477, the “original decision”), the
Board dismissed the application for certification in respect of these security
guards filed by the Syndicat des agents de sécurité Garda, Section CPI-CSN (the
“CSN”) on the principal ground that the Board did not have jurisdiction. In a
decision dated November 12, 2010 (Garda Security Corporation Canada,
[2010] CIRB 549, the “reconsideration decision”), the majority of the Board’s
reconsideration panel also dismissed the application for reconsideration of the
original decision. The CSN is asking the Court to set aside this
reconsideration decision on judicial review.
[3]
For the reasons that follow, I would allow the
application for judicial review. The detention of foreign nationals under the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, falls within federal
jurisdiction, and the labour relations of the security guards tasked with ensuring
such detention in a federal facility also fall within federal jurisdiction and
are governed by the Canada Labour Code.
Background
[4]
The Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”),
established under the Canada Border Services Agency Act, S.C. 2005,
c. 38, reports to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness. This agency is responsible for the security of Canada and for
this purpose, among other things, controls the access of individuals to Canada.
For that purpose, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act empowers
CBSA officers to arrest and detain foreign nationals if they are a danger to
the public, if there is doubt as to their identity or if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that they are unlikely to appear for an examination, an
admissibility hearing or removal from Canada under the Act.
[5]
As part of its mandate under the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, the CBSA operates several detention centres in
Canada, one of these being the Immigration Prevention Centre in the Montréal
area, which includes a centre located at 200 Montée St-François, Laval,
and two satellite facilities: the Guy Favreau Complex detention area at 200 René-Lévesque
Boulevard West, Montréal, and the detention area at 1010 Saint-Antoine
Street West, Montréal.
[6]
Until very recently, the detention of foreign
nationals at this centre and these detention areas was ensured by the Canadian
Corps of Commissionaires. However, following a call for tenders, Garda was
awarded a contract by Public Works and Government Services Canada in order to
provide these services to the CBSA from April 1, 2007, to March 31,
2009. The contract was extended until March 31, 2010. Although the record does
not disclose whether the contract was renewed, counsel confirmed at the hearing
before this Court that Garda was still providing the services in question.
[7]
The background to and the general description of
the services provided by Garda are set out as follows in the contract
(Exhibit R-4 of the affidavit of Bruno Héroux, pages 168 to 169 of the
Applicant’s Record):
[translation]
1. BACKGROUND
The primary role of the Immigration Prevention Centre (IPC) is to
transport, house and ensure the safety of detainees under the IRPA [Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act] and other related memoranda of understanding.
Our objective is to support the operations of the CBSA by taking custody of all
detainees in compliance with national standards and departmental policies on
detention. Thus the IPC team’s role is to ensure the safety of the various
persons involved in enforcing the Act (detention component), for both detainees
and our partners in the field.
1. General description
Security guard services
1.1 For the provision of an unarmed uniformed security guard
service at the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) for the supervision and
transportation of detainees in compliance with the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act (IRPA) and with CBSA guidelines. The security guard services
will be provided at the following locations:
-Canada Border Services Agency
Prevention Centre (IPC)
200 Montée St-François
Laval, Quebec
-Canada Border Services Agency
Guy Favreau Complex (detention area)
200 René-Lévesque Blvd West
Montréal, Quebec
-Canada Border Services Agency
Investigations and Removals (detention area)
1010 Saint-Antoine Street West
Montreal, Quebec
. . .
The Project Manager or his or her replacement shall inform the company’s
coordinator of the work shifts that will be established on the basis of CBSA
requirements, in the various detention areas, such as the IPC, the Guy Favreau
Complex and 1010 St-Antoine Street West. Security guards may be moved from one location to another
depending on CBSA operational requirements.
Services are required 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, except at the
Guy Favreau Complex and 1010 St-Antoine Street West, where services are required only on working days.
At least 40% of security guard staff must be female, on every work
shift and at all locations where services are provided.
1.2 For the supply of uniformed security guard services, for
driving vehicles and guarding detainees who need to be transported, primarily
within the Montréal metropolitan area, but also occasionally to other parts of
the province of Quebec, Ontario and the Maritimes.
1.3 Using CBSA vehicles, provide transportation services for
moving detainees and baggage, picking up or delivering prescriptions or any
other task in accordance with instructions from the Project Manager or his or
her replacement.
1.4 Services shall be provided in compliance with this
document and with the various guidelines issued by the CBSA. The IPC operations
manual will be given to the contractor when the contract is issued. The IPC
operations manual is a document that cannot be given to bidders, for security
reasons.
. . .
[8]
Garda is a large corporation operating in the
security services sector. It employs approximately 40,000 individuals in
several provinces and countries. About 4,000 of its staff are employed in
Quebec, and the labour relations of most of these employees are under
provincial jurisdiction. The Union des agents de sécurité du Québec,
Local 8922 of the United Steelworkers of America (the “Steelworkers”), is
certified under Quebec’s Labour Code, R.S.Q., c. C-27, to represent
employees of Garda working as security guards. A collective agreement governed
by the provisions of Quebec’s Labour Code applies to these employees,
who are also subject to the Decree respecting security guards, R.Q., c.
D-2, r.1, enacted under the Act respecting collective agreement decrees,
R.S.Q., c. D-2 (the “provincial Decree”).
[9]
However, not all Garda employees working in Quebec are governed by Quebec’s Labour Code. In fact, the
record reveals that Garda is also bound by certifications under the Canada
Labour Code affecting, for example, its employees responsible for carrying
out searches at the Montréal-Trudeau Airport, who therefore are not governed by
the provincial Decree, have a separate collective agreement and receive a
higher salary than that provided under the provincial Decree (see the original
decision at paragraph 41). Likewise, the Steelworkers also hold various
certifications under the Canada Labour Code for employees assigned to
airport security (see the original decision at paragraph 57).
[10]
In order to perform its service contract pertaining
to the Montréal area Immigration Prevention Centre, Garda hired many of the
commissionaires who formerly worked there. Garda also assigned several members
of its own security personnel to the Centre. Garda pays all the security guards
working under this contract according to the provincial Decree.
[11]
A few months after the beginning of the
contract, on February 22, 2008, the CSN filed an application for
certification under the Canada Labour Code for a bargaining unit
consisting of Garda security guards assigned to the CBSA in Quebec. This application was challenged by
both Garda and the Steelworkers on three grounds: (1) the Board’s jurisdiction;
(2) the description of the proposed unit; and (3) the timeliness of the
application for certification under the Canada Labour Code.
The original
decision
[12]
Claude Roy, Vice-Chairperson of the Board,
sitting alone, made the original decision dated October 28, 2009, in which he
dismissed the CSN’s application for certification.
[13]
At the hearing before the Board, Garda and the
CSN agreed on the description of the bargaining unit, which covers security
guards employed by Garda and assigned to the CBSA at the Immigration Prevention
Centre. The issue before the Board therefore primarily concerned the Board’s
jurisdiction and, incidentally, the timeliness of the application.
[14]
The evidence before the Board demonstrated that
the security guards assigned to the Immigration Prevention Centre are
principally involved in transporting, monitoring and detaining foreign
nationals who have an irregular status and who are awaiting a decision from the
CBSA. For these purposes, they may handcuff, search and detain these foreign
nationals, but they act under the orders and instructions of CBSA officers, who
alone have the powers to investigate, arrest and detain. The security guards
must obtain a security clearance from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and
some of them must also obtain an airport pass to access the restricted areas of
the Montréal-Trudeau airport. The guards must also follow and comply with the
CBSA Operational Procedures Manual.
[15]
After reviewing the case law and the applicable
principles, the Board found that the main issue before it was to “determine
whether Garda’s activities are an essential part of the operation of the IPC
[Immigration Prevention Centre] by the CBSA, that is, whether those activities
are intrinsically linked with this federal undertaking and whether the work of
the security guards is an integral part of the federal activity in question”
(original decision, at paragraph 115). Relying on certain evidence, the
Board found that these activities were not essential to the CBSA:
[124] The testimony of Ms. Marilyne Paradis, CBSA’s
head of operations at the IPC, clearly showed that the building in which the
IPC is located is used to hold non-violent individuals and that the IPC’s purpose
is to keep family members together. Violent
individuals are transferred to the Rivière-des-Prairies Detention Centre and
decisions in this regard are always made by the CBSA officers.
[125] That witness
stated that the IPC is a medium-security holding centre, that it is not
identified as a Correctional Service of Canada facility and its operation is
not subject to directives of that agency. Garda security guards have no power
to decide whether to place or keep detainees in custody or to investigate, arrest,
interrogate or release individuals. They do not have access to detainees’ files
and are not required to identify detainees. Moreover, Ms. Paradis clearly
indicated that the guards do not engage in interprovincial transportation even
though the collective agreement makes provision for it.
[126] The Board must
determine the application for certification according to the analysis of Garda’s
activities at the IPC. Based on that analysis, the Board finds that those
activities are not severable from its other guard and transportation
activities. Although they are necessary, they are not vital or essential to the
federal undertaking. They are not essential security activities like those in
an airport, and no other evidence was presented to the Board in support of
their being a first line of security.
[16]
The Board also found the application for
certification to be untimely on the basis that it had been filed outside the
time frame prescribed at paragraph 24(2)(d) of the Canada Labour
Code.
The
reconsideration decision—the majority
[17]
The CSN relied on section 18 of the Canada
Labour Code, which allows the Board to review, rescind, amend, alter or
vary its decisions. The application for reconsideration was heard and
determined by a panel of three members of the Board. Two of the panel members
(Louise Fecteau and William G. McMurray) dismissed the application, while a
dissenting member (Graham J. Clarke) would have rather ruled that the Board had
jurisdiction.
[18]
The majority of the reconsideration panel
therefore found that the Board had been right to decline jurisdiction. For this
purpose, the majority distinguished previous decisions of the Board relating to
airport security services, on the ground that Garda’s circumstances were
different: reconsideration decision, at paragraphs 44 to 47 and 50 to 58.
[19]
The majority of the reconsideration panel was of
the view that the services provided by Garda to the CBSA are not severable from
the services Garda provides to its other clients (reconsideration decision, at
paragraph 49):
[translation]
[49] . . . The evidence considered by the Board did not show
that the contract under which Garda provided security services at the IPC was
severable from its other contracts, under which it provides security guard
services. The evidence shows that Garda employee assignments to the IPC are not
exclusive; Garda provides security and transportation services for a number of
other undertakings in Quebec,
and can assign its security guards to them to enable them to complete their
weekly hours of work. In addition, the security guards are not given
specialized training when assigned to the IPC. The evidence also shows that the
operations of taking charge of and transporting detainees and handcuffing,
searching and holding them in detention are performed under the authority of a
CBSA officer, and that Garda guards therefore have no decision-making power in
this regard. The basic security services provided by Garda to its other clients
include guarding, monitoring, and providing safety and protection for premises,
assets and people. Garda security guards also conduct searches and, when
authorized to do so, issue violation notices. In short, there is nothing to
show that the services provided by Garda at the IPC are severable from its
other operations.
[20]
The majority of the reconsideration panel also
distinguished the Ontario Labour Relations Board’s decision in Bhagat Ram
Mehmi, [2004] OLRB Rep. January/February 16; [2004] O.L.R.D. No. 3399 (QL),
which ruled that the labour relations of security guards in an immigration detention
centre in Ontario fell within federal jurisdiction. For the majority of the
reconsideration panel, since the guards of the Montréal area Immigration
Prevention Centre were assigned to watch non-violent detainees, this distinguished
them from the security guards working at the immigration detention centre in Ontario (reconsideration decision, at
paragraph 59):
[translation]
. . . the security guards in [Bhagat Ram Mehmi]
were performing a role similar to that of the correctional services officers.
The detention centre in question was used to detain individuals who had
violated the IRPA and consequently had been arrested or detained by Immigration
Canada because there was reason to believe that they would not appear when summoned
or even that they were a danger to the public. In contrast, according to the
evidence filed, the security guards in the instant matter work in a building in
Laval, Quebec, that houses non-violent detainees, to keep family members
together, a circumstance that requires much less stringent security measures
that those in Bhagat Ram Mehmi, supra.
[21]
The majority of the reconsideration panel did,
however, conclude that the Board had made an error in law on the issue of the
time frame to submit the application for certification. The majority of the
reconsideration panel therefore ruled that, had it had jurisdiction, it would
have allowed that part of the application for reconsideration dealing with this
issue of timeliness.
The
reconsideration decision—dissenting opinion
[22]
In contrast, the Vice-Chairperson of the Board,
Graham G. Clarke concluded that the Board did have jurisdiction over the
matter.
[23]
He first explained that a number of the factors
considered in the Board’s original decision were not relevant to the
constitutional analysis, including the scope of the provincial Decree, the
recruitment and mobility of personnel, the duration of the Garda contract and
the fact that the security guards do not have the same powers as CBSA officers
(at paragraphs 103 to 110 and 114 of the reconsideration decision).
[24]
For the dissenting member, ease of recruitment
and a high level of turnover have never been relevant to a constitutional
determination, no matter how critical they may be to the operation of a
business. Moreover, even though Garda had signed a term contract, this had no
impact on the constitutional analysis, since the CBSA continually contracted
with security agencies for the services in question, which remain the same over
the years regardless of the contractor retained. Similarly, the existence of
the provincial Decree governing security guards under provincial jurisdiction was
not relevant when determining whether guards fall under federal jurisdiction,
since the issue was precisely to determine whether this provincial Decree
constitutionally applied. Finally, the dissenting member noted that the
original decision did not explain how the fact that the guards did not exercise
the same powers as CBSA officers impacted the constitutional determination.
[25]
Following these observations, and after a
careful review of the facts, the dissenting member found that the security
guards are doing a great deal more than monitoring a building; they are rather providing
for the detention of foreign nationals who have been arrested by the CBSA under
a federal statute. The dissenting member was therefore of the opinion that the
duties of the Garda security guards were vital and essential to the Immigration
Prevention Centre’s operations:
[translation]
[115] The
facts in [the original decision] demonstrate that Garda’s services to CBSA,
through its Guards, are an integral part of the IPC. The Guards are not merely
providing general building security at the IPC. Rather, their security
functions relate explicitly to how the IPC carries out its mandate over
detainees under its care and control.
[116] The
very concept of a “detainee” includes that fact they are not free to come and
go as they please. The Contract foresees that the Guards will personify the
coercion that is inherent in the daily operations of any IPC.
[117] In this
role, the Guards transport detainees to different locations. They occasionally
handcuff detainees. They search detainees. They place detainees in cells. The
work is carried out in a medium-security facility as opposed to in a public
building. If a detainee is violent, the Guards may transport that individual to
a higher-security detention centre.
[118] The
Guards’ functions in this regard are vital and essential to an IPC’s daily
operations. It does not matter to what extent the Guards are involved in all
aspects of Canada’s immigration
system. The focus must be on their functions at the specific IPCs in question.
[119] Because of the normal and habitual activities of its
Guards, a portion of Garda’s otherwise provincial business is severable and
becomes subject to the [Canada Labour] Code.
[26]
Finally, on the issue of the timeliness of the
application for certification, the dissenting member found that the reasons on
which the original decision was based were vague. Consequently, he would have
returned this issue to the original panel for redetermination.
Issue and
applicable standard of review
[27]
Neither Garda nor the Steelworkers are challenging
the conclusion of the majority of the reconsideration panel that the Board made
an error in law on the matter of timeliness. Moreover, the description of the
bargaining unit is not at issue. Consequently, the only issue before this Court
is the Board’s jurisdiction to deal with the application for certification.
[28]
The Board’s jurisdiction is an issue which may
be reviewed by this Court pursuant to subsection 22(1) of the Canada
Labour Code and paragraphs 28(1)(h) and 18.1(4)(a) of the Federal
Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7.
[29]
The jurisdictional question at issue requires a
constitutional analysis. This analysis is subject to a standard of correctness;
however, “[w]here it is possible to treat the constitutional analysis
separately from the factual findings that underlie it, curial deference is owed
to the initial findings of fact”: Consolidated Fastfrate v. Western Canada
Council of Teamsters, 2009 SCC 53, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407, at
paragraph 26 (“Consolidated Fastfrate”); see also Dunsmuir v.
New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paragraphs 58 and
59; CHC Global Operations (2008) Inc. v. Global Helicopter Pilots
Association, 2010 FCA 89, at paragraph 22; Syndicat des débardeurs
du port de Québec v. Société des arrimeurs de Québec Inc., 2011 FCA 17, at
paragraph 45.
Analysis
[30]
To properly understand the nature of the issue
before this Court, it is useful to refer to the provisions of the Canada
Labour Code that confer certification jurisdiction on the Board.
Part I of the Canada Labour Code is entitled “Industrial Relations”,
and section 4 thereof reads as follows:
4. This Part applies in respect of employees
who are employed on or in connection with the operation of any federal work,
undertaking or business, in respect of the employers of all such employees in
their relations with those employees and in respect of trade unions and
employers’ organizations composed of those employees or employers.
|
4. La présente partie s’applique
aux employés dans le cadre d’une entreprise fédérale et à leurs syndicats,
ainsi qu’à leurs employeurs et aux organisations patronales regroupant
ceux-ci.
|
[31]
“Federal work, undertaking or business” is
defined at section 2 of the Canada Labour Code, the relevant
provisions of which read as follows:
2. In this Act,
“federal work, undertaking or business” means any work, undertaking or business that is within the
legislative authority of Parliament, including, without restricting the
generality of the foregoing,
. . .
(i) a work, undertaking or business outside the
exclusive legislative authority of the legislatures of the provinces,
. . .
|
2. Les définitions qui suivent
s’appliquent à la présente loi.
« entreprises fédérales » Les installations, ouvrages, entreprises ou secteurs d’activité
qui relèvent de la compétence législative du Parlement, notamment :
[…]
i) les installations, ouvrages,
entreprises ou secteurs d’activité ne ressortissant pas au pouvoir législatif
exclusif des législatures provinciales; […]
|
[32]
The issue to be determined here is whether the
jurisdiction that Parliament conferred on the Board pursuant to section 4
of the Canada Labour Code extends to the labour relations of the
security guards working at the Immigration Prevention Centre under the service
contract between Garda and the Government of Canada. The answer to this
question turns on the principles governing the constitutional division of
powers in the area of labour relations.
Analytical framework
[33]
The basic rule governing the division of powers over
labour relations is that the provinces have jurisdiction over enterprises that
fall within provincial legislative authority and the federal government has
jurisdiction over enterprises that fall within federal legislative authority. Given that provincial jurisdiction over “Property
and Civil Rights” under subsection 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867
extends to labour relations, provincial jurisdiction is the rule, and
Parliament can only assert jurisdiction over labour relations if it is shown
that such jurisdiction is an integral part of its primary competence over some
other single federal subject: Consolidated Fastfrate, at paragraphs 27
and 28.
[34]
The labour relations of
an enterprise therefore fall under the Canada Labour Code only if the enterprise
in question is a federal work, undertaking or business or if its activities, which
a priori fall under provincial authority, are nonetheless integral to a
federal work, undertaking or business: Consolidated Fastfrate, at
paragraph 28.
[35]
In this respect,
Justice Dickson summarized as follows the applicable principles and the
analytical method to use in Northern Telecom v. Communications Workers,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 115 (“Northern Telecom”), at pages 132 to 133:
(1) Parliament has no authority over labour relations as
such nor over the terms of a contract of employment; exclusive provincial
competence is the rule.
(2) By way of exception, however, Parliament may assert
exclusive jurisdiction over these matters if it is shown that such jurisdiction
is an integral part of its primary competence over some other single federal
subject.
(3) Primary federal competence over a given subject can prevent
the application of provincial law relating to labour relations and the
conditions of employment but only if it is demonstrated that federal authority
over these matters is an integral element of such federal competence.
(4) Thus, the regulation of wages to be paid by an
undertaking, service or business, and the regulation of its labour relations,
being related to an integral part of the operation of the undertaking, service
or business, are removed from provincial jurisdiction and immune from the effect
of provincial law if the undertaking, service or business is a federal one.
(5) The question whether an undertaking, service or
business is a federal one depends on the nature of its operation.
(6) In order to determine the nature of the operation, one
must look at the normal or habitual activities of the business as those of “a
going concern”, without regard for exceptional or casual factors; otherwise,
the Constitution could not be applied with any degree of continuity and
regularity.
A recent decision of the British Columbia Labour Relations
Board, Arrow Transfer Co. Ltd. [[1974] 1 Can.
L.R.B.R. 29], provides a useful statement of the method adopted by
the courts in determining constitutional jurisdiction in labour matters. First,
one must begin with the operation which is at the core of the federal
undertaking. Then the courts look at the particular subsidiary operation
engaged in by the employees in question. The court must then arrive at a
judgment as to the relationship of that operation to the core federal
undertaking, the necessary relationship being variously characterized as “vital”,
“essential” or “integral”. As the Chairman of the Board phrased it, at pp.
34-35:
In each case the judgment is a functional,
practical one about the factual character of the ongoing undertaking and does
not turn on technical, legal niceties of the corporate structure or the
employment relationship.
In the case at bar, the first step is to determine whether a core
federal undertaking is present and the extent of that core undertaking. Once
that is settled, it is necessary to look at the particular subsidiary
operation, i.e., the installation department of Telecom, to look at the “normal
or habitual activities” of that department as “a going concern”, and the
practical and functional relationship of those activities to the core federal
undertaking.
[Emphasis added]
[36]
In that decision, at page 135, Justice
Dickson also identified certain relevant factors for determining whether an
enterprise providing a federal undertaking with services or equipment forms an
integral part of the federal undertaking:
a.
the general nature of the service provider’s
operation as a going concern and, in particular, the role of the services
within that operation;
b.
the nature of the corporate relationship between
the service provider and the other companies that it serves, notably the
federal undertaking at issue;
c.
the importance of the work done for the federal
undertaking at issue as compared with other customers of the service provider;
and
d.
the physical and operational connection between
the services provided and the federal undertaking at issue and, in particular,
the extent of these services in the operation of the federal undertaking as a
whole.
[37]
The principles and factors set out in Northern
Telecom are not intended to be applied in a strict or rigid manner;
instead, the test should be flexible and attentive to the facts of each
particular case: United Transportation Union v. Central Western Railway
Corp., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1112, at pages 1139-1140.
[38]
Therefore, I propose to first examine the
federal undertaking in question and then the services provided by Garda, in
order to finally reach a conclusion as to whether there is a “vital”, “essential”
or “integral” link between the operations of the concerned federal undertaking
and these services.
The operations of the federal undertaking
[39]
The Immigration Prevention Centre is a detention
centre of the Government of Canada managed by a federal agency, the CBSA. It is
therefore a “federal undertaking” which forms an integral part of the federal
government. Parliament is constitutionally responsible for the Centre under its
power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada pursuant
to the introductory paragraph to section 91 of the Constitution Act,
1867, under its exclusive legislative authority over naturalization and
aliens (foreign nationals) pursuant to subsection 91(25) thereof, and
under its power to make laws in relation to immigration pursuant to
section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
[40]
Paragraph 4(2)(b) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act provides that the Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness is responsible for the administration of that Act as it
relates to its enforcement, including for arrest, detention and removal. The principal
powers of arrest and detention are set out in section 55 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, and a detention under that section may be
reviewed by the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board pursuant
to sections 54, 57 and 58 thereof:
54. The Immigration Division
is the competent Division of the Board with respect to the review of reasons
for detention under this Division.
55. (1) An officer may
issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of a permanent resident or a
foreign national who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe is
inadmissible and is a danger to the public or is unlikely to appear for
examination, an admissibility hearing or removal from Canada.
(2) An
officer may, without a warrant, arrest and detain a foreign national, other
than a protected person,
(a) who
the officer has reasonable grounds to believe is inadmissible and is a danger
to the public or is unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility
hearing, removal from Canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the
making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection 44(2); or
(b) if
the officer is not satisfied of the identity of the foreign national in the
course of any procedure under this Act.
(3) A
permanent resident or a foreign national may, on entry into Canada, be detained if an officer
(a) considers
it necessary to do so in order for the examination to be completed; or
(b) has
reasonable grounds to suspect that the permanent resident or the foreign
national is inadmissible on grounds of security or for violating human or
international rights.
(4) If a
permanent resident or a foreign national is taken into detention, an officer
shall without delay give notice to the Immigration Division.
57. (1) Within 48 hours
after a permanent resident or a foreign national is taken into detention, or
without delay afterward, the Immigration Division must review the reasons for
the continued detention.
(2) At
least once during the seven days following the review under subsection (1),
and at least once during each 30-day period following each previous review,
the Immigration Division must review the reasons for the continued detention.
(3) In a
review under subsection (1) or (2), an officer shall bring the permanent
resident or the foreign national before the Immigration Division or to a
place specified by it.
58. (1) The Immigration
Division shall order the release of a permanent resident or a foreign
national unless it is satisfied, taking into account prescribed factors, that
(a) they
are a danger to the public;
(b) they
are unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal
from Canada, or at a proceeding
that could lead to the making of a removal order by the Minister under
subsection 44(2);
(c) the
Minister is taking necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion
that they are inadmissible on grounds of security or for violating human or
international rights; or
(d) the
Minister is of the opinion that the identity of the foreign national has not
been, but may be, established and they have not reasonably cooperated with
the Minister by providing relevant information for the purpose of establishing
their identity or the Minister is making reasonable efforts to establish
their identity.
(2) The
Immigration Division may order the detention of a permanent resident or a
foreign national if it is satisfied that the permanent resident or the foreign
national is the subject of an examination or an admissibility hearing or is
subject to a removal order and that the permanent resident or the foreign
national is a danger to the public or is unlikely to appear for examination,
an admissibility hearing or removal from Canada.
(3) If
the Immigration Division orders the release of a permanent resident or a
foreign national, it may impose any conditions that it considers necessary,
including the payment of a deposit or the posting of a guarantee for compliance
with the conditions.
|
54. La Section de l’immigration
est la section de la Commission chargée du contrôle visé à la présente
section.
55. (1) L’agent peut lancer
un mandat pour l’arrestation et la détention du résident permanent ou de l’étranger
dont il a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’il est interdit de territoire
et qu’il constitue un danger pour la sécurité publique ou se soustraira
vraisemblablement au contrôle, à l’enquête ou au renvoi.
(2) L’agent
peut, sans mandat, arrêter et détenir l’étranger qui n’est pas une personne
protégée dans les cas suivants :
a) il a des motifs raisonnables de croire que celui-ci est
interdit de territoire et constitue un danger pour la sécurité publique ou se
soustraira vraisemblablement au contrôle, à l’enquête ou au renvoi, ou à la
procédure pouvant mener à la prise par le ministre d’une mesure de renvoi en
vertu du paragraphe 44(2);
b) l’identité de celui-ci ne lui a pas été prouvée dans le
cadre d’une procédure prévue par la présente loi.
(3) L’agent
peut détenir le résident permanent ou l’étranger, à son entrée au Canada,
dans les cas suivants :
a) il l’estime nécessaire afin que soit complété le contrôle;
b) il a des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner que celui-ci est
interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits
humains ou internationaux.
(4) L’agent
avise sans délai la section de la mise en détention d’un résident permanent
ou d’un étranger.
57. (1) La section
contrôle les motifs justifiant le maintien en détention dans les quarante-huit
heures suivant le début de celle-ci, ou dans les meilleurs délais par la
suite.
(2) Par la
suite, il y a un nouveau contrôle de ces motifs au moins une fois dans les
sept jours suivant le premier contrôle, puis au moins tous les trente jours
suivant le contrôle précédent.
(3) L’agent
amène le résident permanent ou l’étranger devant la section ou au lieu
précisé par celle-ci.
58. (1) La section
prononce la mise en liberté du résident permanent ou de l’étranger, sauf sur
preuve, compte tenu des critères réglementaires, de tel des faits suivants :
a) le résident permanent ou l’étranger constitue un danger
pour la sécurité publique;
b) le résident permanent ou l’étranger se soustraira
vraisemblablement au contrôle, à l’enquête ou au renvoi, ou à la procédure
pouvant mener à la prise par le ministre d’une mesure de renvoi en vertu du
paragraphe 44(2);
c) le ministre prend les mesures voulues pour enquêter sur les
motifs raisonnables de soupçonner que le résident permanent ou l’étranger est
interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits
humains ou internationaux;
d) dans le cas où le ministre estime que l’identité de l’étranger
n’a pas été prouvée mais peut l’être, soit l’étranger n’a pas raisonnablement
coopéré en fournissant au ministre des renseignements utiles à cette fin,
soit ce dernier fait des efforts valables pour établir l’identité de l’étranger.
(2) La
section peut ordonner la mise en détention du résident permanent ou de l’étranger
sur preuve qu’il fait l’objet d’un contrôle, d’une enquête ou d’une mesure de
renvoi et soit qu’il constitue un danger pour la sécurité publique, soit qu’il
se soustraira vraisemblablement au contrôle, à l’enquête ou au renvoi.
(3) Lorsqu’elle
ordonne la mise en liberté d’un résident permanent ou d’un étranger, la
section peut imposer les conditions qu’elle estime nécessaires, notamment la
remise d’une garantie d’exécution.
|
[41]
Section 142 of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act provides that every person in immediate charge or control of
an immigrant station shall, when so directed by an officer, execute any warrant
or written order issued under the said Act for the arrest, detention or removal
from Canada of any permanent
resident or foreign national. Section 143 adds that an order to detain is,
notwithstanding any other law, sufficient authority to the person to whom it is
addressed or who may receive and execute it to arrest and detain the person
with respect to whom the warrant or order was issued or made:
142. Every peace officer and
every person in immediate charge or control of an immigrant station shall,
when so directed by an officer, execute any warrant or written order issued
under this Act for the arrest, detention or removal from Canada of any permanent resident or foreign
national.
143. A warrant issued or an
order to detain made under this Act is, notwithstanding any other law,
sufficient authority to the person to whom it is addressed or who may receive
and execute it to arrest and detain the person with respect to whom the
warrant or order was issued or made.
|
142. Les agents de la paix et
les responsables immédiats d’un poste d’attente doivent, sur ordre de l’agent,
exécuter les mesures — mandats et autres décisions écrites — prises au titre
de la présente loi — en vue de l’arrestation, de la garde ou du renvoi.
143. Par dérogation à toute
autre règle de droit, les mandats ou mesures de mise en détention pris en
vertu de la présente loi confèrent à leur destinataire ou à leur exécutant le
pouvoir d’arrêter et de détenir la personne qui y est visée.
|
[42]
Finally, paragraph 124(1)(b) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act provides that every person who escapes or
attempts to escape from lawful custody or detention under that Act commits an
offence:
124. (1) Every
person commits an offence who
. . .
(b) escapes
or attempts to escape from lawful custody or detention under this Act;
. . .
|
124. (1) Commet une
infraction quiconque :
[...]
b) échappe ou tente d’échapper à
sa détention;
[...]
|
[43]
Foreign nationals who are detained pursuant to
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act are held either in a
provincial correctional facility or in one of the minimum-security detention
centres managed by the CBSA in Montréal, Toronto and Vancouver: see
Exhibit R-3 of the affidavit of Bruno Héroux, at page 111 of the
Appeal Book.
[44]
Consequently, foreign nationals are detained in
these centres only if the CBSA officer in charge has reasonable grounds to
believe that they (a) are a danger to the public; (b) are unlikely to appear
for examination, an admissibility hearing or removal from Canada under the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act; (c) are inadmissible on grounds of security or
for violating human or international rights; or (d) have not reasonably
cooperated by providing relevant information for the purpose of establishing
their identity. To extend the detention of such foreign nationals beyond
48 hours, the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board
must also, upon review, agree with the CBSA officer.
[45]
The clear purpose of the minimum-security
detention centres managed by the CBSA is to prevent foreign nationals held
under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act from escaping the control
of the federal authorities. There can be no doubt that these detention centres
are vital, essential and integral components of the Canadian immigration and
border control systems.
The services
provided by Garda
[46]
Both the terms of the contract between the
Government of Canada and Garda and the evidence adduced before the Board
unequivocally demonstrate that the security guards take charge of the foreign
nationals whose detention has been ordered by CBSA officers under the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act. These security guards handcuff, transport and
escort these foreign nationals from where they were arrested to a CBSA-managed
detention centre in the Montréal area, and they ensure their detention at this
centre. In addition, they transport, handcuff and escort the foreign nationals so
detained in the Montréal area in order to facilitate investigations, hearings
and removal orders under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
[47]
The Garda security guards must meet RCMP
security requirements, and some must hold an airport pass for the restricted
areas at the Montréal-Trudeau
Airport. They must all perform their tasks under the authority of CBSA officers
and comply with federal departmental policies and CBSA administrative
guidelines regarding detention.
[48]
Their primary function is to monitor detained
foreign nationals in order to prevent them escaping or avoiding a detention
imposed on them under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Indeed, it is undisputed that the security services provided by the
approximately 125 Garda security guards in the Montréal area ensure the
effective detention of the foreign nationals held at the Immigration Prevention
Centre.
The “vital”,
“essential” or “integral” link between the federal undertaking and the services
provided by Garda
[49]
The facts of this case are not in dispute. At
issue, rather, are the differing conclusions to be drawn from these facts as to
the vital, essential or integral nature of the services provided by Garda to
the federal undertaking.
[50]
The Board refers mainly to the following factors
in support of its conclusion that the services provided by Garda are not a
vital, essential or integral component of the CBSA’s operation of the Montréal
area’s Immigration Prevention Centre (see paragraphs 124, 125 and 126 of
the original decision and paragraphs 49 and 59 of the reconsideration
decision; these paragraphs are reproduced above):
a.
The detainees are not violent and are not under the
responsibility of the correctional services of Canada;
b.
The security guards in question have no power of
arrest and do not themselves make decisions concerning the detention of foreign
nationals;
c.
The services in question are not severable from
the other services provided by Garda to its other clients; and
d.
The security guards may, on occasion, be
assigned to other Garda contracts.
These factors must
each be analyzed in turn.
[51]
The fact that the Immigration Prevention Centre
is used to detain non-violent foreign nationals who are not under the
responsibility of the Correctional Service of Canada is not relevant to the
analysis of the vital, essential or integral nature of the services at issue.
Foreign nationals detained under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
are generally not detained because they are violent, but because they present a
flight risk in that they are unlikely to appear for examination, an
admissibility hearing or removal from Canada under the Act. Although some foreign nationals may be detained
because they are a danger to the public, this is certainly not the usual reason
justifying detention under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
[52]
Foreign nationals whose detention is ordered by
the CBSA and reviewed by the Immigration Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board are usually not violent individuals, but rather individuals who
present a flight risk. The purpose of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act is not to punish these individuals but to place them in custody pending
the outcome of the immigration proceedings relating to their cases. Their
detention is preventive, not punitive. The essential purpose of the services
provided by the guards supplied by Garda at the Immigration Prevention Centre
is to ensure that foreign nationals presenting a flight risk cannot evade the
federal immigration authorities.
[53]
By subsuming punitive detention with preventive
detention, the Board neglected to consider the Immigration Prevention Centre’s
fundamental purpose and the vital and essential role played there by the
security guards, without whom preventive detention under that Act would be
impossible at the Centre.
[54]
Moreover, the fact that the security guards do
not make decisions regarding the detention of foreign nationals concerned is
not relevant to the constitutional analysis. Ultimately, the Immigration and
Refugee Board’s Immigration Division controls the detention of foreign
nationals under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The fact
that a CBSA officer and the Immigration and Refugee Board make the decisions
regarding the detention of an individual — rather than the security guards — is irrelevant to the analysis of the vital and essential role
played by these guards in the enforcement of such decisions. The issue here is
whether detentions under that Act could be effectively enforced at the
Immigration Prevention Centre without the services of the approximately 125
security guards working there. The record clearly shows that detentions ordered
under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act could not be effectively
maintained at this centre without these services.
[55]
The Board’s conclusion that the services provided
by Garda to the Immigration Prevention Centre are not severable from the
services Garda provides to its other clients also does not withstand careful
analysis. This conclusion results from a mistaken appreciation of detention and
of the State’s role in detention.
[56]
Even though there is no reason to doubt that the
“basic security services provided by Garda to its other clients include
guarding, monitoring, and providing safety and protection for premises, assets
and people”, as pointed out by the majority of the reconsideration panel at
paragraph 49 of its decision, there is no evidence in the record that
Garda’s other clients use the services of that corporation to ensure the
detention of individuals within a detention centre. Indeed, the State holds a
monopoly over coercion, and only the State (acting, in Canada, through the Crown in right of Canada or in right of a province) may forcefully detain an individual and
manage a detention centre for such a purpose. This function is at the heart of the
very concept of the modern State, without which our contemporary society could
not operate.
[57]
We are not dealing here with monitoring public
access to a building, or verifying the identity of visitors, or monitoring
buildings to prevent theft or other wrongdoings. Rather, Garda’s services to
the Immigration Prevention Centre ensure the detention of foreign nationals
under a federal statute. None of Garda’s other clients may operate a detention
centre or enter into a contract with Garda to provide for the detention of individuals.
It is therefore wrong to hold that the services provided by Garda for the
Immigration Prevention Centre are similar to those services Garda provides to its
other clients. Ensuring the detention of an individual is a service profoundly
different and distinct from those provided to Garda’s other clients, and this
very specific detention service is moreover governed by federal government
guidelines, standards and policies with which all the security guards must
comply.
[58]
As to the staff’s limited mobility and the fixed
term of Garda’s contract, these factors are hardly relevant.
[59]
Indeed, the contract between the Government of
Canada and Garda expressly requires staff stability. Sections 7 and 8 of
the contract are very clear in that regard (Exhibit R-4 to the affidavit
of Bruno Héroux, at page 172 of the Applicant’s Record):
[translation]
7. Assignment
consistency. The Contractor should make every possible effort to assign the
same full-time Security Guards to the same locations and shifts, and attempt to
limit the work of these people to assignments under this contract. This will
ensure that the staff become familiar with the work location in question and will
reduce the need to train them and introduce them to new local requirements.
With respect to
specific duties previously established in the Project Manager’s written
instructions and to optimize performance and ensure the continuity and quality
of service, the Contractor shall minimize its staff turnover. This will ensure
appropriate and efficient use of equipment supplied to the Security Guards.
8. Turnover. The Contractor will ensure that hiring methods and
guard selection standards enable it to put together a reliable and stable
staff.
[60]
Garda must therefore provide the CBSA with
continuous service, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, using reliable,
stable staff, preferably assigned full-time. Even though some of the guards
may, on occasion, be assigned to other contracts, this is certainly not the
goal of the services offered to the CBSA.
[61]
Concerning the length of the service contract, I
note that many service contracts with federal undertakings have a fixed term, but
this fact does not entail that the services provided under such contracts cannot
be characterized as being a vital, essential or integral part of the federal
undertaking concerned. Finding otherwise would lead to deciding constitutional
issues on the basis of the duration of a contract rather than on the basis of the
vital, essential or integral nature of the services provided under the contract.
[62]
Garda’s services for the Immigration Prevention
Centre are easily severable from that corporation’s other services, the
evidence before the Board revealing no contrary impediment. Garda is, in fact,
a multinational corporation that manages many service contracts in several
provinces and countries. In the Montréal area, Garda manages employees
certified under the Canada Labour Code as well as employees certified
under Quebec’s Labour Code.
[63]
In light of the record taken as a whole and of the
principles applicable to the constitutional analysis at hand, I can only
conclude that the security guard services that Garda provides for the
Immigration Prevention Centre are a vital, essential or integral part of the
operations of this centre.
[64]
This conclusion is indeed consistent with the Board’s
decisions in analogous cases, and it follows the conclusion of the Ontario
Labour Relations Board in Bhaghat Ram Mehmi concerning an immigration detention
centre in Ontario.
[65]
In Securiguard Services Limited, [2005]
CIRB 342, the Board certified a union under the Canada Labour Code to
represent a group of employees providing perimeter security at the Vancouver International Airport.
[66]
The Vancouver International Airport Authority
does not hire its own employees to enforce the security aspects of the federal
regulations which apply to it, but contracts out this responsibility to private
specialized service providers through a competitive tender process. One of the
aspects of airport security is perimeter security. Perimeter security refers to
the control of restricted areas that are not accessible by the general public. This
security service is provided by Securiguard’s employees and includes the
control and monitoring of restricted area passes; surveillance camera operation;
escort security for VIPs; and the checking or monitoring of access and entry of
airport employees, airline crews and employees of service providers, as well as
vehicle entry onto airport grounds, ramps and runways.
[67]
In Securiguard Services Limited, the
Board noted that these security services were required pursuant to the Aeronautics
Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-2, and were therefore different from those services
provided for by Securiguard to its other clients. These services could
therefore be reasonably severed. Given that these activities were essential for
ensuring airport security, they fell under federal jurisdiction:
[28] Securiguard employees are permanently
assigned to provide services to the airport and are trained specifically for
these duties. Securiguard employees enforce on behalf of a federal undertaking,
security measures developed in compliance with schedules to the Aeronautics
Act, which is federal legislation. Securiguard employees must obtain valid
restricted area passes issued by Transport Canada that are exclusive to the airport to be able to work there.
Moreover, certification under the provincial Private Investigators Act and
the Security Agencies Act (R.S.B.C., 1996, c. 374) is a general competence
requirement of all persons who work as security guards within the province, but
does not determine whether employees are governed by provincial labour
legislation. As well, the services provided by Securiguard under contract to
the Vancouver International Airport are separate from its contracts for services at other employers.
. . .
[34] In
light of these answers, the Board is of the view that Securiguard’s services at
the airport are sufficiently connected to the operations of the Airport
Authority to be severable from more routine security contracts. There is no
evidence that the cleaning staff, booksellers, shopsellers, food vendors and
other service providers must similarly comply with the Aeronautics Act
or that their operations are essential to the airport’s operation.
[35] Consequently,
the Board views the work of Securiguard’s employees at Airport Authority as
unique compared to the services it provides to other clients who operate under
federal jurisdiction and distinct from its other contracts. The level and
quality of work of Securiguard’s employees is totally dependent on the
standards set by the airport, and the standards of service that apply at the Vancouver International Airport.
[68]
The Board reached a similar decision with
respect to the security guards of the Canadian Corps of Commissionaires
providing similar services at the Halifax Airport: Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Nova Scotia
Division of Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, CIRB Letter Decision 1647.
[69]
Likewise, in A.S.P. Incorporated, [2006]
CIRB 368, the Board recognized its certification jurisdiction with regard to
security guards working for a security agency under contract with various
clients and providing security services at the Toronto-Pearson Airport,
including under a contract with SkyService for monitoring the doors to a hangar;
a contract with TBI for customer service personnel at Toronto Terminal 3; ad
hoc contracts with Aecon Construction and Torbear Construction for security
services for the construction of Terminal 3; and various contracts with
the Airport Authority for lost and found items at the airport, security at
various airside locations at the airport and the monitoring of the Airport
Authority building.
[70]
In that case (at paragraph 45), “it [was]
clear to the Board that the employees of ASP [the sub-contractor] perform[ed]
duties essential to airport security and that, in accordance with its
obligations under the Aeronautics Act, the GTAA [Greater Toronto Airport
Authority] could not operate without security services being in place.”
[71]
The analogy between airport perimeter services
and the services provided by the security guards at the Immigration Prevention
Centre is clear. In this case, the security guards perform tasks that are
essential to the effective detention of foreign nationals held under a federal
statute, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. These tasks are carried
out in accordance with federal policies and directives. The CBSA could not effectively
operate the Montréal area Immigration Prevention Centre without the services of
the approximately125 security guards provided by Garda.
[72]
Finally, I note that in Bhagat Ram Mehni,
above, the Ontario Labour Relations Board held that federal jurisdiction extends
to the labour relations of security guards working at an immigration detention
centre in Ontario. The facts in
Bhagat Ram Mehni are almost identical to those in the present case; even
though the majority of the reconsideration panel did attempt to distinguish the
facts of this case in its reconsideration decision, its arguments are not
persuasive in light of the Ontario Labour Relations Board’s description of the
facts in its Bhagat Ram Mehni decision:
3.
The applicant is a security officer for the
intervenor which is a company which provides security services to various other
companies. The responding party (the “UFCW” or the “Union”) represents the applicant in his employment relations with the
intervenor.
4.
Throughout the relevant period the applicant
worked as a security officer for the Canada Immigration
Holding Center (the “CIHC”). The CIHC is a hotel converted into a minimum security
detention centre, run by the immigration authorities of the federal government.
The CIHC is used to detain persons who have violated the Immigration Act
and who have been arrested or detained by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (‘CIC”)
because CIC has grounds to believe they will not appear for proceedings or who
pose a public danger.
5.
There are approximately 140 security officers at
the CIHC who serve in two primary functions. First, security officers are used
to escort detainees to and from the CIHC and various ports of entry and
immigration and hearing locations. Second, security officers act as guards
within the CIHC to ensure that detainees remain in the CIHC and behave
properly. In this regard security officers man posts and conduct patrols of the
CIHC. In other words, they fulfill a similar role to that of correction officer
in a correction institution.
[73]
As in Bhagat Ram Mehni, the security
guards of the Montréal area Immigration Prevention Centre provide for the
detention of foreign nationals arrested under the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, and the services they provide are essential to the Centre
and integral to its operation. Given their duties, federal jurisdiction over their
labour relations seems clear to me.
[74]
I note finally that federal authorities must be in
a position to keep the Centre operating in the event of a labour conflict, be
that through the Board acting pursuant to section 87.4 of the Canada
Labour Code or through Parliament pursuant to back-to-work legislation. It
would in fact be incongruous if provincial authorities were called upon to make
decisions regarding essential services at a Government of Canada detention
centre, or if they were otherwise called upon to interfere in the management of
the labour relations affecting the operations of such a centre.
Conclusions
[75]
For all of these reasons, I would allow the
application for judicial review, set aside the Board’s reconsideration decision,
and refer the matter back to the Board for redetermination of the
reconsideration application with directions to allow the application and to
consider the CSN’s
application for
certification under the Canada Labour Code. I would award costs to the
CSN, and I would order Garda and the Steelworkers to bear these costs equally.
“Robert M. Mainville”
“I agree.
Marc Noël J.A.”
“I agree.
Johanne Trudel J.A.”
Certified true
translation
Michael Palles