Docket:
A-74-13
Citation: 2013
FCA 231
CORAM:
SHARLOW J.A.
MAINVILLE J.A.
NEAR J.A.
BETWEEN:
|
MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS ULC
|
Appellant
|
and
|
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CANADA CO., MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP.,
AND THE MINISTER OF HEALTH
|
Respondents
|
Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on October 1, 2013.
Judgment delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on October 1,
2013.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: SHARLOW
J.A.
Docket:
A-74-13
Citation:
2013 FCA 231
CORAM:
SHARLOW
J.A.
MAINVILLE
J.A.
NEAR
J.A.
BETWEEN:
|
MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS ULC
|
Appellant
|
and
|
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CANADA CO., MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP.,
AND THE MINISTER OF HEALTH
|
Respondents
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the
Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on October 1, 2013).
SHARLOW J.A.
[1]
Mylan Pharmaceuticals ULC is appealing the
judgment of Justice Barnes (2013 FC 48) awarding the respondents (collectively
Bristol Myers) costs of $45,000 plus harmonized sales tax and reasonable
disbursements payable in accordance with reasons issued concurrently.
[2]
The costs were awarded in respect of a judgment
(2012 FC 1142) that disposed of an application by Bristol Myers under the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93‑133, for an
order prohibiting Mylan from selling a certain drug until the expiry of two
patents. The prohibition application was granted in respect of only one of the
patents, which expired on July 29, 2013. That was a partial win for Bristol
Myers. If Bristol Myers had succeeded in respect of the second patent, the
prohibition order would have been in force until February 2, 2018. That was a
partial win for Mylan, because no prohibition order kept it from the market
after July 29, 2013. Another outcome of the application was that there was no
successful attack on the validity of either patent.
[3]
In their submissions in the Federal Court,
Bristol Myers claimed costs of over $90,000 and disbursements of almost
$400,000. Mylan argued that no costs should be payable at all, or that any
costs awarded to Bristol Myers should be set off against the costs awarded to
Mylan.
[4]
Justice Barnes rejected the notion of awarding
no costs and instead awarded Bristol Myers approximately 50% of the costs it
claimed, plus disbursements except certain disbursements relating to expert
evidence tendered by Bristol Myers.
[5]
A decision on costs is discretionary and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is based on an error in
principle or is plainly wrong (see Bell
Helicopter Textron Canada Limitée v. Eurocopter, société par actions simplifiée,
2013 FCA 220, paragraphs 7 and 8). In this appeal, Mylan alleges that Justice
Barnes erred in principle in three respects.
[6]
First, Mylan argues that Justice Barnes was
obliged as a matter of law to award costs to neither party because of the
divided success. While that is a common outcome in cases of divided success, it
is not an outcome mandated by an immutable principle of law. Justice Barnes
considered that alternative and rejected it for reasons that he explained.
[7]
Mylan also argues that Justice Barnes ignored
the settled principle that the success of a legal proceeding is determined by
reference to its practical result and the remedies sought. In our view, Justice
Barnes made no such error. He was clearly aware of the practical result of the
proceeding and the remedies sought. Although his assessment of those factors
does not accord with Mylan’s, we see no error in principle.
[8]
Finally, Mylan argues that Justice Barnes
penalized Mylan for making arguments that did not find favour with the Court.
We see no indication that Justice Barnes did any such thing.
[9]
We have considered Mylan’s suggestion that
awards such as this one provide an incentive to generic drug manufacturers to
issue multiple notices of allegation rather than one where more than one patent
is involved. The record affords this Court no factual foundation for assessing
the validity of that argument. However, we note that the judges and
prothonotaries of the Federal Court have significant experience with such
matters. We have no doubt that if they perceive that litigants are conducting
themselves in a manner that is unjustifiably inefficient, they are well
equipped to respond on a case by case basis through appropriate case management
and in the matter of costs.
[10]
This appeal will be dismissed with costs.
"K. Sharlow"