SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Citation:
Martin v. Alberta (Workers’ Compensation Board), 2014 SCC 25, [2014] 1
S.C.R. 546
|
Date:
20140328
Docket:
35052
|
Between:
Douglas
Martin
Appellant
and
Workers’
Compensation Board of Alberta, Appeals Commission for Alberta
Workers’
Compensation and Attorney General of Canada
Respondents
-
and -
Workers’
Compensation Board of British Columbia, Commission de la santé et de la
sécurité du travail and Workers’ Compensation Board of Nova Scotia
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell,
Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 63)
|
Karakatsanis J. (McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella,
Rothstein, Cromwell and Wagner JJ. concurring)
|
Martin v. Alberta (Workers’ Compensation Board), 2014 SCC 25,
[2014] 1 S.C.R. 546
Douglas Martin Appellant
v.
Workers’ Compensation Board of Alberta,
Appeals Commission for Alberta Workers’
Compensation
and Attorney General of Canada Respondents
and
Workers’ Compensation Board of British
Columbia,
Commission de la santé et de la sécurité
du travail and
Workers’ Compensation Board of
Nova Scotia Interveners
Indexed as: Martin v. Alberta (Workers’ Compensation Board)
2014 SCC 25
File No.: 35052.
2013: December 10; 2014: March 28.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell,
Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for alberta
Workers’
compensation — Entitlement to compensation — Worker claiming compensation due
to chronic onset stress — Provincial policy imposing criteria for eligibility
for compensation on chronic onset stress claims — Whether provincial policy
applies in determining eligibility under Government Employees Compensation Act
— Whether provincial policy conflicts with Government Employees Compensation
Act — Whether denial of claim was reasonable — Government Employees
Compensation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. G-5, ss. 2 , 4 — Workers’ Compensation Act,
R.S.A. 2000, c. W-15, s. 1 — Workers’ Compensation Board of Directors’ Policy 03-01,
Part II, Application 6.
M,
an employee of Parks Canada, was notified that disciplinary action would result
if he did not provide an adequate response to a request filed under access to
information legislation. M alleged that this letter, following the stress of
years of conflict over another workplace issue, triggered a psychological
condition. He initiated a claim for compensation for chronic onset stress.
Under
s. 4 of the Government Employees Compensation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. G‑5
(GECA ), federal workers who suffer workplace injuries are entitled to
compensation at the same rate and under the same conditions as provided under
the provincial law where the employee is usually employed, and compensation is
determined by the same board, officers or authority as determine compensation
under provincial law. The GECA and the Workers’ Compensation Act,
R.S.A. 2000, c. W‑15 (WCA), both define “accident” as including a
wilful and intentional act of someone other than the claimant and a fortuitous
or chance event occasioned by a physical or natural cause. Alberta’s
Workers’ Compensation Board of Directors’ Policy 03‑01, Part II,
Application 6 (Policy), made under the WCA identifies four criteria
which must be met in order to establish eligibility for compensation for
chronic onset stress. The third and fourth criteria require that the work‑related
events are excessive or unusual in comparison to the normal pressures and
tensions experienced by the average worker in a similar occupation and that
there is objective confirmation of the events.
M’s
claim was denied by the Alberta Workers’ Compensation Board, the Dispute
Resolution and Decision Review Body, and the Appeals Commission for Alberta
Workers’ Compensation (Commission) on the basis that it did not meet the third
and fourth criteria set out in the Policy. On judicial review, the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench concluded that s. 4(1) of the GECA set out a
complete eligibility test for federal workers and the provincial Policy did
not apply. The matter was returned to the Commission to be determined solely
by the GECA . The Alberta Court of Appeal restored the Commission’s
decision, finding that the provincial Policy did apply.
Held:
The appeal should be dismissed.
In
enacting the GECA , Parliament intended that provincial boards and
authorities would adjudicate the workers’ compensation claims of federal
government employees — including both entitlement to and rates of compensation
— according to provincial law, except where the GECA clearly conflicts
with provincial legislation. Where Parliament intended to impose different
conditions, it has done so expressly. Where a direct conflict with the provincial
law exists, the GECA will prevail, rendering that aspect of the
provincial law or policy inapplicable to federal workers. This interpretation
is supported by the text of s. 4 , the scheme and history of the GECA ,
and Parliament’s stated intentions.
In
this case, the provincial Policy’s interpretation of “accident” in the context
of psychological stress claims does not conflict with the GECA . The GECA’s
permissive and flexible definition of “accident” is consistent with
Parliament’s intention to delegate the administration of workers’ compensation
to the provincial agencies, and enables different provinces to define
eligibility for compensation differently. In determining whether a worker’s
chronic onset stress was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course
of employment, it was not inconsistent with the GECA or unreasonable for
Alberta to require that the work‑related events are excessive or unusual
in comparison to the normal pressures and tensions experienced by the average
worker in a similar occupation and that there is objective confirmation of the
events. Those requirements reflect Alberta’s interpretation of “accident” in
the context of psychological stress claims.
The
Commission’s decision to deny compensation in this case was reasonable. It was
open to the Commission to find that the predominant cause of M’s psychological
injury was his reaction to a letter from his employer requesting compliance
with an access to information request, and that such a request was not
excessive or unusual in terms of normal pressures and tensions in a similar
occupation.
Cases Cited
Referred
to: Rees v. Royal
Canadian Mounted Police,
2005 NLCA 15, 246 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 79, leave to appeal refused, [2005] 2
S.C.R. x; Stewart v. Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission,
2008 NBCA 45, 331 N.B.R. (2d) 278; Canada Post Corp. v. Smith (1998), 40
O.R. (3d) 97, leave to appeal refused, [1998] 3 S.C.R. v; Thomson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal, 2003 NSCA 14, 212 N.S.R. (2d) 81; Canadian
Broadcasting Corp. v. Luo, 2009 BCCA 318, 273 B.C.A.C. 203; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’
Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654; Cape
Breton Development Corp. v. Morrison Estate, 2003 NSCA 103, 218 N.S.R. (2d)
53, leave to appeal refused, [2004] 1 S.C.R. vii; McLellan v. Workers’
Compensation Appeals Tribunal, 2003 NSCA 106, 218 N.S.R. (2d) 176; Marine
Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate, 2013 SCC 44, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 53;
Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1997] 2
S.C.R. 890; Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, CQLR, c. A‑3.001, ss. 382, 454.
Act to amend the Government Employees Compensation Act, S.C. 1931, c. 9, s. 2.
Act to amend the Government Employees Compensation Act, S.C. 1955, c. 33, s. 2.
Act
to provide Compensation where Employees of His Majesty are killed or suffer
injuries while performing their duties, S.C. 1918, c. 15, s. 1(1).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
Government Employees Compensation Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. G‑5, ss. 2 “accident”, 4(1), (2), (3).
Government Employees Compensation Act, 1947, S.C. 1947, c. 18, ss. 2(1) “accident”, 3(1).
Government Employees Compensation Regulations 1948 (Pulmonary
Tuberculosis), SOR/48‑573.
Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I‑21,
s. 14 .
Workers
Compensation Act, C.C.S.M., c. W200, s. 51.1(1)(a).
Workers
Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 492, s. 99(2).
Workers
Compensation Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. W‑7.1, s. 30(1).
Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W‑15, ss. 1(1) “accident”, 8(3)(c), (d),
13.2(6).
Workers’
Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994‑95, c. 10, s. 183.
Workers’
Compensation Act, S.N.W.T. 2007, c. 21, s. 91(3).
Workers’
Compensation Act, S.Nu. 2007, c. 15, s. 31(2).
Workers’
Compensation Act, S.Y. 2008, c. 12, ss. 3 “policy”, 18.
Workers’
Compensation Act, 2013, S.S. 2013, c. W‑17.11, s. 23(2).
Workplace
Health, Safety and Compensation Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. W‑11,
s. 5(1)(a).
Workplace Health,
Safety and Compensation Commission Act, S.N.B. 1994, c. W‑14, s. 7(f).
Workplace
Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 16, Sched. A, ss. 126, 161.
Authors Cited
Alberta. Workers’ Compensation Board. Policies and Information
Manual, Claimant & Health Care Services Policies (online: http://www.wcb.ab.ca/public/policy/manual/claimant.asp).
Canada. House of Commons. House of Commons Debates,
vol. II, 2nd Sess., 22nd Parl., February 28, 1955, p. 1561.
Canada. House of Commons. House of Commons Debates, vol.
II, 3rd Sess., 20th Parl., March 27, 1947, p. 1824.
Canada. House of Commons. House of Commons Debates, vol.
II, 3rd Sess., 20th Parl., March 31, 1947, pp. 1892, 1894, 1896.
Canada. House of Commons. House of Commons Debates, vol.
II, 6th Sess., 21st Parl., May 7, 1952, p. 1974.
Canada. House of Commons. House of Commons Debates, vol.
132, 1st Sess., 13th Parl., April 16, 1918, p. 812.
Driedger, Elmer A. Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed.
Toronto: Butterworths, 1983.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal (Fraser C.J. and Watson and
McDonald JJ.A.), 2012 ABCA 248, 65 Alta. L.R. (5th) 220, 536 A.R. 121, 559
W.A.C. 121, 353 D.L.R. (4th) 499, [2012] 11 W.W.R. 1, 1 C.C.E.L. (4th) 193,
[2012] A.J. No. 879 (QL), 2012 CarswellAlta 1444, allowing an appeal from a
decision of Ouellette J., 2010 CarswellAlta 2817, which set
aside a decision of the Appeals Commission for Alberta Workers’ Compensation,
2009 CanLII 66292, and ordered a reconsideration. Appeal dismissed.
Andrew
Raven, Andrew Astritis and Amanda
Montague‑Reinholdt, for the appellant.
Douglas
R. Mah, Q.C., and Ron Goltz, for the
respondent the Workers’ Compensation Board of Alberta.
Sandra
Hermiston, for the respondent the Appeals Commission
for Alberta Workers’ Compensation.
John S.
Tyhurst, for the respondent the Attorney General of
Canada.
Laurel
M. Courtenay and Scott A. Nielsen, for the
intervener the Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia.
Pierre-Michel Lajeunesse and Lucille
Giard, for the intervener Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du
travail.
Roderick (Rory) H. Rogers, Q.C., and Madeleine F. Hearns, for the intervener the Workers’
Compensation Board of Nova Scotia.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
Karakatsanis J. —
I.
Introduction and Overview
[1]
The appellant, an employee of Parks Canada,
initiated a claim for workers’ compensation. Under the federal Government
Employees Compensation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. G-5 (GECA ), federal
workers who suffer workplace injuries are entitled to compensation “at the same
rate and under the same conditions” as provided under the provincial law where
the employee is usually employed: s. 4(1) and (2) . The compensation is
determined by “the same board, officers or authority” as determine compensation
under provincial law: s. 4(3) . The appellant’s claim was denied by the
Appeals Commission for Alberta Workers’ Compensation (Commission), 2009 CanLII
66292, because it did not meet all the criteria set out in Alberta’s Workers’
Compensation Board of Directors’ Policy 03-01, Part II, Application 6 (Policy),
authorized under the Alberta Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c.
W-15 (WCA). The Alberta Court of Appeal found that the provincial Policy
applied to Mr. Martin’s claim and restored the Commission’s denial of
compensation.
[2]
The main issue in this appeal is whether the
GECA requires the provincial boards to apply provincial law and policy to determine
entitlement to workers’ compensation. Provincial courts of appeal have reached
competing conclusions on this question. Some have concluded that the GECA
provides a complete code of eligibility for federal workers’ compensation.[1] Others, like the Alberta Court of Appeal in this case, have
concluded that eligibility for compensation under the GECA is determined
in accordance with provincial rules.[2]
[3]
I would dismiss the appeal. The provincial
boards and authorities are required under the GECA to apply their own
provincial laws and policies, provided they do not conflict with the GECA .
I conclude that the Commission’s decision to reject the claim was reasonable.
II.
Background Facts
[4]
The appellant, Douglas Martin, began employment
with Parks Canada as a park warden in 1973. In 2000, he commenced a health and
safety complaint against Parks Canada, arguing that wardens should be armed
when carrying out law enforcement duties. This complaint generated various
internal complaint processes, court cases and appeals. The appellant felt that
he suffered a loss of work, training and promotion opportunities as a result of
his leadership role in the dispute.
[5]
In June 2006, Parks Canada received a request under
access to information legislation. It instructed the appellant to disclose
information relating to data on his work computer so that it could comply with
the request. Parks Canada was not satisfied that the appellant had responded
adequately. On December 18 of that year, he received a letter notifying him that
if he did not provide further response to the request by December 13 (five days
prior to receiving the letter), disciplinary action would result.
[6]
The appellant already had a written reprimand on his
file and feared that the next disciplinary action would be dismissal. He
alleged that the letter, following the stress of years of conflict over the
health and safety issue, triggered a psychological condition. He took medical
leave beginning December 23, 2006, consulted medical professionals for treatment,
and initiated a claim for compensation for chronic onset stress the following
month.
III.
Proceedings Below
[7]
The appellant’s claim was denied by three levels
of workers’ compensation authorities — the Alberta Workers’ Compensation Board
(WCB), the Dispute Resolution and Decision Review Body, and the Commission — on
the basis that it did not meet the criteria set out in the Policy related to
chronic onset stress. In particular, the Commission held that his claim failed
to meet the third and fourth provincial Policy criteria — namely, that
the “work-related events are excessive or unusual in comparison to the normal
pressures and tensions experienced by the average worker in a similar
occupation” and that “there is objective confirmation of the events” (Appellant’s
Book of Authorities, at p. 56).
[8]
On judicial review, the Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench concluded that the provincial Policy did not apply, and therefore
set aside the decision and returned the matter to the Commission. As a federal
employee, the appellant’s eligibility for compensation was to be determined
solely under the GECA , which was designed to ensure that all federal
government employees in Canada are subject to the same rules. The third and
fourth eligibility criteria imposed by the Policy were improper extra
hurdles which were inconsistent with the GECA .
[9]
The Alberta Court of Appeal (2012 ABCA 248, 65
Alta. L.R. (5th) 220 (Fraser C.J. and Watson and McDonald JJ.A.)) restored the
Commission’s decision (para. 84), the majority reasoning that Parliament had
intended to rely upon provincial eligibility criteria, and the Policy criteria
did not conflict with the federal GECA (paras. 4-8, 30-33, 35-47 and
51).
IV.
Analysis
A.
Issues
[10]
This appeal gives rise to three issues. First,
was the Commission entitled to apply provincial policy in determining
eligibility under the federal GECA ? Second, if so, did the particular
Policy in this case conflict with the definition of “accident” in the GECA ?
Third, was the Commission’s denial of the claim in this case reasonable?
B.
Standard of Review
[11]
The appropriate standard of review in this case
is reasonableness. Section 4 of the GECA gives the provinces broad
authority to determine the compensation claims of federal workers, in effect
rendering the GECA a “home” or “constituent” statute for the provincial
tribunals. The presumption of reasonableness where an administrative tribunal
interprets a “home” or “constituent” statute is not displaced here as the
question of law is not of central importance to the legal system and is
squarely within the specialized functions of workers’ compensation tribunals: Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association,
2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654, at para. 30. As discussed below, Parliament
intended that provinces would generally adjudicate claims according to
provincial law, resulting in the potential for different applications of the GECA
from province to province.
[12]
With respect to the adjudication of Mr. Martin’s
claim more specifically, the issue is one of mixed fact and law and this expert
tribunal is entitled to deference.
C.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
[13]
The relevant provisions of the GECA and
the WCA are as follows:
Government Employees Compensation Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. G-5
2. [Definitions]
In this Act,
“accident”
includes a wilful and an intentional act, not being the act of the employee,
and a fortuitous event occasioned by a physical or natural cause;
. . .
4.
(1) [Persons eligible for compensation] Subject to this Act, compensation shall
be paid to
(a)
an employee who
(i)
is caused personal injury by an accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment, or
(ii)
is disabled by reason of an industrial disease due to the nature of the employment; and
(b)
the dependants of an employee whose death results from
such an accident or industrial disease.
(2)
[Rate of compensation and conditions] The employee or the dependants referred
to in subsection (1) are, notwithstanding the nature or class of the employment,
entitled to receive compensation at the same rate and under the same conditions
as are provided under the law of the province where the employee is usually
employed respecting compensation for workmen and the dependants of deceased
workmen, employed by persons other than Her Majesty, who
(a)
are caused personal injuries in that province by accidents arising out of and
in the course of their employment; or
(b)
are disabled in that province by reason of industrial
diseases due to the nature of their employment.
(3)
[Determination of compensation] Compensation under subsection (1) shall be
determined by
(a)
the same board, officers or authority as is or are established by the law of
the province for determining compensation for workmen and dependants of
deceased workmen employed by persons other than Her Majesty; or
(b)
such other board, officers or authority, or such court, as the Governor in
Council may direct.
Workers’
Compensation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W-15
1(1) [Interpretation] In this Act,
(a) “accident”
means an accident that arises out of and occurs in the course of employment in
an industry to which this Act applies and includes
(i) a
wilful and intentional act, not being the act of the
worker who suffers the accident,
(ii) a
chance event occasioned by a physical or natural cause,
(iii) disablement, and
(iv) a disabling or potentially disabling condition caused by an
occupational disease;
D.
Does the Provincial Policy Apply in Determining
Eligibility Under the GECA ?
[14]
The primary issue in this appeal addresses the
nature of the relationship between the GECA and provincial workers’
compensation law: if and when provincial workers’ compensation legislation,
such as the Alberta WCA, can be used to determine eligibility for
compensation under the GECA .
(1)
Submissions of the Parties
[15]
The appellant argues that s. 4(1) of the GECA
sets out a complete eligibility test. Parliament intended to subject all
federal employees to the same eligibility standard, but to have the amount of compensation
be determined by each province. Thus, a worker governed by the GECA who
suffers injury as a result of a work-related accident is entitled to
compensation, without reference to any provincial law or policy respecting
eligibility. Section 4(1) and the definition of “accident” in the GECA would
be redundant if provincial legislation governed to determine eligibility for
compensation. The question is whether the stress at issue is an injury by
“accident” within the meaning of the GECA .
[16]
The respondent the WCB submits that its
authority to determine compensation for federal employees under s. 4 of the GECA
includes the power to make policies in respect of compensation, including
eligibility. The GECA provides an efficient system of compensation for
federal employees consistent with that of provincial workers; the interplay
between the GECA and the WCA is a positive example of cooperative
federalism. Section 4(2), which directs that federal employees are to receive
compensation “at the same rate and under the same conditions” as provincial
employees, refers to both entitlement and quantum of benefits.
[17]
The respondent the Attorney General of Canada
contends that the intention of the GECA is to incorporate provincial law
into the assessment of both eligibility and rate of compensation. The GECA
was intended to create parity between workers within a province and to rely on
provincial law and administration. Where Parliament intended to distinguish
part of the GECA from the various provincial Acts, it has done so
expressly. Therefore, except in those few situations where it conflicts with
the GECA , provincial law determines issues of compensation.
(2)
Analysis
[18]
“[T]he words of an Act are to be read in their
entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with
the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”
(E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87).
[19]
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the
Commission was required to apply provincial law and policy to determine the
entitlement to and rate of compensation for an employee governed by the GECA .
The GECA incorporates provincial workers’ compensation regimes, except
where they conflict with the GECA . It creates an efficient and consistent
system so that federal and other workers within a province are generally
compensated at the same rates and under the same conditions. Where Parliament
intended to impose different conditions, it has done so expressly.
(a)
The Text and Scheme of the Provisions
[20]
Section 4(1) of the GECA is a general
provision which provides that compensation is to be paid to employees who are
caused personal injury due to a workplace accident, and to their dependents if
death results: “Subject to this Act, compensation shall be paid to . . . an
employee who . . . is caused personal injury by an accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment . . . .” In my view, this does not suggest
that the provision is a complete code for determining eligibility for
compensation. Compensation is “[s]ubject to this Act”. Neither the words
“eligibility” nor “entitlement” appear in s. 4(1) . Marginal notes are not part
of the provision and are not determinative of the meaning of the section: Interpretation
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 14 .
[21]
Although the injury must be caused by an
“accident”, the broad and open-ended definition of “accident” in s. 2 of the GECA
provides only two categories of events which will constitute accidents: it
“includes” both “wilful” and “intentional” acts of others and “fortuitous event[s]”.
No standard or rule is provided in the definition of “accident” — or in s. 4(1)
— by which to determine what categories of “act[s]” or “event[s]” may
constitute “accident[s]”, when such acts are “arising out of and in the course
of . . . employment” or to address when an injury is “caused” by an accident.
[22]
Read as a whole and in context, s. 4 supports
the interpretation that the criteria for entitlement are not specified in the GECA
and are to be determined according to provincial workers’ compensation law and
authorities.
[23]
First, s. 4(2) provides that federal employees
under the GECA are “entitled to receive compensation at the same
rate and under the same conditions as are provided under the law of the
province where the employee is usually employed”. This provides parallel entitlements
to all workers within a given province. Since provinces have the
jurisdiction to enact their own legislation respecting workers’ compensation,
s. 4(2) contemplates that different “rates” and “conditions” of compensation
will apply to federal workers in different provinces, depending on the law
enacted in their province of employment. Thus, the consistency promoted is for
all workers within a province — and not for federal workers throughout the
country.
[24]
It would make little sense to defer to a
provincial regime of compensation for the rates and conditions of compensation
without also deferring on the question of eligibility, since those aspects of
the regime are inevitably intertwined. “Conditions” for the receipt of
compensation will determine whether or not an employee receives compensation.
Thus, the “entitlement” under s. 4(2) to receive compensation “under the same
conditions” as other employees in the province suggests that federal employees
are entitled to receive compensation under the same circumstances. As I
observe below, the legislative history clearly indicates that the reference to
the “same conditions” was intended to indicate that the eligibility
conditions for federal employees under the GECA were to be the same
as under the provincial scheme.
[25]
The parallel language used in s. 4(1) and (2)
further links eligibility for compensation of federal employees to the
provincial scheme. Under s. 4(1), compensation shall be paid to a federal
employee who “is caused personal injury by an accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment”. Section 4(2) states that federal employees
are entitled to compensation as provided for workers under provincial
jurisdiction who are “caused personal injuries in that province by accidents
arising out of and in the course of their employment”. This mirroring of
the language suggests that federal employees receive compensation in the same
circumstances as fellow workers in the province where they work for injuries caused
by an accident “arising out of and in the course of . . . employment”.
[26]
Section 4(3) provides that “[c]ompensation under
subsection (1) shall be determined by . . . the same board, officers or
authority as is or are established by the law of the province for determining
compensation for [workers under provincial jurisdiction]”. As with s. 4(2),
this provision contemplates that boards or authorities may determine
compensation differently from province to province.
[27]
Thus, the text of the GECA suggests that
s. 4(1) does not set out a complete test for eligibility for compensation.
Section 4(1) simply states that federal workers injured in accidents on the job
are to be compensated subject to the GECA . The broad and open-ended
definition of “accident” in s. 2 does not assist in determining the boundaries
of entitlement. It is far more likely that Parliament intended to rely on
provincial laws defining the scope of “accident” to provide some certainty.
The authority granted in s. 4(2) and (3) is itself strongly indicative of such
a role. According to s. 4(2) , federal workers are entitled to the rates and
conditions of compensation determined according to provincial law. And in s.
4(3) , the GECA clearly delegates to the provincial boards the actual
determination of compensation under s. 4(1) . Provincial institutions and
laws thus provide the structure and boundaries necessary to determine whether
and how much compensation is to be paid to federal employees.
(b)
Legislative Purpose
[28]
The history of the text of the GECA as
well as Parliament’s stated intentions clearly demonstrate that Parliament’s
purpose in enacting the GECA was to rely on provincial laws and
provincial boards to determine federal workers’ compensation claims, except
where the GECA clearly conflicts with provincial legislation.
[29]
The GECA’s predecessor statute was
enacted in 1918: An Act to provide Compensation where Employees of
His Majesty are killed or suffer injuries while performing their duties,
S.C. 1918, c. 15. According to s. 1(1) of the initial Act,
both “the liability for and the amount of such compensation” were to be
determined under provincial law and by provincial authorities:
1. (1) An employee in the service of His Majesty who is injured,
and the dependents of any such employee who is killed, shall be entitled to the
same compensation as the employee, or as the dependent of a deceased employee,
of a person other than His Majesty would, under similar circumstances, be
entitled to receive under the law of the province in which the accident
occurred, and the liability for and the amount of such compensation
shall be determined in the same manner and by the same Board, officers or
authority, as that established by the law of the province for determining
compensation in similar cases, or by such other Board, officers or authority or
by such court as the Governor in Council shall from time to time direct.
[30]
Indeed, the Minister responsible for the initial
Act described it as ensuring that “[i]n case of injury, an employee of the
Government railway will be in exactly the same position in regard to
compensation as would the employee of a railway company” (Hon. J. D. Reid, House
of Commons Debates, vol. 132, 1st Sess., 13th Parl., April 16, 1918, at p.
812 (emphasis added)).
[31]
In 1947, the words “the liability for” were
replaced by the phrase “the right to” compensation (S.C. 1947, c. 18, s.
3(1)). Both phrases plainly refer to a worker’s entitlement to, or eligibility
for, compensation. The definition of “accident” was also added at that time —
without any particular discussion in Parliament.
[32]
In 1955, the present phrase was adopted, stating
that federal employees are to receive compensation “at the same rate and
under the same conditions” as are provided under the law of the province
where the employee is usually employed (S.C. 1955, c. 33, s. 2). During first
reading of these amendments, the Minister responsible stated:
The
proposed amendments provide that the entitlement to and rates of
compensation payable to an employee under the act shall be determined in
accordance with and under the same circumstances as are provided under the
law of the province where the employee is usually employed . . . . [Emphasis
added.]
(Hon. M. F. Gregg, House of Commons Debates, vol. II, 2nd
Sess., 22nd Parl., February 28, 1955, at p. 1561)
[33]
The phrase “under the same conditions” appears
to have directly replaced the earlier references to “the liability for” and “the
right to” compensation. And as the legislative debates made clear, these were
to be determined by provincial law and adjudicative bodies.
[34]
In providing that provincial law and authorities
were to determine compensation for federal government workers, Parliament
expressly recognized that “[c]laims arising from accidents or otherwise are
handled differently according to the provinces” (Hon. L. Chevrier, House of
Commons Debates, vol. II, 3rd Sess., 20th Parl., March 27, 1947, at p.
1824) and that “[t]he right to compensation and the amount of it in each
case are decided by the provincial workmen’s compensation board under the
statute of the province concerned” (Hon. M. F. Gregg, House of Commons
Debates, vol. II, 6th Sess., 21st Parl., May 7, 1952, at p. 1974 (emphasis
added)).
[35]
In short, the legislative history of the GECA
and statements of parliamentary purpose demonstrate that the intent has
remained consistent since 1918: both eligibility for and the rate of
compensation are to be determined according to provincial law.
(c)
Conflicts Between the GECA and Provincial
Legislation
[36]
As can be seen from the legislative history,
Parliament also intended to enact specific exceptions to its reliance on
provincial law.
[37]
For example, in 1947, Parliament amended the GECA
to provide coverage for pulmonary tuberculosis contracted in a government
hospital or sanatorium, which was not covered at the time under provincial
legislation. During a debate in the House of Commons, the Minister responsible
for the amendments referred several times to Parliament’s general
intention “to accept the decisions of the provincial boards of what is an
accident and what is an industrial disease” in order to avoid setting up a
separate federal authority to adjudicate claims (Hon. L. Chevrier, House of
Commons Debates, vol. II, 3rd Sess., 20th Parl., March 31, 1947, at p.
1892). However he affirmed that the amendment “introduces a new principle” and
that the new section “provides something which no other provincial act, save
perhaps one, does” (pp. 1894 and 1896).
[38]
Potential conflicts between the GECA and
provincial workers’ compensation legislation were discussed in Cape Breton
Development Corp. v. Morrison Estate, 2003 NSCA 103, 218 N.S.R. (2d)
53, leave to appeal refused, [2004] 1 S.C.R. vii.
[39]
The issue in Morrison was whether a
“benefit of the doubt” presumption in the Nova Scotia workers’ compensation
legislation applied to workers who fell under the GECA . The Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal held that the presumption with respect to causation in the
provincial Act applied to federal workers as well. The court held that there
was no conflict between the two statutes, as there was no language in the GECA
to exclude federal workers from the benefit of such a presumption (para. 45).[3] The court adopted the Attorney General of Canada’s description of
the legislative landscape, concluding that:
The provincial workers’
compensation scheme governs claims submitted under GECA provided that:
(a)
the provision in issue is reasonably incidental to a “rate” or “condition”
governing compensation under the law of the province, and
(b)
the provision is not otherwise in conflict with GECA . [para. 68]
I agree. Where a direct conflict
between the provincial law and the GECA exists, the GECA will
prevail, rendering that aspect of the provincial law or policy inapplicable to
federal workers.[4] Otherwise, the provincial workers’ compensation scheme prevails.
In either case, provincial boards and authorities will be responsible for
adjudicating the claim.
[40]
Given the broad delegation of the determination
of eligibility to the provincial level, conflicts between provincial law and
the GECA with respect to eligibility will generally only arise in
situations where the GECA regime has specifically included or excluded
matters from compensation in a way that is in conflict with the relevant
provincial law, as for example occurred in the case of pulmonary tuberculosis.
E.
The Interpretation of “Accident”: Did the
Provincial Policy Conflict With the GECA ?
[41]
Given my conclusion that provincial law applies,
except to the extent it is in conflict with the GECA , the second
issue is whether the provincial Policy conflicted with the definition of
“accident” in s. 2 of the GECA . Specifically, was it reasonable for the
Commission to apply the Alberta Policy criteria to determine whether the
chronic onset stress was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course
of employment? Or did the Policy necessarily conflict with the GECA ?
(1)
Submissions of the Parties
[42]
The appellant submits that the GECA ’s definition
of “accident” is broad and inclusive and cannot be limited by provincial law or
policy. To interpret “accident” as requiring excessive or unusual workplace
events is inconsistent with the broad definition of “accident” under the
GECA . The Policy unreasonably and unfairly imposes a stricter causative
requirement on those suffering from psychological injuries than on those
suffering from physical injuries.
[43]
The respondent the WCB argues that the
provincial Policy does not change or add extra requirements to the definition
of “accident” in the GECA . Instead, it provides guidance in determining
whether an accident, as defined in both the Alberta WCA and the GECA ,
has occurred and, if so, whether it arose out of and in the course of
employment.
[44]
The respondent the Attorney General of Canada
contends that Parliament left considerable room for provincial law to determine
the specific circumstances under which an injury is compensable and the factors
to be considered in this decision.
(2) Analysis
(a) The
Relationship Between the GECA and the WCA
[45]
The GECA provided no definition for the
term “accident” until 1947, even though the requirement that the employee’s
injury be caused by an “accident arising out of and in the course of his employment”
had been present in the legislation since 1931 (S.C. 1931, c. 9, s. 2).
[46]
The definition of “accident” in the Alberta
legislation is substantially the same as the definition in the GECA . Both
include accidents arising out of and in the course of employment (see s. 4(1)
of the GECA and the definition of “accident” in s. 1(1) of the WCA).
Both include “a wilful and intentional act” of someone
other than the claimant and a “fortuitous” or “chance” “event occasioned by a
physical or natural cause” (see the definitions of “accident” in s. 2 of the GECA
and s. 1(1) of the WCA).
[47]
The Alberta legislation, like all provincial
workers’ compensation legislation, contemplates the consistent adjudication of
claims through the application of policies.[5] Section
13.2(6)(b) of the Alberta WCA states that the Appeals Commission “is
bound by the board of directors’ policy relating to the matter under appeal”.
In effect, the Alberta policies govern the interpretation and application of
the WCA.
(b) The Specific
Policy in Issue
[48]
The WCB has adopted specific policies to guide
decision making on the acceptance of certain medical conditions. The Policy
identifies the circumstances under which a psychiatric or psychological
disability is compensable. No one has suggested that the Alberta Policy is ultra
vires the WCA. The Policy defines the parameters of an “accident”
as related to claims for chronic onset stress by identifying four criteria
which must be met in order to establish eligibility for compensation:
11. When does WCB accept claims for chronic onset stress?
As
with any other claim, WCB investigates the causation to determine whether the
claim is acceptable. Claims for this type of injury are eligible for
compensation only when all of the following criteria are met:
• there is a confirmed psychological or psychiatric diagnosis . . .
• the work-related events or stressors are the predominant cause of
the injury; . . .
• the work-related events are excessive or unusual in comparison to
the normal pressures and tensions experienced by the average worker in a
similar occupation, and
• there is objective confirmation of the events.
In
addition to the duties reasonably expected by the nature of the worker’s occupation,
normal pressures and tensions include, for example, interpersonal relations and
conflicts, health and safety concerns, union issues, and routine labour
relations actions taken by the employer, including workload and deadlines, work
evaluation, performance management (discipline), transfers, changes in job
duties, lay-offs, demotions, terminations, and reorganizations, to which all
workers may be subject from time to time. [pp. 5-6]
[49]
In my view, to interpret “accident” to require
excessive or unusual workplace events is not inconsistent with the broad
definition of “accident” in s. 2 of the GECA , which “includes
a wilful and an intentional act, not being the act of the employee, and a
fortuitous event occasioned by a physical or natural cause”. The
definition of “accident” sets out a minimum content, but is neither exhaustive
nor limiting. It is permissive and flexible, consistent with Parliament’s
intention to delegate the administration of workers’ compensation to the
provincial agencies. As the intervener the Workers’ Compensation Board of
British Columbia pointed out, neither the GECA nor the WCA
definition of “accident” provides guidance as to when an accident or injury is,
in fact, caused by the worker’s employment. Provincial law supplements
the federal Act with structure and specificity.
[50]
In this case, the province required excessive or
unusual events for psychological stress claims and objective confirmation of
those events. The requirements simply reflect Alberta’s interpretation of
“accident” in the context of psychological stress claims. Under a no-fault
compensation scheme, what constitutes an “accident” cannot be solely dependent
on the worker’s subjective view of events. An event triggering a physical
injury will often be easier to identify than one giving rise to a mental
injury. Alberta’s enactment of a policy which defines a workplace “accident”
causing mental injury is not unreasonable.
[51]
Workers’ compensation schemes in Canada follow
the Meredith model, a “historic trade-off” under which workers lose their cause
of action against their employers for workplace injuries, but gain coverage
under a no-fault insurance scheme (Marine Services International Ltd. v.
Ryan Estate, 2013 SCC 44, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 53, at para. 29, citing Pasiechnyk
v. Saskatchewan (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890, at
para. 25). Employers are forced to contribute to the scheme, but are freed
from potentially crippling liability. These schemes provide guaranteed
compensation for injuries arising from industrial diseases or accidents (Marine
Services, at para. 30).
[52]
As was pointed out in Canada Post, the
disparity in entitlements between federal workers in different provinces which
arises from the scheme of the GECA is not “inconsistent with the
principles of federalism” (p. 105). The plan carried out through the GECA
is cooperative federalism at work. Provincial policies may define eligibility
for compensation differently, but Parliament intended this flexibility. The GECA’s
open-ended definition of “accident” enables this flexibility; it does not
curtail it.
[53]
Finally, the appellant relied on the values in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to argue that the definition
of “accident” must be interpreted in a way that does not impose additional
causality burdens on claimants for mental health injuries as compared to
claimants for physical injuries. However, the constitutionality of the
provisions was not challenged before this Court. For this Court to make a
determination based on Charter values would in effect be to decide a Charter
challenge to the Policy without a proper record.
[54]
For these reasons, the Commission was entitled
to conclude that there is no conflict between the definition of “accident”
under the GECA and the Policy’s requirement that chronic stress arise as
a result of “excessive or unusual” events where “there is objective
confirmation”.
F.
Was the Denial of the Claim in This Case
Reasonable?
[55]
The third and final issue on appeal, then, is
whether the Commission’s application of the Policy to the appellant’s
claim was reasonable. There is no dispute that the appellant met the first two
Policy criteria: there was a confirmed psychological or psychiatric diagnosis,
and the work-related events or stressors were the predominant cause of the
injury.
[56]
The parties’ dispute is with respect to the last
two criteria of the Policy, at p. 5:
•
the work-related events are excessive or unusual in comparison to the
normal pressures and tensions experienced by the average worker in a similar
occupation, and
•
there is objective confirmation of the events.
[57]
With respect to the third criterion, that the
events must be excessive or unusual, the appellant argues that the Commission
wrongly found the letter to be the “predominant cause” of the appellant’s
condition (A.F., at para. 85, quoting the Commission’s decision, at para. 28).
By not taking into account the culmination of a series of events, the
Commission failed to fully account for his situation.
[58]
However, the Commission explicitly acknowledged
in its analysis “that the stressful factors arising from the work situation
included, for example, health and safety concerns, interpersonal relations and
conflicts in the workplace, compliance deadlines, performance management and
the employer’s direction that the worker comply with a request for disclosure
under the Access to Information Act ” (para. 29). The Commission noted
that such factors fall under the Policy’s description of normal pressures and
tensions and therefore do not qualify as excessive or unusual.
[59]
Given the record, and the way in which the claim
was presented, it was open to the Commission to find that the “predominant
cause” of Martin’s psychological injury was his reaction to a letter from his
employer requesting compliance with an access to information request, and that
such a request was not unusual in terms of normal pressures and tensions in a
similar occupation (paras. 28 and 30).
[60]
I do not agree with the appellant that the
Commission unreasonably interpreted the list of “normal pressures and tensions”
in the Alberta Policy as completely excluding compensation for injuries arising
from labour relations issues, or health and safety concerns and interpersonal
relations and conflicts. A fair reading of the reasons makes clear that the
Commission found that, on the facts of this case, the events were not excessive
or unusual.
[61]
The Commission’s conclusion respecting the third
criterion was “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47).
[62]
Since the third criterion was not met, the
Commission’s decision to deny compensation in this case was reasonable. There
is no need to consider the Commission’s analysis of the fourth criterion.
V.
Conclusion
[63]
In enacting the GECA , Parliament intended
that provincial boards and authorities would adjudicate the workers’
compensation claims of federal government employees — including both entitlement
to and rates of compensation — according to provincial law, except where a
conflict arises between the provincial law and the GECA . The Alberta
Policy’s interpretation of “accident” in the context of psychological
stress claims does not conflict with the GECA and was applicable to the
appellant’s claim. The Commission’s decision to deny compensation in this case
was reasonable. The appeal is dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
Solicitors for the
appellant: Raven, Cameron, Ballantyne & Yazbeck, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the
respondent the Workers’ Compensation Board of Alberta: Workers’ Compensation
Board of Alberta, Edmonton.
Solicitor for the
respondent the Appeals Commission for Alberta Workers’ Compensation: Appeals
Commission for Alberta Workers’ Compensation, Edmonton.
Solicitor for the
respondent the Attorney General of Canada: Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the
intervener the Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia: Workers’
Compensation Board of British Columbia, Richmond.
Solicitors for the intervener Commission de la santé et de la
sécurité du travail: Vigneault Thibodeau Bergeron, Québec.
Solicitors for the intervener the Workers’ Compensation Board of
Nova Scotia: Stewart McKelvey, Halifax.