SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Robert
T. Strickland, George Connon,
Roland
Auer, Iwona Auer-Grzesiak, Mark Auer and
Vladimir
Auer by his Litigation Representative Roland Auer
Appellants
and
Attorney
General of Canada
Respondent
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver,
Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon and Côté JJ.
Reasons
for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 65)
Joint
Concurring Reasons:
(paras. 66 to 85)
|
Cromwell J. (McLachlin C.J. and
Rothstein, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon and Côté JJ. concurring)
Abella and Wagner JJ.
|
Strickland v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015
SCC 37, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 713
Robert T. Strickland, George Connon,
Roland Auer, Iwona Auer-Grzesiak,
Mark Auer and Vladimir Auer by his
Litigation Representative Roland Auer Appellants
v.
Attorney General of Canada Respondent
Indexed as: Strickland v.
Canada (Attorney General)
2015 SCC 37
File No.: 35808.
2015: January 20; 2015: July 9.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis,
Wagner, Gascon and Côté JJ.
on appeal from the federal
court of appeal
Courts — Federal Court — Judicial review — Jurisdiction — Family law — Divorce —
Child support — Guidelines — Lawfulness of federal child support guidelines challenged
by means of judicial review — Federal Court declined to undertake judicial
review — Whether provincial superior courts have jurisdiction to address
validity of federal child support guidelines — Even if they do, whether federal
courts erred in refusing to hear judicial review application on its merits — Federal
Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 18 — Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd
Supp .), s. 26.1(2) — Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175.
The
appellants brought an application for
judicial review in the Federal Court seeking a declaration that the Federal
Child Support Guidelines are unlawful as they are not authorized by s.
26.1(2) of the Divorce Act . They claim that the Guidelines are
not based on the “relative abilities to contribute” of both spouses and that
they do not reasonably calculate the amounts required “to maintain the
children”. The application judge held that the Federal Court is not an
appropriate forum in which to address the validity of the Guidelines. Given
the minor role the Federal Court plays in issues under the Divorce Act
and the breadth of the jurisdiction and expertise of the provincial superior
courts in matters related to divorce and child support, it was found that it
would be inappropriate for the Federal Court to consider the judicial review
application on its merits. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this conclusion.
Held:
The appeal should be dismissed.
Per
McLachlin C.J. and Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon and Côté
JJ.: The Court’s jurisprudence supports
the principle that the provincial superior courts, in the context of
proceedings properly before them, can address the legality of the conduct of
federal boards, commissions and tribunals, where doing so is a necessary step
in resolving the claims asserted in those proceedings. This means that in the
context of family law proceedings otherwise properly before them, the
provincial superior courts can decide that the Guidelines made by the
Governor in Council are ultra vires and decline to apply them if doing
so is a necessary step in resolving the matters before them.
Judicial
review by way of the old prerogative writs has always been understood to be discretionary. This means that even if the
applicant makes out a case for review on the merits, the reviewing court has an
overriding discretion to refuse relief. Declarations of rights, whether sought
in judicial review proceedings or in actions, are similarly a discretionary
remedy. The discretionary nature of judicial review and declaratory relief is
continued by the judicial review provisions of the Federal Courts Act . Section
18.1(3) provides that “[o]n an application for judicial review, the Federal
Court may” make certain orders in the nature of those traditional
remedies. As a result, judges of the Federal Court have discretion in
determining whether judicial review should be undertaken. The fact that
undertaking judicial review is discretionary means that the Federal Court judge’s
exercise of that discretion is entitled to deference on appeal.
One
of the discretionary grounds for refusing to undertake judicial review is that there is an adequate alternative. In order for an
alternative forum or remedy to be adequate, neither the process nor the remedy
need be identical to those available on judicial review. The categories of
relevant factors are not closed, as it is for courts to identify and balance
the relevant factors in the context of a particular case. The court should
consider not only the available alternative, but also the suitability and
appropriateness of judicial review in the circumstances. In short, the question
is not simply whether some other remedy is adequate, but also whether judicial
review is appropriate. Ultimately, this calls for a type of balance of convenience
analysis which should take account of the purposes and policy considerations
underpinning the legislative scheme in issue.
In
this case, the appellants’ position that
they are entitled to a ruling on the legality of the Guidelines through
a judicial review is fundamentally at odds with the discretionary nature of
judicial review and with the broad grounds on which that discretion may be
exercised. The appellants do not have a right to have the Federal Court rule on
the legality of the Guidelines; the Federal Court has discretion to do
so which it has decided not to exercise. Further, the appellants’ position that
the alternative is not adequate because it does not provide identical
procedures or relief cannot be accepted. The appellants’ arguments focus too
narrowly on how challenging the Guidelines in the context of family law
litigation in the provincial superior courts will not provide everything that
might be available to them on judicial review. Here, the appellants request a
judicial determination of, among other things, whether the Guidelines
are based, as they are required to be by s. 26.1(2) of the Divorce Act ,
on the principle that spouses have a joint financial obligation to maintain the
children of the marriage in accordance with their relative abilities to
contribute to the performance of that obligation. Making that determination
will inevitably engage family law expertise in relation to, among other things,
the nature and extent of the obligation to maintain children and how the
relative abilities of parents to do so should be assessed. The provincial
superior courts deal day in and day out with disputes in the context of marital
breakdown concerning the needs of children, as well as what custody and support
arrangements are in their best interests. Parliament has entrusted, for
practical purposes, this entire area of law to the provincial superior courts. Having
done so, it would be curious to say the least, if the legality of a central
aspect of that regime were to be finally decided by the federal courts which,
as a result of federal legislation, have virtually no jurisdiction with respect
to family law matters.
It
would not be more efficient in this case
to obtain a ruling in the Federal Court, as such a ruling would not be binding
on any provincial superior court. Regardless of what the Federal Court might
decide, before a ruling could have any practical effect, the issue would have
to be re-litigated in the superior courts, or, alternatively, litigated up to
this Court. It would be for the provincial courts to decide the impact of the
illegality of the Guidelines on particular support orders and that could
only be done in the context of a multitude of individual cases. Further, the
appellants’ judicial review proceedings exclude direct adversarial
participation by other directly affected parties: spouses and former spouses
seeking child support orders or variations of them under the Divorce Act .
However, adjudicating the issue in the context of Divorce Act or child
support proceedings would ensure full participation of these parties.
In
summary, the Federal Court did not make
any reviewable error in exercising the discretion not to entertain the judicial
review application for declaratory relief. Provincial superior courts have
jurisdiction to address the validity of the Guidelines where doing so is
a necessary step in resolving a case otherwise properly before them. Judicial
review in the Federal Court is manifestly inappropriate in this case and the
Federal Court reasonably exercised its discretion not to engage in it.
The
parties assumed that the Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to grant judicial review remedies directed against regulations
promulgated by the Governor in Council and as a result, that point is not
before the Court for decision. But as presently advised, the concerns expressed
in the minority opinion in relation to this issue are not shared. The language
of the Federal Courts Act can be taken as a clear and explicit expression
of parliamentary intent. No one questions that s. 18 does not withdraw the
authority of the provincial superior courts to grant the traditional
administrative law remedies against federal boards, commissions and tribunals
on division of powers grounds, but with respect to judicial review on
administrative law grounds, it has been expressly confirmed that the Federal
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction as described in s. 18 of the Federal
Courts Act .
Per
Abella and Wagner JJ.: Although there is agreement with the result reached by
the majority opinion, there is concern
that the reasons not be seen as representing a definitive view from this Court
that the provincial superior courts cannot declare federal regulations invalid on
administrative grounds. The parties did not argue the issue of whether s. 18 of
the Federal Courts Act grants the Federal Court exclusive original
jurisdiction to declare invalid federal regulations promulgated by the Governor
in Council. As a result, this case should not be seen as categorically
endorsing the assumption that the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
declare invalid all such regulations. This Court has said that provincial
superior courts have jurisdiction to declare invalid the federal laws they
administer. Any derogation from the jurisdiction of the provincial superior
courts requires clear and explicit statutory wording to this effect. Section 18
of the Federal Courts Act does not clearly and unequivocally strip the
provincial superior courts of their jurisdiction to declare federal regulations
made by the Governor in Council to be invalid on administrative grounds. The
Federal Court was created to remove from the provincial superior courts the
jurisdiction to supervise federal administrative tribunals, not to strip them
of their jurisdiction to determine the vires of the federal regulations
they apply. There is no evidence that Parliament intended to limit the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts by preventing them from
determining the vires of the regulations they apply. At the very least,
this argues for caution and full argument before this Court declares — or is
seen to declare — that s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act means that the
Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all federal regulations even if
they are not part of legislative schemes over which the Federal Court has
jurisdiction or expertise, such as the Divorce Act .
Cases Cited
By
Cromwell J.
Adopted:
Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 S.C.R.
585; Canada (Attorney General) v. McArthur, 2010 SCC 63, [2010] 3 S.C.R.
626, aff’g 2008 ONCA 892, 94 O.R. (3d) 19; Canadian Food Inspection Agency
v. Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, 2010 SCC 66,
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 657; referred to: Saskatchewan Wheat Pool v. Canada
(Attorney General) (1993), 67 F.T.R. 98; Attorney General of Canada v.
Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307; Canada Labour
Relations Board v. Paul L’Anglais Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 147; Canada (Human
Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626; Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339; Mills
v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; R. v. Morgentaler (1984), 41 C.R.
(3d) 262; R. v. Miller, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 613; May v. Ferndale
Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809; Mission Institution v.
Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502; Harelkin v. University of
Regina, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561; Canada (Auditor General) v. Canada
(Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 49; Canadian
Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3; Hadmor
Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton, [1982] 1 All E.R. 1042; C.B. Powell
Limited v. Canada (Border Services Agency), 2010 FCA 61, [2011] 2 F.C.R.
332.
By
Abella and Wagner JJ.
Distinguished:
Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3
S.C.R. 585; Canada (Attorney General) v. McArthur, 2010 SCC 63, [2010] 3
S.C.R. 626; referred to: Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R.
437; Sorbara v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 506, 98 O.R. (3d)
673, leave to appeal refused, [2009] 3 S.C.R. x; Saskatchewan Wheat Pool v.
Canada (Attorney-General) (1993), 107 D.L.R. (4th) 63; Messageries publi-maison
ltée v. Société canadienne des postes, [1996] R.J.Q. 547; Waddell v.
Governor in Council (1981), 30 B.C.L.R. 127, aff’d (1982), 142 D.L.R. (3d)
177; Re Williams and Attorney-General for Canada (1983), 45 O.R. (2d)
291; British Columbia Milk Marketing Board v. Aquilini, [1997] B.C.J. No.
843 (QL), rev’d in part (1998), 165 D.L.R. (4th) 626, notice of discontinuance
filed, [1999] 2 S.C.R. v; Attorney General of Canada v. Law Society of
British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307; Wakeford v. Canada (2002), 58
O.R. (3d) 65, leave to appeal refused, [2002] 4 S.C.R. vii; Lavers v.
British Columbia (Minister of Finance) (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 193; International
Fund for Animal Welfare, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998), 157
D.L.R. (4th) 561; Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies
of Canada, 2015 SCC 7, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401; Dyck v. Highton, 2003
SKQB 396, 239 Sask. R. 38; Ward v. Canada (Attorney General) (1997), 155
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 313, rev’d (1999), 183 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 295, rev’d
2002 SCC 17, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 569; Souliere v. Leclair (1998), 52 C.R.R.
(2d) 156; Premi v. Khodeir (2009), 198 C.R.R. (2d) 8; Grenon v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2007 ABQB 403, 76 Alta. L.R. (4th) 346;
Canada Labour Relations Board v. Paul L’Anglais Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 147.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. B-3 .
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. C-23.
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 101 .
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 .
Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp .),
s. 26.1 .
Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18 .
Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175,
ss. 7, 10.
Federal Court Act , S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1,
ss. 17, 18.
Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7
[am. 2002, c. 8, s. 14], ss. 2 “federal board, commission or other tribunal”, 17
[am. 1990, c. 8, s. 3], 18, 18.1(3).
Authors Cited
Brown, Donald J. M., and John M. Evans, with the assistance of
Christine E. Deacon. Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada.
Toronto: Carswell, 2013 (loose-leaf updated December 2014, release 3).
Bushnell, Ian. The Federal Court of Canada: A History, 1875-1992.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.
Canada. House of Commons. House of Commons Debates, vol. IV,
2nd Sess., 34th Parl., November 1, 1989, pp. 5413-14.
Canada. House of Commons. House of Commons Debates, vol. V, 2nd
Sess., 28th Parl., March 25, 1970, pp. 5469-71.
de Smith, S. A. Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th
ed., by J. M. Evans. London: Stevens & Sons, 1980.
Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp., vol.
1. Toronto: Carswell, 2007 (loose-leaf updated 2014, release 1).
Jones, David Phillip, and Anne S. de Villars. Principles of
Administrative Law, 6th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 2014.
Mullan, David J. “The Discretionary Nature of Judicial Review”, in
Robert J. Sharpe and Kent Roach, eds., Taking Remedies Seriously: 2009. Montréal:
Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2010, 420.
Pound, Richard W. Chief Justice W.R. Jackett: By the Law of the Land.
Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Blais C.J. and Sharlow and
Gauthier JJ.A.), 2014 FCA 33, 460 N.R. 240, [2014] F.C.J. No. 998 (QL), 2014
CarswellNat 3631 (WL Can.), affirming a decision of Gleason J., 2013 FC 475,
432 F.T.R. 152, [2013] F.C.J. No. 529 (QL), 2013 CarswellNat 1363 (WL Can.). Appeal
dismissed.
Glenn Solomon, Q.C., and Laura
Warner, for the appellants.
Anne M. Turley and Catherine
A. Lawrence,
for the respondent.
The judgment of
McLachlin C.J. and Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver,
Karakatsanis, Gascon and Côté JJ. was delivered by
Cromwell J. —
I.
Introduction
[1]
The appellants seek to make a point: that the Federal
Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, are unlawful. They chose to
make it by bringing a judicial review application in the Federal Court. The
Federal Court, however, found that this was not an appropriate means by which
to raise this issue and dismissed their application. It did so by exercising
the well-established discretion to decline to undertake judicial review when
some other, more suitable remedy is available. The Federal Court of Appeal
upheld that decision. In my view, it made no mistake in doing so.
[2]
The appellants’ challenge to the child support Guidelines
raises an issue of fundamental importance to, and with broad ramifications for
child support on divorce, an area entrusted by Parliament mainly to the
provincial superior courts. Questions about the nature and objectives of child
support on divorce, which are squarely within the expertise of those courts,
will be central to resolving the appellants’ challenge. While the appellants
point to procedural and efficiency advantages of addressing these questions by
means of judicial review in the Federal Court, any advantages are, on closer
examination, largely illusory. I would therefore affirm the decision of the
Federal Court of Appeal.
II.
Overview of the Facts, Judicial History and
Issues
[3]
The Governor in Council has made guidelines, by
regulation, respecting child support orders: Guidelines. The power to do
so is conferred by s. 26.1 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd
Supp .). That provision authorizes the Governor in Council to make such
guidelines “based on the principle that spouses have a joint financial
obligation to maintain the children of the marriage in accordance with their
relative abilities to contribute to the performance of that obligation” (s.
26.1(2) ).
[4]
The six appellants are potentially affected by
the Guidelines in different ways. Three of them pay child support.
Robert T. Strickland entered into an interim child support agreement through
court-mandated mediation during a divorce action. George Connon, who is
separated from his wife, voluntarily pays child support calculated in
accordance with the Guidelines. Roland Auer pays child support to
his second wife, the amount of which was initially calculated with reference to
the Guidelines and has since been varied twice by the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench. The other three appellants are Roland Auer’s first wife, Iwona
Auer-Grzesiak, and two of his sons. They argue that they are affected by Mr.
Auer’s obligation to pay child support to his second wife.
[5]
The appellants maintain that the Guidelines
are not authorized by s. 26.1(2) and are therefore unlawful (or as lawyers say,
are ultra vires). They claim that, contrary to what that section
requires, the Guidelines are not based on the “relative abilities to
contribute” of both spouses and that they do not reasonably calculate the
amounts required “to maintain the children”. To advance this position, the
appellants brought an application for judicial review in the Federal Court
seeking a declaration to this effect.
[6]
The Federal Court has “exclusive original
jurisdiction . . . to . . . grant declaratory relief, against any federal
board, commission or other tribunal”: Federal Courts Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. F-7, s. 18(1) (a). The parties argued the appeal on the
assumption that, under the Federal Courts Act , the application for a
declaration that the Guidelines are ultra vires is, by virtue of
this provision, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court. There
was no argument to the contrary and I accept that assumption for the purposes
of my reasons. However, the Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to
dismiss the judicial review application arguing, among other things, that the
Federal Court should exercise its discretion to decline to hear the
application.
[7]
The Federal Court agreed and dismissed the
appellants’ judicial review application: 2013 FC 475, 432 F.T.R. 152. The
application judge, Gleason J., held that the Federal Court is not an
appropriate forum in which to address the validity of the Guidelines.
She reasoned that the provincial superior courts have jurisdiction over a claim
that the Guidelines are ultra vires if that claim is made in
proceedings in which those courts are asked to apply them. Given the minor role
the Federal Court plays in issues under the Divorce Act and the breadth
of the jurisdiction and expertise of the provincial superior courts in matters
related to divorce and child support, it would be inappropriate for the Federal
Court to consider the judicial review application on its merits. The Federal
Court of Appeal upheld this conclusion: 2014 FCA 33, 460 N.R. 240.
[8]
The appellants’ appeal to this Court, as I see
it, raises two related questions:
1. Do
the provincial
superior courts have jurisdiction to address the validity of the Guidelines?
2. Even
if they do, did the federal courts err in refusing to hear the judicial review
application on its merits?
[9]
In my view, the provincial superior courts have
jurisdiction to address the validity of the Guidelines where doing so is
a necessary step in resolving a case otherwise properly before them and the
Federal Court did not err by refusing to hear the appellants’ judicial review
application.
III.
Analysis
A.
First Issue: Do the Provincial Superior Courts
Have Jurisdiction to Address the Validity of the Guidelines?
(1)
Position of the Parties
[10]
The Federal Court’s refusal to undertake
judicial review was based on a central premise: the provincial superior courts
may rule on the legality of the Guidelines when that question arises in
a proceeding otherwise properly before them. The appellants challenge that
premise. Their position is based on two uncontroversial propositions.
[11]
They say, first, that s. 18 of the Federal
Courts Act gives the Federal Court exclusive original jurisdiction to
(among other things) “grant declaratory relief, against any federal board,
commission or other tribunal”. (The full text is in the Appendix.) This leads
to their second point, which is that this exclusive jurisdiction undisputedly
includes the jurisdiction to declare regulations promulgated by the Governor in
Council, such as the Guidelines, to be ultra vires: Saskatchewan
Wheat Pool v. Canada (Attorney General) (1993), 67 F.T.R. 98, at paras. 8
and 12. The appellants submit that it follows from these two points that
litigants like themselves, who are seeking a public law remedy against a
federal entity, may proceed only in the federal courts: Canada
(Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585, at
para. 19.
[12]
The appellants note that there are only two
exceptions to this exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court, neither of
which applies here. First, Parliament may create express exceptions, as it has
done in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 , and the Extradition
Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18 . There is no such express exception for the
appellants’ judicial review proceeding. Second, Parliament cannot, through s.
18 of the Federal Courts Act or otherwise, deprive provincial superior
courts of the ability to determine the constitutional validity and
applicability of legislation: Attorney General of Canada v. Law Society of
British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307; Canada Labour Relations Board v.
Paul L’Anglais Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 147. But that principle does not apply
here because the appellants challenge the Guidelines on administrative
law, not on constitutional grounds.
[13]
Based on these points, the appellants submit
that, contrary to the view of the federal courts, “the weight of authority, and
strong policy considerations, favour concluding that the provincial superior
courts do not require jurisdiction to determine administrative validity as part
of being asked to apply the Guidelines” and that provincial superior
courts must presume the Guidelines to be valid unless found to be
invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction: A.F., at para. 83 (emphasis
deleted).
[14]
The respondent Attorney General rejects this
contention and supports the conclusion of the federal courts on this point.
[15]
In my respectful view, the Attorney General is
correct. A provincial superior court can hear and determine a challenge to the
legality of the Guidelines where that determination is a necessary step
in disposing of support proceedings properly before it. This, in my view, is
clear from a line of very recent authority from this Court. I will turn to
review it and explain why it applies here after a brief account of the purposes
of the Federal Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.
(2)
Section 18 and the Federal Court’s Exclusive
Jurisdiction
[16]
In 1970, Parliament enacted the Federal Court
Act , S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1. The Act was subsequently renamed the Federal
Courts Act , S.C. 2002, c. 8, s. 14 , which is the legislation in force
today. For clarity, when I refer to the “Act” in these reasons, I refer to the
enactment that was in force at the relevant time.
[17]
Before the Act, judicial review of federal
administrative action was conducted by the provincial superior courts as an
aspect of their inherent jurisdiction. However, with the growth of federal
regulatory regimes and administrative tribunals, several disadvantages of this
arrangement became apparent. These included the possibility of multiple
proceedings involving a federal decision that could lead to conflicting
decisions and “a perceived lack of familiarity with federal legislation by
judges who encountered it only occasionally”: D. J. M. Brown and J. M. Evans,
with the assistance of C. E. Deacon, Judicial Review of Administrative
Action in Canada (loose-leaf), at topic 2:4100.
[18]
To respond to these concerns, Parliament
consolidated judicial review of federal boards, commissions and tribunals
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court: s. 18 of the Act. This,
it was hoped, would ensure uniformity and prevent a multiplicity of
proceedings: see, e.g., TeleZone, at paras. 49-50; Canada (Human
Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626, at para.
35. The then-Minister of Justice stated that this consolidation was
“designed to create a single and uniform basis of superintending jurisdiction
in relation to federal boards and commissions and to place them on the same
footing in this regard as provincial boards and commissions”: TeleZone,
at para. 50, citing House of Commons Debates, vol. V, 2nd Sess.,
28th Parl., March 25, 1970, at p. 5471. Thus, with the passage of the Act,
Parliament “remove[d] from the superior courts of the provinces the
jurisdiction over prerogative writs, declarations, and injunctions against
federal boards, commissions and other tribunals and . . . place[d] that
jurisdiction (slightly modified) in a new federal court”: Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339,
at para. 34; see also Paul L’Anglais Inc., at p. 154.
[19]
The Act also gave the Federal Court exclusive
jurisdiction over proceedings against the federal crown: s. 17. However, this
scheme proved unworkable in practice by virtue of the constitutional limits of
the court’s jurisdiction under s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 .
That meant that the Federal Court generally had no jurisdiction over Crown
servants or over other co-defendants, third parties or defendants by
counterclaim and that those persons and proceedings had to be addressed in
parallel proceedings in the provincial superior courts. This unsatisfactory
state of affairs was resolved by amendments in 1990 making the Federal Court’s
jurisdiction over claims against the federal Crown concurrent with that of the
provincial superior courts rather than exclusive: S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 3; and
see generally, P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. Supp.),
vol. 1, at pp. 7-33 and 7-34. Thus, since 1990, the Federal Court’s exclusive
jurisdiction with respect to judicial review is a qualification of the general
rule of concurrent jurisdiction between it and the provincial superior courts.
(3)
The TeleZone Principle
[20]
I have already referred briefly to the practical
problems which arose by virtue of the attempt to confer on the Federal Court
exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the federal Crown. The conferral of
exclusive jurisdiction in judicial review of federal tribunals has also given
rise to some practical problems. The main one, which arose in a line of recent
cases, is whether this exclusive judicial review jurisdiction means that a
claim for damages based on allegedly unlawful conduct by a federal board,
commission or tribunal cannot be brought in the provincial superior courts
without the claimant first successfully applying for judicial review of that
conduct in the Federal Court: TeleZone; Canada (Attorney General) v.
McArthur, 2010 SCC 63, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 626; Canadian Food Inspection
Agency v. Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, 2010 SCC
66, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 657.
[21]
The Attorney General of Canada adopted the
position that bringing an action in the provincial superior courts without
first challenging the legality of the conduct by way of judicial review in the
Federal Court was an impermissible evasion of the Federal Court’s exclusive
judicial review jurisdiction under s. 18 and therefore constituted an
impermissible collateral attack on the actions of the federal tribunal. This
Court, however, unanimously rejected this contention, noting that accepting it
would create a “bottleneck” that was “manifestly not the intention of
Parliament”: TeleZone, at para. 3.
[22]
TeleZone and the
related cases, although they did not decide the precise point in issue here,
support the principle that the provincial superior courts have the authority to
consider and rule on the legality of the actions of federal tribunals when
doing so is a necessary step in adjudicating claims properly before the
superior courts. As in my view this principle is central to this case, a brief
review of the key cases is in order.
[23]
In TeleZone, the plaintiff company sued
the federal government in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, seeking
damages in tort, contract and equity stemming from a decision not to include
TeleZone among the successful bidders for licences to provide personal
communication services — essentially a cell phone network. It alleged that the
Minister of Industry Canada had breached a term of the department’s policy
statement which had accompanied its call for licence applications and had
failed to treat TeleZone fairly as required by the tendering process. TeleZone
neither impugned the Minister’s decision to issue the licences nor sought a
licence for itself. It simply sought damages for the Minister’s allegedly
illegal conduct in denying it a licence and for failing to treat it fairly. The
Crown argued that by virtue of the Federal Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under
s. 18 of the Act, TeleZone could not advance these claims in the Superior Court
unless it first obtained from the Federal Court an order quashing the
Minister’s decision.
[24]
The Court rejected the Crown’s position, holding
that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice could determine whether the
Minister’s decision was lawful or not for the purposes of the damages claim.
The claim as pleaded was “dominated by private law considerations”: TeleZone,
at para. 80. The Court explained that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction in s.
18 must be understood in the broader context of the Act. Section 17 of
the Act (as amended in 1990) explicitly confers concurrent jurisdiction on the
provincial superior courts “in all cases in which relief is claimed against the
Crown”. The exclusive jurisdiction provision in s. 18 must be understood as “a
reservation or subtraction from the more comprehensive grant of concurrent
jurisdiction in s. 17”: para. 5. Thus, the provincial superior courts may
exercise their concurrent jurisdiction where the attack on a law or an order is
essential to the cause of action and adjudication of that allegation is a
necessary step in disposing of the claim: para. 67. As Binnie J. put it on
behalf of the Court, s. 18 of the Act does not “shield the Crown from private
law damages involving [federal boards, commissions and tribunals] in respect of
losses caused by unlawful government decision making without first passing
through the Federal Court”: para. 3. The provincial superior courts, in the
context of matters properly before them, have the authority “to determine every
legal and factual element necessary for the granting or withholding of the
remedies sought”, including the potential unlawfulness of government orders:
para. 6. Binnie J. was careful to point out that this principle will not apply
unless the validity of the underlying order is genuinely a necessary step in an
otherwise valid proceeding and is not simply made to appear as such as the
result of “artful pleading”: para. 75.
[25]
The companion case of McArthur supports
the premise relied on by the Federal Court in this appeal. In McArthur,
the plaintiff sued the federal Crown in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
He sought damages and constitutional remedies for what he alleged was wrongful
or false imprisonment and emotional harm stemming from time he spent in
solitary confinement, segregation and a special handling unit. The Court stated
the issue to be whether Mr. McArthur could pursue his damages claim in the
Superior Court for arbitrary detention and alleged mistreatment without first
seeking judicial review in the Federal Court to quash the segregation orders
that were the basis of his claim: para. 1. Mr. McArthur alleged that the
segregation orders were made without just cause and lacked the reasonable
grounds required under the relevant statute. As Binnie J. noted, Mr. McArthur was
“putting in issue the lawfulness or validity of the segregation orders, but he
[did] so as an element of a private law cause of action over which the
provincial superior court ha[d] jurisdiction”: para. 13.
[26]
The Court rejected the Crown’s position that Mr.
McArthur must first seek judicial review in the Federal Court to quash the
segregation orders that founded his claim: paras. 2 and 11. The Superior Court
had jurisdiction to entertain the claim because its authority extended to “the
person and the subject matter in question and, in addition, [because it] has
authority to make the order sought”: para. 17, citing Mills v. The Queen,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at p. 960, quoting Brooke J.A. in R. v. Morgentaler
(1984), 41 C.R. (3d) 262 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 271. Thus, in adjudicating the
claim, the Court could consider “the validity of Mr. McArthur’s detention in
the context of a damages claim, as well as the impact, if any, of a valid
order on Crown liability”: para. 15 (emphasis in original). Binnie J. concluded
that “[t]here is nothing in the Federal Courts Act to give the Federal
Court the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness or validity of the
order of a ‘federal board, commission or other tribunal’ when Mr. McArthur does
not seek any of the remedies listed in s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act ”:
para. 17.
[27]
I acknowledge that, unlike in McArthur,
the appellants in this case do seek a s. 18 remedy, a declaration of
invalidity. However, the question at this point in the analysis focuses on the
authority of the superior courts to deal with the Guidelines. McArthur
strongly supports the premise of the Federal Court’s decision in the
present case, that is, that the provincial superior courts have the authority
to determine the “lawfulness or validity” of the Guidelines in the
course of proceedings properly before them in which doing so is a necessary
step in resolving those proceedings. As I will discuss below, this was a key
consideration for the federal courts in exercising discretion not to undertake
judicial review.
[28]
In the last of the relevant cases in the TeleZone
line, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, the Agency contested the
jurisdiction of the Quebec Superior Court to entertain recourses in warranty
alleging that a direction the Agency had issued was the cause of any damage
meat producers had suffered from being unable to market some of their product:
para. 9. The Agency’s position was that the claims could not succeed without
first attacking the lawfulness or validity of its decision by way of judicial review
in the Federal Court: paras. 16 and 20. Once again, this Court affirmed that
“[s]uccessfully challenging an administrative decision of a federal board on
judicial review is not a requirement for bringing an action for damages with
respect to that decision”: para. 21. Since the Quebec Superior Court had
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the dispute, the claims
were properly before it: para. 29.
[29]
This decision, too, supports the premise of the
Federal Court in the present case: the superior court can rule on the legality
of the federal administrative action in proceedings properly before it in which
deciding that issue is an essential step.
[30]
Another line of cases illustrates and supports
this approach. They affirm the view that a provincial superior court dealing
with an application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid can
assess the legality of detention resulting from the decision of a federal
board. These cases rejected the contention that certiorari in aid of habeas
corpus was no longer available in the provincial superior courts by virtue
of the exclusive jurisdiction provision in s. 18 of the Act.
[31]
In R. v. Miller, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 613, the
Court noted that Parliament intended to leave with provincial superior courts
“the jurisdiction by way of habeas corpus to review the validity of a
detention imposed by federal authority”: p. 624. This parliamentary intent
combined with the importance of certiorari in aid to the effectiveness
of habeas corpus led the Court to conclude that a provincial superior
court has jurisdiction to issue certiorari in aid of habeas corpus
to assess the validity of detention: p. 625. Certiorari in aid was
considered to be distinct from the writ of certiorari to quash a
decision of a federal authority and was therefore not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Court by virtue of s. 18 . In May v. Ferndale
Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809, the Court reaffirmed this
principle as it did once again most recently in Mission Institution v. Khela,
2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502. The Court held that reasonableness of the
decision to detain should be regarded as one element of its lawfulness. It
followed that the provincial superior court may review for reasonableness in
deciding an application for habeas corpus even though the court would,
in effect although not in form, be assessing the legality on administrative law
grounds of the federal board’s conduct and orders: para. 65.
(4)
Conclusion on the First Issue
[32]
The Federal Court of Appeal held that the
Federal Court judge “did not err in law when she concluded that the provincial
superior courts have jurisdiction to determine the vires of the
Guidelines in the context of proceedings for which they have
jurisdiction under the Divorce Act and to decline to apply them if found
to be ultra-vires”: para. 7. I agree.
[33]
The Court’s jurisprudence, which I have just
reviewed, supports the principle that the provincial superior courts, in the
context of proceedings properly before them, can address the legality of the
conduct of federal boards, commissions and tribunals, where doing so is a
necessary step in resolving the claims asserted in those proceedings. This
means that in the context of family law proceedings otherwise properly before
them, the provincial superior courts can decide that the Guidelines are ultra
vires and decline to apply them if doing so is a necessary step in
resolving the matters before them. It follows that the appellants’ position to
the contrary on this point must be rejected and that the premise underlying the
decisions of the Federal Courts to decline jurisdiction was correct.
B.
Second Issue: Did the Federal Courts Err in
Refusing to Hear the Judicial Review Application on Its Merits?
(1)
Introduction
[34]
The appellants submit that the Federal Court
erred by refusing to entertain their judicial review application.
[35]
The Federal Court based its discretionary
decision to deny judicial review primarily on the greater expertise of
provincial superior courts in family law. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld that decision and referred to
additional factors supporting it. Invalidating the Guidelines, the
Federal Court of Appeal reasoned, would have uncertain consequences in respect
of family law matters outside the Divorce Act to which the Guidelines
apply by virtue of provincial legislation and practice and adjudicating these
issues in the context of a divorce or corollary relief proceeding in the
superior courts would ensure a more complete adversarial debate: paras. 14-16.
[36]
The appellants submit that the federal courts
erred because the possibility of challenging the Guidelines in the
context of child support proceedings in the provincial superior courts is a
remedy that is neither adequate nor truly “alternative” for several reasons.
Before turning to those submissions in detail, however, it will be helpful to
establish the legal framework within which this issue must be decided.
(2)
Legal Principles
(a)
The Discretionary Nature of Judicial Review and
Declaratory Relief
[37]
Judicial review by way of the old prerogative
writs has always been understood to be discretionary. This means that even if
the applicant makes out a case for review on the merits, the reviewing court
has an overriding discretion to refuse relief: see, e.g., D. J. Mullan, “The
Discretionary Nature of Judicial Review”, in R. J. Sharpe and K. Roach, eds., Taking
Remedies Seriously: 2009 (2010), 420, at p. 421; Harelkin v. University
of Regina, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561, at p. 575; D. P. Jones and A. S. de Villars,
Principles of Administrative Law (6th ed. 2014), at pp. 686-87; Brown
and Evans, at topic 3:1100. Declarations of right, whether sought in judicial
review proceedings or in actions, are similarly a discretionary remedy: “. . .
the broadest judicial discretion may be exercised in determining whether a case
is one in which declaratory relief ought to be awarded” (Dickson C.J. in Canada
(Auditor General) v. Canada (Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources),
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 49, at p. 90, citing S. A. de Smith, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action (4th ed. 1980), at p. 513).
[38]
The discretionary nature of judicial review and
declaratory relief is continued by the judicial review provisions of the Act.
This is underlined both by the reference in s. 18 to the traditional
prerogative writs and other administrative law remedies which have always been
considered discretionary and by the use of permissive rather than mandatory
language in relation to when relief may be granted. Section 18.1(3) provides
that “[o]n an application for judicial review, the Federal Court may”
make certain orders in the nature of those traditional remedies. This statutory
language “preserves the traditionally discretionary nature of judicial review.
As a result, judges of the Federal Court . . . have discretion in determining
whether judicial review should be undertaken”: Canadian Pacific Ltd. v.
Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 31; TeleZone,
at para. 56.
[39]
The fact that undertaking judicial review is
discretionary means that the Federal Court judge’s exercise of that discretion
is entitled to deference on appeal. As this Court noted in Matsqui, an appellate court “must defer to
the judge’s exercise of . . . discretion and must not interfere with it merely
on the ground that the members of the appellate court would have exercised the
discretion differently”: para. 39, quoting Lord Diplock in Hadmor
Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton, [1982] 1 All E.R. 1042, at p. 1046.
(b)
Alternative Relief
[40]
One of the discretionary grounds for refusing to
undertake judicial review is that there is an adequate alternative. The leading
case is Harelkin, in which a student alleged that a university committee
made a decision that violated his procedural rights. There was a right of
appeal to the university’s senate, but instead of pursuing it, the student
applied for judicial review. This Court held that the judge at first instance
had erred in entertaining the judicial review application because he failed to
exercise his discretion on relevant grounds: he did not consider whether the
internal appeal process was an adequate alternative remedy that was capable of
curing the denial of natural justice of which the student complained.
[41]
The Court has applied similar reasoning in a
number of cases to dismiss applications for judicial review. For example, in Matsqui,
the Court upheld the decision of the Federal Court to decline to hear Canadian
Pacific’s application for judicial review because it could have pursued an
appeal procedure established by the Matsqui Band. In Canada (Auditor
General), the Court refused judicial review to the Auditor General to
challenge a denial of access to information because a political remedy —
reporting to the House of Commons any refusals to comply with requests for
information — was an adequate alternative remedy.
[42]
The cases identify a number of considerations
relevant to deciding whether an alternative remedy or forum is adequate so as
to justify a discretionary refusal to hear a judicial review application. These
considerations include the convenience of the alternative remedy; the nature of
the error alleged; the nature of the other forum which could deal with the
issue, including its remedial capacity; the existence of adequate and effective
recourse in the forum in which litigation is already taking place; expeditiousness;
the relative expertise of the alternative decision-maker; economical use of
judicial resources; and cost: Matsqui, at para. 37; C.B. Powell
Limited v. Canada (Border Services Agency), 2010 FCA 61, [2011] 2 F.C.R.
332, at para. 31; Mullan, at pp. 430-31; Brown and Evans, at topics
3:2110 and 3:2330; Harelkin, at p. 588. In order for an alternative
forum or remedy to be adequate, neither the process nor the remedy need be
identical to those available on judicial review. As Brown and Evans put it, “in
each context the reviewing court applies the same basic test: is the
alternative remedy adequate in all the circumstances to address the
applicant’s grievance?”: topic 3:2100 (emphasis added).
[43]
The categories of relevant factors are not
closed, as it is for courts to identify and balance the relevant factors in the
context of a particular case: Matsqui, at paras. 36-37, citing Canada
(Auditor General), at p. 96. Assessing whether there is an adequate
alternative remedy, therefore, is not a matter of following a checklist focused
on the similarities and differences between the potentially available remedies.
The inquiry is broader than that. The court should consider not only the
available alternative, but also the suitability and appropriateness of judicial
review in the circumstances. In short, the question is not simply whether some
other remedy is adequate, but also whether judicial review is appropriate.
Ultimately, this calls for a type of balance of convenience analysis: Khosa,
at para. 36; TeleZone, at para. 56. As Dickson C.J. put it on
behalf of the Court: “Inquiring into the adequacy of the alternative remedy is
at one and the same time an inquiry into whether discretion to grant the
judicial review remedy should be exercised. It is for the courts to isolate and
balance the factors which are relevant . . .” (Canada (Auditor General),
at p. 96).
[44]
This balancing exercise should take account of
the purposes and policy considerations underpinning the legislative scheme in
issue: see, e.g., Matsqui, at paras. 41-46; Harelkin, at
p. 595. David Mullan captured the breadth of the inquiry well:
While discretionary reasons
for denial of relief are many, what most have in common is a concern for
balancing the rights of affected individuals against the imperatives of the
process under review. In particular, the courts focus on the question of
whether the application for relief is appropriately respectful of the statutory
framework within which that application is taken and the normal processes
provided by that framework and the common law for challenging administrative
action. Where the application is unnecessarily disruptive of normal
processes . . . the courts will generally deny relief. [Emphasis added; p.
447.]
[45]
The factors to be considered in exercising this
discretion cannot be reduced to a checklist or a statement of general rules.
All relevant factors, considered in the context of the particular case, should
be taken into account.
(3)
Analysis of the Appellants’ Position
[46]
The Federal Court exercised its discretion not
to hear the judicial review application because Parliament has granted
virtually exclusive jurisdiction over the Divorce Act to the provincial
superior courts and, by virtue of their expertise in child support
matters, those courts are “better placed” than the Federal Court to deal with
the validity of the Guidelines: para. 61. The Federal Court of Appeal
essentially adopted this reasoning and further supported it by noting that
appellate courts would “significantly benefit from the practical expertise that
provincial superior courts have with such matters and from the additional
arguments provided by the spouse seeking support as well as those of the AGC if
he chose to intervene”: para. 16. These considerations are appropriately
concerned more with the unsuitability of judicial review in the Federal Court
in this case than with the narrower question of whether a remedy comparable to
that sought by the appellants is available elsewhere. In my opinion, judicial
review in the Federal Court is manifestly inappropriate here and that court
reasonably exercised its discretion not to engage in it.
[47]
At its core, the appellants’ claim is that they
are entitled to a ruling on the legality of the Guidelines. They say
that they are seeking a purely public law remedy which they can only obtain in
the Federal Court and they do not seek, or want, any other remedy. This claim
is founded on three flawed propositions that also undermine the appellants’
more specific submissions.
[48]
First, the appellants’ position that they are
entitled to a ruling on the legality of the Guidelines through a
judicial review is fundamentally at odds with the discretionary nature of
judicial review and with the broad grounds on which that discretion may be
exercised. As Brown and Evans put it, “the discretionary nature of [judicial
review] reflects the fact that unlike private law, its orientation is not, and
never has been, directed exclusively to vindicating the rights of
individuals”: topic 3:1100. The appellants thus do not have a right to have
the Federal Court rule on the legality of the Guidelines; the Federal
Court has a discretion to do so, which it has decided not to exercise.
[49]
Second, the appellants’ position that the
alternative is not adequate because it does not provide identical procedures or
relief cannot be accepted. The appellants’ arguments focus too narrowly on how
challenging the Guidelines in the context of family law litigation in
the provincial superior courts will not provide everything that might be
available to them on judicial review. Exercising the discretion to decline
judicial review jurisdiction requires the court to take a broader view. The
court should consider such factors as the appropriateness of judicial review in
the particular context and, as Mullan put it, whether judicial review is
“appropriately respectful” of the statutory framework and of the “normal
processes” for which it provides.
[50]
In short, the analysis cannot simply look at the
alleged advantages of judicial review from the appellants’ perspective so that
they can make their point, but also must engage with the more fundamental
question of how judicial review interacts with the operation of the Guidelines
in family law litigation in the provincial courts. When this is done, the
conclusion is that the appellants’ position is misconceived.
[51]
The Guidelines operate and play a central
role within a complex area of law, governed by the Divorce Act .
Parliament has entrusted, for practical purposes, this entire area of law to
the provincial superior courts. Having done so, it would be curious, to say the
least, if the legality of a central aspect of that regime were to be finally
decided by the federal courts, which, as a result of federal legislation, have
virtually no jurisdiction with respect to family law matters. The appellants’
judicial review proceedings are thus deeply inconsistent with fundamental
parliamentary choices about where important family law issues will be
determined.
[52]
Third, the appellants’ position that obtaining a
ruling in the Federal Court would be more efficient than a proliferation of
rulings in the various provincial superior courts in individual family law
proceedings cannot be accepted. The appellants submit that the alternative
remedy of litigation in the provincial superior courts is inefficient and would
give rise to multiple proceedings, undermining judicial economy. This is simply
not the case.
[53]
The appellants’ position overlooks the fact that
a ruling of the Federal Court on this issue would not be binding on any
provincial superior court. Thus, regardless of what the Federal Court might
decide, before the ruling could have any practical effect, the issue would have
to be re-litigated in the superior courts, or, alternatively, litigated up to
this Court. Even if there were a binding ruling that the Guidelines were
unlawful, a proliferation of litigation would be inevitable. It would be for
the provincial courts to decide the impact of the illegality of the Guidelines
on particular support orders and that could only be done in the context of a
multitude of individual cases. A further complexity arises from the fact that
all provinces and territories except Quebec have adopted child support
guidelines that are very similar to the Guidelines and use the federal
child support tables. Those provincial laws are not subject to the appellants’
challenge and yet might well be affected by it. These practical considerations
significantly undermine the appellants’ position that a single judicial review
proceeding would resolve the main issue more efficiently.
[54]
In light of these considerations, arguments
based on the efficiency of judicial review in the Federal Court do not
persuade. They are disconnected from both the practical realities and the
potential impact of these proceedings.
[55]
I turn to the appellants’ remaining specific
submissions. They submit that a child support proceeding is not available for
some of the appellants and is not appropriate for others. Mark Auer, Vladimir
Auer and Iwona Auer-Grzesiak have no alternative way of addressing the impact
they allege that the Guidelines have on them, in part because children
cannot bring a child support application and thus cannot raise the validity of
the Guidelines in that context. George Connon is not a party to
proceedings under the Divorce Act and would rather not initiate
adversarial proceedings to access the alternative remedy: his complaint is
against the Governor General in Council, not his wife.
[56]
These submissions refer to factors that, while
often strengthening the case for engaging in judicial review, cannot reasonably
be thought to be entitled to much weight in the circumstances of this case.
While the appellants say that the impact of the Guidelines on spouses
and children from other marriages can only be addressed in judicial review
proceedings, this must be considered in light of the fact that the
appellants’ judicial review proceedings exclude direct adversarial
participation by other directly affected parties: spouses and former spouses
seeking child support orders or variations of them under the Divorce Act .
As the Federal Court of Appeal pointed out, adjudicating the issue in the
context of Divorce Act or child support proceedings would ensure full
participation of these parties.
This is at least as important a consideration as giving
the appellants an opportunity to try to make their point that the Guidelines
are unlawful. I agree with the Federal Court of Appeal that while having the legality of the Guidelines determined
in a single proceeding in the Federal Court might weigh in favour of the
Federal Court hearing the application, it does not outweigh the factors that
favour declining jurisdiction. Moreover, as I discussed earlier, the touted
advantages are largely illusory.
[57]
The appellants take exception to the Federal
Court and the Federal Court of Appeal concluding that the interest of the payor
applicants was to seek a downward variation in the amount of child support that
they are paying. Counsel for the appellants emphasized during oral argument
that this is not the relief sought in the judicial review application, that it
is not the appellants’ characterization of the case and that even if successful
in their judicial review application, there would be no immediate effect on
most of the child support arrangements that underlie this case. Taking this
submission at face value, the appellants seek to engage the discretionary
judicial review jurisdiction of the Federal Court in an area outside its core
institutional expertise in order to achieve “no immediate effect” for themselves.
This consideration, in my respectful view, strengthens not weakens the case for
declining to engage in judicial review in this case.
[58]
The appellants also submit that they seek a
declaration of invalidity; the “alternative” would give them something else entirely,
which they do not want. Quoting TeleZone, at para. 19, they say that
“[a]ccess to justice requires that the claimant be permitted to pursue its
chosen remedy directly”: A.F., at para. 145. The provincial superior courts do
not, as required by TeleZone, have jurisdiction over the order sought. The
appellants maintain that the alternative remedy in the provincial superior
courts does not comply with the principle of rule of law. It would not provide
instructions to the Governor in Council or permit the appellants to determine
whether the Guidelines are properly enacted. In my respectful view,
these submissions do not identify any reviewable error on the part of the
Federal Court.
[59]
As I discussed earlier, the remedy available in
an alternative forum need not be the claimant’s preferred remedy or identical
to that which the claimant seeks by way of judicial review. As the Court
affirmed in Matsqui, at para. 37, and Harelkin, at
p. 588, the remedial capacity of the alternative decision-maker is only one
factor to consider in assessing adequacy. Thus, assuming (as the parties did
before us) that the provincial superior courts cannot grant the remedy of a
declaration of invalidity, this factor is relevant but not decisive. As for the
contention that denying access to judicial review is contrary to the principle
of the rule of law, I have already explained that the appellants do not have a
right to require the Federal Court to engage in judicial review. Moreover,
there is ample opportunity for the legality of the Guidelines to be
challenged in family law litigation to which their operation is directly
relevant.
[60]
The appellants further submit that the courts
below misunderstood the expertise engaged by these proceedings, as they assumed
that this was a family law case. According to the appellants, this case
requires administrative, not family law, expertise because the question is
whether the legislation authorizes the making of these Guidelines. I
respectfully disagree.
[61]
The appellants request a judicial determination
of, among other things, whether the Guidelines are based, as they are
required to be by s. 26.1(2) of the Divorce Act , on the principle “that
spouses have a joint financial obligation to maintain the children of the
marriage in accordance with their relative abilities to contribute to the
performance of that obligation”: see A.F., at paras. 12-13. Making that
determination will inevitably engage family law expertise in relation to, among
other things, the nature and extent of the obligation “to maintain” children
and how the “relative abilities” of parents to do so should be assessed. The
provincial superior courts deal day in and day out with disputes in the context
of marital breakdown concerning the needs of children, as well as what custody
and support arrangements are in their best interests. They regularly entertain
submissions on the suitability of support orders, including setting support for
special or extraordinary expenses (s. 7 of the Guidelines) and
entertaining claims of undue hardship related to payment of support (s. 10 of
the Guidelines). This subject-matter expertise will properly be brought
to bear on the appellants’ contentions. I agree with the following observations
of the Federal Court of Appeal:
. . . the vires
of the Guidelines should be determined by a court that has developed the
particular expertise to properly assess the arguments in their factual context.
This is particularly important when one considers the nature of the arguments
set out in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the application and the general allegation
at paragraph 16 that the Guidelines are unreasonable and manifestly unjust,
which involves looking at the impact of the Guidelines and the child support
calculation formula on spouses and children in practice. Practical experience
is relevant also when one considers that the Guidelines provide significant discretion
to the provincial superior courts to depart from the statutory formula.
According to the Appellants, such courts in fact rarely exercise that
discretion. It would be difficult for the Federal Court to assess the validity
of that contention. [para. 13]
(4)
Summary
[62]
I conclude that the Federal Court did not make
any reviewable error in exercising the discretion not to entertain this
judicial review application for declaratory relief.
[63]
Since writing my reasons, I have had the
advantage of reviewing the concurring reasons of my colleagues Abella and
Wagner JJ. As they point out, this case was argued on the basis that there was
no dispute that the Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to grant
judicial review remedies directed against regulations promulgated by the
Governor in Council. This assumption by the parties is hardly surprising given
this Court’s recent decision in McArthur, at paras. 2 and 17, aff’g 2008
ONCA 892, 94 O.R. (3d) 19, at para. 94, in which we at least implicitly if not
explicitly affirmed that s. 18 of the Act gives the Federal Court exclusive
original jurisdiction to issue a prerogative remedy or grant declaratory relief
against any federal board, commission or other tribunal on administrative law
grounds. My colleagues point to a number of “concerns” about this assumption
and raise various possible arguments that might be made to the contrary. As
none of these points was argued, I of course will keep an open mind about them.
But I do not want my silence on these issues to be understood as indicating
that, at least as presently advised, I share the concerns raised by my
colleagues.
[64]
At this point, it seems to me that the language
of the Act conferring “exclusive original jurisdiction” can be taken as a clear
and explicit expression of parliamentary intent. Similarly, as
presently advised I see no reason to doubt that the Governor in Council, when
exercising “jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under an Act of Parliament”
is a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” within the meaning of s. 2
the Act. Further, the Court in Paul L’Anglais Inc. distinguished between
Federal Court jurisdiction to rule on constitutionality and jurisdiction to
engage in judicial review on administrative law grounds. No one questions that
s. 18 does not withdraw the authority of the provincial superior courts to
grant the traditional administrative law remedies against federal boards,
commissions and tribunals on division of powers grounds: see, e.g., Paul
L’Anglais Inc. at pp. 152-63. But with respect to judicial review on
administrative law grounds, the Court expressly confirmed that the Federal
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction as described in s. 18 of the Act:
In
adopting s. 18 of the Federal Court Act , . . . Parliament in effect
divested the superior courts of the superintending and reforming power over
federal agencies and conferred it on the Trial Division of the Federal Court .
. . .
It
is well established that the effect of s. 18 [of the Federal Court Act ]
was to transfer all superintending and reforming power over federal agencies
from the superior courts to the Federal Court . . . .
. . .
. .
. Parliament has a perfect right to enact that the superintending and reforming
power over federal agencies, acting in the administration of the laws of Canada
. . . will be exercised exclusively by the Federal Court, a court created for
the better administration of those laws. However, it cannot confer such an exclusive
power on the Federal Court when what is involved is no longer the
administration of a law of Canada, but the interpretation and application of
the Constitution. [pp. 153-54 and 162]
All of these matters are, of
course, for another day.
IV.
Disposition
[65]
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
The
following are the reasons delivered by
[66]
Abella and wagner JJ. — The
provincial superior courts administer the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3
(2nd Supp .), and the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175. As
the majority states, Parliament has entrusted this entire area of law to the
provincial superior courts.
[67]
The parties proceeded before us on the
assumption that the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declare invalid
all federal regulations promulgated by the Governor in Council. In view of the
fact that this issue was not argued, and given its importance, in our
respectful view this case should not be seen as categorically endorsing this
assumption. Pending argument in another case where the issue is squarely
raised, our concerns arise from a number of sources.
[68]
First, any derogation from the jurisdiction of the
provincial superior courts “requires clear and explicit statutory wording to
this effect”: Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437, at para. 46; Canada
(Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585, at para. 42. A
superior court “has jurisdiction to entertain virtually any claim unless that
jurisdiction is specifically, unequivocally and constitutionally removed by
Parliament”: Sorbara v. Canada (Attorney General) (2009), 98 O.R. (3d)
673 (C.A.), at para. 7, leave to appeal refused, [2009] 3 S.C.R. x. It would
be possible to argue, in our view, that s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 , does not clearly and unequivocally strip the
provincial superior courts of their jurisdiction to declare federal regulations
made by the Governor in Council to be invalid on administrative grounds.
[69]
In fact, this Court has never held that the
Federal Court enjoys the exclusive authority to declare all regulations made by
the Governor in Council invalid. Only two appellate courts have endorsed that
proposition: Saskatchewan Wheat Pool v. Canada (Attorney-General)
(1993), 107 D.L.R. (4th) 63 (Sask. C.A.), at pp. 66-69; Messageries
publi-maison ltée v. Société canadienne des postes, [1996] R.J.Q. 547
(C.A.).
[70]
A contrary view was expressed by several others:
Waddell v. Governor in Council (1981), 30 B.C.L.R. 127 (S.C.), appeal
dismissed as academic (1982), 142 D.L.R. (3d) 177 (B.C.C.A.); Re Williams
and Attorney-General for Canada (1983), 45 O.R. (2d) 291 (H.C.J.); and British
Columbia Milk Marketing Board v. Aquilini, [1997] B.C.J. No. 843 (S.C.)
(QL), rev’d in part on other grounds (1998), 165 D.L.R. (4th) 626 (B.C.C.A.), notice
of discontinuance filed, [1999] 2 S.C.R. v.
[71]
Moreover, over three decades ago, this Court
decided that provincial superior courts have jurisdiction to declare the
federal laws they apply ultra vires on division of powers grounds so
that they are not left with “the invidious task of execution of federal and
provincial laws . . . while being unable to discriminate between valid and
invalid federal statutes so as to refuse to ‘execute’ the invalid statutes”: Attorney
General of Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307,
at p. 328.
[72]
Provincial superior courts also have
jurisdiction to declare the federal laws they apply to be contrary to the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms : Wakeford v. Canada (2002), 58 O.R.
(3d) 65 (C.A.), at para. 40, leave to appeal refused, [2002] 4 S.C.R. vii; Lavers
v. British Columbia (Minister of Finance) (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 193
(B.C.C.A.); International Fund for Animal Welfare, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General) (1998), 157 D.L.R. (4th) 561 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).
[73]
Federal regulations are federal law. Consequently, an
argument can be made that the jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts to
declare invalid the federal laws they apply necessarily includes the authority
to declare invalid the federal regulations they apply: see e.g. Canada
(Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R.
401; Dyck v. Highton (2003), 239 Sask. R. 38 (Q.B.); Ward v. Canada
(Attorney General) (1997), 155 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 313 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.)),
rev’d on other grounds (1999), 183 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 295 (Nfld. C.A.), rev’d
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 569; Souliere v. Leclair (1998), 52 C.R.R. (2d) 156
(Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)); Premi v. Khodeir (2009), 198 C.R.R. (2d)
8 (Ont. S.C.J.); Grenon v. Canada (Attorney General) (2007),
76 Alta. L.R. (4th) 346 (Q.B.).
[74]
We are not suggesting that Parliament lacks the authority under s. 101
of the Constitution Act, 1867 to grant the Federal Court jurisdiction to
declare federal regulations ultra vires. Our concern is simply whether
the Federal Courts Act has given it the exclusive jurisdiction to
do so.
[75]
The Federal Court was created to remove from the
provincial superior courts the jurisdiction to supervise federal administrative
tribunals, not to strip them of their jurisdiction to determine the vires of
the federal regulations they apply: Ian Bushnell, The Federal Court of
Canada: A History, 1875-1992 (1997), at pp. 157-58; see also Richard W.
Pound, Chief Justice W.R. Jackett: By the Law of the Land (1999), at p.
220; John Turner, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, House
of Commons Debates, vol. V, 2nd Sess., 28th Parl., March 25, 1970, at pp.
5469-71.
[76]
The view that s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act
was designed to consolidate judicial review jurisdiction of federal boards
in a national court — and not to interfere with the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts — was later confirmed by Doug
Lewis, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, when introducing
certain amendments to the Federal Court Act in 1989: House of Commons
Debates, vol. IV, 2nd Sess., 34th Parl., November 1, 1989, at pp. 5413-14.
[77]
There is no evidence that Parliament intended to limit
the subject matter jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts by preventing
them from determining the vires of the regulations they apply. At the
very least, this argues for caution and full argument before this Court
declares — or is seen to declare — that s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act means
that the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all federal
regulations, even if they are not part of legislative schemes over which the
Federal Court has jurisdiction or expertise, such as the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 , or, as in this case, the Divorce Act .
[78]
Nor should the companion decisions in Canada
(Attorney General) v. McArthur, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 626, and TeleZone
necessarily contradict this view. With respect, the question of whether the
provincial superior courts have jurisdiction to declare federal regulations
invalid was not in issue in either case, and neither judgment purported to
decide the question of whether the Governor in Council is a “federal board,
commission or other tribunal” for the purposes of the Federal Courts Act .
In fact, the Governor in Council was not implicated in either case. As such, we
respectfully disagree with the majority’s assertion that McArthur
“implicitly if not explicitly affirmed that s. 18 of the Act gives the Federal
Court exclusive original jurisdiction to issue a prerogative remedy or grant
declaratory relief” against the Governor in Council: para. 63.
[79]
In McArthur, a prison inmate sought damages in
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against federal prison authorities for
“arbitrary detention and alleged mistreatment”: para. 1. The legal issue was
whether the inmate had to “first seek judicial review in the Federal Court to
quash the segregation orders that [were] the basis of his claim” before he
could proceed with his monetary claims in the superior court: para. 1. In TeleZone,
a company sought damages in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for breach of
contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment resulting from a decision of the
Minister of Industry Canada. The legal issue in that case was whether the
company had to obtain “an order quashing the Minister’s decision” from the
Federal Court before it could proceed with its damages claim in the superior
court: para. 2.
[80]
In both cases, this Court concluded that s. 18 of the Federal
Courts Act does not require a party to seek judicial review in the Federal
Court before initiating an action for damages against the Crown in a provincial
superior court. The Court’s decisions focused entirely on the jurisdiction of
the provincial superior courts to issue monetary relief. As the majority itself
acknowledges, the question of the provincial superior courts’ jurisdiction to
issue declaratory relief in connection with federal regulations was not in
issue. As a result, it is difficult to see how it can be said that these cases
“support the principle” that the provincial superior courts have only a limited
authority, or that they stand for the proposition that the provincial superior
courts can only consider the administrative validity of federal regulations
where it is “genuinely a necessary step in an otherwise valid proceeding and is
not simply made to appear as such as the result of ‘artful pleading’”: para. 24.
[81]
The majority also suggests that this Court’s decision in Canada Labour Relations Board v. Paul L’Anglais Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 147, “expressly confirmed” that s. 18 grants the
Federal Court exclusive original jurisdiction “to engage in judicial review on
administrative law grounds”, while the provincial superior courts retain only
the “jurisdiction to rule on constitutionality”: para. 64. In our respectful
view, the Paul L’Anglais decision supports a contrary interpretation.
[82]
Paul L’Anglais was about a decision by the Canada Labour
Relations Board, which had found that two media companies were “federal
undertakings and that their employees perform work which falls under the
jurisdiction established by the Canada Labour Code ”. The companies
brought a motion in the Quebec Superior Court arguing that their activities
fell within “the exclusive authority of the provincial legislatures”. The issue
before the Court was whether s. 18 ousted the jurisdiction of the superior
court to “review the decision made in the case at bar by the Board”. The Court
held that s. 18 does not have “the effect of superseding the superintending and
reforming power of the Superior Court and its jurisdiction in evocation over
the decision rendered in the case at bar by the Canada Labour Relations Board”:
pp. 151-52, 158 and 163. Not only did the Court make no reference to any
distinction between “constitutionality” and “administrative law grounds”, it
made no reference to administrative law grounds at all. It is with respect
inaccurate to state, as the majority does, that the Court made a distinction
between “jurisdiction to rule on constitutionality”, and jurisdiction “to
engage in judicial review on administrative law grounds” for the purposes of s.
18 .
[83]
What the Court did say in Paul L’Anglais was
that it was expressly endorsing and applying its earlier decision in Law
Society (p. 158). In that case, the Director of Investigation and Research
had interpreted the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, as
giving him jurisdiction to initiate an investigation into the regulations and
policies about advertising by members of the Law Society of British Columbia.
The Law Society responded by initiating an action in the British Columbia
Supreme Court seeking a declaration that the Act did not apply to the Law
Society or its members, or, to the extent that it did apply, a declaration that
the Act was ultra vires Parliament. The legal issue was whether s. 18
ousted the jurisdiction of the superior court to issue declarations in
connection with federal laws. The Court concluded that s. 18 did not have this
effect: pp. 320, 322-23 and 329.
[84]
In reaching this conclusion, the Law Society decision too did not
distinguish between “constitutionality” and “administrative law grounds” to
determine the effect of s. 18 on the jurisdiction of the provincial superior
courts. Rather, the Court expressly held that the provincial superior courts
cannot be stripped of the jurisdiction to declare invalid the federal laws they
apply:
It is difficult to see how an argument
can be advanced that a statute adopted by Parliament for the establishment of a
court for the better administration of the laws of Canada can at the same time
include a provision that the provincial superior courts may no longer declare a
statute enacted by Parliament to be beyond the constitutional authority of
Parliament. Sections 17 and 18 of the Federal Court Act must, in the
view of the appellants, be so construed. In my view Parliament lacks the
constitutional authority to so provide. To do so would strip the basic
constitutional concepts of judicature of this country, namely the superior
courts of the provinces, of a judicial power fundamental to a federal system as
described in the Constitution Act. At the same time it would
leave the provincially-organized superior courts with the invidious task of
execution of federal and provincial laws, to paraphrase the Valin case, supra,
while being unable to discriminate between valid and invalid federal
statutes so as to refuse to “execute” the invalid statutes. For this second and
more fundamental reason I conclude that the British Columbia courts have the
requisite jurisdiction to entertain the claims for declarations herein made.
[Emphasis added; p. 328.]
There was no suggestion,
either in Law Society or Paul L’Anglais, that the legal
proposition — provincial superior courts should not be in the “invidious”
position of having to apply invalid federal laws — extended only to
declarations of constitutional invalidity.
[85]
Accordingly, although we agree with the result
reached by the majority, we are concerned that the reasons not be seen as
representing a definitive view from this Court that the provincial superior
courts cannot declare federal regulations invalid on administrative grounds.
APPENDIX
Divorce Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp .)
26.1 (1) The Governor in Council
may establish guidelines respecting the making of orders for child support,
including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, guidelines
(a) respecting
the way in which the amount of an order for child support is to be determined;
(b) respecting
the circumstances in which discretion may be exercised in the making of an
order for child support;
(c) authorizing
a court to require that the amount payable under an order for child support be
paid in periodic payments, in a lump sum or in a lump sum and periodic
payments;
(d) authorizing
a court to require that the amount payable under an order for child support be
paid or secured, or paid and secured, in the manner specified in the order;
(e) respecting
the circumstances that give rise to the making of a variation order in respect
of a child support order;
(f) respecting
the determination of income for the purposes of the application of the
guidelines;
(g) authorizing
a court to impute income for the purposes of the application of the guidelines;
and
(h) respecting
the production of income information and providing for sanctions when that
information is not provided.
(2) The guidelines shall be based on the principle that spouses
have a joint financial obligation to maintain the children of the marriage in
accordance with their relative abilities to contribute to the performance of
that obligation.
(3) In subsection (1), “order for child support” means
(a) an
order or interim order made under section 15.1;
(b) a
variation order in respect of a child support order; or
(c) an
order or an interim order made under section 19.
Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175
7. (1) In a child support order
the court may, on either spouse’s request, provide for an amount to cover all
or any portion of the following expenses, which expenses may be estimated,
taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s
best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means
of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern
prior to the separation:
(a) child
care expenses incurred as a result of the custodial parent’s employment,
illness, disability or education or training for employment;
(b) that
portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child;
(c) health-related
expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually,
including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a
psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy,
occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids,
glasses and contact lenses;
(d) extraordinary
expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational
programs that meet the child’s particular needs;
(e) expenses
for post-secondary education; and
(f) extraordinary
expenses for extracurricular activities.
(1.1) For the purposes of paragraphs (1)(d) and (f),
the term “extraordinary expenses” means
(a) expenses
that exceed those that the spouse requesting an amount for the extraordinary
expenses can reasonably cover, taking into account that spouse’s income and the
amount that the spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court
has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the
court has otherwise determined is appropriate; or
(b) where
paragraph (a) is not applicable, expenses that the court considers are
extraordinary taking into account
(i) the amount
of the expense in relation to the income of the spouse requesting the amount,
including the amount that the spouse would receive under the applicable table
or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the
amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate,
(ii) the
nature and number of the educational programs and extracurricular activities,
(iii) any
special needs and talents of the child or children,
(iv) the
overall cost of the programs and activities, and
(v) any
other similar factor that the court considers relevant.
(2) The guiding principle in determining the amount of an expense
referred to in subsection (1) is that the expense is shared by the spouses in
proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the
contribution, if any, from the child.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), in determining the amount of an
expense referred to in subsection (1), the court must take into account any
subsidies, benefits or income tax deductions or credits relating to the
expense, and any eligibility to claim a subsidy, benefit or income tax
deduction or credit relating to the expense.
(4) In determining the amount of an expense referred to in
subsection (1), the court shall not take into account any universal child care
benefit or any eligibility to claim that benefit.
10. (1) On either spouse’s
application, a court may award an amount of child support that is different
from the amount determined under any of sections 3 to 5, 8 or 9 if the court
finds that the spouse making the request, or a child in respect of whom the
request is made, would otherwise suffer undue hardship.
(2) Circumstances that may cause a spouse or
child to suffer undue hardship include the following:
(a) the
spouse has responsibility for an unusually high level of debts reasonably
incurred to support the spouses and their children prior to the separation or
to earn a living;
(b) the
spouse has unusually high expenses in relation to exercising access to a child;
(c) the
spouse has a legal duty under a judgment, order or written separation agreement
to support any person;
(d) the
spouse has a legal duty to support a child, other than a child of the marriage,
who is
(i) under
the age of majority, or
(ii) the
age of majority or over but is unable, by reason of illness, disability or
other cause, to obtain the necessaries of life; and
(e) the
spouse has a legal duty to support any person who is unable to obtain the
necessaries of life due to an illness or disability.
(3) Despite a determination of undue hardship under subsection
(1), an application under that subsection must be denied by the court if it is
of the opinion that the household of the spouse who claims undue hardship
would, after determining the amount of child support under any of sections 3 to
5, 8 or 9, have a higher standard of living than the household of the other
spouse.
(4) In comparing standards of living for the purpose of subsection
(3), the court may use the comparison of household standards of living test set
out in Schedule II.
(5) Where the court awards a different amount of child support
under subsection (1), it may specify, in the child support order, a reasonable
time for the satisfaction of any obligation arising from circumstances that
cause undue hardship and the amount payable at the end of that time.
(6) Where the court makes a child support order in a different
amount under this section, it must record its reasons for doing so.
Federal Courts Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7
17. (1) Except as otherwise
provided in this Act or any other Act of Parliament, the Federal Court has
concurrent original jurisdiction in all cases in which relief is claimed
against the Crown.
(2) Without restricting the generality of subsection (1), the
Federal Court has concurrent original jurisdiction, except as otherwise
provided, in all cases in which
(a) the
land, goods or money of any person is in the possession of the Crown;
(b) the
claim arises out of a contract entered into by or on behalf of the Crown;
(c) there
is a claim against the Crown for injurious affection; or
(d) the
claim is for damages under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act .
(3) The Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and determine the following matters:
(a) the
amount to be paid if the Crown and any person have agreed in writing that the
Crown or that person shall pay an amount to be determined by the Federal Court,
the Federal Court — Trial Division or the Exchequer Court of Canada; and
(b) any
question of law, fact or mixed law and fact that the Crown and any person have
agreed in writing shall be determined by the Federal Court, the Federal Court —
Trial Division or the Exchequer Court of Canada.
(4) The Federal Court has concurrent original jurisdiction to hear
and determine proceedings to determine disputes in which the Crown is or may be
under an obligation and in respect of which there are or may be conflicting
claims.
(5) The Federal Court has concurrent original jurisdiction
(a) in
proceedings of a civil nature in which the Crown or the Attorney General of
Canada claims relief; and
(b) in
proceedings in which relief is sought against any person for anything done or
omitted to be done in the performance of the duties of that person as an
officer, servant or agent of the Crown.
(6) If an Act of Parliament confers jurisdiction in respect of a
matter on a court constituted or established by or under a law of a province,
the Federal Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding in respect of
the same matter unless the Act expressly confers that jurisdiction on that
court.
18. (1) Subject to section 28, the
Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction
(a) to
issue an injunction, writ of certiorari,
writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus
or writ of quo warranto, or grant
declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or other tribunal;
and
(b) to
hear and determine any application or other proceeding for relief in the nature
of relief contemplated by paragraph (a), including any proceeding
brought against the Attorney General of Canada, to obtain relief against a
federal board, commission or other tribunal.
(2) The Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and determine every application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition or
writ of mandamus in relation
to any member of the Canadian Forces serving outside Canada.
(3) The
remedies provided for in subsections (1) and (2) may be obtained only on an
application for judicial review made under section 18.1.
Appeal
dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the
appellants: Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes, Calgary.
Solicitor for the
respondent: Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.