Miller v. Monit International Inc., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 432, 2001
SCC 13
Monit International Inc. Appellant
v.
Bernard Miller Respondent
Indexed as: Miller v. Monit International Inc.
Neutral citation: 2001 SCC 13.
File No.: 27307.
Hearing and judgment: November 1, 2000.
Reasons delivered: March 1, 2001.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and L’Heureux‑Dubé,
Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Civil procedure – Declinatory exceptions – Lack of
jurisdiction by reason of subject matter – Crown leasing premises used by
international organization for its head office from building owner – Former
employee of organization bringing action against owner seeking damages for
health problems allegedly suffered because of inadequate air quality in
building – Owner bringing motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction – Whether
Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear claim – Code of Civil Procedure,
R.S.Q., c. C-25, arts. 31, 164.
Courts – Jurisdiction – Civil claim for damages –
International organizations – Immunity – Crown leasing premises used by
international organization for its head office from building owner – Former
employee of international organization bringing action against building owner
seeking damages for health problems allegedly suffered because of inadequate
air quality in building – Whether Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear claim
– Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, art. 31.
The respondent M was employed as an interpreter by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”). The appellant (“Monit”)
owned the building in Montreal where, pursuant to a lease agreement with the
federal Crown, ICAO’s head office was situated. M brought an action against
the Crown and Monit seeking damages for health problems he alleged he suffered
because of inadequate air quality in the building. At trial, Monit brought a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to art. 164 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The Superior Court dismissed the motion, and that
decision was upheld by a majority of the Court of Appeal.
Held: The appeal
should be dismissed. The Superior Court is competent to hear the claim.
For the reasons stated in Miller v. Canada, the
success or failure of this action at trial has nothing to do with the internal
operations of the international organization. Despite its lease agreement
with the Crown, Monit, as owner, remained responsible for ensuring that the
premises were maintained in a manner that ensured safe occupancy. Monit’s
claim that the inviolable nature of the ICAO headquarters prevented its
entrance into the premises is not supported by the evidence. M presented
evidence that Monit was the only party in control of the air and ventilation
system. This evidence suggests that ICAO was only one of many lessees in that
building. It also suggests that people regularly entered the building and that
both the Crown and Monit were given permission to enter the actual ICAO
premises on numerous occasions owing to the air problems.
There is no reason to remove M’s right to bring a
legal action in the ordinary courts of Canada merely because of evidentiary
difficulties that Monit may face. This is not a jurisdictional matter, but one
for the trial judge. In any event, any evidence required by Monit should
already be within its control. If ICAO truly had no control over the
ventilation system, any evidence with respect to the maintenance of the
building and the ventilation system, including remedial work completed, would
be within the control of Monit rather than ICAO.
Cases Cited
Applied: Miller v. Canada, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 407, 2001 SCC 12.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, arts. 31, 164.
Headquarters Agreement between
the Government of Canada and the International Civil Aviation Organization, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 7, arts. 4, 21, 32, 33.
Supplementary Agreement between
Canada and the International Civil Aviation Organization, Can. T.S. 1980 No. 18, arts. II, VI, VII.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal,
[1999] R.J.Q. 719, [1999] Q.J. No. 754 (QL) (sub nom. Canada v. Miller),
dismissing the appellant’s appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, [1998]
R.J.Q. 260, [1997] Q.J. No. 4022 (QL) (sub nom. Canada v. Miller),
dismissing the appellant’s declinatory exception. Appeal dismissed.
Paul A. Melançon and Hugues
Duguay, for the appellant.
Leonard E. Seidman and Sabrina
Seal, for the respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
1
Bastarache J. — This
appeal raises the issue of whether the Court of Appeal was correct to find that
the Superior Court of Quebec has jurisdiction over a civil claim commenced
against a Canadian corporation by a former employee of an international
organization located in Quebec for damages suffered at his place of employment.
2
This case was heard on November 1, 2000 in conjunction with Miller v.
Canada, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 407, 2001 SCC 12, released concurrently, which
raises a similar issue. This appeal was dismissed from the bench with reasons
to follow.
I. Factual
Background
3
The respondent Bernard Miller is a British citizen who, between January
2, 1990 and May 7, 1994, was employed as an interpreter for the International
Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”), which is a specialized agency of the
United Nations. At all material times, Monit International Inc. was the owner
of 1000 Sherbrooke Street West in Montreal where, pursuant to a lease agreement
with Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (“the Crown”), the head office of
ICAO was situated.
4
The facts in this case are essentially those summarized in Miller
v. Canada.
5
Miller alleges that Monit, and not ICAO, was responsible for building
maintenance, heating, cooling and ventilation, and that, in that role, Monit
employed all building services staff and operated the aforementioned equipment
for ICAO and other lessees of the building. Further, he alleges that through a
variety of acts, Monit contributed to the air quality problem in the building.
6
Miller further alleges that Monit was aware of the air quality problems
and failed to warn him and other employees of the risk to their health. Both
the Crown and Monit had tried to fix problems with the air quality in the
building, but were unsuccessful.
7
Miller claims that he is unable to work due to his present medical
condition. He has brought an action against the Crown and Monit seeking
damages in the amount of $2,164,585.46 jointly and severally, as well as
$25,000 in punitive damages against Monit. The claim against Monit is based on
the argument that, as owner of the building, Monit was responsible for the poor
air quality in the building and, having been aware of this health hazard, it is
liable for its failure to warn the employees of ICAO of the resulting danger to
their health. At trial, Monit brought a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction pursuant to art. 164 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure,
R.S.Q., c. C-25. The Quebec Superior Court denied the motion; this decision
was appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal and was heard in conjunction with Miller
v. Canada. The appeal was dismissed, Mailhot J.A. dissenting.
8
Monit alleges that Miller’s claim falls entirely within working
conditions and thereby exclusively within the area of labour relations. It
argues that this subject matter is totally governed by the ICAO Service Code
and, pursuant to the international agreements between ICAO and the Canadian
government, the administrative regime in the Service Code must be followed. As
such, the Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to hear these claims.
9
Miller argues, and the Superior Court and Court of Appeal agreed, that
the claim is not based on his employment relationship, but rather, on the
extra-contractual delictual acts of Monit. Therefore, the international
immunity from which ICAO benefits cannot be afforded to Monit and, since this
dispute is not between the respondent and his employer, nor between the Crown
and ICAO, the Superior Court is competent to hear the case on its merits.
II. Statutory
Framework
10
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25
31. The Superior Court is the court of
original general jurisdiction; it hears in first instance every suit not
assigned exclusively to another court by a specific provision of law.
Headquarters
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the International Civil Aviation
Organization
Article
4
Inviolability
of premises
(1) The headquarters premises of the Organization shall be inviolable.
. . .
(3) The property and assets of the Organization,
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search,
requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference,
whether by executive, administrative, judicial, or legislative action, except
with the consent of and under the conditions agreed to by the Secretary General
of the Organization. This section shall not prevent the reasonable application
of fire protection regulations.
Article
21
Purpose
of privileges and immunities
(1) Privileges and immunities under Articles 19
and 20 are accorded to officials in the interests of the Organization and not
for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Secretary General
of the Organization shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of
any official in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the
course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the
Organization. In the case of the President of the Council and the Secretary
General of the Organization, the Council of the Organization shall have the
right to waive the immunity.
(2) Without prejudice to their privileges and
immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and
immunities to respect the laws and regulations of Canada. They also have a
duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of Canada.
Article
33
Other
Disputes
The Organization shall make adequate provision for
appropriate modes of settlement of:
(a) disputes arising out of contracts or
other disputes to which the Organization is a party;
(b) disputes involving any officials of the
Organization if their immunity has not been waived in accordance with Article
21.
Supplementary
Agreement between Canada and the International Civil Aviation Organization
Article II
Obligations
under the Lease
1. Taking into consideration that the said
premises are rented solely and exclusively for the needs of the Organization’s
Headquarters, the Government of Canada shall, as the Lessee, assure that the
Lessor complies with its obligations as specified in the lease or as they may
be prescribed in the Civil Code of the Province of Quebec or under any other
law.
. . .
3. Notwithstanding any references in this
Supplementary Agreement to the Lease between the Government of Canada and the
owner of the premises, the mutual rights and obligations of the Government of
Canada and the Organization with respect to the Headquarters premises shall be
governed by this Supplementary Agreement.
Article VI
Settlement
of Disputes
Any dispute between the Organization and the
Government of Canada concerning the interpretation or application of this
Supplementary Agreement shall be settled in accordance with Article VII,
Section 31, of the Headquarters Agreement.
Article VII
Court
actions
1. Without prejudice to the privileges and
immunities of the Organization as defined in the Headquarters Agreement, the
Government of Canada reserves its right to refer any cause of action related to
the Lease to the competent courts of Canada.
2. The Organization shall, in such circumstances,
facilitate the proper administration of justice and assist the Government of
Canada by providing all relevant evidence.
III. Judicial
History
11
Benoît J. and the Court of Appeal heard this
case together with the companion case, Miller v. Canada. In their
reasons, they referred to the Crown rather than Monit in dealing with what
appear to have been identical submissions. It is for this reason that
reference is sometimes made to the Crown rather than Monit in the following
description of the case history.
A. Quebec
Superior Court, [1998] R.J.Q. 260
12
Benoît J. held that the Superior Court has jurisdiction
to hear the respondent’s claims. He reviewed the contractual relationships
between the parties and held that there was no contractual link between Monit
and Miller, nor any contractual obligations owed by Monit to Miller.
13
According to Benoît J., any litigation between Monit
and ICAO, or between Miller and ICAO, is outside the jurisdiction of the
Superior Court because of the Organization’s immunity from all legal suits and
the available recourse to an international administrative body. Further, any
litigation between Miller and his employer would be governed by the ICAO
Service Code provisions.
14
Benoît J. also found that art. 32 of the Headquarters
Agreement only concerns the parties to the Agreement and art. 33(b) only
involves claims against an ICAO employee where immunity has not been
lifted. As such, neither is applicable in the present case.
15
Monit argued that the act of signing the lease
by the Crown was an international obligation falling within the jure imperii
rule and, therefore, the Canadian courts have no jurisdiction over matters
related to the lease. Benoît J. held that, although the act of signing the
agreements is a jure imperii act of Canada, Miller’s claim is not based
on the lease nor on the agreements, but, instead, on Monit’s failure to
properly maintain its building and failure to warn of the dangers therein.
16
Monit also alleged that the only recourse available
for unsafe working conditions is before the international administrative
tribunals. Benoît J. held that the obligation to provide a healthy working
environment only falls within “working conditions” if it is within the control
of the employer. Benoît J. noted that Miller had alleged that Monit was
invited into the premises by ICAO, was aware of toxic substances in the air and
did not warn him of the resultant danger to his health; he held that the legal
issues are therefore those of establishing causation and damages, which have to
be determined on the merits. Benoît J. stated that, whether the person to be
warned was an international employee or not, the obligation remained the same
and the Superior Court is competent to hear the extra-contractual claim.
17
Finally, Benoît J. found that, since Miller was
not claiming employee benefits from his employer in this suit and that there
was no possibility of contradictory judgments or double indemnity, the forum
non conveniens rule was not applicable.
B. Quebec Court of Appeal, [1999] R.J.Q. 719
Nuss J.A.
18
The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed
the appeal, thereby confirming that the Quebec Superior Court has jurisdiction
to consider the respondent’s claim. The Crown’s position, adopted by Monit,
was that, because Miller was an employee, anything to do with
employee/employer relations was covered by the immunity and privileges of
international organizations. Nuss J.A. held that the Superior Court was
correct in emphasizing that Miller’s claim was not against ICAO and held that
the Crown, and impliedly Monit, could not clothe itself in the privilege and
immunity vested in international organizations.
19
The Crown argued that all obligations of the
Canadian government, if any, flowed from the agreements; Nuss J.A. held that
Miller was not a party to these agreements and not bound by them. As such, the relationship of the Crown to ICAO was not relevant.
20
Nuss J.A. held that if the Crown, and impliedly
Monit, harmed a person, saving a case where domestic law had given them
immunity, they may be sued in Canadian courts. There is no principle of law
providing that, because a party is involved with an international organization,
it is not subject to an action filed in Canadian courts.
21
The Crown argued that, because Miller was
covered by the ICAO Service Code, his recourse must follow the rules in the
Code, which do not authorize suits against it. This was also the position of
Monit. Nuss J.A. held that these rules apply to cases involving Miller and
ICAO, and here, Miller is not bringing an action against ICAO. Further, even
if the alleged acts did occur during the respondent’s employment with ICAO,
immunity from suit that vests in ICAO is not transferred to the Crown nor,
impliedly, to Monit.
22
Monit relied on the Crown’s argument but Nuss
J.A. held that it did not have the status of the Crown nor Canada’s
relationship with ICAO or the United Nations. Thus, Nuss J.A. found that the
status of Monit is no different than that of any other person in Quebec who
commits an act for which he or she is extra-contractually responsible.
Mailhot J.A. (dissenting)
23
Mailhot J.A. agreed with almost all aspects of Monit’s
claim which relied heavily on the arguments of the Crown in the parallel case
and would have allowed the appeal. She held that Miller’s declaration clearly
shows that actions occurring during his employment are the basis of the claim
and that the building has territorial immunity due to the Headquarters
Agreement. These claims are tied to the working conditions and Miller’s health
problems which manifested themselves as soon as he started working in his
office on the 13th floor and in the interpretation booths.
24
Mailhot J.A. held that there was nothing in the
agreements permitting an employee to sue the Crown, and impliedly Monit, for
working conditions inside the building, but they do include provisions stating
a mechanism to deal with disputes. Article 33 of the Headquarters Agreement
refers to “Other Disputes”.
25
Mailhot J.A. remarked that Miller entered work
each day, not at the invitation of Monit, but rather as an employee of ICAO.
If there is any recourse, it is against the employer. She viewed the damages
requested by Miller, which include medical reimbursement and employment
retraining, as employee benefits. Because of ICAO immunity and internal
mechanisms, she stated that Miller cannot sue ICAO in court and that the
present action is an attempt to do indirectly what he cannot do directly.
26
Mailhot J.A. found that there was a risk of
double indemnity or contradictory judgments, and a risk of interfering in the
internal affairs of ICAO. The application and interpretation of
international agreements is not for ordinary courts; they should not interfere
in the adjudicative choice made by the sovereign parties. Finally, she held
that, although there is no legal link between Monit and Miller, Monit is the
owner of the building and has signed a lease with the Canadian government. As
such, Monit’s obligations are towards the lessee (Canada), whose obligations
were assumed by the occupant, ICAO. Therefore, Monit has no obligations
towards the respondent.
IV. Issues
27
There is only one issue that must be addressed
for the determination of this appeal: Did the Court of Appeal err in
determining that the Quebec Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear the claim
of Mr. Miller against Monit? For the appellant to succeed, it must show, pursuant
to art. 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the respondent’s case is
assigned exclusively to a court other than the Superior Court by a specific
provision of law.
V. Analysis
28
Monit’s arguments are substantially the same as those
of the Crown in Miller v. Canada. It argues that, in considering the
jurisdiction of the Superior Court, this Court must consider the context in
which these injuries were incurred. In particular, Monit argues that the
respondent acknowledged that these injuries were in relation to his employment
when he included a statement to that effect in his declaration. The appellant
submits that, because of the link between Miller’s injuries and his employment,
any damages fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of his employer, ICAO,
because of the immunity provisions in the Headquarters Agreement.
29
There is a claim against both the Crown and
Monit for failure to warn of the dangerous air quality in the building, but
there is an additional claim that Monit, as owner, failed to properly maintain
the building in which the respondent worked. The appellant argues that any
attempt by Miller to prove such a claim will impinge on the immunity of ICAO
and interfere in its internal processes. In addition, Monit submits that it will
face severe difficulties in preparing a full answer and defence to such a claim
because of the immunity of ICAO and its employees and the inviolable nature of
its premises.
30
Monit was the owner of the premises in
question. It had no contractual relationship with ICAO or its employees.
Despite its lease agreement with the Crown, as owner, it remained responsible
for ensuring that the premises were maintained in a manner that ensured safe
occupancy. Monit argues that the inviolable nature of the ICAO headquarters
prevented its entrance into the premises. Such a claim does not appear to be
supported by the evidence in this case. Miller states that ICAO had absolutely
no responsibility for maintenance of the building and that it had no control
over the ventilation system. Although the Crown and Monit both argue that they
were not permitted to enter the building, the respondent presented evidence
that Monit was the only party in control of the air and ventilation system.
This evidence suggests that ICAO was only one of many lessees in that
building. It also suggests that people regularly entered the building and,
although the actual ICAO premises could not be entered without permission, due
to the air problems both the Crown and Monit were given permission to enter on
numerous occasions. In fact, Monit was a member of a Joint Working Group which
was created to resolve the air quality problems.
31
Monit argues that it would face difficulties in
preparing its defence if the action was allowed to proceed; however, as with
the Crown, this is not a reason to deny jurisdiction. In any event, as argued
by the respondent, any evidence required by Monit should already be within its
control. If ICAO truly had no control over the ventilation system, any
evidence with respect to the maintenance of the building and the ventilation
system, including remedial work completed, would be within the control of Monit
rather than ICAO. There is no reason to remove the respondent’s right to bring
a legal action in the ordinary courts of Canada merely because of evidentiary
difficulties that Monit may face. This is not a jurisdictional matter, but one
for the trial judge.
32
The success or failure of this action at trial
has nothing to do with the internal operations of the international
organization and, as such, for the reasons stated in Miller v. Canada,
the appeal is dismissed with party and party costs, and this case is returned
to the Quebec Superior Court for determination on its merits.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Marchand,
Magnan, Melançon, Forget, Montréal.
Solicitors for the respondent: Seal
Seidman, Montréal.