Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment),
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 624, 2003 SCC 58
Imperial Oil Ltd. Appellant
v.
Attorney General of Quebec for and on behalf of
the Minister of the Environment, André Boisclair
(formerly Paul Bégin) Respondent
and
Administrative Tribunal of Québec, City of Lévis, Ginette
Tanguay, Marc Turgeon, Lucie Munger, Nicolas Pelletier,
Christine Duhaime, Succession of Claude Maheux, Christine
Bédard, Nancy Kidd, André Martin, Jacques Desmeules, Claude
Nadeau, Brigitte Michaud, Lucien Bélanger, Carole Roseberry,
Reynald Landry, Bernard Côté, Groupe B. Côté, Caisse populaire
Desjardins of Saint‑David, Les Entreprises Michel Verret inc.,
André Blais, Sylvie Bourget, Céline Couture, Jacques Marquis,
Normand Rodrigue, Chantale Jean, Jean‑Marc Bergeron,
Jocelyne Giasson, Lini Fortin, Martine Ringuet, Marielle
Vallières, Gilbert Caron, Rita Nolin, Renée‑Claude Gagné,
Danny Gracez and Corporation Adélaîde Capitale inc. Mis en cause
and
Attorney General of Ontario and Friends of the Earth Interveners
Indexed as: Imperial Oil Ltd. v.
Quebec (Minister of the Environment)
Neutral citation: 2003 SCC 58.
File No.: 28835.
2003: February 14; 2003 : October 30.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major,
Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Administrative law — Discretion — Procedural
fairness — Duty of impartiality — Conflict of interest — Minister of the
Environment issuing characterization order against former owner of land
polluted by hydrocarbons when he was himself sued for damages by present owners
of land — Whether Minister fulfilled his duty of impartiality in issuing
characterization order — Environment Quality Act, R.S.Q., c. Q‑2,
s. 31.42.
Environmental law — Decontamination and restoration
— Characterization of land — Order of Minister — Nature of functions and powers
assigned to Minister in connection with administration of Environment Quality
Act — Content of rules of procedural fairness relevant to performance of
Minister’s functions — Environment Quality Act, R.S.Q., c. Q‑2,
s. 31.42.
When contamination caused problems at a site that had
been operated by Imperial Oil, Quebec’s Minister of the Environment ordered
Imperial, pursuant to s. 31.42 of the Environment Quality Act (“EQA”),
to prepare at its own expense a site characterization study which would also
include appropriate decontamination measures and submit it to the Ministère.
Imperial declined to do the study and asked the Administrative Tribunal of
Québec to quash the Minister’s order. It argued, inter alia, that
there had been a violation of the rules of procedural fairness that applied to
the Minister’s decision since the Minister was in a conflict of interest
because he had been involved in the earlier decontamination work and was now
being sued concerning the contamination of the site by the present owners of
the land. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, but the Superior Court allowed
the application for judicial review. It concluded that the Minister’s order
should be set aside because the Tribunal had adopted an unreasonable
interpretation of s. 31.42 EQA, but also because the Minister was
in a conflict of interest. The Minister therefore did not have the appearance
of impartiality required by the rules of procedural fairness. The Quebec
Court of Appeal set aside this decision and affirmed the Minister’s order.
Held: The appeal
should be dismissed.
The Minister had the authority to issue the kind of
order at stake in the present case under the EQA. Section 31.42, which
sets out what is called the polluter‑pay principle, allows for the use of
a broad discretion by the Minister. Under that provision, the Minister may
impose an obligation on the parties responsible for the contamination of the
environment to conduct the studies required in order to ascertain the nature of
the problem identified, to submit a plan for the corrective work and, where
applicable, to have that work performed at their own expense. In the
application of s. 31.42, the Minister is performing a mainly political
role which involves his authority, and his duty, to choose the best course of
action, from the standpoint of the public interest, in order to achieve the
objectives of the environmental protection legislation. He is not performing
an adjudicative function. On the contrary, he is performing his functions of
management and application of environmental protection legislation.
Imperial’s challenge rests on an erroneous
understanding of the Minister's functions and of the nature of the relevant
rules of procedural fairness. Having regard to the context, which
includes the Minister’s functions viewed in their entirety, as well as to the
framework within which his power to issue orders is exercised, the concept of
impartiality governing the work of the courts does not apply to his decision.
The contextual nature of the content of the duty of impartiality, like that of
all of the rules of procedural fairness, may vary in order to reflect the
context of a decision‑maker’s activities and the nature of its
functions. Here, the Minister certainly had to comply with the procedural
fairness obligations set out in the law, such as the requirements that notice
be given to interested persons and that reasons for the decision be given.
Once those requirements had been met, the principles of procedural fairness
that applied to the situation, and that were in fact codified by the Act
respecting Administrative Justice, required only that he comply with the
procedural obligations set out in the law and that he carefully and attentively
consider the representations made by the person subject to the law he administered.
Moreover, the interests in issue certainly did not amount to a personal
interest within the meaning applied to that expression in the case law. The
only interests the Minister was representing were the public interest in
protecting the environment and the interest of the State, which is responsible
for preserving the environment. In the circumstances of this case, it was
difficult to separate those interests. In exercising his discretion, the
Minister could properly consider a solution that would save some public money.
Accordingly, he applied one of the organizing principles of the EQA, the
polluter‑pay principle. There was no conflict of interest such as would
warrant judicial intervention, let alone any abuse or misuse of power. The Minister
acted within the framework provided by the applicable law and in accordance
with that law. There was no need to rely on the theory of overlapping duties
or the theory of necessity since there was no ground on which proceedings to
review the decision of the Administrative Tribunal of Québec dismissing the
appeal from the Minister’s decision were available.
Cases Cited
Applied: Pearlman
v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, [1991]
2 S.C.R. 869; referred to: 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société
d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, 2001 SCC 40; Valente
v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673; Committee for Justice and Liberty v.
National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369; Bell Canada v. Canadian
Telephone Employees Association, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884, 2003 SCC 36; Old
St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1170;
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999]
2 S.C.R. 817; Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990]
1 S.C.R. 653; IWA v. Consolidated‑Bathurst Packaging Ltd., [1990]
1 S.C.R. 282; Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of
Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623; Ocean Port
Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing
Branch), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, 2001 SCC 52.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting Administrative
Justice, R.S.Q., c. J‑3, ss. 2, 5, 15,
137.
Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A‑12,
ss. 6 , 7 .
Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, s. 11 (d).
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33 .
Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12, s. 23.
Contaminated Sites Remediation
Act, S.M. 1996, c. 40, ss. 1(1)(c)(i), 9(1),
15(1), 17(1), 21(a).
Crown Forest Sustainability
Act, 1994, S.O. 1994, c. 25, s. 56(1).
Environment Act, S.N.S. 1994‑95, c. 1, ss. 2(c), 69, 71, 78(2), 88,
89, 90.
Environment Management Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 118, s. 6(3).
Environment Quality Act, R.S.Q., c. Q‑2, ss. 2(c), 19.1, 19.2, 19.3, 22,
25, 27, 31.11, 31.42 [ad. 1990, c. 26, s. 4; am. 1997, c. 43,
s. 518], 31.43, 31.44 [ad. 1990, c. 26, s. 4; am. 1997, c. 43,
s. 520], 96 [am. 1999, c. 75, s. 32], 106 to 115, 113, 115.1 [am.
1984, c. 29, s. 21].
Environmental Management and
Protection Act, 2002, S.S. 2002, c. E‑10.21,
ss. 7, 9, 12, 14, 15, 46.
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. E‑7, ss. 4(2), 5.1, 6, 7, 16.
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, ss. 7, 8, 43, 93, 97, 99, 150, 190(1).
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E‑9, ss. 7, 7.1, 21.
Environmental Protection Act, S.N.L. 2002, c. E‑14.2, ss. 8(1), 9, 28, 29, Part XIII.
Environmental Protection and
Enhancement Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E‑12,
ss. 2(i), 112, 113(1), 114(1), 116.
Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F‑14, s. 42 .
Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.40, ss. 16.1 [ad. 1998, c. 35, s. 49],
32, 84, 91.
Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11, ss. 29, 30.
Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, UN Doc. A/Conf. 151/5/Rev. 1
(1992).
Waste Management Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 482, ss. 26.5(1), 27(1), 27.1, 28.2, 28.5.
Authors Cited
Daigneault, Robert. “La portée de
la nouvelle loi dite ‘du pollueur‑payeur’” (1991), 36 McGill L.J.
1027.
Garant, Patrice. Droit
administratif, vol. 2, Le contentieux, 4e éd.
Cowansville, Qué.: Yvon Blais, 1996.
Issalys, Pierre, et Denis
Lemieux. L’action gouvernementale: Précis de droit des institutions
administratives, 2e éd. Cowansville, Qué.: Yvon Blais,
2002.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal,
[2001] R.J.Q. 1732, [2001] Q.J. No. 3541 (QL), reversing a decision of the
Superior Court, J.E. 2000‑442, that had set aside a decision of the
Administrative Tribunal of Québec, [1999] T.A.Q. 1256. Appeal dismissed.
Pierre Legault and Olivier
Therrien, for the appellant.
Claude Bouchard, Dominique
Rousseau and Anne‑Marie Brunet, for the respondent.
Jacques Lemieux,
for the mis en cause the Administrative Tribunal of Québec.
Michel Laliberté,
for the mis en cause the City of Lévis.
Jack D. Coop,
for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
Written submissions only by Jerry V. DeMarco, Robert
V. Wright and Lynda M. Collins, for the intervener Friends of the
Earth.
English version of the judgment of the Court delivered
by
LeBel J. —
I. Introduction
1
This environmental law case arises out of the application of the
polluter‑pay statutory principle that has now been incorporated into the
environmental legislation of Quebec. When contamination caused problems at a
site that had been operated by the appellant, Imperial Oil Limited
(“Imperial”), Quebec’s Minister of the Environment (the “Minister”) ordered
Imperial to prepare at its own expense a site characterization study which
would also include appropriate decontamination measures and submit it to the
Ministère. Imperial challenged that order before the Administrative Tribunal
of Québec (“ATQ”), without success. The Superior Court allowed Imperial’s
application for judicial review because the Tribunal had committed what were,
in the Court’s opinion, unreasonable errors in interpreting the relevant
legislation. In addition, the Court held that a situation of conflict of
interest in which the Minister found himself at the time the order was issued
would have invalidated the order in any event. Because the Minister had been
involved in supervising earlier decontamination work at the site and a number
of purchasers of parts of the site had brought action against the Minister in
civil liability, he did not have the appearance of impartiality required by the
rules of procedural fairness applicable to his decision. The Quebec Court of
Appeal set that judgment aside. In the opinion of that Court, the nature of
the duties imposed on the Minister created a state of necessity which justified
a situation that would otherwise have breached the principle of impartial
administrative decision‑making. The appeal decision also held that the
ATQ had not unreasonably interpreted the Environment Quality Act,
R.S.Q., c. Q‑2 (“EQA”).
2
This appeal again raised a number of the legal issues that had
previously been considered by the Quebec Court of Appeal and the Superior Court
in this case. For reasons differing in part from those of the Court of Appeal,
I would dismiss this appeal. The Minister had the authority to issue the
kind of order at stake in the present case under the EQA. Accordingly,
by reason of the nature of the duties assigned to the Minister by the EQA,
he did not violate any of the rules of procedural fairness that applied to the
execution of his power to issue orders. The concept of impartiality was
raised, interpreted and applied incorrectly in this case.
II. Origin of the Case
3
As in many environmental law cases, the roots of the problem in issue go
back a very long time, in this case to, or almost to, the beginning of the 20th
century. In about 1920, Imperial built a petroleum products depot on land it
had acquired on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River in Lévis,
opposite Québec. Imperial continued to operate the depot until 1973. In 1979,
it sold the buildings. The purchaser demolished the petroleum processing
facilities, and in 1987 sold the site on to a real estate developer, Les
Habitations de la Marina Inc. (“Marina”), which planned to build a residential
complex on it.
4
The environmental problems became apparent at that time. Test borings
of the soil showed the presence of hydrocarbons. The discovery of these
contaminants might have become a bar to the issuing of building permits.
Marina then commissioned soil characterization studies. The experts it
consulted confirmed the presence of contaminants and suggested two
decontamination methods to solve the problem. They also recommended that the
Ministère de l’Environnement et de la Faune of Quebec be consulted in order to
obtain its advice about the measures being considered. The Ministère required
further studies, which Marina obtained and submitted. The Ministère then
approved the decontamination methods to be used so that housing could be built
on the former oil depot site. No contact was made with Imperial during that
period. The Ministère’s requirements included that the decontamination work be
supervised by an independent consultant. The developer did not hire the
consultant, but had the decontamination work executed in accordance with the
recommendations of the Ministère. When it was over, the Ministère issued a
certificate of authorization. Streets were laid out, and a number of houses
were built.
5
In 1994, the pollution problem on the site resurfaced. The owners of
some of the properties again noticed signs that hydrocarbons were present in
the soil, and became concerned. New characterization studies were done and
confirmed their fears. Because of the oil and the concentrations of
mineral grease detected, the land could not be used for residential
purposes. Owners of contaminated lots filed three actions in court
against the vendor who had sold them the property and against the City of
Lévis, which had issued the building permits. The Ministère was also
joined as a party. It was alleged, inter alia, that it had been
negligent in supervising and approving the decontamination work. Notices of
intended proceedings were served in other cases. The matter became
increasingly politicized. The City of Lévis began to look for a solution that
would satisfy the owners involved and the public.
6
To that end, the City of Lévis initiated discussions with the Ministère,
which considered a variety of solutions. On March 12, 1998, after further
studies and lengthy consultations, the Minister decided to issue an order under
s. 31.42 EQA. This order required Imperial, as the former owner and
operator of the site, to have a soil characterization study done by an
independent expert, at its own expense, and to submit the report no later than
June 30, 1998. The study had to include a detailed examination of
the condition of the soil, an assessment of the level of soil contamination and
recommendations as to what action should be taken upon receipt of the report.
The order, called a characterization order, did not direct that the work be
done at that stage in the proceedings initiated by the Ministère.
7
Imperial declined to do the characterization study. It exercised the
right of appeal provided for by s. 96 EQA. It asked the Tribunal
to quash the Minister’s order. After the dismissal of its appeal by the
Tribunal, it initiated the judicial review proceedings which are now the
subject of the appeal to this Court. In order to precisely identify the legal
issue on which the outcome of this appeal turns, we must carefully examine the
judicial history of this case and the reasons stated first by the
Administrative Tribunal and then by the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal.
III. Judicial History
A. Administrative Tribunal of Québec,
[1999] T.A.Q. 1256
8
Imperial’s argument before the Administrative Tribunal was, first, that
there had been a violation of the rules of procedural fairness that applied to
the Minister’s decision. The Minister was in a conflict of interest, because
he had been involved in the decontamination work done in 1988 and 1989.
Accordingly, it was impossible for him to act impartially, in accordance with
the principles of natural justice. Its second argument was that the facts of
the case did not support a characterization order, and that in any event the
order could not have been made against Imperial, which argued that it had used
its site in accordance with then acceptable standards for industrial land,
during the time it operated its depot.
9
The decision of the Administrative Tribunal rejected all of the
appellant’s arguments. The Tribunal found, first, that the complaints
regarding the violation of the rules of procedural equity were without merit.
In its opinion, the notices required had been given before the order was
issued. Imperial had had an opportunity to present observations to the
Minister. Moreover, in the Tribunal’s opinion, the legislation created
overlapping functions that were an exception to the rule of impartiality. The
overlap reflects the exigencies of the enforcement of environmental
legislation. The order, which was limited to the characterization study, was
also not an unreasonable exercise of the Minister’s powers. The argument
concerning the requirements that had to be met before issuing the order was
also rejected after a review of the evidence. On that point, the Tribunal
decided that such orders may be made against a party who is no longer the owner
of a site, if it may have been responsible for pollution discovered on the
site, after the transfer or abandonment, in accordance with ss. 31.42 and
31.43 EQA. In the Tribunal’s opinion, the evidence established that the
hydrocarbons found in the soil, which had in fact moved beyond the boundaries
of the site, came from the operations carried on by Imperial. The
Tribunal affirmed the Minister’s order for those reasons.
B. Quebec Superior Court, J.E. 2000‑442
10
Imperial then moved the dispute to the Superior Court. It filed an
application for judicial review and declaratory judgment. Its application
asked that the decision of the Administrative Tribunal affirming the Minister’s
order be reviewed and set aside. In its application, the appellant restated
its arguments concerning the failure to meet the requirements governing the
issuing of that kind of order, in the context of this case. It also alleged
that the Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable. Its main argument, however,
seems to have related to the legal status of the Minister at the time the order
was issued. On that point, it argued that the Tribunal should not have
affirmed a decision that the Minister had had no jurisdiction to make, because
he was in a conflict of interest and thus did not have the impartiality
required to make the decision. The conflict of interest allegedly arose from
the proceedings that had previously been brought against the Minister
concerning the contamination of the land, and the proceedings he had been
threatened with, as well as from his involvement in the decontamination work
carried on between 1987 and 1989. Imperial also noted — correctly — that
during that period it had received neither a warning that the pollution problem
had been discovered or that work had been undertaken to remedy it nor a request
that it be involved in that work. It pointed out that the work had complicated
the situation and had undoubtedly considerably increased the costs of the
characterization studies and of the decontamination and site restoration work
that might have to be executed.
11
Pelletier J. allowed the application for judicial review and set
aside the Tribunal’s decision and the Minister’s order. His judgment held,
first, that the Tribunal had adopted an unreasonable interpretation of
s. 31.42 EQA when it concluded that the characterization order
imposed only reasonable costs on Imperial. The Superior Court seems to
have thought, in this case, that the characterization order necessarily
involved an order to perform decontamination or restoration, and that the two
steps could not be separated. Pelletier J. therefore found that the Tribunal
had greatly underestimated the extent of the obligations imposed by the order,
and that the seriousness of that error vitiated the Tribunal’s entire analysis
of the evidence and the findings it made on the basis of that analysis.
The judge also accepted the conflict of interest argument. His judgment
explains that the Minister was in a flagrant conflict of interest, because of
his involvement in the decontamination of the site and the proceedings brought
against him. His interest in the ultimate outcome of the case, which the judge
characterized as “personal”, prevented him from acting with the necessary
impartiality. The order was therefore also vitiated by this fundamental
defect. This meant that a problem of bias on the part of the decision‑maker
had arisen. This problem could not be solved through the doctrine of built‑in
bias, which restricts the scope of the duty of impartiality because of the
nature of the management and decision‑making structures that govern the
discharge of the duties by the Minister.
C. Quebec Court of Appeal, [2001] R.J.Q.
1732
12
On appeal by the Minister, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of
the Superior Court and dismissed the application for judicial review for the
reasons stated in the opinion of Thibault J.A. She found, first, that the
Superior Court had erred in concluding that the EQA did not permit the
Minister to issue orders concerning the characterization studies and the
restoration and decontamination work in two separate steps. She then held
that the financial consequences of the order were not a relevant criterion at
the time it was issued. On that point, therefore, the judgment rejected the
argument that the interpretation of the Act had been unreasonable.
13
The opinion of Thibault J.A. dealt primarily with the procedural
fairness problem, particularly as it related to the Minister’s bias and
conflict of interest. In her opinion, although the Minister was exercising a
discretionary administrative power, he was nonetheless bound to act
impartially. She conceded that there was an appearance of bias, because of the
Minister’s financial interest. However, to avoid quashing the impugned
decision, she then relied upon the concept of necessity: the Minister alone may
perform the functions and exercise the powers provided for by the Act to ensure
that the obligations that the legislation imposes on the polluter are met, in
order to protect the environment in Quebec. The acknowledgement of a state of
necessity justified an exception to the principle of impartiality applied to
administrative decision‑makers. The Minister’s alleged inability to
act resulted from the duties imposed on him by law, and not from his voluntary
act. Thibault J.A. also did not think that it was necessary to examine
the arguments made by Imperial concerning the constitutionality of the
Administrative Tribunal of Québec, as she believed it to be of no practical
consequence in this case. Imperial’s application for judicial review was
therefore dismissed in its entirety by the Quebec Court of Appeal. That
judgment is the subject of the appeal for which leave was granted to this
Court.
IV. Relevant Statutory Provisions
14
Environment Quality Act, R.S.Q., c. Q‑2
31.42. Where the Minister believes on reasonable grounds that a
contaminant is present in the environment in a greater quantity or
concentration than that established by regulation under paragraph a of
section 31.52, he may order whoever had emitted, deposited, released or
discharged, even before 22 June 1990, all or some of the contaminant
to furnish him with a characterization study, a programme of decontamination or
restoration of the environment describing the work proposed for the
decontamination or restoration of the environment and a timetable for the
execution of the work.
Moreover, where the Minister believes on reasonable
grounds that a contaminant prohibited by regulation of the Government is
present in the environment or that a contaminant present in the environment is
likely to affect the life, health, safety, welfare or comfort of human beings,
or to cause damage to or to otherwise impair the quality of the soil,
vegetation, wildlife or property, he may issue an order to the same effect to
whoever has emitted, deposited, released or discharged, even before
22 June 1990, all or some of the contaminant.
The order shall include a statement of the reasons
invoked by the Minister and specify the time within which the documents must be
furnished to him. The order takes effect 16 days after its notification
or on any later date stated therein.
Within 60 days of receipt of the documents,
the Minister may approve the proposed decontamination or restoration work and
the timetable for its execution, with or without amendment. Whoever is named
in the order as being responsible for the source of contamination shall at the
request of the Minister provide him, within the time he fixes, with any
information, research findings or study he may need to grant his approval.
Whoever is named in the order as being responsible
for the source of contamination shall execute the work in accordance with the
timetable, as approved by the Minister.
31.44. At least 15 days before issuing either order, the
Minister shall, as prescribed by section 5 of the Act respecting administrative
justice (chapter J‑3), notify whoever has emitted, deposited, released or
discharged the contaminant and, where applicable, the owner of the soil
concerned, stating the reasons on which the order is based, the time within
which the documents required under section 31.42 must be furnished to him or the
work he may order under section 31.43 and the timetable for its execution, the
date on which the order, if issued, is to take effect and the fact that
observations may be presented by whoever has been notified and, where
applicable, by the owner of the soil concerned within the period of time
specified in the prior notice as well as the fact that whoever has been
notified may, for the purposes of section 31.43, propose work and a timetable
for its execution.
The prior notice shall be accompanied with a copy
of every analysis, study or other technical report taken into consideration by
the Minister.
For the purposes of section 31.43, the Minister may
approve, with or without amendment, the work and the timetable for its
execution proposed, where that is the case, by whoever is responsible for the
source of contamination, upon presenting observations.
Upon notifying the prior notice, the Minister shall
transmit a copy to the secretary‑treasurer or clerk of the municipality
where the contaminant has been found.
96. Any order issued by the Minister, except those contemplated
in sections 29 and 32.5, in the second paragraph of section 34 and in sections
35, 49.1, 58, 61, 114, 114.1 and 120 may be contested by the municipality or
person concerned before the Administrative Tribunal of Québec.
The same applies in all cases where the Minister
refuses to grant or revokes an authorization certificate, a certificate, an
authorization, an approval other than the approval referred to in the third paragraph
of section 31.44, a permission or a permit, refuses to renew a permit, notifies
a notice under section 31.46, requires a change in an application made to him,
fixes or apportions costs and expenses other than those contemplated in section
32.5 or 35, determines compensation under section 61, notifies a denial of
conformity to the proponent of a project, refuses to issue or amends, suspends
or revokes a depollution attestation or refuses to amend or to revoke a
depollution attestation upon application from the holder thereof.
An operator of an industrial establishment may,
where the Minister approves rates with amendments pursuant to section 32.9,
contest such decision before the Tribunal.
115.1. The Minister may take all such measures as he may
indicate to clean, collect or contain contaminants that are or that are likely
to be emitted, deposited, discharged or ejected into the environment or to
prevent their being emitted, deposited, discharged or ejected into the
environment, where he considers such measures necessary to avert or diminish
the risk of damage to public or private property, human beings, wildlife,
vegetation or the general environment.
The Minister may claim the direct and indirect
costs related to such measures, in the same manner as any debt owing to the
Government, from any person or municipality who had custody of or control over
the contaminants and from any person or municipality responsible for the
emission, deposit, discharge or issuance of the contaminants, as the case may
be, whether or not the latter has been prosecuted for infringement of this
Act. Liability is joint and several where there are several debtors involved.
Act
respecting Administrative Justice, R.S.Q., c. J‑3
2. The procedures leading to an individual decision to be made
by the Administration, pursuant to norms or standards prescribed by law, in
respect of a citizen shall be conducted in keeping with the duty to act fairly.
.
. .
15. The Tribunal has the power to decide any question of law or
fact necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction.
In the case of the contestation of a decision, the
Tribunal may confirm, vary or quash the contested decision and, if appropriate,
make the decision which, in its opinion, should have been made initially.
.
. .
137. Each party may plead any ground of law or fact relevant to
the determination of his rights and obligations.
V. Analysis
A. The Issues
15
A clear understanding of the nature of the issues between the parties in
this Court is essential in order to avoid getting sidetracked by related
problems. We need to go straight to the precise question the answer to
which will determine the outcome of this appeal. Prior to that, however,
I will summarize the arguments and problems no longer raised by the parties in
this Court. The analysis will then focus on the question that really remains
at issue in this appeal.
16
The Administrative Tribunal, the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal
all had to determine whether the Minister had the authority to issue two orders
in succession, the first concerning the characterization of the site and the
second the performance of the work. They considered the requirements to be met
before the characterization order could be issued, and discussed the evidence
introduced on that point. None of that remains in issue in this Court.
17
The sole issue now at stake in this appeal is the question of procedural
fairness or natural justice in relation to the Minister’s decision. It
remains, though, an important issue. The appellant submits that there was
bias, or at the least an appearance of bias, that completely vitiated the
decision to issue a characterization order. That argument is based on the
premise that the Minister was bound by a duty of impartiality that he could not
fulfil because of the existence of a conflict of interest. The conflict, it is
submitted, arose both from the involvement of the Ministère in the
decontamination operations performed earlier and from the economic consequences
of the legal action that had been taken or was being threatened against it.
The Quebec Court of Appeal based its reasoning on the same premise, but then
sought to restrict its scope of application through the identification of
exceptions to the duty of impartiality, such as necessity. We will therefore
have to consider the nature and effects of that duty, and the conditions and scope
of its application to an administrative decision‑maker such as the
Minister. If the argument that the Minister must be impartial, as framed by
the appellant, is found to be without merit, the legal basis for the entire
challenge to the decisions of the Tribunal and the Minister will fall
apart. The application for judicial review will then have to be
dismissed.
B. The Statutory Framework Created by the
Environment Quality Act
18
Although the appeal heard by the Court raises an administrative law issue
in the context of an application for judicial review, the question relates to
an environmental protection problem in Quebec. It cannot be resolved without
first examining the statutory framework that governs this field in Quebec. The
examination of this framework will then make possible the proper identification
and definition of the nature of the functions and powers assigned to the
Minister, in connection with the administration of environmental legislation.
With an accurate understanding of the objectives and operation of that scheme,
we will then be better able to ascertain the content of the rules of procedural
fairness which are relevant to the performance of the Minister’s functions, and
to determine whether they were breached when the characterization order was
issued (Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, [1991]
2 S.C.R. 869, at p. 886, per Iacobucci J.).
19
The Quebec legislation reflects the growing concern on the part of
legislatures and of society about the safeguarding of the environment. That
concern does not reflect only the collective desire to protect it in the
interests of the people who live and work in it, and exploit its resources,
today. It may also be evidence of an emerging sense of inter‑generational
solidarity and acknowledgement of an environmental debt to humanity and to the
world of tomorrow (114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v.
Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, 2001 SCC 40, at para. 1, per
L’Heureux‑Dubé J.).
20
The centrepiece of Quebec’s environmental legislation is the Environment
Quality Act, which was originally enacted in 1972. That Act recognizes
that every person is entitled to a healthy environment and to the protection of
the living species inhabiting it (s. 19.1 EQA). To ensure that
this right may be effectively exercised, and that the duties created to give
effect to it are executed, the Act provides for a variety of mechanisms for
taking action. Various schemes are established for authorizing and monitoring
activities that could threaten the environment. Others prohibit or restrict
the emission of contaminants and impose obligations to decontaminate. There
are also sometimes severe penal sanctions for breaches of the Act. The
Superior Court is given broad powers of injunction, to prevent or stop any act
that might interfere with the fundamental right to the preservation of the
quality of the environment (s. 19.2 EQA).
21
The Minister of the Environment plays a key role in the administration
of the Act and the regulations under it, and in the implementation of the
general policy on which they are based. The legislature has delegated
substantial and diverse functions and powers to the Minister for such
purposes. Broadly speaking, the Minister prepares plans for the
conservation and protection of the environment and sees that they are carried
out (s. 2(c) EQA). The legislature has also assigned the
Minister the task of issuing authorizations, depollution certificates and
permits required for any activity that might result in the discharge of
contaminants into the environment or reduce the quality of the environment
(ss. 22 and 31.11 EQA). In addition, the Act gives the
Minister broad powers to act in order to prevent harm to the quality of the
environment by making various categories of orders prescribing various
corrective measures (see, for example, ss. 25 and 27 EQA).
Morever, the Minister may institute the civil or penal proceedings that are
necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act (s. 19.3 EQA and
ss. 106 to 115 EQA). The Minister may also have the necessary
corrective work executed and its cost recovered from the offenders
(ss. 113 to 115.1 EQA).
22
The power to make orders that is in issue in this appeal belongs to a
class of powers delegated to the Minister which allow him to take action
whenever contaminants are found in the environment. Other provisions in the
Act, such as ss. 113 and 115.1, authorize the Minister to have the work
needed to eliminate the contaminants executed, and to try to recover its cost
from the parties responsible later. Section 31.42 provides for a
different approach. Under that provision, the Minister may impose an
obligation on the parties responsible for the contamination of the environment
to conduct the studies required in order to ascertain the nature of the problem
identified, to submit a plan for the corrective work and, where applicable, to
have that work performed at their own expense. As we have seen, the order
issued under s. 31.42 is subject to appeal to the ATQ. As well, neglect
or refusal to carry out such an order entitles the Minister to initiate the
civil or penal proceedings provided for in, inter alia, Division XIII of
the Act. We need not examine the legal rules applicable to the proceedings in
this appeal. Nor, in the context of this appeal, do we need to examine
the nature and scope of the defences that could be raised in the course of
proceedings. Those questions will undoubtedly provide the subject matter
of future developments in the case law.
23
Section 31.42 EQA, which was enacted in 1990 (S.Q. 1990,
c. 26, s. 4), applies what is called the polluter‑pay
principle, which has now been incorporated into Quebec’s environmental
legislation. In fact, that principle has become firmly entrenched in
environmental law in Canada. It is found in almost all federal and provincial
environmental legislation, as may be seen: Canadian Environmental Protection
Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33 ; Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. A‑12, ss. 6 , 7 ; Fisheries Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. F‑14, s. 42 ; Waste Management Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 482, ss. 26.5(1), 27(1), 27.1, 28.2, 28.5; Environment
Management Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 118, s. 6(3); Environmental
Protection and Enhancement Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E‑12, ss. 2(i),
112, 113(1), 114(1), 116; Environmental Management and Protection Act, 2002,
S.S. 2002, c. E‑10.21, ss. 7, 9, 12, 14, 15, 46; Contaminated
Sites Remediation Act, S.M. 1996, c. 40, ss. 1(1)(c)(i), 9(1),
15(1), 17(1), 21(a)); Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. E.19, ss. 7, 8, 43, 93, 97, 99, 150, 190(1); Pesticides Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11, ss. 29, 30; Ontario Water Resources Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. O.40, ss. 16.1, 32, 84, 91; Crown Forest
Sustainability Act, 1994, S.O. 1994, c. 25, s. 56(1);
Environment Act, S.N.S. 1994‑95, c. 1, ss. 2(c), 69, 71,
78(2), 88, 89, 90; Environmental Protection Act, S.N.L. 2002, c. E‑14.2,
ss. 8(1), 9, 28, 29, Part XIII; Environmental Protection
Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E‑9, ss. 7, 7.1, 21; Environmental
Protection Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. E‑7, ss. 4(2), 5.1, 6, 7,
16. (See R. Daigneault, “La portée de la nouvelle loi dite ‘du pollueur‑payeur’”
(1991), 36 McGill L.J. 1027.) That principle is also recognized at
the international level. One of the best examples of that recognition is found
in the sixteenth principle of Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
UN Doc. A/Conf. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992).
24
To encourage sustainable development, that principle assigns polluters the
responsibility for remedying contamination for which they are responsible and
imposes on them the direct and immediate costs of pollution. At the same time,
polluters are asked to pay more attention to the need to protect ecosystems in
the course of their economic activities.
25
The procedure which authorizes the Minister to issue an order against
whoever is responsible for the pollution under s. 31.42 EQA and its
related provisions represents one of the most important enforcement tools
available in Quebec’s environmental legislation. The adaptation of such a
procedure appeared of singular importance in the search for a solution to soil
contamination problems. On that point, it should be noted that the
decision of the ATQ quoted passages from the debates of the National Assembly
of Quebec in 1990 confirming that legislative objective. Section 31.42 allows
for the use of a broad discretion in pursuit of that objective. The Minister
may issue a characterization order or prescribe that a work program be carried
out. The Act authorizes the Minister to issue an order when he believes on
reasonable grounds that a contaminant harmful to the environment is present in
a place and may cause harm to human beings or the ecosystem. The order may be
made against whoever is responsible for the contamination, including anyone
whose activity occurred before the coming into force of the Act in 1990. As
discretionary and broad as the power to make orders appears to be, nonetheless
important procedural requirements circumscribe it. We must now examine them.
26
Those procedural rules provide more guidance about certain aspects of
the general duty of procedural fairness that s. 2 of the Act respecting
Administrative Justice imposes on administrative decision‑makers, by
codifying a consistent line of decisions in Canadian administrative law
(P. Issalys and D. Lemieux, L’action gouvernementale: Précis de
droit des institutions administratives (2nd ed. 2002), at p. 847).
First, s. 31.44 EQA requires that the Minister give 15 days’ prior
notice of his intention to issue an order. Such a notice shall state, inter
alia, that the person to whom it is directed may present observations
within the time specified, and shall describe the reasons for the proposed
decision. Section 31.44 then refers to s. 5 of the Act respecting
Administrative Justice, which describes the obligations with which an
administrative authority such as the Minister must comply before making an
individual and unfavourable decision in respect of a citizen. That provision
restates the requirement that the interested parties be given prior notice,
also sets out the right to present observations and produce documents
concerning the proposed decision and reiterates that reasons must be given in
support of the decision.
27
The record confirms that the necessary notices were given. The
appellant had an opportunity to present its observations, which the Minister
reviewed before issuing a decision, for which reasons were given. The
procedural framework established by the Act was therefore followed. As we have
seen, the debate then focused on another issue which is also a component of the
principles of natural justice: the nature and scope of the duty of impartiality
that applies to the decision‑maker, the Minister. That issue was
incorrectly addressed, however, on the basis of an erroneous understanding both
of the duty of impartiality of the Minister and of the consequences of the
conflict of interest to which a breach of that principle allegedly gave rise.
At the outset of the analysis, a preferred approach would have been to attempt
to determine the applicability of the concept of impartiality relied upon by
the appellant, in its full potential reach. In this perspective, the
scope of the duty of impartiality upon an administrative decision‑maker
such as the Minister in the exercise of an essentially discretionary and
political power, and the manner in which that duty is discharged, would then
have had to be examined.
C. The Duty of Impartiality in
Administrative Law and Variations of That Duty
28
The duty of impartiality ranks among the fundamental obligations of the
courts. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognizes the
right of any person charged with an offence to be tried by an independent and
impartial tribunal (s. 11 (d)). In the matters which fall within
the legislative jurisdiction of Quebec, s. 23 of the Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12, recognizes the right to a
fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal as a fundamental human
right. The concept of impartiality refers to the decision‑maker’s state
of mind (Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, at
p. 685, per Le Dain J.). The decision‑maker must approach
the issue submitted to him or her with an open mind, not influenced by personal
interests or outside pressure. It is not sufficient that the decision‑maker
be impartial in his or her own mind, internally, to the satisfaction of his or
her own conscience. It is also necessary that the decision‑maker appear
impartial in the objective view of a reasonable and well‑informed
observer (Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board,
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 394, per de Grandpré J.; also
: Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees Association, [2003] 1
S.C.R. 884, 2003 SCC 36, at para. 17, per McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache
J.). The duty of impartiality, which originated with the judiciary, has now
become part of the principles of administrative justice.
29
The principles of natural justice do undeniably govern the actions of
administrative decision‑makers, as is in fact evidenced by s. 2 of
the Act respecting Administrative Justice (P. Garant, Droit
administratif (4th ed. 1996), vol. 2, Le contentieux, at
pp. 319‑320 and 338; Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v.
Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1170, at p. 1190, per
Sopinka J.; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 20, per L’Heureux‑Dubé
J.). Imperial therefore argues that the duty of impartiality applies in its
full rigour and that the Minister did not meet its requirements.
30
The appellant argued that the Minister had placed himself in an
insoluble conflict of interest because of his unfortunate involvement in the
failed decontamination of the Lévis Marina site and the legal and financial
consequences of that involvement for the Minister. The appellant underlines
that the decisions made by the Minister, and the actions taken by him, in the
course of those decontamination operations even resulted in the loss of any
appearance of impartiality. Accordingly, the appellant submits, his capacity
to make an impartial decision was irremediably compromised in the eyes of any
properly informed, objective and reasonable observer. However, that is not the
full extent of the problem. The appellant then points out that legal action
has already been initiated against the Minister by a number of owners of
contaminated land, claiming substantial damages from him. In addition, notices
have been sent to the Ministère in a number of cases in which further actions
in damages remain possible. The potential risks of damage judgments in those
cases put the Minister in a situation in which he is incapable of acting with
the necessary independence in applying s. 31.42. In the appellant’s
submission, the decision to proceed by issuing a characterization order is
necessarily tainted by the suspicion that the Minister’s intention in so doing
was to insulate himself from the possible legal consequences of his unfortunate
involvement in the decontamination operations at the Marina site. Allowing the
Minister to act with impunity in these circumstances would amount to ratifying
a genuine abuse or misuse of power.
31
The appellant’s reasoning thus treats the Minister, for all intents and
purposes, like a member of the judiciary, whose personal interest in a case
would make him apparently biased in the eyes of an objective and properly
informed third party. This line of argument overlooks the contextual nature of
the content of the duty of impartiality which, like that of all of the rules of
procedural fairness, may vary in order to reflect the context of a decision‑maker’s
activities and the nature of its functions (Baker, supra, at
para. 21; Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990]
1 S.C.R. 653, at p. 682, per L’Heureux‑Dubé J.; IWA
v. Consolidated‑Bathurst Packaging Ltd., [1990]
1 S.C.R. 282, at pp. 323‑24, per Gonthier J.; Newfoundland
Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities),
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 623, at p. 636, per Cory J.). These
variations in the actual content of the principles of natural justice
acknowledge the great diversity in the situations of administrative decision‑makers
and in the roles they play, as intended by legislatures (Ocean Port Hotel
Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch),
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, 2001 SCC 52, at para. 24, per
McLachlin C.J.). The categories of administrative bodies involved range from
administrative tribunals whose adjudicative functions are very similar to those
of the courts, such as grievance arbitrators in labour law, to bodies that
perform multiple tasks and whose adjudicative functions are merely one aspect
of broad duties and powers that sometimes include regulation‑making
power. The notion of administrative decision‑maker also includes
administrative managers such as ministers or officials who perform policy‑making
discretionary functions within the apparatus of government. The extent of the
duties imposed on the administrative decision‑maker will then depend on
the nature of the functions to be performed and on the legislature’s
intention. In each case, the entire body of legislation that defines the
functions of an administrative decision‑maker, and the framework within
which his or her activities are carried on, will have to be carefully
examined. The determination of the actual content of the duties of procedural
fairness that apply requires such an analysis.
32
In his management of the Marina file, the Minister made a decision that
especially targeted Imperial. That decision may impose substantial
expenses on the parties which the Minister considers to be the authors of the
pollution of the site in question. There is no doubt that the characterization
order calls for major studies in order to determine the condition of the site
and for the preparation of recommendations about the measures which should be
taken to remedy the contamination of the site. Given these circumstances, we
need a concrete definition of the nature and extent of the rules of procedural
fairness that apply to the Minister’s decision. Is the Minister bound by a
duty of impartiality, in its full scope and rigour, as are judges or
administrative tribunals that essentially perform adjudicative functions, such
as the ATQ or grievance arbitrators in the case of labour law? On this point,
the decisions of this Court stress the crucial importance of a careful
examination of the applicable legislation in order to determine the nature and
scope of the rules of procedural fairness that apply to action taken by an
administrative decision‑maker (Ocean Port Hotel, supra, at
paras. 20 and 22; Bell Canada, supra, at para. 22).
33
The Environment Quality Act defines the nature and extent of the
procedural fairness obligations by which the Minister is bound when he issues a
characterization order. Those procedural obligations result from the express
terms of the Act, such as requirements respecting the structure for managing
environmental problems and the type of functions assigned to the Minister for
that purpose. The method of managing environmental problems selected by the
legislature creates a situation that the legislature clearly intended to create
and to which it clearly agreed. The role assigned to the Minister by the
legislation sometimes inevitably places the Minister in a conflict with those
subject to the law he administers, in the course of the implementation of
environmental legislation.
34
When the Minister has to make a specific decision concerning someone
subject to the law, he must comply with precise procedural obligations, which
were described earlier. Generally speaking, those obligations require that he
give notice to the person concerned, receive and review the representations and
information submitted by that person and give reasons to that person for his
decision. The effect of this procedural framework is that the Minister must carefully
and attentively examine the observations submitted to him. However, that
obligation is not equivalent to the impartiality that is required of a judge or
an administrative decision‑maker whose primary function is adjudication.
In performing his functions, the Minister is involved in the management of an
environmental protection system. He must make decisions in a context in which
the need for the long‑term management of environmental problems plays a
prominent role, and in which he must ensure that the fundamental legislative
policy on which the interpretation and application of environment quality
legislation are based is implemented. The Minister has the responsibility of
protecting the public interest in the environment, and must make his decisions
in consideration of that interest.
35
What remains to be considered is the problem of the Minister’s personal
interest, as that interest was expressed by the trial judge. The decision in Pearlman,
supra, provided necessary guidance on the nature of the personal
interest that would put an administrative decision‑maker in a conflict of
interest within the meaning of the principles of procedural fairness.
That case dealt with disciplinary proceedings taken by the Manitoba Law Society
against one of its members, who argued that the members of the Law Society’s
Discipline Committee were in an unavoidable conflict of interest. The enabling
statute of the professional body in question allowed it to award the costs of a
disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer subject to those proceedings. In
the submission of the appellant Pearlman, the members of the committee
therefore had a pecuniary interest in ordering that costs be paid. They would
benefit from payment of those costs as members of the Law Society, and that
situation created an unacceptable appearance of conflict of interest (Pearlman,
at p. 883, per Iacobucci J.).
36
The Court rejected that argument. It again stressed that the manner in
which the rules of natural justice are applied depends on the context
(pp. 884‑85). The duty to remain untainted by personal interest
applied in a context in which the members of the Discipline Committee were
performing their duties in the common interests of the profession and for the
protection of the public, not for their personal benefit. Any interest they
may have had in recovering the costs of the proceedings was too remote and
attenuated to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the eyes of an
objective and properly informed observer (pp. 891‑92, per
Iacobucci J.).
37
In light of the foregoing, I am of the view that the Minister was merely
defending, in the context of this case, the inseparable interests of the public
and the state in the protection of the environment.
VI. Application of the Rules of Procedural
Fairness
38
In this case, as was discussed above, the Minister used a discretionary
political power for the purposes of the application of s. 31.42 EQA.
A contamination problem had to be dealt with, and he had to choose the solution
that he considered to be the most appropriate. That choice fell within the
discretion assigned to him by the Act (Issalys and Lemieux, supra, at
p. 127). He had to choose among doing nothing, carrying out the necessary
investigations and work and then trying to recover the cost from the persons
responsible for the contamination of the site, and going directly to those
persons and trying to compel them to take the necessary action at their own
expense. The Minister was not performing an adjudicative function in which he
was acting as a sort of judge. On the contrary, he was performing his
functions of management and application of environmental protection
legislation. The Minister was performing a mainly political role which
involved his authority, and his duty, to choose the best course of action, from
the standpoint of the public interest, in order to achieve the objectives of
the environmental protection legislation.
39
Having regard to the context, which includes the Minister’s functions
viewed in their entirety, as well as to the framework within which his power to
issue orders is exercised, the concept of impartiality governing the work of
the courts did not apply to his decision. Certainly, the Minister must comply
with the procedural fairness obligations set out in the law such as the
requirements that notice be given to interested persons and that reasons for
the decision be given. Once those requirements have been met, the principles
of procedural fairness that apply to the situation, and that are in fact, as we
have seen, codified by the Act respecting Administrative Justice,
required only that he comply with the procedural obligations set out in the law
and that he carefully and attentively consider the representations made by the
person subject to the law he administers. Moreover, applying the
principles stated in Pearlman, the interests in issue certainly did not
amount to a personal interest within the meaning applied to that expression in
the case law. The only interests the Minister was representing were the public
interest in protecting the environment and the interest of the State, which is
responsible for preserving the environment. In the circumstances of this case,
it would be difficult to separate those interests. In exercising his
discretion, the Minister could properly consider a solution that might save
some public money. Accordingly, he applied one of the organizing principles of
the Environment Quality Act, the polluter‑pay principle. There
was no conflict of interest such as would warrant judicial intervention, let
alone any abuse or misuse of power. The Minister acted within the framework
provided by the applicable law and in accordance with that law. There was no
need to rely on the theory of overlapping duties or the theory of necessity
since there was no ground on which proceedings to review the decision of the
Administrative Tribunal of Québec dismissing the appeal from the Minister’s
decision were available. The appellant’s entire challenge rested on an
erroneous understanding of the Minister’s functions and of the nature of the
relevant rules of procedural fairness.
VII. Conclusion
40
For these reasons, the appeal must be dismissed. I would award costs to
the Attorney General of Quebec.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Desjardins Ducharme Stein Monast,
Montréal.
Solicitor for the respondent: Department of Justice, Québec.
Solicitors for the mis en cause the Administrative Tribunal of Québec:
Lemieux Chrétien Lahaye Corriveau, Québec.
Solicitor for the mis en cause the City of Lévis: City of Lévis,
Lévis.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario: The
Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitor of the intervener Friends of the Earth: Sierra Legal
Defence Fund, Toronto.