SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Her
Majesty The Queen
Appellant
and
Georges
Beaulieu
Respondent
Coram: McLachlin
C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron and Cromwell JJ.
Reasons
for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 9)
|
Charron J.
(McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish and Cromwell JJ.
concurring)
|
______________________________
R. v.
Beaulieu, 2010 SCC 7, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 248
Her Majesty
The Queen Appellant
v.
Georges
Beaulieu Respondent
Indexed
as: R. v. Beaulieu
2010 SCC 7
File
No.: 33181.
2010: January 12;
2010: February 25.
Present: McLachlin C.J.
and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron and Cromwell JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Enforcement — Exclusion of
evidence — Violation of accused’s right against unreasonable search and seizure
— Trial judge declining to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether evidence should have been excluded.
During the course of an investigation into drug trafficking, RCMP
officers obtained an authorization to intercept the accused’s private
communications. While installing listening devices in his car, they found a
hidden compartment containing a leather case with a loaded firearm in it. The
firearm was rendered unusable and placed back in the car. The accused was
later convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm. Although the
firearm itself was never recovered and therefore not in evidence at trial, the
accused challenged the admissibility of the testimony relating to its
discovery. The trial judge found that the search exceeded the scope of the
authorization and violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms but declined to exclude the evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) ,
primarily on the basis that the police officers did not believe they were
exceeding the powers granted to them by the authorization and had not evidenced
a flagrant disregard of the accused’s Charter rights. A majority of the
Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence and
set aside the conviction.
Held: The appeal should be allowed.
The Court of Appeal’s decision should be set aside and the accused’s
conviction restored. Considerable deference is owed to a trial judge’s
s. 24(2) assessment and, in this case, she considered the proper factors
and made no unreasonable findings. The fact that the trial judge and the Court
of Appeal did not have the benefit of the new three‑part s. 24(2)
inquiry set out in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, does
not affect the outcome of this case because the relevant factors in a
s. 24(2) analysis have not changed and the trial judge’s reasons make
clear that the three Grant considerations point toward admitting the
evidence.
Cases Cited
Applied: R. v. Grant, 2009
SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353; referred to: R. v. Collins, [1987]
1 S.C.R. 265.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, ss. 8 , 24(2) .
Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46, s. 95 .
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (Gendreau,
Dalphond and Côté JJ.A.), 2009 QCCA 797, [2009] J.Q. no 3803
(QL), 2009 CarswellQue 3887, setting aside the accused’s conviction. Appeal
allowed.
Magalie Cimon and Henri‑Pierre
La Brie, for the appellant.
Michel Dussault, Christian
Raymond and Alexandre Boucher, for the respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
[1] Charron J. — This is a Crown appeal as
of right on the question of whether the trial judge erred in declining to
exclude evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms . In our view, the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal erred in
reversing the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence. We would allow the
Crown’s appeal and restore the conviction.
[2] The
relevant facts are detailed in the decisions below and need only be reviewed
briefly here. The respondent, Georges Beaulieu, was convicted of possession of
a loaded prohibited firearm contrary to s. 95 of the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46 . The firearm was found in a secret compartment
of his car during the course of an extensive investigation into drug
trafficking. As part of the operation, RCMP officers in Montreal obtained an
authorization to intercept the private conversations of Mr. Beaulieu. While
installing listening devices in his car, two officers discovered hidden
electrical switches underneath the dashboard. The officers followed the wires
and found that they led to the centre of the console. They dismantled the
console and found a hidden compartment containing a leather case. At this
point, the officers stopped their installation and notified their superior who
then opened the case to find that it contained a loaded firearm. So as not to
jeopardize the ongoing investigation, the police had the firearm rendered
unusable and placed it back in the car. One year later, Mr. Beaulieu was
charged with this offence.
[3] While the
firearm itself was never recovered and was therefore not in evidence at trial
at the Court of Quebec, Mr. Beaulieu challenged the admissibility of the
testimony relating to the discovery of the firearm. The trial judge found that
the search was not performed [translation]
“for the purpose of installing the device, ensuring their safety or protecting
their investigative technique” (Appellant’s Record, vol. IV, at p. 85).
Rather, at the time of the search, the police, surprised by the discovery of
the wires and hidden compartment, had abandoned the plan to install listening
devices. Consequently, the search exceeded the scope of the judicial
authorization and violated s. 8 of the Charter . That finding was not
appealed. It is not disputed that the judicial authorization did not give the
police carte blanche to search the vehicle in a manner or for a purpose that
exceeded the terms of the judicial order.
[4] The trial
judge, however, declined to exclude the evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) ,
primarily on the basis that the police officers did not believe they were
exceeding the powers granted to them by the authorization and had not evidenced
a flagrant disregard of Mr. Beaulieu’s Charter rights. Gendreau
J.A., writing for a majority of the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal and set
aside the conviction: 2009 QCCA 797 (CanLII). Côté J.A., dissenting, would
have dismissed the appeal.
[5] The
majority of the Court of Appeal erred in interfering with the trial judge’s
weighing of the factors in the s. 24(2) analysis. In R. v. Grant, 2009
SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, this Court reaffirmed that “considerable
deference” is owed to a trial judge’s s. 24(2) assessment of what would bring
the administration of justice into disrepute having regard to all the
circumstances (para. 86). In this case, the trial judge considered proper
factors and made no unreasonable findings. With regard to the trial judge’s
conclusion that the Charter breach was at the less serious end of the
spectrum — which was central to the analysis on these facts — the dissent noted
correctly, [translation] “[i]n
determining the seriousness of the breach, she considered a set of factors.
Her assessment of the facts was not unreasonable, nor did she make a palpable
and overriding error in her analysis” (para. 53). Her determination deserved
deference.
[6] Neither
the trial judge nor the Court of Appeal had the benefit of this Court’s
decision in Grant which established a new three-part inquiry for
determining whether the admission of evidence would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute: (1) the seriousness of the Charter -infringing
state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the Charter -protected
interests of the accused; and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the
case on its merits. The application of the Grant approach does not
affect the outcome of the s. 24(2) determination in the case at bar.
[7] First, as
this Court noted in Grant, the relevant factors have not changed: “These
concerns, while not precisely tracking the categories of considerations set out
in Collins, capture the factors relevant to the s. 24(2) determination
as enunciated in Collins and subsequent jurisprudence” (para. 71,
referencing R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265).
[8] Second,
the trial judge’s reasons make clear that the three Grant considerations
point toward admitting the evidence. As noted above, the trial judge’s
conclusions as to the seriousness of the breach were central to this case, and
they remain equally relevant under the Grant approach. As for the
impact of the breach, the trial judge took into account Mr. Beaulieu’s reduced
privacy interest in his car and the limited scope and invasiveness of the
search. With regard to society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits,
she concluded that the evidence was crucial to the Crown’s case. It is also
uncontested that a gun is reliable evidence.
[9] The appeal
is allowed. The decision of the Court of Appeal is set aside and the
conviction is restored.
Appeal allowed.
Solicitor for the appellant: Directeur
des poursuites criminelles et pénales du Québec, Longueuil.
Solicitors for the respondent: Dussault, Raymond,
Poliquin, Sherbrooke.