SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Ministry
of Public Safety and Security (Formerly
Solicitor
General) and Attorney General of Ontario
Appellants
and
Criminal Lawyers’
Association
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Attorney
General of Canada, Attorney General of Quebec,
Attorney
General of Nova Scotia, Attorney General of New
Brunswick,
Attorney General of Manitoba, Attorney General
of
British Columbia, Attorney General of Newfoundland and
Labrador,
Tom Mitchinson, Assistant Commissioner, Office
of
the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario,
Canadian
Bar Association, Information Commissioner of
Canada,
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Canadian
Newspaper
Association, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers’
Association,
Canadian Association of Journalists and
British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella,
Charron and Rothstein JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 76)
|
McLachlin C.J. and Abella J.
(Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Charron and Rothstein JJ. concurring)
|
______________________________
Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’
Association, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815
Ministry of
Public Safety and Security (Formerly
Solicitor General) and Attorney General of Ontario Appellants
v.
Criminal Lawyers’ Association Respondent
and
Attorney
General of Canada, Attorney General of Quebec,
Attorney
General of Nova Scotia, Attorney General of New
Brunswick,
Attorney General of Manitoba, Attorney General
of British
Columbia, Attorney General of Newfoundland and
Labrador, Tom
Mitchinson, Assistant Commissioner, Office
of the
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario,
Canadian Bar
Association, Information Commissioner of
Canada,
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Canadian
Newspaper
Association, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers’
Association,
Canadian Association of Journalists and
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Interveners
Indexed as: Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal
Lawyers’ Association
2010 SCC 23
File No.: 32172.
2008: December 11; 2010: June 17.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Fish,
Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal
for ontario
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Freedom of
expression — Access to information — Exemptions — Minister refusing to disclose
records relating to murder case, claiming exemptions under s. 14 (law
enforcement) and s. 19 (solicitor‑client privilege) of Ontario
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act — Whether s. 23 of
Act violates guarantee of freedom of expression by failing to extend “public
interest” balancing to exemptions found in ss. 14 and 19 — Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2 (b) — Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, ss. 14, 19, 23.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Freedom of
expression — Scope — Access to government held information — Whether freedom of
expression protects access to information — If so, in what circumstances —
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2 (b).
Access to information — Access to records —
Exemptions — Minister refusing to disclose records relating to murder case,
claiming exemptions under freedom of information legislation — Whether
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression protects access to
information — If so, in what circumstances — Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, s. 2 (b) — Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, ss. 14, 19, 23.
The trial judge ordered a stay of proceedings in a
murder trial, finding many instances of abusive conduct by state officials.
The Ontario Provincial Police investigated and exonerated the police of
misconduct without giving reasons for their finding. Concerned about the
disparity between the findings at trial and the conclusion of the police
investigation, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (“CLA”) made a request under
the Ontario Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (“FIPPA”)
to the responsible Minister for disclosure of records relating to the
investigation. The records at issue were a lengthy police report and two
documents containing legal advice. FIPPA exempts various categories of
documents from disclosure, some of which may be disclosed pursuant to a
discretionary ministerial decision, including law enforcement records under
s. 14 and solicitor‑client privileged records under s. 19.
Some records in the ministerial discretion category, but not those under
ss. 14 and 19, are subject to a further review to determine whether a
compelling public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs the purpose of the
exemption under s. 23 of FIPPA.
The Minister refused to disclose any of the records
without explanation, claiming exemptions under, among other provisions,
ss. 14 and 19 of FIPPA. On review, the Assistant Information and
Privacy Commissioner held, without inquiring into the Minister’s exercise of
discretion, that the impugned records qualified for exemption under a number of
sections of the Act, including ss. 14(2)(a) and 19. He noted that s. 23
did not apply to these two provisions of FIPPA, and accordingly, did not
determine whether there was a compelling public interest at play. He also
concluded that the omission of ss. 14 and 19 from the public interest
override in s. 23 did not constitute a breach of the CLA’s right to
freedom of expression guaranteed under s. 2 (b) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms . The Divisional Court upheld the decision
not to disclose the documents and agreed with the conclusion that the exclusion
of ss. 14 and 19 from s. 23 did not violate s. 2 (b) of
the Charter . In a majority decision, the Court of Appeal allowed the
CLA’s appeal, concluding that the exemption scheme violated the Charter .
Held: The appeal should
be allowed. The Assistant Commissioner’s order confirming the
constitutionality of s. 23 of FIPPA should be restored. The
documents protected by s. 19 of FIPPA dealing with solicitor‑client
privilege should be exempted from disclosure. The claim under the law
enforcement provision, s. 14 of FIPPA, should be returned to the
Commissioner for reconsideration.
The real constitutional issue before the Court is
whether the failure to extend the s. 23 public interest override to
documents for which law enforcement or solicitor‑client privilege are
claimed violates the guarantee of freedom of expression in s. 2 (b)
of the Charter . Section 2 (b) of the Charter
guarantees freedom of expression, but it does not guarantee access to all
documents in government hands. Determining whether s. 2 (b) of the Charter
protects such access is essentially a question of how far s. 2 (b)
protection extends. It asks whether s. 2 (b) is engaged at all and
is best approached by building on the methodology set out in Irwin Toy.
To demonstrate that there is expressive content in
accessing these documents, a claimant must establish that the denial of access
effectively precludes meaningful public discussion on matters of public
interest. If this necessity is established, a prima facie case for
production is made out, but the claimant must go on to show that there are no
countervailing considerations inconsistent with production. A claim for
production may be defeated, for example, if the documents are protected by a
privilege, as privileges are recognized as appropriate derogations from the
scope of protection offered by s. 2 (b) of the Charter . It
may also be that a particular government function is incompatible with access
to certain documents, and these documents may remain exempt from disclosure
because it would impact the proper functioning of affected institutions. If
the claim survives this second step, then the claimant establishes that
s. 2 (b) is engaged, and the only remaining question is whether the
government action infringes that protection.
The legislature’s decision not to make documents under
ss. 14 and 19 subject to the s. 23 public interest override does not
violate the right to free expression guaranteed by s. 2 (b) of the Charter .
The CLA has not demonstrated that meaningful public discussion of the handling
of the investigation and prosecution of the murder cannot take place under the
current legislative scheme. Even if the first step were met, the CLA would
face the further challenge of demonstrating that access to ss. 14 and 19
documents, obtained through the s. 23 override, would not impinge on
privileges or impair the proper functioning of relevant government
institutions. Sections 14 and 19 are intended to protect documents from
disclosure on these very grounds.
On the record before us, it is not established that the
CLA could satisfy the requirements of the framework and, as a result,
s. 2 (b) is not engaged. In any event, the impact of the absence of
a s. 23 public interest override in relation to documents under
ss. 14 and 19 is so minimal that even if s. 2 (b) were engaged
it would not be breached. The ultimate answer to the CLA’s claim is that the
absence of a second‑stage review, provided by the s. 23 override for
documents within ss. 14 and 19, does not significantly impair any
hypothetical right to access government documents given that those sections,
properly interpreted, already incorporate considerations of the public
interest. The CLA therefore would not meet the test because it could not show
that the state has infringed its rights to freedom of expression.
In reviewing the Minister’s decision not to disclose the
records, the Commissioner must determine whether the exemptions were properly
claimed and, if so, whether the Minister’s exercise of discretion was
reasonable. In this case, the order pertaining to the claim under s. 14
of FIPPA should be returned to the Commissioner for reconsideration.
The Commissioner upheld the Minister’s decision without reviewing the
Minister’s exercise of discretion under ss. 14 and 19 of FIPPA
because s. 23 did not apply to these sections. The absence of reasons and
the failure of the Minister to order disclosure of any part of the voluminous
documents sought raise concerns which should have been investigated by the
Commissioner. Had the Commissioner conducted an appropriate review of the
Minister’s decision, he might well have reached a different conclusion as to
whether the Minister’s discretion under s. 14 was properly exercised.
The Commissioner’s decision on the s. 19 claim,
however, should be upheld. It is difficult to see how these records could have
been disclosed under the established rules on solicitor‑client privilege
and based on the facts and interests at stake.
Applied: Irwin Toy
Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927; Montréal (City) v. 2952‑1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62, [2005]
3 S.C.R. 141; referred to: R. v. Court (1995), 23 O.R.
(3d) 321; R. v. Court (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 263; Ontario (Ministry of
Finance) v. Ontario (Inquiry Officer) (1998), 5 Admin. L.R. (3d) 175, rev’d
(1999), 13 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1; Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General),
2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016; Baier v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 31, [2007]
2 S.C.R. 673; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fineberg (1994), 19 O.R.
(3d) 197; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1
S.C.R. 877; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2
S.C.R. 1326; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General),
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; R. v. Basi, 2009 SCC 52, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 389; R.
v. Metropolitan Police Comr., Ex parte Blackburn, [1968] 1 All E.R. 763; R.
v. Campbell, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565; R. v. Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601; R.
v. Regan, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297; Krieger v. Law Society of
Alberta, 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372; R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC
5, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1
S.C.R. 821; Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860; R. v.
McClure, 2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445; Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 61, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209; Maranda
v. Richer, 2003 SCC 67, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 193; Pritchard v. Ontario (Human
Rights Commission), 2004 SCC 31, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809; Goodis v. Ontario
(Ministry of Correctional Services), 2006 SCC 31, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 32; Blank
v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 319; Canada
(Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of Health, 2008 SCC 44,
[2008] 2 S.C.R. 574; Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455; R. v. Brown,
2002 SCC 32, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 185; Ontario (Minister of Finance) v. Higgins
(1999), 118 O.A.C. 108, leave to appeal refused, [2000] 1 S.C.R. xvi; Ontario
(Information and Privacy Commissioner, Inquiry Officer) v. Ontario (Minister of
Labour, Office of the Worker Advisor) (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 395; Ontario
(Attorney General) v. Ontario (Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act Adjudicator) (2002), 22 C.P.R. (4th) 447.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑5, s. 39 .
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 2 (b), 7 , 11 (b), (d).
Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. F.31, ss. 10, 14, 19, 23, 50(1)(a).
Authors Cited
Brandeis, Louis D. “What
Publicity Can Do”, Harper’s Weekly, vol. 58, December 20, 1913, 10.
Mitchinson, Tom. “‘Public Interest’ and Ontario’s Freedom
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act”. Speech to Law Society of
British Columbia, February 16, 2001.
Ontario. Commission on Freedom of
Information and Individual Privacy. Public Government for Private People:
The Report of the Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual Privacy.
Toronto: The Commission, 1980.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal
(Juriansz, MacFarland and LaForme JJ.A.), 2007 ONCA 392, 86 O.R. (3d) 259,
224 O.A.C. 236, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 60 Admin. L.R. (4th) 279, 220 C.C.C. (3d)
343, 58 C.P.R. (4th) 298, 156 C.R.R. (2d) 1, [2007] O.J. No. 2038 (QL);
2007 CarswellOnt 3218, setting aside a decision of Blair R.S.J. and
Gravely and Epstein JJ. (2004), 70 O.R. (3d) 332, 237 D.L.R. (4th) 525,
184 O.A.C. 223, 13 Admin. L.R. (4th) 26, 30 C.P.R. (4th) 267, 116 C.R.R. (2d)
323, [2004] O.J. No. 1214 (QL), 2004 CarswellOnt 1172. Appeal allowed.
Daniel Guttman, Sophie
Nunnelley and Don Fawcett, for the appellants.
David Stratas, Brad
Elberg, Trevor Guy and Ryan Teschner, for the respondent.
Christopher Rupar and Jeffrey G.
Johnston, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
Dominique A. Jobin,
for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
Written submissions only by Edward A. Gores,
Q.C., for the intervener the Attorney General of Nova Scotia.
Gaétan Migneault,
for the intervener the Attorney General of New Brunswick.
Nathaniel Carnegie and Deborah
Carlson, for the intervener the Attorney General of Manitoba.
Allan Seckel, Q.C.,
and Deanna Billo, for the intervener the Attorney General of British
Columbia.
Barbara Barrowman,
for the intervener the Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador.
William S. Challis, Stephen
McCammon and Allison Knight, for the intervener Tom Mitchinson,
Assistant Commissioner, Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Ontario.
Mahmud Jamal and Karim
Renno, for the intervener the Canadian Bar Association.
Marlys Edwardh, Daniel
Brunet and Jessica Orkin, for the intervener the Information
Commissioner of Canada.
Guy J. Pratte
and Nadia Effendi, for the intervener the Federation of Law Societies of
Canada.
Paul B. Schabas
and Ryder Gilliland, for the interveners the Canadian Newspaper
Association, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers’ Association and the Canadian
Association of Journalists.
Catherine Beagan Flood
and Iris Fischer, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil
Liberties Association.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
The Chief Justice and
Abella J. —
1. Overview
[1]
Access to information in the hands of public institutions can increase
transparency in government, contribute to an informed public, and enhance an
open and democratic society. Some information in the hands of those
institutions is, however, entitled to protection in order to prevent the
impairment of those very principles and promote good governance.
[2]
Both openness and confidentiality are protected by Ontario’s freedom of
information legislation, the Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31 (“FIPPA” or the “Act”). The
relationship between them under this scheme is at the heart of this appeal. At
issue is the balance struck by the Ontario legislature in exempting certain
categories of documents from disclosure.
[3]
The Act exempts various categories of documents from disclosure. This
case concerns records that may be disclosed pursuant to a discretionary
ministerial decision. More particularly, this case concerns records prepared
in the course of law enforcement investigations (s. 14) and records protected
by solicitor-client privilege (s. 19). The Act provides that some records in
the ministerial discretion category are subject to a further review to
determine whether a compelling public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs
the purpose of the exemption under s. 23 of FIPPA. The Act does not
require this additional public interest review for solicitor-client records or
law enforcement records.
[4]
The Criminal Lawyers’ Association (“CLA”) is an advocacy group
representing members of the criminal defence bar in Ontario. It is seeking
records in the hands of the Crown relating to a murder case which gave rise to
judicial expressions of concern: two documents containing legal advice and a
318-page report looking into alleged police misconduct. The Minister refused
to disclose either the report or related documents, stating that the exemptions
in the Act for solicitor-client privilege and law enforcement privilege covered
all the material. On review, the Assistant Information and Privacy
Commissioner held, without inquiring into the Minister’s exercise of
discretion, that the impugned records qualified for exemption under a number of
sections of the Act, including ss. 14(2)(a) and 19. He noted that s. 23 did not
apply to these two provisions of the Act and, as such, he did not determine
whether there was a compelling public interest at play here in the context of
ss. 14 and 19.
[5]
Section 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
freedom of expression, but it does not guarantee access to all documents in
government hands. Access to documents in government hands is constitutionally
protected only where it is shown to be a necessary precondition of meaningful
expression, does not encroach on protected privileges, and is compatible with
the function of the institution concerned.
[6]
The CLA argues that the Act’s failure in s. 23 to include a public
interest review for solicitor-client and law enforcement privileged documents
violates freedom of expression in s. 2 (b) of the Charter . For
the reasons that follow, we conclude that there is no such violation.
[7]
This said, it is not clear on the material before us that the Assistant
Commissioner, in applying the Act, fully considered the scope of his discretion
under s. 14, the law enforcement provision. We therefore remit this
matter to the Commissioner for reconsideration to determine whether any or all
of the report should be disclosed.
2. Background
[8]
This case arises out of the murder of Domenic Racco in 1983, for which
four men (Anthony Musitano, Domenic Musitano, Guiseppe Avignone, and William
Rankin) were originally charged. They pled guilty to lesser charges in 1985.
In 1990, two other individuals, Graham Rodney Court and Peter Dennis Monaghan,
were alleged to have been hired to kill Racco. Court and Monaghan were
convicted after a jury trial in 1991.
[9]
In 1995, the Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for Monaghan on
the basis, inter alia, of fresh evidence (R. v. Court (1995), 23
O.R. (3d) 321). It was evidence that had been lost before trial, but the
police did not reveal its loss to the defence until two-and-a-half years after
the trial. A new trial was also ordered, for both Monaghan and Court, based on
inadequate jury instructions at trial.
[10] Both
men applied for a stay of proceedings in 1997 on the grounds of a breach of
their Charter rights. Glithero J. concluded that their rights under ss.
7 , 11 (b) and 11 (d) of the Charter had been violated to
such a degree that the proceedings should be stayed, stating:
. . . I have found many instances of abusive conduct by state
officials, involving deliberate non‑disclosure, deliberate editing of
useful information, negligent breach of the duty to maintain original evidence,
improper cross‑examination and jury addresses during the first trial.
That prejudice is completed. The improper cross‑examinations and
jury address would not be repeated at a new trial and the completed prejudice
with respect to those issues would not therefore be perpetuated in a new
trial. The effects or prejudice caused by the abusive conduct in systematic
non‑disclosure, deliberate revision of materials so as to exclude useful
information to the defence, and the unexplained loss, or breach of the duty to
preserve, of so much original evidence would be perpetuated through a future
trial in that the defence cannot be put back into the position they would
originally have been, and which in my view they were entitled to maintain
throughout the trial process. That evidence is gone, either entirely or to the
extent of severely diminishing the utility of the evidence, and the prejudice
thereby occasioned has only been exaggerated by the passage of time since the
1991 trial and prior to the belated disclosure of this information in 1996.
[Emphasis added.]
(R. v. Court (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 263 (Gen. Div.), p. 300)
[11] As a
result of Glithero J.’s rebuke, the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) undertook
an investigation into the conduct of the Halton Regional Police, the
Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police, and the Crown Attorney in the case. In a
terse press release on April 3, 1998, the OPP exonerated the police on the
grounds that there was “no evidence that the officers attempted to obstruct
justice by destroying or withholding a vital piece of evidence” and “no
evidence that information withheld from defence was done deliberately and with
the intent to obstruct justice”. Despite the clear public interest in knowing
why the misconduct found by Glithero J. did not merit criminal charges, the OPP
offered no explanation for its conclusions.
[12] Concerned
about the disparity between the findings of Glithero J. and the conclusions
reached by the OPP, the CLA made a request under FIPPA to the Minister
of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services (later the Minister of
Public Safety and Security and now the Minister of Community Safety and
Correctional Services) for disclosure of records relating to the OPP
investigation. The records at issue were a 318‑page police report
detailing the results of the OPP’s investigation; a March 12, 1998 memorandum
from a Crown Attorney to the Regional Director of Crown Operations containing
legal advice with respect to the police report; and a March 24, 1998 letter
from the Regional Director of Crown Operations to a police official also
containing legal advice on the OPP investigation.
[13] The
Minister refused to disclose any of these records, claiming several exemptions
under the Act, including: s. 14 (law enforcement), s. 19 (solicitor‑client
privilege), s. 20 (danger to health and safety), and s. 21 (personal privacy).
He did not explain how or why each of these exemptions applied to the material
in question and did not address the possibility of partial disclosure.
[14]
The CLA appealed the Minister’s decision not to disclose the
records to the Commissioner pursuant to s. 50(1)(a) of FIPPA.
[15] The
Minister’s decision was reviewed by the Assistant Information and Privacy
Commissioner, Tom Mitchinson. Reliance on the s. 20 exemption was
withdrawn. On May 5, 2000, Mr. Mitchinson upheld the propriety of the
Minister’s decision not to disclose the records (IPC Order PO-1779). He found
that the public interest in disclosure “clearly outweigh[ed]” the purpose of
the exemption on the facts of this case, and would have applied the s. 23
override with respect to the s. 21 personal privacy exemption; however, he
upheld the Minister’s refusal because the other claimed exemptions (ss. 14 and
19) are not included within the s. 23 override. He was also asked to consider
whether the omission of ss. 14 and 19 from the public interest override
constituted a breach of the CLA’s Charter right to freedom of
expression. He concluded that it did not.
[16] At the
Divisional Court, Blair R.S.J. upheld the decision not to disclose the
documents and agreed with the conclusion that the FIPPA exemption scheme
did not violate s. 2 (b) of the Charter : (2004), 70 O.R. (3d) 332.
[17] The
appeal was allowed by the Court of Appeal: 2007 ONCA 392, 86 O.R. (3d) 259.
LaForme J.A., for the majority, concluded that the exemption scheme in FIPPA
violated the Charter . Juriansz J.A. dissented, concluding that there
was no Charter violation, and questioned whether expression was
genuinely at issue at all.
[18] The
Minister appealed the matter to this Court on the issue of the
constitutionality of s. 23, given the exclusion of ss. 14 and 19 from its
scope. Before this Court, and before the Court of Appeal for that matter, the
CLA based its attack on the constitutionality of the statutory scheme and not
on the Minister’s exercise of discretion under either s. 14 or s. 19.
3. The Legislative Scheme
[19] The
Act provides for limited access to information in the government’s hands.
Section 10(1) provides for general rights of access to information, subject to
a limited number of statutory exemptions:
10.—(1) Every person has a right of access to a record or a
part of a record in the custody or under the control of an institution unless,
(a) the record or the part of the record falls within one of
the exemptions under sections 12 to 22; or
(b) the head is of the opinion on reasonable
grounds that the request for access is frivolous or vexatious.
[20] The
exemptions include Cabinet records (s. 12); advice to government (s. 13);
law enforcement records (s. 14); records relating to relations with other
governments (s. 15); defence records (s. 16); third-party information (s. 17);
records related to Ontario’s economic and other interests (s. 18); records to
which solicitor-client privilege applies (s. 19); records whose disclosure
might reasonably be expected to seriously threaten the safety or health of an
individual (s. 20); personal information (s. 21); records putting species
at risk (s. 21.1); and information already or soon to be publicly available (s.
22).
[21] There
is no discretion, and disclosure must be refused in the case of some categories
of exemptions, including Cabinet records, records containing certain
third-party information, and records containing personal information. Other
categories of exemptions are discretionary. They include the exemptions at
issue in this case: law enforcement records under s. 14 and solicitor-client
privileged records under s. 19.
[22] Section
14, dealing with law enforcement records, states:
14.—(1) A head may refuse to disclose a record where the
disclosure could reasonably be expected to,
(a) interfere with a law enforcement matter;
(b) interfere with an investigation undertaken with a view to a
law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely
to result;
(c) reveal investigative techniques and procedures currently in
use or likely to be used in law enforcement;
(d) disclose the identity of a confidential source of
information in respect of a law enforcement matter, or disclose information
furnished only by the confidential source;
(e) endanger the life or physical safety of a law enforcement
officer or any other person;
(f) deprive a person of the right to a fair trial or impartial
adjudication;
(g) interfere with the gathering of or reveal law enforcement intelligence
information respecting organizations or persons;
(h) reveal a record which has been
confiscated from a person by a peace officer in accordance with an Act or
regulation;
(i) endanger the security of a building or the security of a vehicle
carrying items, or of a system or procedure established for the protection of
items, for which protection is reasonably required;
(j) facilitate the escape from custody of a person who is under
lawful detention;
(k) jeopardize the security of a centre for lawful detention;
or
(l) facilitate the commission of an unlawful act or hamper the
control of crime.
(2) A head may refuse to disclose a record,
(a) that is a report prepared in the course of law
enforcement, inspections or investigations by an agency which has the function
of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law;
(b) that is a law enforcement record where the disclosure would
constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament;
(c) that is a law enforcement record where the disclosure could
reasonably be expected to expose the author of the record or any person who has
been quoted or paraphrased in the record to civil liability; or
(d) that contains information about the history, supervision or
release of a person under the control or supervision of a correctional
authority.
(3) A head may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of a
record to which subsection (1) or (2) apply.
(4) Despite clause (2) (a), a head shall disclose a record that
is a report prepared in the course of routine inspections by an agency where
that agency is authorized to enforce and regulate compliance with a particular
statute of Ontario.
(5) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a
record on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program including
statistical analyses unless disclosure of such a record may prejudice,
interfere with or adversely affect any of the matters referred to in those subsections.
Section 19 deals
with solicitor-client privilege. At the material time, it stated:
19. A head may refuse to disclose
a record that is subject to solicitor-client privilege or that was prepared by
or for Crown counsel for use in giving legal advice or in contemplation of or
for use in litigation.
[23] The
Minister asserting the exemption has the burden of demonstrating that it
applies. Any decision made by a Minister is subject to review by the
Commissioner. In reviewing ministerial decisions made pursuant to certain
exemptions, the Commissioner considers the public interest pursuant to s. 23,
the “public interest override”:
23. An exemption from disclosure of a
record under sections 13 [advice to government], 15 [relations with other
governments], 17 [third-party information], 18 [economic and other interests of
Ontario], 20 [danger to safety or health], 21 [personal privacy] and 21.1
[species at risk] does not apply where a compelling public interest in the
disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the purpose of the exemption.
[24] The s.
23 public interest override does not apply to documents exempted from disclosure
for law enforcement (s. 14) and solicitor-client privilege (s. 19). The main
issue in this case, as it was argued before us, is whether this renders s. 23
unconstitutional.
[25] When
an exemption is invoked by the head of an institution (the Minister) under ss.
13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 21.1, the effect of s. 23 is to require the
Commissioner to not only review whether the exemption was validly claimed, but
whether the public interest in the disclosure of the record “clearly outweighs
the purpose of the exemption” (Ontario (Ministry of Finance) v. Ontario
(Inquiry Officer) (1998), 5 Admin. L.R. (3d) 175 (Ont. Div. Ct.), rev’d
(1999), 13 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.)).
[26] This
public interest override was a late addition to the legislation. The Attorney
General took the position that it would undermine the context of the Act:
You are just saying to them, ignore the standards of the Act that
the Legislature has set up and do what you please by looking at the public
interest.
[27] Nevertheless,
a public interest provision was eventually introduced for some but not all
categories of exemptions on the insistence of some of the members of the
legislature. This was despite the fact that the Williams Commission Report on
which the Act was based had not specifically recommended its adoption (Ontario,
Public Government for Private People: The Report of the Commission on Freedom
of Information and Individual Privacy (1980) (the “Williams Commission”
Report); Speech by Tom Mitchinson, Assistant Commissioner, Ontario Information
and Privacy Commissioner, “Public Interest” and Ontario’s Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, February 16, 2001).
[28] This
review of the general statutory scheme brings us to the specific challenge
before us. The CLA argued that s. 23 of FIPPA infringes s. 2 (b)
of the Charter by failing to extend the “public interest” balancing to
the exemptions found in ss. 14 and 19 concerning law enforcement and
solicitor-client privileged records.
4. Is the Legislation Constitutional?
[29] It is
essential to correctly frame the real constitutional issue before the Court.
That issue is whether the failure to extend the s. 23 public interest override
to documents for which law enforcement or solicitor-client privilege are
claimed violates the guarantee of freedom of expression in s. 2 (b) of
the Charter .
(a) Access to Information Under Section 2(b) of
the Charter
[30] The
first question to be addressed is whether s. 2(b) protects access to
information and, if so, in what circumstances. For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that s. 2(b) does not guarantee access to all documents in
government hands. Section 2(b) guarantees freedom of expression, not
access to information. Access is a derivative right which may arise where it
is a necessary precondition of meaningful expression on the functioning of
government.
[31] Determining
whether s. 2 (b) of the Charter requires access to documents in
government hands in a particular case is essentially a question of how far s.
2 (b) protection extends. A question arises as to how the issue should
be approached. The courts below were divided on whether the analysis should
follow the model adopted in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General),
2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016. In their argument before this Court, some
of the parties also placed reliance on Dunmore and on this Court’s
subsequent decision in Baier v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R.
673. In our view, nothing would be gained by furthering this debate. Rather,
it is our view that the question of access to government information is best
approached by building on the methodology set in Irwin Toy Ltd. v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at pp. 967-68, and in Montréal
(City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141. The
main question in this case is whether s. 2 (b) is engaged at all. We
conclude that the scope of the s. 2 (b) protection includes a right to
access to documents only where access is necessary to permit meaningful
discussion on a matter of public importance, subject to privileges and
functional constraints. We further conclude, as discussed more fully below,
that in this case these requirements are not satisfied. As a result, s. 2 (b)
is not engaged.
[32] The Irwin
Toy framework involves three inquiries: (1) Does the activity in question
have expressive content, thereby bringing it within the reach of s. 2 (b)?
(2) Is there something in the method or location of that expression that would
remove that protection? (3) If the activity is protected, does the state action
infringe that protection, either in purpose or effect? These steps were
developed in Montréal (City) (at para. 56) in the context of expressive
activities, but the principles animating them equally apply to determining
whether s. 2 (b) requires the production of government documents.
[33] This
leads us to more detailed comments on the scope of s. 2 (b) protection
where the issue is access to documents in government hands. To demonstrate
that there is expressive content in accessing such documents, the claimant must
establish that the denial of access effectively precludes meaningful
commentary. If the claimant can show this, there is a prima facie case
for the production of the documents in question. But even if this prima
facie case is established, the claim may be defeated by factors that remove
s. 2 (b) protection, e.g. if the documents sought are protected by
privilege or if production of the documents would interfere with the proper
functioning of the governmental institution in question. If the claim survives
this second step, then the claimant establishes that s. 2 (b) is
engaged. The only remaining question is whether the government action
infringes that protection.
[34] The
first inquiry into expressive content asks whether the demand for access to
information furthers the purposes of s. 2 (b). In the case of demands
for government documents, the relevant s. 2 (b) purpose is usually
the furtherance of discussion on matters of public importance.
[35] Not
every demand for government information serves this purpose. Thus the
jurisprudence holds that there is no general right of access to information.
The position is well put in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fineberg
(1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 197 (Div. Ct.), per Adams J.:
By contrast, our political access makes government
bureaucracy accountable to elected officials who, in turn, conduct their
business in the context of public elections and legislatures and where the
media, again, play a fundamental reporting role. . . . Against this
tradition, it is not possible to proclaim that s. 2 (b) entails a general
constitutional right of access to all information under the control of
government and this is particularly so in the context of an application
relating to an active criminal investigation. [Emphasis added; p. 204.]
[36] To
show that access would further the purposes of s. 2 (b), the claimant
must establish that access is necessary for the meaningful exercise of free
expression on matters of public or political interest: see Irwin Toy,
at pp. 976 and 1008; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 877. On this basis, the Court has recognized access to
information under s. 2 (b) in the judicial context: “members of the
public have a right to information pertaining to public institutions and
particularly the courts” (Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General),
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at p. 1339). The “open courts” principle is “inextricably
tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2 (b)” because it “permits the public
to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and
proceedings” (Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney
General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 23, per La Forest J.).
[37] In
sum, there is a prima facie case that s. 2 (b) may require
disclosure of documents in government hands where it is shown that, without the
desired access, meaningful public discussion and criticism on matters of public
interest would be substantially impeded. As Louis D. Brandeis famously wrote in
his 1913 article in Harper’s Weekly entitled “ What Publicity Can Do”:
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants ... .” Open government
requires that the citizenry be granted access to government records when it is
necessary to meaningful public debate on the conduct of government
institutions.
[38] If
this necessity is established, a prima facie case for production is made
out. However, the claimant must go on to show that the protection is not
removed by countervailing considerations inconsistent with production.
[39] Privileges
are recognized as appropriate derogations from the scope of the protection
offered by s. 2 (b) of the Charter . The common law privileges,
like solicitor-client privilege, generally represent situations where the
public interest in confidentiality outweighs the interests served by
disclosure. This is also the rationale behind common law privileges that have
been cast in statutory form, like the privilege relating to confidences of the
Queen’s Privy Council under s. 39 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C‑5 . Since the common law and statutes must conform to the Charter ,
assertions of particular categories of privilege are in principle open to
constitutional challenge. However, in practice, the outlines of these
privileges are likely to be well settled, providing predictability and
certainty to what must be produced and what remains protected.
[40] It may
also be that a particular government function is incompatible with access to
certain documents. For example, it might be argued that while the open court
principle requires that court hearings and judgments be open and available for
public scrutiny and comment, memos and notes leading to a judicial decision are
not subject to public access. This would impair the proper functioning of the
court by preventing full and frank deliberation and discussion at the
pre-judgment stage. The principle of Cabinet confidence for internal
government discussions offers another example. The historic function of a
particular institution may assist in determining the bounds of institutional
confidentiality, as discussed in Montréal (City), at para. 22. In that
case, this Court acknowledged that certain government functions and activities
require privacy (para. 76). This applies to demands for access to information
in government hands. Certain types of documents may remain exempt from
disclosure because disclosure would impact the proper functioning of affected
institutions.
(b) The Constitutionality of Section 23
[41] The
CLA argues that the failure of the legislature to make the s. 23 public
interest override applicable to the exemptions in ss. 14 and 19 denies it
access to the documents it seeks and thus violates s. 2 (b) of the Charter .
The CLA argues that if the override were applicable, the CLA would be entitled
to the records in question due to their public interest nature.
[42] We
first address the question of the extent to which the absence of a s. 23 public
interest override impairs the ability to obtain documents protected by ss. 14
and 19 of the Act. Against this background, we ask whether s. 2 (b) is
engaged in the case at bar, and if so, whether it is breached.
(i) The Impact of the Absence of the
Section 23 Public Interest Override in This Case
[43] In our
view, it is not established that the absence of a s. 23 review for public
interest significantly impairs the CLA’s access to documents it would otherwise
have had. Law enforcement privilege and solicitor‑client privilege
already take public interest considerations into account and, moreover, confer
a discretion to disclose the information on the Minister. For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that the public interest override contained in s. 23 would
add little to what is already provided for in ss. 14 and 19 of the Act.
[44]
We turn first to records prepared in the course
of law enforcement, which are dealt with under s. 14 of the Act. As
jurisprudence surrounding concepts such as informer privilege and prosecutorial
discretion attests, there is a strong public interest in protecting documents
related to law enforcement: R. v. Basi, 2009 SCC 52, [2009] 3 S.C.R.
389; R. v. Metropolitan Police Comr., Ex parte Blackburn, [1968] 1 All
E.R. 763 (C.A.), at p. 769, cited in R. v. Campbell, [1999] 1 S.C.R.
565, at para. 33; R. v. Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, at p. 623, per
L’Heureux-Dubé J.; R. v. Regan, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at
para. 64, per LeBel J.; Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, 2002
SCC 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372, at para. 32; R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5,
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 48, per Charron J. Section 14 of the Act
reflects this. The legislature in s. 14(1) has in effect declared that
disclosure of records described in subsets (a) to (l) would be so detrimental
to the public interest that it presumptively cannot be countenanced.
[45] However,
by stipulating that “[a] head may refuse to disclose” a record in this
category, the legislature has also left room for the head to order disclosure
of particular records. This creates a discretion in the head.
[46] A
discretion conferred by statute must be exercised consistently with the
purposes underlying its grant: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at paras. 53, 56 and 65. It follows
that to properly exercise this discretion, the head must weigh the
considerations for and against disclosure, including the public interest in
disclosure.
[47]
By way of example, we consider s. 14(1)(a) where
a head “may refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure could reasonably
be expected to . . . interfere with a law enforcement matter”. The main
purpose of the exemption is clearly to protect the public interest in effective
law enforcement. However, the need to consider other interests, public and
private, is preserved by the word “may” which confers a discretion on the head
to make the decision whether or not to disclose the information.
[48]
In making the decision, the first step the head
must take is to determine whether disclosure could reasonably be expected to
interfere with a law enforcement matter. If the determination is that it may,
the second step is to decide whether, having regard to the significance of that
risk and other relevant interests, disclosure should be made or refused. These
determinations necessarily involve consideration of the public interest in open
government, public debate and the proper functioning of government
institutions. A finding at the first stage that disclosure may interfere with
law enforcement is implicitly a finding that the public interest in law
enforcement may trump public and private interests in disclosure. At the
second stage, the head must weigh the public and private interests in
disclosure and non-disclosure, and exercise his or her discretion accordingly.
[49]
The public interest override in s. 23 would add
little to this process. Section 23 simply provides that exemptions from
disclosure do not apply “where a compelling public interest in the disclosure
of the record clearly outweighs the purpose of the exemption”. But a proper
interpretation of s. 14(1) requires that the head consider whether a compelling
public interest in disclosure outweighs the purpose of the exemption, to
prevent interference with law enforcement. If the head, acting judicially, were
to find that such an interest exists, the head would exercise the discretion
conferred by the word “may” and order disclosure of the document.
[50]
The same rationale applies to the other
exemptions under s. 14(1) as well as to those under s. 14(2). Section 14(2)(a)
is particularly relevant in the case at bar. It provides that a head “may
refuse to disclose a record . . . that is a report prepared in the course of
law enforcement, inspections or investigations by an agency which has the
function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law”. The main purpose
of this section is to protect the public interest in getting full and frank
disclosure in the course of investigating and reporting on matters involving
the administration of justice; an expectation of confidentiality may further
the goal of getting at the truth of what really happened. At the same time,
the discretion conferred by the word “may” recognizes that there may be other
interests, whether public or private, that outweigh this public interest in
confidentiality. Again, an additional review under s. 23 would add little, if
anything, to this process.
[51]
This interpretation is confirmed by the established
practice for review of s. 14 claims which proceeds on the basis that, even
in the absence of the s. 23 public interest override, the head has a wide
discretion. The proper review of discretion under s. 14 has been explained as
follows:
The absence of section 14 from the list of exemptions that can be
overridden under section 23 does not change the fact that the exemption is
discretionary, and discretion should be exercised on a case‑by‑case
basis. The LCBO’s submission suggests that it would never be appropriate to
disclose such records in the public interest, or in order to promote
transparency and accountability, in the context of the exercise of discretion.
I disagree, and in my view, such a position would be inconsistent with the
requirement to exercise discretion based on the facts and circumstances of
every case.
(IPC Order PO‑2508‑I/September 27, 2006, at
p. 6, per Senior Adjudicator John Higgins)
[52]
We therefore conclude that s. 14 already
provides for adequate consideration of the public interest in the disclosure of
the records. In reviewing a claim for an exemption under s. 14, the
Commissioner, as discussed more fully below, focuses on the exercise of
discretion under that section. A further consideration under s. 23 would add
essentially another level of review.
[53]
The same analysis applies, perhaps even more
strongly, to the exemption for documents protected by solicitor-client
privilege. Section 19 of the Act provides that a head “may refuse to disclose
a record that is subject to solicitor-client privilege or that was prepared by
or for Crown counsel for use in giving legal advice or in contemplation of or
for use in litigation”. The purpose of this exemption is clearly to protect
solicitor-client privilege, which has been held to be all but absolute in
recognition of the high public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
the solicitor-client relationship: Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R.
821, at p. 836; Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860, at p.
875; Campbell, at para. 49; R. v. McClure, 2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1
S.C.R. 445, at paras. 35 and 41; Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2002 SCC 61, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209, at paras. 36-37; Maranda
v. Richer, 2003 SCC 67, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 193; Pritchard v. Ontario
(Human Rights Commission), 2004 SCC 31, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809; Goodis
v. Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services), 2006 SCC 31, [2006]
2 S.C.R. 32; Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39, [2006]
2 S.C.R. 319; Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of
Health, 2008 SCC 44, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 574. The only exceptions recognized
to the privilege are the narrowly guarded public safety and right to make full
answer and defence exceptions: Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455; R.
v. Brown, 2002 SCC 32, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 185.
[54] Given
the near-absolute nature of solicitor-client privilege, it is difficult to see
how the s. 23 public interest override could ever operate to require disclosure
of a protected document. This is particularly so given that the use of the
word “may” would permit and, if relevant, require the head to consider the
overwhelming public interest in disclosure. Once again, the public interest
override in s. 23 would add little to the decision-making process.
[55]
The conclusion that the s. 23 override in the
case of the law enforcement and solicitor-client exemptions adds little more
than a second level of review is consistent with the legislative history of the
Act. The Williams Commission Report, on which the Act was based, did not
recommend a public interest override, presumably not finding such an override
necessary. The Minister who spoke to the legislation resisted suggestions for
a public interest override. It was tacked on by amendment, but made applicable
only to certain exemptions. These are generally exemptions of a political or
personal nature — advice to government; third-party information; economic and
other interests of Ontario; danger to health and safety; personal privacy; and
species at risk. These exemptions reflect a legislative choice that is not at
issue in this appeal. But by way of comparison, it may be possible to argue
that the s. 23 public interest override might serve a purpose with respect to
these issues, since they may not inherently raise the need to balance all
conflicting interests, raising the risk that the public interest in disclosure
might be overlooked. But that cannot be said of the law enforcement and
solicitor-client exemptions.
[56] We
conclude that the CLA has failed to establish that the inapplicability of the
s. 23 public interest override significantly impairs its ability to obtain the
documents it seeks. Sections 14 and 19 already incorporate, by necessity, the
public interest to the extent it may be applicable.
(ii) Is the Section 23 Public Interest
Override Constitutionally Required?
[57] Having
examined the impact of the legislature’s decision not to make documents under
ss. 14 and 19 subject to the s. 23 public interest override, we are in a
position to address the ultimate question: Does this decision violate the right
to free expression guaranteed by s. 2 (b) of the Charter ? To
answer this question, we must return to our earlier discussion of when
disclosure of documents in government hands may be constitutionally required
under the Irwin Toy framework.
[58] The
first question is whether any access to documents that might result from
applying the s. 23 public interest override in this case would enhance s. 2 (b)
expression. This is only established if the access is necessary to permit
meaningful debate and discussion on a matter of public interest. If not, then
s. 2 (b) is not engaged.
[59] In our
view, the CLA has not demonstrated that meaningful public discussion of the
handling of the investigation into the murder of Domenic Racco, and the
prosecution of those suspected of that murder, cannot take place under the
current legislative scheme. Much is known about those events. In granting the
stay against the two accused, Glithero J. stated:
. . . I have found many instances of abusive conduct
by state officials, involving deliberate non‑disclosure, deliberate
editing of useful information, negligent breach of the duty to maintain
original evidence, improper cross‑examination and jury addresses during
the first trial. [p. 300]
The record
supporting these conclusions is already in the public domain. The further
information sought relates to the internal investigation of the conduct of the
Halton Regional Police, the Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police and the Crown
Attorney in this case. It may be that this report should have been produced
under the terms of the Act, as discussed below. However, the CLA has not
established that it is necessary for meaningful public discussion of the
problems in the administration of justice relating to the Racco murder.
[60] If
necessity were established, the CLA, under the framework set out above (para.
33) would face the further challenge of demonstrating that access to ss. 14 and
19 documents, obtained through the s. 23 override, would not impinge on
privileges or impair the proper functioning of relevant government
institutions. As discussed, ss. 14 and 19 are intended to protect
documents from disclosure on these very grounds. On the record before us, it
is not established that the CLA could satisfy the requirements of the above
framework.
[61] It is
unnecessary to pursue this inquiry further because, in any event, the impact of
the absence of a s. 23 public interest override in relation to documents under
ss. 14 and 19 is so minimal that even if s. 2 (b) were engaged, it would
not be breached. The ultimate answer to the CLA’s claim is that the absence of
the second-stage review, provided by the s. 23 override for documents within
ss. 14 and 19, does not significantly impair any hypothetical right to access
government documents, given that those sections, properly interpreted, already
incorporate consideration of the public interest. The CLA would not meet the
test because it could not show that the state has infringed its rights to
freedom of expression.
5. Exercise of the Discretion Under the Act
[62] Having
decided that s. 23 of the Act itself is constitutional, our focus shifts now to
determining whether the decisions of the Minister (the head) and the Commission
complied with the statutory framework established by the Act.
(a) The Decisions
[63] The
Minister’s decision not to disclose the records in question was conveyed to the
CLA in a letter dated November 27, 1998, citing a number of statutory
exemptions as the reason for the denial, including s. 21 (the personal privacy
exemption), s. 19, and a number of subsections of s. 14. The letter provided no
explanation for applying these exemptions; nor did it explain why no part of
the records sought would be disclosed.
[64] On
review, the Assistant Commissioner recognized that the documents contained
personal information about people involved in the case, including police
officers, Crown counsel, witnesses, the victim, the accused and others. He
concluded, however, that there was “a compelling public interest” in disclosure
that “clearly outweigh[ed]” the interest in non‑disclosure. Therefore, if
only the s. 21 personal privacy exemption were at issue, he would have ordered
disclosure pursuant to the s. 23 override.
[65] The
Assistant Commissioner also determined that the discretionary exemptions in ss.
14 and 19 could be applied to the records at issue. Because s. 23 does not
apply to ss. 14 and 19, he upheld the Minister’s decision not to disclose
without reviewing the Minister’s exercise of discretion under ss. 14 and 19 of
the Act.
(b) The Duty of the “Head” (or Minister)
[66] As
discussed above, the “head” making a decision under ss. 14 and 19 of the Act
has a discretion whether to order disclosure or not. This discretion is to be
exercised with respect to the purpose of the exemption at issue and all other
relevant interests and considerations, on the basis of the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. The decision involves two steps. First,
the head must determine whether the exemption applies. If it does, the head
must go on to ask whether, having regard to all relevant interests, including
the public interest in disclosure, disclosure should be made.
[67] The
head must consider individual parts of the record, and disclose as much of the
information as possible. Section 10(2) provides that where an exemption is
claimed, “the head shall disclose as much of the record as can reasonably be
severed without disclosing the information that falls under one of the
exemptions”.
(c) The Duty of the Reviewing Commissioner
[68] The
Commissioner’s review, like the head’s exercise of discretion, involves two
steps. First, the Commissioner determines whether the exemption was properly
claimed. If so, the Commissioner determines whether the head’s exercise of
discretion was reasonable.
[69]
In IPC Order P-58/May 16, 1989, Information and
Privacy Commissioner Linden explained the scope of his authority in reviewing
this exercise of discretion:
In my view, the head’s exercise of discretion must be
made in full appreciation of the facts of the case, and upon proper application
of the applicable principles of law. It is my responsibility as Commissioner
to ensure that the head has exercised the discretion he/she has under the Act.
While it may be that I do not have the authority to substitute my discretion
for that of the head, I can and, in the appropriate circumstances, I will order
a head to reconsider the exercise of his/her discretion if I feel it has not
been done properly. I believe that it is our responsibility as the
reviewing agency and mine as the administrative decision-maker to ensure that
the concepts of fairness and natural justice are followed. [Emphasis added; p.
11.]
[70] Decisions
of the Assistant Commissioner regarding the interpretation and application of
the FIPPA are generally subject to review on a standard of
reasonableness (see Ontario (Minister of Finance) v. Higgins (1999), 118
O.A.C. 108, at para. 3, leave to appeal refused, [2000] 1 S.C.R. xvi; Ontario
(Information and Privacy Commissioner, Inquiry Officer) v. Ontario (Minister of
Labour, Office of the Worker Advisor) (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 395 (C.A.), at
paras. 15-18; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act Adjudicator) (2002), 22 C.P.R. (4th) 447
(Ont. C.A.), at para. 3).
[71] The
Commissioner may quash the decision not to disclose and return the matter for
reconsideration where: the decision was made in bad faith or for an improper
purpose; the decision took into account irrelevant considerations; or, the
decision failed to take into account relevant considerations (see IPC Order PO‑2369‑F/February
22, 2005, at p. 17).
[72] In the
case before us, the Commissioner concluded that since s. 23 was inapplicable to
ss. 14 and 19, he was bound to uphold the Minister’s decision under those
sections. Had he interpreted ss. 14 and 19 as set out earlier in these
reasons, he would have recognized that the Minister had a residual discretion
under ss. 14 and 19 to consider all relevant matters and that it was open to
him, as Commissioner, to review the Minister’s exercise of his discretion.
[73] The
Commissioner’s interpretation of the statutory scheme led him not to review
the Minister’s exercise of discretion under s. 14, in accordance with the
review principles discussed above.
[74]
Without pronouncing on the propriety of the Minister’s decision,
we would remit the s. 14 claim under the law enforcement exemption to the Commissioner
for reconsideration. The absence of reasons and the failure of
the Minister to order disclosure of any part of the voluminous documents sought
at the very least raise concerns that should have been investigated by the
Commissioner. We are satisfied that had the Commissioner conducted an
appropriate review of the Minister’s decision, he might well have reached a
different conclusion as to whether the Minister’s discretion under s. 14 was
properly exercised.
[75] We
view the records falling under the s. 19 solicitor-client exemption
differently. Under the established rules on solicitor-client privilege, and
based on the facts and interests at stake before us, it is difficult to see how
these records could have been disclosed. Indeed, Major J., speaking for this
Court in McClure, stressed the categorical nature of the privilege:
. . . solicitor-client privilege must be as close to
absolute as possible to ensure public confidence and retain relevance. As
such, it will only yield in certain clearly defined circumstances, and does
not involve a balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis. [Emphasis
added; para. 35.]
(See also Goodis, at paras. 15-17, and Blood Tribe, at
paras. 9-11.)
Accordingly, we
would uphold the Commissioner’s decision on the s. 19 claim.
6. Conclusion
[76]
We would allow the appeal, set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeal, and restore the Assistant Commissioner’s Order
confirming the constitutionality of s. 23 of FIPPA. The documents
protected by s. 19 of FIPPA are exempted from disclosure. We would,
however, order that the claim under s. 14 of the Act be returned to the
Commissioner for reconsideration in light of these reasons. In accordance with
the request of the parties, there will be no order for costs.
Appeal allowed.
Solicitor for the appellants: Attorney
General of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitors for the respondent: Heenan
Blaikie, Toronto.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of
Canada: Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of
Quebec: Department of Justice, Québec.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of
Nova Scotia: Attorney General of Nova Scotia, Halifax.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of
New Brunswick: Attorney General of New Brunswick, Fredericton.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of
Manitoba: Attorney General of Manitoba, Winnipeg.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of
British Columbia: Attorney General of British Columbia, Victoria.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of
Newfoundland and Labrador: Attorney General of Newfoundland and
Labrador, St. John’s.
Solicitor for the intervener Tom Mitchinson,
Assistant Commissioner, Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Ontario: Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitors for the intervener the Canadian Bar
Association: Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.
Solicitor for the intervener the Information
Commissioner of Canada: Information Commissioner of Canada, Ottawa.
Solicitors for the intervener the Federation of Law
Societies of Canada: Borden Ladner Gervais, Ottawa.
Solicitors for the interveners the Canadian Newspaper
Association, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers’ Association and the Canadian
Association of Journalists: Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Toronto.
Solicitors for the intervener the British Columbia
Civil Liberties Association: Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Toronto.