Docket:
IMM-12781-12
Citation: 2013 FC 1210
Toronto, Ontario, December
3, 2013
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
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BETWEEN:
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AIMÉ-LANDRY AHISHAKIYE
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1]
Due to mischaracterization of fact based on
confusion in respect of the Applicant’s testimony, which led to the Refugee
Protection Division’s error of fact in its credibility findings, the Court does
not find the decision is reasonable when assessed as a whole in context.
II. Introduction
[2]
The Applicant seeks a judicial review of a
decision by the RPD of the Immigration and Refugee Board, dated November 6,
2012, wherein, it was determined that the Applicant was not a Convention
refugee under section 96 nor a person in need of protection under section 97 of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001 c 27 [IRPA].
III. Background
[3]
The Applicant, Mr. Aimé-Landry Ahishakiye, is a
young Tutsi from Bujumbura, Burundi.
[4]
In early 2010, the Applicant became a student at
the Hope Africa University. At the university, the Applicant indicates he made
friends with a number of students who supported the National Forces of
Liberation [NFL] political party of Burundi.
[5]
The Applicant explains that these students began
pressuring him to join the party in April 2010. Despite declining numerous
offers, they continued to pressure him to join for months.
[6]
In May 2010, the Applicant submitted a visa
application to come to Canada to study at the University of Sherbrooke. This
visa was denied as classes had already begun when his application was reviewed
by the Canadian Embassy.
[7]
On September 24, 2010, the Applicant states that
one of the students who had asked him to join the NFL approached him and
demanded that the Applicant join the party, forcefully handing him a membership
card. That same evening, the Applicant states he received a threatening
telephone call from the same student and he continued receiving such calls
until shortly before his departure to Canada.
[8]
On September 27, 2010, the Applicant stopped
attending classes at the Hope Africa University. The Applicant states he feared
leaving his home as a result of the threatening telephone calls.
[9]
On December 16, 2010, the Applicant received a
student visa to study at the University of Sherbrooke. The Applicant
subsequently left Burundi for Canada on December 29, 2010.
[10]
On January 5, 2011, the Applicant submitted a
refugee claim in Etobicoke, Ontario. The Applicant did not attend the
University of Sherbrooke after his arrival.
[11]
On November 6, 2012, the RPD rendered a decision
that the Applicant was neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of
protection.
IV. Decision
under Review
[12]
In its decision, the RPD determined that the
Applicant was not credible and that he had not established a serious
possibility of persecution or that he would be personally subject to a risk to
his life or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in Burundi.
[13]
In assessing the Applicant’s credibility, the
RPD found it implausible that the Applicant’s parents would have taken the
matter “lightly”, as testified by the Applicant, when informed by their 19 year
old son that he was being threatened by other students.
[14]
The RPD noted that his parents would have
reasonably been expected to have contacted the school administration where
their son had experienced the recruitment efforts of the NFL. The RPD found
that this lack of action on the part of the Applicant’s parents greatly put
into question the credibility of his testimony.
[15]
In addition to its finding regarding the
credibility of the Applicant, the RPD noted that the objective evidence on file
did not demonstrate that he fit the profile of those generally targeted by the
NFL, or that the party was engaged in recruiting members against their will.
The RPD therefore concluded that objective evidence did not establish the
existence of a serious possibility of persecution or risk to his life or cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment.
V. Issue
[16]
Is the RPD’s decision reasonable?
VI. Relevant
Legislative Provisions
[17]
The following legislative provisions of the IRPA
are relevant:
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Convention refugee
96. A
Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion,
(a) is
outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of
that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries; or
(b)
not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
return to that country.
Person in need of protection
97.
(1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to
their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country
of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject
them personally
(a) to
a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to
a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment if
(i) the
person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of that country,
(ii) the risk
would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced
generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the
risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk
is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or
medical care.
Person in need of protection
(2) A person
in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations
as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection.
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Définition de « réfugié »
96. A
qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et
ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de
chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays
dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette
crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne à protéger
97.
(1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être
soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la
torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines
cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne
peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y
est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires
de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à protéger
(2) A
également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada
et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par
règlement le besoin de protection.
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VII. Position
of the Parties
[18]
The Applicant raised various grounds to support his
position that the RPD’s decision is not reasonable, all of which are related to
how the RPD assessed the evidence on file.
[19]
Firstly, the Applicant contends that the RPD erred in
misconstruing his testimony. The Applicant states that the RPD confused two
conversations he had with his parents regarding the actions of the NFL towards
him; his initial conversation with regard to being approached by members of the
NFL, and the second, a conversation in which he revealed he had been threatened
by them.
[20]
The Applicant submits that in misconstruing this
evidence and drawing a negative credibility finding from it, it is not possible
to know for certain how the RPD would have judged the case otherwise.
[21]
The Applicant submits that the RPD also misconstrued
the evidence on record regarding the recruitment pattern of the NFL. The
Applicant states that the evidence in fact demonstrates that the NFL did rely
on violence to recruit new members in 2010, primarily through youth partisans.
[22]
The Applicant further submits that the RPD erred in
finding that his testimony regarding his parents’ reaction to the threats made
by the NFL was implausible. The Applicant states that he clearly testified that
the university’s security service was non-existent; therefore, his parents
cannot have reasonably been expected to communicate with it regarding their
son’s safety. Moreover, the Applicant states that once the RPD accepted that
the Police in Burundi were not reliable, there was no logical basis for the RPD
to expect the Applicant to go to the university to resolve the problem.
[23]
Lastly, the Applicant argues that the RPD breached a
principle of natural justice by basing its credibility findings on a doubt
which was not put to the Applicant. Specifically, the Applicant states that the
RPD erred in making a determination regarding the Applicant’s father’s
political views without first asking him directly if he was a supporter of the
CNDD-FCC.
[24]
The Respondent argues that the RPD was entitled to find
that the Applicant’s account of events was not credible, and did not err by
ignoring evidence of the atrocities committed by the NFL in Burundi at that time. To the contrary, the Respondent submits that the RPD did not have any
evidence before it to support the Applicant’s claims of forcible and
threatening recruitment efforts by the NFL.
[25]
The Respondent further submits that the RPD did not err
in its assessment of the Applicant’s evidence of his parents’ reaction to the
threats by the NFL. The Respondent argues that the Applicant’s claim that the RPD
confused the two conversations discussed by the Applicant in his testimony is
self-serving and attempts to explain away the testimony that it questioned.
Further, the Respondent asserts that the RPD was entitled to find it not
credible that the Applicant would simply drop out of school without approaching
authorities for assistance.
[26]
With regard to the Applicant’s claim that the RPD
breached a principle of fundamental justice, the Respondent submits that the RPD
did not make a determination that his father was politically active, or that he
was a CNDD-FDD partisan or supporter. The RPD simply found that he was in a
position that was approved by the government in power.
VIII. Standard of Review
[27]
The applicable standard for issues involving the RPD’s
weighing of evidence or findings of credibility is the standard of
reasonableness (Aguebor v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
(1993), 160 NR 315 (FCA) at para 4).
[28]
The decision must therefore be justifiable, transparent
and intelligible. It should be vacated only if it is perverse, capricious, not
based on the evidence or based on an important mischaracterization of material
facts (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190).
[29]
The Applicant also alleges that the RPD breached a
principle of natural justice. The appropriate standard of review for issues
involving procedural fairness and natural justice is the standard of
correctness (Sketchley v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404, [2006]
3 FCR 392 at para 46).
IX. Analysis
[30]
In the Court’s view, the Applicant has demonstrated
that the RPD based its decision on a negative credibility finding that was made
due to confusion in respect of the testimony, and, thus, on the basis of the
narrative, itself.
[31]
In its decision, the RPD relied largely on the
Applicant’s account of his parents’ reaction regarding the threats by the NFL
in determining that his story was not credible. The RPD
concluded:
[18] Le demandeur
a expliqué qu’il ne s’était pas adressé à la police parce que la police n’est
pas fiable. Il est évident au regard de la preuve documentaire que la
population n’accorde aucune confiance aux forces de sécurité. Le tribunal
considère raisonnable que le demandeur se soit abstenu de faire appel à la
police.
[19] Cependant, lorsque
le tribunal a demandé au demandeur s’il avait tenu ses parents au courant des
pressions exercées sur lui pour qu’il rejoigne le FNL, le demandeur a répondu
que oui, mais que ses parents avaient pris ses révélations à la légère. Le
tribunal juge peu probable, voire invraisemblable, que les parents du demandeur
aient pris à la légère les révélations du demandeur que le FNL cherchait à le
recruter contre son gré. Le demandeur lui-même a insisté dans son exposé
circonstancié qu’il avait ressenti de l’inquiétude face à la possibilité d’être
mépris par les forces de sécurité pour un membre du FNL, un mouvement que le
demandeur qualifie de mouvement rebelle dans son exposé circonstancié.
[Emphasis added].
[32]
As described above, the Applicant asserts that the RPD,
inadvertently confused two separate conversations he had with his parents to
arrive at this conclusion. Conversely, in its memorandum, the Respondent argues
that these two conversations are one and the same event, and that the Applicant
is merely attempting to invent a temporal distinction in the facts.
[33]
The Court cannot agree with the Respondent’s
suggestion. As it clearly appears from the transcript of the hearing (Certified
Tribunal Record at pp 293-294) the Applicant recounted two distinct
conversations with his parents regarding the threats received by the NFL. It is
only after the RPD questioned the Applicant about the date he started receiving
actual threats that the Applicant discussed his parents’ reaction to those
threats. The Applicant described his parents’ reaction as being “very scared”
and “in shock” [translated]. The Court refers to the passage in question from
the transcript:
PRÉSIDENTE : Vous aviez quoi? Dix-huit ans?
DEMANDEUR : J’avais, oui, à l’époque j’avais 18 ans.
PRÉSIDENTE : Vous en avez parlé à vos parents de vos problèmes?
DEMANDEUR : Oui. Donc à l’époque, donc, c’était pas des problèmes. Donc tout
simplement j’ai parlé à mes parents : « Ah, vous savez quoi? Il y a des
personnes qui me parlent de politique, du FNL ». Et donc mon père disait : «
(Inaudible) du FNL? Pourquoi ils te parlent? » Et tout. Bon, moi je disais,
bon, ils me parlent. Il me demandait donc : « Est-ce qu’ils te menacent? Est-ce
que tu vois qu’il y a des signes de t’impliquer dedans? » Etc. Et donc moi je
disais, bon, ils me parlent tout simplement du FNL. Donc ils discutent entre
eux en parlant du CNDD, du FNL. Donc ils discutent en tous cas et donc moi j’ai
pas beaucoup de trucs à dire parce que j’ai pas – j’ai pas vraiment de
connaissances dans ce domaine-là et… Donc ils ont pris ça à la légère quoi
donc. Il n’y avait pas de menace, il y avait rien du tout. Donc ils étaient au
courant de ça.
PRÉSIDENTE: Mais le 24 septembre, là c’était quand même assez sérieux. C’est
le soir même qu’on vous avez appelé pour vous menacer.
DEMANDEUR: Oui, oui. Donc là, à partir…
PRÉSIDENTE : Vous en avez parlé à vos parents.
DEMANDEUR : Oui, oui.
PRÉSIDENTE : Et?
DEMANDEUR: Donc quand – donc après la fin de cet appel-là donc j’ai déjà –
donc tout simplement donc j’ai parlé à mes parents. Je leur ai dit que je viens
de recevoir un appel et que j’avais reconnu un des étudiants qui avaient – qui
étudiaient avec moi. Et donc il me disait que simplement j’allais regretter ma
décision parce que j’avais pas pris la carte du parti qu’il m’avait donnée.
PRÉSIDENTE : Quelle a été leur réaction ?
DEMANDEUR : Ils ont eu très peur. Il ont été choqués.
[34]
The Court agrees with the Applicant that the RPD
misconstrued the evidence provided in his testimony. It is clear in reading the
transcript that the Applicant was attempting to recount his entire narrative to
the RPD in his testimony, but was not given the chance to do so. In his
testimony, the Applicant not only referred to the incident that occurred on
September 24, 2010, but also to the events that occurred before he was
threatened. It is only after being interrupted and questioned by the RPD with regard
to the telephone threats of September 24, 2010, that the Applicant mentioned his
parents’ reaction to those threats. Prior to this intervention by the RPD, the
Applicant described his experience before the threats arose.
[35]
Due to mischaracterization of fact based on confusion
in respect of the Applicant’s testimony, which led to the RPD’s error of fact
in its credibility findings, the Court does not find the decision is reasonable
when assessed as a whole in context.
[36]
The RPD relied primarily on this finding to justify its
conclusion that the Applicant lacked credibility. The RPD undertook very little
substantive analysis on the remainder of the evidence upon which the
Applicant’s claim of a well-founded fear relied, although the documentary
evidence submitted by the Applicant reasonably supported his claim of fear from
youth NFL members in Burundi.
[37]
As stated by this Court in Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v El Attar, 2013 FC 1012, “a reasonable
result will not save a decision that is devoid of adequate reasons where there
is a duty to give reasons and where the reasons cannot be augmented by regard
to the record” (at para 10) (Reference is also made to Komolafe v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 431).
[38]
Without further analysis of the other evidence on the
record, the Court cannot find that the principles of Newfoundland and
Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011
SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708 save the decision. Even if the RPD found some evidence
not to be credible, it was required to continue go on to consider whether there
remained a residuum of reliable evidence to support a well-founded fear of
persecution (Joseph v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2011 FC 548 at para 11). This is particularly true in the present case where
the evidence found not credible was only related to peripheral issues.
[39]
Given that this factor, in and of itself, is
determinative of the matter, the Court does not see a need to address the other
grounds raised by the Applicant.
X. Conclusion
[40]
For all of the above-noted reasons, the Applicant’s
application for judicial review is allowed.
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