Docket: T-1683-15
Citation:
2016 FC 790
Ottawa, Ontario, July 11, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
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BETWEEN:
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STARBUCKS (HK)
LIMITED
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Applicant
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and
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TRINITY
TELEVISION INC.
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application pursuant to s 18.1 of the
Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 [Federal
Courts Act] of a decision of the
Registrar of Trade-marks to give public notice of the adoption and use of NOWTV
as an official mark by Trinity Television Inc [Respondent], which was
communicated through publication in Volume 48, No. 2434 of the Trade-marks
Journal on June 20, 2001.
II.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The Applicant, Starbucks (HK) Limited, is a
company based in Hong Kong.
[3]
The Respondent is (or was) a non-share
corporation incorporated in Manitoba and based in Winnipeg, Manitoba. It is (or
was) a registered charity and its letters patent indicate that one of its
corporate objectives is (or was) producing and distributing television programs
that convey Christian teachings.
[4]
The Respondent is also the holder of NOWTV, an
official mark. On April 10, 2001, the Respondent filed a request pursuant to s
9(1)(n)(iii) of the Trade-Marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13 [Trade-Marks
Act], to give public notice of its claimed adoption and use of NOWTV as an
official mark in association with services in Canada under serial number
913,106. The Registrar gave public notice through publication in the Trade-marks
Journal on June 20, 2001 of the adoption and use by the Respondent of NOWTV
as an official mark.
[5]
On October 24, 2013, the Applicant filed an
application in the Canadian Intellectual Property Office to register the Trade-mark
NOW TV & Design under application number 1,649,254.
[6]
On July 18, 2014, an examiner’s report noted
that s 9(1)(n)(iii) prohibited registration of the Applicant’s design mark in
light of the Respondent’s official NOWTV mark.
III.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[7]
The decision under review is the Registrar’s Decision
to designate NOWTV an official mark, published in Volume 48, No. 2434 of the Trade-marks
Journal on June 20, 2001. No reasons were provided in connection with the Decision.
IV.
ISSUES
[8]
The Applicant submits that the following matters
are at issue in this proceeding:
1)
What standard of review applies to the
Registrar’s Decision?
2)
Whether the Applicant has standing to bring this
application for judicial review?
3)
Whether the Registrar’s Decision was reasonable?
4)
Whether the Court should exercise its discretion
to extend the time for making this application for judicial review?
V.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[9]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir] held that a standard of review
analysis need not be conducted in every instance. Instead, where the standard
of review applicable to a particular question before the court is settled in a
satisfactory manner by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that
standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless, or where the
relevant precedents appear to be inconsistent with new developments in the
common law principles of judicial review, must the reviewing court undertake a
consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of review analysis: Agraira
v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at para
48.
[10]
The Applicant submits that the applicable
standard of review is reasonableness but that a narrow margin of appreciation
ought to be applied for several reasons, including that the matter is one of
mixed fact and law that concerns the meaning of “public authority” under s
9(1)(n)(iii) of the Trade-marks Act, and the lack of discretion bestowed
on the Registrar by the Act. The Applicant also highlights that the Federal
Court of Appeal has indicated that s 9(1)(n)(iii) should not be given an
expansive meaning: Ontario Association of Architects v Association of
Architectural Technologists of Ontario, 2002 FCA 218 at para 64 [Ontario
Association of Architects]. While I agree that reasonableness has been
triggered, I am unconvinced such a narrow margin should be applied. The second
and third issues brought forward by the Applicant are questions of mixed fact
and law and involve the Registrar of Trade-marks’ expertise and fact-finding.
The reasonableness standard will be used in the analysis of these two issues.
[11]
As regards the issue of standing, analysis will
involve determining if the Applicant meets the requirements of the Federal
Courts Act to bring an application for judicial review. This is a
determination of mixed fact and law and therefore attracts a reasonableness
standard: Schamborzki v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 1262 at para
32.
[12]
Finally, in terms of the extension of time
issue, as both a discretionary matter and of mixed fact and law, it will be
reviewed using the standard of reasonableness: Imperial Oil Resources Ltd v
Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 139 at para 44; Dube v Canada
(Attorney General), 2016 FC 43 at para 36; Bernard v Canada (Attorney
General), 2014 FC 350 at para 12.
[13]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the analysis will be
concerned with “the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also
with] whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir,
above, at para 47, and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v
Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 59. Put another way, the Court should intervene
only if the Decision was unreasonable in the sense
that it falls outside the “range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”
VI.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[14]
The following provisions of the Trade-marks
Act is applicable in this proceeding:
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Prohibited
marks
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Marques
interdites
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9 (1) No
person shall adopt in connection with a business, as a trade-mark or
otherwise, any mark consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely to
be mistaken for,
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9 (1) Nul ne
peut adopter à l’égard d’une entreprise, comme marque de commerce ou
autrement, une marque composée de ce qui suit, ou dont la ressemblance est
telle qu’on pourrait vraisemblablement la confondre avec ce qui suit :
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…
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…
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(n) any
badge, crest, emblem or mark
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n) tout
insigne, écusson, marque ou emblème
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…
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…
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(iii) adopted and used by any public
authority, in Canada as an official mark for goods or services,
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(iii) adopté
et employé par une autorité publique au Canada comme marque officielle pour
des produits ou services,
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in respect of which the Registrar has, at
the request of Her Majesty or of the university or public authority, as the
case may be, given public notice of its adoption and use;
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à
l’égard duquel le registraire, sur la demande de Sa Majesté ou de
l’université ou autorité publique, selon le cas, a donné un avis public
d’adoption et emploi;
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Further prohibitions
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Autres interdictions
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11 No person shall use in connection
with a business, as a trade-mark or otherwise, any mark adopted contrary to
section 9 or 10 of this Act or section 13 or 14 of the Unfair Competition
Act, chapter 274 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952.
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11 Nul ne peut employer relativement
à une entreprise, comme marque de commerce ou autrement, une marque adoptée
contrairement à l’article 9 ou 10 de la présente loi ou contrairement à
l’article 13 ou 14 de la Loi sur la concurrence déloyale, chapitre 274
des Statuts revisés du Canada de 1952.
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When trade-mark registrable Marque
de commerce enregistrable
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Marque de commerce enregistrable
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12 (1) Subject to section 13, a
trade-mark is registrable if it is not
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12 (1) Sous réserve de l’article 13,
une marque de commerce est enregistrable sauf dans l’un ou l’autre des cas
suivants :
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(a) a word that is primarily merely
the name or the surname of an individual who is living or has died within the
preceding thirty years;
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a) elle est constituée d’un mot n’étant
principalement que le nom ou le nom de famille d’un particulier vivant ou qui
est décédé dans les trente années précédentes;
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(b) whether depicted, written or
sounded, either clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in the
English or French language of the character or quality of the goods or
services in association with which it is used or proposed to be used or of
the conditions of or the persons employed in their production or of their
place of origin;
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b) qu’elle soit sous forme graphique,
écrite ou sonore, elle donne une description claire ou donne une description
fausse et trompeuse, en langue française ou anglaise, de la nature ou de la
qualité des produits ou services en liaison avec lesquels elle est employée,
ou en liaison avec lesquels on projette de l’employer, ou des conditions de
leur production, ou des personnes qui les produisent, ou de leur lieu
d’origine;
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(c) the name in any language of any
of the goods or services in connection with which it is used or proposed to
be used;
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c) elle est constituée du nom, dans
une langue, de l’un des produits ou de l’un des services à l’égard desquels
elle est employée, ou à l’égard desquels on projette de l’employer;
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(d) confusing with a registered
trade-mark;
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d) elle crée de la confusion avec une
marque de commerce déposée;
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(e) a mark of which the adoption is
prohibited by section 9 or 10;
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e) elle est une marque dont l’article
9 ou 10 interdit l’adoption;
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(f) a denomination the adoption of
which is prohibited by section 10.1;
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f) elle est une dénomination dont
l’article 10.1 interdit l’adoption;
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(g) in whole or in part a protected
geographical indication, where the trade-mark is to be registered in
association with a wine not originating in a territory indicated by the
geographical indication;
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g) elle est constituée, en tout ou en
partie, d’une indication géographique protégée et elle doit être enregistrée
en liaison avec un vin dont le lieu d’origine ne se trouve pas sur le
territoire visé par l’indication;
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(h) in whole or in part a protected geographical
indication, where the trade-mark is to be registered in association with a
spirit not originating in a territory indicated by the geographical
indication; and
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h) elle est constituée, en tout ou en
partie, d’une indication géographique protégée et elle doit être enregistrée
en liaison avec un spiritueux dont le lieu d’origine ne se trouve pas sur le
territoire visé par l’indication;
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(i) subject to subsection 3(3) and
paragraph 3(4)(a) of the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act, a mark the
adoption of which is prohibited by subsection 3(1) of that Act.
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i) elle est une marque dont
l’adoption est interdite par le paragraphe 3(1) de la Loi sur les marques
olympiques et paralympiques, sous réserve du paragraphe 3(3) et de
l’alinéa 3(4)a) de cette loi.
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[15]
The following provision of the Federal Courts
Act is applicable in this proceeding:
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Application for judicial review
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Demande de contrôle judiciaire
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18.1 (1) An application for judicial
review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or by anyone directly
affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought.
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18.1 (1) Une demande de contrôle
judiciaire peut être présentée par le procureur général du Canada ou par
quiconque est directement touché par l’objet de la demande.
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Time Limitation
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Délai de présentation
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(2) An application for judicial
review in respect of a decision or an order of a federal board, commission or
other tribunal shall be made within 30 days after the time the decision or
order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or other
tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the
party directly affected by it, or within any further time that a judge of the
Federal Court may fix or allow before or after the end of those 30 days
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(2) Les demandes de contrôle
judiciaire sont à présenter dans les trente jours qui suivent la première
communication, par l’office fédéral, de sa décision ou de son ordonnance au
bureau du sous-procureur général du Canada ou à la partie concernée, ou dans
le délai supplémentaire qu’un juge de la Cour fédérale peut, avant ou après
l’expiration de ces trente jours, fixer ou accorder.
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VII.
ARGUMENTS
A.
Standing
[16]
The Applicant argues that, as a result of the
direct adverse impact it has suffered from the Registrar’s Decision, it clearly
has the standing required under s 18.1(1) of the Federal Courts Act to
bring this application for judicial review: TCC Holdings Inc v Families as
Support Teams Society, 2014 FC 830 [TCC Holdings].
B.
Reasonableness
[17]
The Applicant says that the protection granted
to official marks is “exceptional” because it
gives important advantages over the rights associated with an ordinary Trade-mark:
Gill: Fox on Canadian Law of Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 4th
(online); Ontario Association of Architects, above, at paras 4
and 34-36.
[18]
The Registrar’s finding that the Respondent is a
public authority is at odds with the evidence. While there is no definition for
“public authority” in the Trade-marks Act, the Applicant submits that
the Federal Court of Appeal has set out a two-part test to determine this issue.
The Court must first determine whether the entity in question is subject to
governmental control, and then review the extent to which the organization’s
activities benefit the public: Ontario Association of Architects, above.
Status as a charity is not enough for an entity to qualify: Canadian Jewish
Congress v Chosen People Ministries, Inc, 2003 FCA 272 at para 4 [Canadian
Jewish Congress]; TCC Holdings, above, at paras 23-24.
C.
Extension of time
[19]
This is an appropriate case, according the Applicant,
for the Court to exercise its discretion under s 18.1(2) of the Federal
Courts Act to extend the time period for commencing a judicial review
application period beyond 30 days: Canada (Attorney General) v Larkman,
2012 FCA 204 at paras 61-62; TCC Holdings, above. Several reasons as to
why it is in the interests of justice to do so are submitted:
1. The Applicant’s case on its merits is very strong;
2. There is no prejudice caused to the Respondent, who has not
participated at all in the judicial review application;
3. There is a reasonable explanation for the delay, as it was only on July
18, 2014 that the Respondent’s official mark prevented the Applicant to
register its Trade-mark. The application for judicial review was initiated on
October 5, 2015, well within the time period for responding to the examiner’s
report;
4. The Applicant will be significantly prejudiced if disallowed from
proceeding with the judicial review because of: the exceptional nature of the
rights associated with an official mark; there being no other avenue to
challenge the mark; and the entity requesting the official mark is normally the
only party to the proceeding before the Registrar of Trade-marks;
5. It would be unfair if a party that is not a public entity could
enjoy the exceptional rights conferred on the holder of an official mark.
[20]
The Respondent has not filed a notice of
appearance or otherwise participated in this proceeding.
VIII.
ANALYSIS
[21]
The Respondent has declined to participate in
these proceedings. At the hearing before me in Toronto, Mr. Cotter, counsel for
the Applicant, informed the Court that his office had received a voicemail
message from Mr. Thiessen, a former president and director of the Respondent,
indicating that the Respondent had sold its business to Rogers in 2005 and had
no interest in responding to the application.
[22]
Apart from the issue of costs, I am satisfied
that the Applicant has established its case for the relief sought in that:
(1) The Applicant has standing to bring this application under s 18.1(1)
of the Federal Courts Act as being a party “directly
affected by the matter in respect of which the relief is sought” and has
suffered “a direct adverse impact from the decision”
(see Canada Post Corp v Untied States Postal Service, 2005 FC 1630 at
para 12) in that the NOWTV official mark was cited against the Applicant and
prevented the Applicant from registering its NOW TV and Design Trade-mark. See TCC
Holdings, above, at paras 8, 9, and 19;
(2) The Decision is unreasonable because the law is clear that status as
a charity is insufficient to constitute an entity as a “public
authority.” See Canadian Jewish Congress, above, at para 3;
(3) An extension of time within which to bring this application is
warranted because it is in the interest of justice to do so for the following
reasons:
a) The Applicant’s case on the merits is very strong;
b) There is no prejudice to the Respondent who has no further interest
in the official mark and has not participated in this judicial review
application;
c) There is a reasonable explanation for the delay. Although the
Registrar’s Decision was made in 2001, it was only on July 18, 2014, when the
Respondent’s official mark was cited in the Examiner’s Report against the
Applicant in this application to register the Trade-mark NOW TV & Design.
This application for judicial review was commenced on October 5, 2015,
which was within the time period for responding to the examiner’s report.
d) The Applicant will be significantly prejudiced if barred from
proceedings with this judicial review application because of the following
unique aspects of official marks:
i.
The exceptional nature of the rights conferred
on the holder of an official mark;
ii.
There is essentially no other way to challenge
an official mark. As noted above, once the Registrar has given public notice,
and official mark is “hardy and virtually inexpungeable”;
iii.
As the Federal Court of Appeal stated in Ontario
Association of Architects, above, the entity requesting the official mark
will normally be the only party to the proceeding before the Registrar. These
are also very significant factors in the context of this case favouring the
extension of time;
e) It would be patently unfair and completely contrary to the interest
of justice if an entity that is not a public authority was permitted to enjoy
the exceptional rights conferred on the holder of an official mark. As was
noted by the Federal Court of Appeal in Ontario Association of Architects,
above, an official mark “confers very substantial
benefits not available to the owners of trade-marks, and thus has the capacity
to injure both existing trade-mark owners and the public.” The public
interest (i.e., the potential injury to the public) is also a very significant
factor in the context of this case favouring the extension of time.
[23]
The Applicant has asked for costs against the Respondent
for this application but the Court feels that costs are not warranted. The Respondent
has not opposed the application and the Applicant is, in effect, simply
correcting the Trade-mark register so that it can proceed with its own Trade-mark
application.
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