Docket: IMM-5233-15
Citation:
2016 FC 813
Ottawa, Ontario, July 18, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Southcott
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BETWEEN:
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MUHAMMAD NASIM
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
The Applicant is seeking judicial review
pursuant to section 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], of a decision dated October 27, 2015 of the
Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] of the Immigration and Refuge Board of Canada. In
that decision, made pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD
confirmed the determination of the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] that the
Applicant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection.
[2]
For the reasons that follow, this application is
dismissed.
I.
Background
[3]
The Applicant’s allegations are detailed in the
narrative portion of his Basis of Claim [BOC] form. The Applicant is a citizen
of Pakistan who alleges that in 2000 he joined the Awami National Party [ANP]
in the Swat District of Pakistan. Under the banner of the ANP, he worked for
three NGOs, Save the Children, OMEED and the Devolution Trust for Community
Empowerment [DTCE], restoring schools and assisting women’s education. The
Applicant alleges that, as a result of this work, he received threatening calls
from the Taliban in November 2013 and 2014.
[4]
The Applicant claims to have reported the
threatening phone calls to the police but that they refused to take any sort of
action because the Applicant could not identify the callers. Following a call
on February 23, 2014, in which his life was threatened, the Applicant moved to
Karachi. Shortly thereafter, he alleges he was shot at by the Taliban while
shopping at a local bazaar. The Applicant says he reported the shooting
incident to the police but that they did nothing to assist him other than make
a report of the matter. He then left Pakistan and claims that he is unable to
return because of his fear of being killed by the Taliban.
[5]
In his BOC form, the Applicant also details a
prior refugee claim he made in the United Kingdom [U.K.] in 1996 based on his
membership in the Jamaat-e-Islami Party. His claim was rejected and he was deported
back to Pakistan in 1999. The Applicant alleges that he never resumed his
support for the Jamaat-e-Islami Party due to its fundamentalist polices and
support for the Taliban.
[6]
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [the
Minister] filed a Notice of Intent to Intervene in the RPD’s hearing of the
Applicant’s refugee claim and submitted evidence related to credibility issues.
The Minister submitted a Five Country Conference Report from the United States
[U.S.] Department of Homeland Security that indicated the Applicant was
fingerprinted on May 3, 2007 in conjunction with an application for a U.S.
non-immigrant visa made under the name Fnu Salim. The Minister submitted that
the Applicant had not noted any difficulties in Pakistan between 1999 and
November 2013 and, as such, he had no reason to misrepresent himself to U.S.
officials at the time of his visa application. The Minister concluded that the
Applicant was being truthful in his U.S. visa application, that his real name
is Fnu Salim, and that he was misrepresenting himself to Canadian authorities
to substantiate a refugee claim.
[7]
As part of the intervention, the Minister also submitted
a Document Analysis Report of the Applicant’s National Identity Card [NIC]
which found that the card was probably genuine but that it contained a number
of anomalies that indicated it may have been altered. The Minister’s position
was that the RPD should find the Applicant not to be a Convention refugee or a person
in need of protection.
II.
RPD Decision
[8]
The RPD made adverse findings against the
Applicant with respect to his identity and credibility. With respect to
identity, the RPD held that there was no clear and convincing evidence of the
Applicant’s true identity or his route to Canada. However, as noted below, the
RAD subsequently accepted the Applicant’s identity as claimed. It is therefore
not necessary to set out the RPD’s detailed analysis on this issue.
[9]
The RPD considered the objective component of
the Applicant’s alleged well-founded fear of persecution to be a determinative
issue. As the Applicant’s fear was linked to threats allegedly received because
he performed humanitarian work through NGOs, the Applicant was questioned about
that work. He testified there were 15 full time workers and 9 to 10 volunteers.
He did not know if the full time workers were threatened and testified that a
couple of volunteers received threats but were not as active as he was. In
assessing the Applicant’s evidence, the RPD noted that the Applicant was vague
in his responses as to any details of threats to others working under similar
circumstances. As a result, the RPD drew a negative inference from this lack of
knowledge and concluded that his evidence was untrustworthy and not credible.
[10]
The RPD also found that the Applicant had not
provided clear and convincing evidence of Pakistan’s inability to protect its
citizens. He testified that he reported the threatening phone calls to the
police but that, since he could not identify the callers, the police did
nothing. The RPD concluded that there was nothing before it that suggested,
given the particular circumstances, the police did not act in accordance with
the evidence before them, i.e. only unsourced telephone calls.
[11]
The RPD considered the Applicant’s testimony
that, following the threats, he moved to Karachi and shortly thereafter, while
on his way to a local bazaar, was shot at by the Taliban who intended to kill
him. The RPD observed that the Applicant responded to questions on this
incident in a very confusing manner, testifying: that he was not aware of how
many Taliban there were because he did not see them; that he was the only one
on the street; that he heard the shots, fell to the ground and the bullets
landed beside him; and that he heard them running away. The RPD found this
story neither credible nor trustworthy on the basis that, if more than one
Taliban member had been pursuing the Applicant, they would not have missed
their target and would not have run away if he was in front of them on an empty
street. The RPD noted that it was unclear from the Applicant’s testimony how
he was aware they were the Taliban. Further, the RPD found it not credible that
the Taliban could have managed to locate the Applicant just a few days after
his arrival in Karachi, a city of approximately 15 million people.
[12]
The Applicant provided newspaper articles and letters
in support of the alleged attack in Karachi. However, in light of its negative
credibility findings, the RPD placed no weight on this evidence, finding that
it was manufactured in an attempt to establish a refugee claim.
III.
RAD Decision
[13]
The Applicant filed an appeal with the RAD,
which accepted the Applicant’s identity as claimed but, due to lack of
credibility, confirmed the RPD’s determination that the Applicant was neither a
Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection.
[14]
The RAD relied on the Federal Court’s decision
in Huruglica v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799 for the
standard by which it was to review the decision of the RPD. The RAD recognized
its role was to review all aspects of the RPD’s decision and to come to an independent
assessment of the refugee claim, deferring to the RPD only where the lower
tribunal enjoys a particular advantage in reaching a conclusion, such as issues
of credibility.
[15]
In considering the objective basis for a
well-founded fear of persecution, the RAD stated that it reviewed all of the
Applicant’s evidence, including the CD recording of the RPD’s hearing, and concurred
with the RPD’s finding that it was reasonable to expect the Applicant would
have discussed the alleged threatening phone calls with full-time NGO workers,
other volunteers and, at minimum, with those who were responsible for
administering his alleged work with the NGOs concerned. The RAD also observed
that the Applicant did not disclose any corroborating documentation concerning
his association with the three NGOs, other than: a hand written letter from
OMEED dated August 3, 2014, which appeared to be a response to a self-report by
the Applicant; some pictures; and a letter from his brother. Accordingly, the
RAD found the Applicant failed to provide sufficient credible evidence that he
was personally threatened by the Taliban.
[16]
With respect to the issue of state protection,
the RAD found that it was doubtful the Applicant required police protection and
that it was open to the RPD to find the police response to be reasonable in the
circumstances. Accordingly, the RAD found that the Applicant failed to rebut
the presumption of state protection.
[17]
The RAD then noted that the RPD failed to
consider the documentary evidence in support of the alleged shooting incident
in Karachi. However, the RAD reviewed the evidence and found that, given the
implausibility of the Taliban finding the Applicant in Karachi in combination
with the lack of evidence surrounding the Karachi shooting, it was open to the
RPD to find the story to be neither credible nor trustworthy. The RAD concurred
with this finding.
[18]
The RAD also reviewed the evidence concerning
the Applicant’s pursuit of safety in the U.K. and the U.S. before coming to
Canada. The RAD found that these events were significant as they related to the
Applicant’s general credibility. In relation to the Applicant’s residence and
refugee claim in the U.K., the RAD found that it strained credulity that he was
fleeing persecution considering that he waited approximately three years to
make a claim in the U.K., his claim was rejected for lack of corroboration, and
the trouble with the alleged agent of his persecution was allegedly resolved in
a conversation with his father. In relation to the application for a U.S. non-immigrant
visa in 2007, the RAD noted the Applicant testified that he made the application
because he feared the Taliban. However, he made no mention in his BOC of any
risk from the Taliban that would cause him to leave the country at that time.
[19]
The RAD also observed that, in addition to the
Applicant’s misrepresentations to U.S. authorities, he misrepresented himself
to Canadian authorities in his Port of Entry [POE] interview when he stated
that he had never used any other name and that he had never been refused refugee
status by any other country. Ultimately, the RAD found that the Applicant’s
actions and testimony raised a serious doubt as to his credibility and that
there was insufficient credible evidence to find that he would be at risk of persecution
or that he would face a risk to his life if he were returned to Pakistan.
IV.
Issues and Standard of Review
[20]
As identified below in the summary of the
Applicant’s arguments, he raises a number of issues to be considered by the
Court. Together, these issues amount to a consideration of whether the RAD’s
decision was unreasonable. The parties agree, and I concur, that the standard applicable
to the Court’s review of the RAD’s decision is reasonableness (see Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 [Huruglica]
at para 14; Sui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 406 at
para 14).
[21]
The parties confirmed that the articulation of
the standard applicable to the RAD’s review of the RPD’s decision, as addressed
recently by the Federal Court of Appeal in Huruglica, is not engaged in
this application, although the Applicant argues, in support of his position
that the RAD’s decision is unreasonable, that the RAD failed to conduct its own
full and independent assessment of the evidence as is required of an appeal
tribunal (see Ali v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 396).
V.
Positions of the Parties
A.
Applicant’s Arguments
(1)
Discussion of Threats with Others
[22]
The Applicant says that it was highly speculative
for the RAD to concur with the RPD’s finding that it was reasonable to expect
the Applicant would have discussed the alleged threatening phone calls with
other full-time workers or others associated with the NGOs. The Applicant
notes that he testified he had not had any direct contact with full-time NGO
workers who may have received threats.
(2)
Establishment of Identity and Failure to
Consider Evidence
[23]
The Applicant also submits that the RAD’s
decision is unreasonable in light of its finding that the Applicant established
his identity and its finding that the RPD failed to consider the documentary
evidence in support of the alleged shooting incident in Karachi.
(3)
Assessment of Documentary Evidence
[24]
The Applicant takes the position that the RAD’s
assessment of the corroborative evidence in support of his claim is
unreasonable for the following reasons:
A.
He provided two letters from OMEED (not one as
found by the RAD) which confirmed his volunteer work with the subject
organization and the fact that his life was at risk by the Taliban;
B.
The RAD incorrectly stated the source and date
of a letter from the National Youth Organization. It also made an
unsubstantiated and unreasonable finding when it stated that the letter from
the National Youth Organization was a self-report by the Applicant;
C.
Contrary to the RAD’s findings, he provided
further evidence of his work with NGOs and the problems he incurred in Pakistan
as a result, including the letter from the National Youth Organization, as well
as a letter from the General Secretary of the ANP;
D.
The RAD’s assessment of the two newspaper
articles in support of his claim is unreasonable, as the fact that he may have
been the source of one or both of the articles does not provide a basis to
discount their probative value;
E.
The RAD ignored or failed to properly consider
the probative value of other documentation tendered in support of the
Applicant’s credibility and the well-foundedness of his claim, including: ANP
documentation; Election Commission Cards; a written statement to a Station
House Officer; a supporting affidavit from his brother; and photographs showing
him engaged in charitable activities with NGOs. Accordingly, the RAD’s finding
that he had not provided sufficient evidence corroborating his association with
NGOs in Pakistan and his problems with the Taliban is unreasonable; and
F.
The RAD’s finding as to the implausibility of
the Applicant being located in Karachi by the Taliban is unreasonable in light
of the acknowledged and documented pervasiveness of the Taliban in Pakistan.
The Applicant refers to the country condition documentation establishing this
pervasiveness and the connection between the Taliban and organized crime and
Pakistan’s intelligence service and army.
(4)
Presumption of State Protection
[25]
The Applicant submits that the RAD’s finding
that he had not rebutted the presumption of state protection is unreasonable. In
support, he states that his evidence clearly indicated the police had been
derelict in their response to the attempt on his life by the Taliban and that
the documentary evidence concerning the relevant country conditions in Pakistan
shows the inability of the Pakistani police to deal with terrorist organizations
such as the Taliban. He also notes the RAD did not find that he did not require
state protection but only that it was doubtful he did. The Applicant argues
that, by failing to conduct its own assessment of the documentary evidence, the
RAD failed to truly act as an appeal tribunal and come to its own conclusion
with respect to the correctness of the RPD’s finding on the issue of state
protection, as required by Huruglica.
(5)
Applicant’s Prior Immigration History
[26]
The Applicant submits that the RAD placed unreasonable
emphasis on his immigration history with the U.S. and the U.K. immigration
authorities in determining the credibility and well-foundedness of his refugee
claim. The Applicant points out that his immigration history with the U.S. and the
U.K. is dated, that the material incidents precipitating his refugee claim in
Canada post-date his dealings with the U.S. and U.K. authorities by many years,
and that his prior immigration history does not go to the core of his present
refugee claim.
(6)
Implausibility of Karachi Incident
[27]
The Applicant argues the RAD erred by failing to
find the RPD’s conclusion, that the Taliban would not have missed their target
had they intended to kill him, to be highly speculative. In support, he cites Huruglica
for the proposition that the RAD owes no deference to the RPD in respect of
findings that are not based on the credibility of evidence, such as
implausibility findings. The Applicant argues that the making of adverse
findings of credibility based on implausibility should only be made “in the clearest cases”, where “the facts as presented are outside the realm of what could
reasonably be expected, or where the documentary evidence demonstrates that the
event could not have happened in the manner asserted by the claimant.”
(see Valtchev v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001
FCT 776 [Valtchev]).
B.
Respondent’s Arguments
[28]
The Respondent’s overall position is that the
RAD refused the Applicant’s claim because he was not a credible witness. As a
result, there was insufficient credible and trustworthy evidence upon which the
RAD could conclude that the claim was well-founded. The Respondent says the
RAD’s reasons are intelligible and transparent and that, viewing its decision
as a whole, the Applicant failed to provide any persuasive arguments to suggest
the RAD erred in concluding as it did.
(1)
Establishment of Identity
[29]
The Respondent argues that the RAD’s concurrence
with the RPD’s overall negative determination is not unreasonable. The RPD made
several credibility findings that are independent of the finding that the
Applicant failed to establish his identity before the RPD. As such, the
credibility findings remained as alternative findings of the RPD to be
considered by the RAD on appeal, which performed its own assessment of the
evidence and confirmed the decision of the RPD: (see Siddiqui v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1028 at para 105).
(2)
Discussion of Threats with Others
[30]
The Respondent cites authorities related to the
role of a reviewing Court in assessing the reasonableness of an implausibility
finding, particularly as it relates to a negative credibility assessment (see K.K.
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 78 at paras 65-66,
69 [K.K.]; Navarrete Andrade v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2013 FC 436 at para 14; Rahal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2012 FC 319 at para 44; Aguebor v Canada (Minister of Employment &
Education), [1993] FCJ No 732 (FCA); Faryna v Chorny (1951),
[1952] 2 DLR 354 (BCCA); Alizadeh v Canada (Minister of Employment &
Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 11 (FCA); Shahamati v Canada (Minister of
Employment & Immigration), [1994] FCJ No 415 (FCA); Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v Abdo, 2007 FCA 64 at para 12; Gonzalez v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] FCJ No 805
(FCT); Pathmanapan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 763 at
para 12). The Respondent argues that the RPD and the RAD were entitled to
assess the well-foundedness and credibility of the alleged threats by the
Applicant’s response to such, including his actions and knowledge as they
relate to threats against others doing similar work, having regard to common
sense, rationality, and as measured against the backdrop of country condition
evidence and its own understanding of human behaviour and expertise inherent in
the conclusion.
[31]
The Respondent’s position is that the RAD
reasonably concurred with the RPD’s finding that, had the Applicant been
threatened as alleged, it was reasonable to expect that he would have discussed
the threats with the full-time and volunteer staff or those who were
responsible for administering the NGOs’ work. The Respondent submits this is
an entirely reasonable inference to draw, as one would expect a person to
discuss with the organization their problems resulting from doing the
organization’s work and, at the very least, to try to ascertain the
pervasiveness and seriousness of the threats across the organization.
(3)
Errors with Respect to OMEED Letters
[32]
The Respondent acknowledges that the RAD
mistakenly considered both OMEED letters to be a single letter based on
handwritten translations but submits that nothing determinative turns on this
error, and that this does not impugn the overall assessment of the evidence
concerning the alleged threats against the Applicant.
(4)
Evidence with Respect to NGO Work and Threats
[33]
The Respondent submits that it is trite law that
the RAD is not required to mention every piece of evidence in its decision. The
Applicant did not provide any evidence to confirm his work for two NGOs for
which he claimed to volunteer, i.e. Save the Children and DTCE. With respect to
his work for OMEED, the Respondent notes that the RAD considered the OMEED
letters, photos taken of the Applicant at a bi-annual event and his brother’s affidavit
statement. The Respondent also notes the ANP letter vaguely refers to the
Applicant’s work for a few NGOs and appears to be based on self-reporting and
that the letter from the National Youth Organization is silent on the
Applicant’s alleged NGO work. The Respondent’s position is that these documents
cannot be said to be first-hand evidence or sufficient credible and probative
evidence of the Applicant’s work and resultant threats.
(5)
Implausibility of Karachi Incident
[34]
The Respondent’s position is that it was
reasonable for the RAD to conclude that the Applicant’s account of the alleged
shooting in Karachi was not credible, as reasonable inferences were drawn in
reaching this determination. The Respondent notes that the RAD considered the
RPD’s finding that the Applicant’s story concerning the incident in Karachi was
not credible and that the RAD then considered the RPD’s finding in light of its
own assessment of the Applicant’s documentary evidence (i.e. the two newspaper
articles) and found that these constituted insufficient credible and
trustworthy evidence of sufficient probative value to establish the fact of the
shooting and its circumstances. In view of the credibility concerns that were
not overcome by the newspaper articles, the Respondent argues that the RAD
reasonably concurred with the RPD’s finding that the Applicant’s story
concerning the alleged shooting was not credible.
[35]
The Respondent also submits that, where a
general finding is made that a claimant lacks credibility, that determination
is sufficient to dispose of the claim unless there is independent and credible
documentary evidence in the record capable of supporting a positive disposition
of the claim. The Applicant bears the onus of demonstrating that there is such
evidence (see Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Sellan, 2008 FCA
381 at para 3; Ogiriki v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2006 FC 342 at para 11; Waheed v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FCT 329 at paras 41-42). The Respondent says that, taken
together and having regard to its general lack of credibility finding, the RAD
reasonably determined that the Applicant provided insufficient evidence that he
was personally threatened by the Taliban in Swat.
(6)
Presumption of State Protection
[36]
The Respondent notes that the RAD reasonably
doubted that the Applicant required state protection and submits that, given it
is the Applicant who bears the burden of establishing a need for state
protection, this finding is determinative of the state protection issue.
(7)
Applicant’s Immigration History
[37]
In relation to the Applicant’s submission that
the RAD placed undue weight on the Applicant’s immigration history, the
Respondent notes that the weight of evidence is within the RAD’s purview. The
Respondent says the RAD was entitled to consider the Applicant’s immigration
history and to give it significant weight as it relates to the Applicant’s
general credibility. The Respondent contends that the RAD reasonably drew a
negative general credibility inference from the Applicant’s misrepresentations,
especially given that the Applicant had no apparent reason to fail to provide
the complete truth to Canadian immigration authorities. The Respondent refers
to Federal Court jurisprudence to the effect that the cumulative impact of
issues peripheral to a claimed well-founded fear of persecution can support the
rejection of the claim where they reveal an overarching pattern of deception by
the Applicant, which taints the credibility of the entire claim (see Naeem v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1134 at para 14; Karakaya
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 777 at para 33; Manoharan
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 871 at paras
7-14; Li v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 998 at para 17;
Leung v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1993] FCJ No
685 (FCA); Feng v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 476 at
para 13; Sheikh v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration),
[1990] FCJ No 604 (FCA).
VI.
Analysis
[38]
For the reasons that follow, my conclusion is
that, viewed as a whole, the RAD’s decision is a reasonable one and
demonstrates the necessary independent assessment of the evidence before it,
which supports conclusions that are intelligible and transparent.
A.
Events in Swat
[39]
With respect to the RAD’s findings surrounding
his association with the NGOs and the threats he allegedly received in Swat, I
disagree with the Applicant’s position that it was speculative for the RAD to
concur with the RPD’s finding that it was reasonable to expect the Applicant
would have discussed the alleged threatening calls with others at the NGOs. While
the Applicant points out that he testified that he had no direct contact with
full-time NGO workers, the RAD noted this testimony and his evidence that he
was unaware if any of these workers had received threatening calls. The RAD did
not overlook the evidence in reaching its conclusion on this point and I cannot
conclude its finding to be unreasonable.
[40]
However, the Applicant is correct, and the Respondent
acknowledges, that the RAD made errors in its references to the documentary
evidence related to the NGOs and alleged threats in Swat. The Applicant argues
that the RAD referred to there being one letter from OMEED, when there were in
fact two letters, and mistakenly referred to the handwritten letter from the
National Youth Organization as being from OMEED and misstated its date. The RAD
also failed to mention a letter from the ANP that referred to the Applicant
volunteering with NGOs and having told the ANP that he had been threatened.
[41]
I accept that these were errors on the part of
the RAD. I include in that finding a conclusion that the letter from the ANP
was overlooked. I appreciate that a board such as the RAD is presumed to have
reviewed all the evidence and need not refer to every piece of evidence that
was submitted (see Kandha v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016
FC 430 at para 16). However, I conclude the RAD overlooked the ANP letter on
the basis that the RAD listed the corroborating documentation concerning the
Applicant’s association with the three NGOs but failed to mention this letter,
notwithstanding that it refers to his volunteer work.
[42]
Nevertheless, I do not consider the errors described
above to be sufficiently significant to undermine the reasonableness of the RAD’s
decision. The RAD concluded that the Applicant provided insufficient evidence to
establish that he had been threatened by the Taliban. With respect to the
documentary evidence related to the NGOs, I read the RAD’s reasoning to be that
it was a product of self-reporting by the Applicant. The Applicant argues that
this is incorrect in that the only letter that expressly refers to the author
having been told by the Applicant about the threats is the one from the ANP.
However, none of the other letters from the NGOs attest to any basis for first-hand
knowledge of the threats allegedly received by the Applicant. I therefore
cannot conclude the RAD’s confusion surrounding the OMEED and National Youth
Organization letters to be material to its decision. Nor is the failure to
mention the second OMEED letter material, as it does not speak to the threats
at all.
[43]
The Applicant also argues that, even if the
letters are based on self-reporting, this is not a valid basis to refuse to
give them any corroborative weight. I accept that the RAD might have treated
the fact that the Applicant reported threats to the NGOs as corroborative of his
testimony. However, the RAD is entitled to deference on the weight it chose to
give this evidence and, as the corroborative evidence is not independent of the
Applicant, I cannot conclude the RAD’s finding on this point is unreasonable.
[44]
With respect to the other documentary evidence
relevant to the alleged threats received in Swat (i.e. the written statement
made by the Applicant to a Station House Officer, his brother’s affidavit, and
the photographs depicting the Applicant’s activities in support of female
education in Pakistan), the RAD refers to the Applicant’s submission that the
RPD failed to assign probative value to this documentation and subsequently
refers to having reviewed all of the evidence, including the pictures and the
evidence of his brother. I therefore cannot conclude the RAD failed to take
this evidence into account.
[45]
While the Applicant notes that the RAD incorrectly
refers to the affidavit from his brother as a letter, the RAD correctly referred
to it as an affidavit earlier in the decision. I therefore do not find the RAD
erred by misunderstanding the nature of the document. The Applicant also
observes that his statement to a Station House Officer was not mentioned again
by the RAD after it referred to the Applicant’s submissions. However, this is
another example of the Applicant’s self-reporting, and it is apparent from the
RAD’s reasons, in relation to the events in Swat and the later events in Karachi
(as discussed below), that it was not prepared to treat this sort of evidence
as sufficiently corroborative of the Applicant’s credibility.
B.
Events in Karachi
[46]
Turning to the events in Karachi, the RAD
considered the newspaper reports of the alleged shooting and noted that the RPD
failed to do so but, again, the RAD did not view the reports as sufficiently
corroborative of the Applicant’s evidence because they were based on
self-reporting.
[47]
As with the RAD’s analysis surrounding the documentary
evidence related to the events in Swat, its decision as a whole demonstrates
the RAD’s concern with the Applicant’s credibility and that it was not prepared
to afford any significant weight to evidence that was not independent of the
Applicant. This concern is demonstrated in particular by the following findings
by the RAD, that it concluded raised a serious doubt as to the Applicant’s
general credibility:
A.
He resided in the U.K. between 1993 and 1996,
without claiming protection, and then asserted a claim which was rejected
because of lack of corroboration;
B.
He testified that he applied for a U.S. non-immigrant
visa in 2007 because he feared the Taliban but he made no mention in his BOC of
any risk from the Taliban until 2013; and
C.
He misrepresented himself to both U.S. and
Canadian authorities. In connection with his Canadian claim, he falsely stated
that he had never used any other name and that he had never been refused
refugee status by any other country.
[48]
These general credibility findings impacted the
RAD’s overall assessment of the Applicant’s trustworthiness. Against this
backdrop, I cannot conclude the RAD acted unreasonably in its approach to the
corroborating documents.
[49]
The Applicant also argues the RAD’s conclusion,
that the Applicant’s story about the alleged shooting in Karachi was neither
credible nor trustworthy, was the product of an impermissible implausibility
finding on the basis that it strained credulity that the Taliban would be able
to track the Applicant down in Karachi, a city of 15 million people 2500 km
away from Swat. The Applicant submits that this finding is outside the sort of
analysis permitted by Valtchev and refers to the decision of Justice
Mosely in Santos v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2004 FC 937 at para 15, in which it was held that implausibility findings must
be based on clear evidence, as well as a clear rationalization process.
[50]
The Applicant submits that the RAD erred, in
making its implausibility finding regarding the alleged shooting incident in
Karachi, by failing to consider the documentary evidence which speaks to the
pervasiveness of the Taliban’s network. While the RAD does not cite the
documentary evidence, its reasons state that it reached its conclusion about
the Taliban “in spite of its alleged network”.
It therefore cannot be concluded that this point was overlooked by the RAD. I
do not consider the RAD’s finding to be unsupported by the evidence or without
a clear rationalization process. In so finding, I note that the RAD did not
reject the Applicant’s testimony solely based on its implausibility analysis
but also considered the documentary evidence in support of the alleged shooting
as it found the RPD should have done. However, it noted the Applicant’s
testimony that he was alone on the road when the alleged incident occurred and,
as explained above, it concluded that there was a lack of corroborative
evidence. I do not find the RAD’s overall analysis of this alleged incident to
be unreasonable.
C.
Presumption of State Protection
[51]
On the issue of the presumption of state
protection, I agree with the Respondent that it was reasonable for the RAD,
having reached the conclusion it did with respect to the alleged threating
phone calls, to conclude that it was doubtful the Applicant required police
protection. There was no need for the RAD to perform further analysis of this
issue. While the Applicant argues that “doubtful”
falls short of a finding on this issue, I again agree with the Respondent that,
given the Applicant bears the burden of establishing his claim, the RAD’s
finding is sufficient for it to have discharged its mandate as an appeal
tribunal.
VII.
Conclusion
[52]
I find the RAD’s decision as a whole to be
reasonable and within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes. As such, this
application for judicial review must be dismissed.
[53]
The parties proposed no question of general
importance for certification for appeal, and none is stated.
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