Docket: IMM-5492-15
Citation:
2016 FC 748
Vancouver, British Columbia, July 4, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Strickland
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BETWEEN:
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LIQUAN CAI
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a
decision of the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board of Canada (“IAD”), dated July 17, 2015, in which the IAD dismissed the
Applicant’s appeal of an exclusion order made against him by the Immigration
Division (“ID”) pursuant to s 40(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (“IRPA”). The Applicant did not challenge the
legality of that decision on appeal before the IAD, but instead sought to have the
order stayed and set aside on humanitarian and compassionate (“H&C”)
grounds pursuant to ss 67(1)(c) and 68 of the IRPA.
Background
[2]
The Applicant is a citizen of China who landed
in Canada on October 28, 2006, having been sponsored by his first wife, Nicole
Rachel Qesnelle, a Canadian citizen. The two subsequently divorced and the
Applicant sponsored his second wife, Jing Sun, whom he married on March 2,
2009. The Applicant’s second marriage also ended in divorce. The Applicant
now resides in British Columbia with his common law spouse, Amy Li Hong Yang, a
Canadian citizen, with whom he has been in a relationship since December 2012. They
have two children together, born on July 27, 2013 and September 2, 2015,
respectively, both of whom are Canadian citizens. The Applicant operates a
successful seafood wholesaling company.
[3]
Following a Canada Border Services Agency
investigation (“CBSA”), the Applicant’s first marriage to Nicole Rachel
Qesnelle was identified as having been fraudulently orchestrated for the
express purpose of enabling the Applicant to obtain permanent resident status
in Canada. As a result, the ID found the Applicant to be inadmissible pursuant
to s 40(1)(a) of the IRPA.
Decision Under Review
[4]
The IAD found that the exclusion order made
against the Applicant on May 28, 2014 was valid, which conclusion was not
challenged by the Applicant himself. The IAD also found insufficient
humanitarian and compassionate considerations, taking into account the best
interests of a child directly affected by the decision, to warrant special
relief in light of the circumstances of the case.
[5]
The IAD noted that the factors it may consider
when exercising its discretionary jurisdiction to stay or allowing the appeal
of an exclusion order included those set out in Ribic v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1985] IABD No 4, 1986 CarswellNat 1357 [Ribic],
which it listed in its reasons. It also noted that the Supreme Court of
Canada in Chieu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002
SCC 3 [Chieu] found those factors to be non-exhaustive and that the
weight to be accorded to any particular factor is dependent upon the
circumstances of each case. To this list, the IAD added that the best
interests of any child or children directly affected by the decision must also
be considered pursuant to the decision in Baker v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 [Baker]. It also
cited Wang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC
1059 in support of the statement that the exercise of this discretion must be
consistent with the objectives of the IRPA, including the need to protect the
health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian
society. In the context of a misrepresentation, this includes the maintenance
of the integrity of the immigration system and the potential threats arising
from errors in the administration of the IRPA that may result.
[6]
The IAD noted that the misrepresentation in this
case was a marriage-of-convenience, facilitated by a Toronto-based organization
contracted by the Applicant for the express purpose of enabling him to obtain
permanent resident status in Canada. The general scheme was uncovered by CBSA
as the result of “Project Honeymoon” and the Applicant was subsequently
identified as a client of that organization. The IAD found that the Applicant
knowingly and actively participated in the misrepresentation and that the consequences
of his actions had been considerable, including that his status in Canada
acquired as a result of the marriage-of-convenience had subsequently allowed
him to sponsor his second wife’s immigration to Canada. The IAD found that the
nature of the misrepresentation was particularly serious and that “extensive positive humanitarian and compassionate factors
will need to be established… in order to overcome the seriousness of the index
misrepresentation”.
[7]
The IAD also found that the transcript of the
original ID hearing showed the Applicant was not remorseful, as he had
attempted to convince the ID that his marriage to Nicole Rachel Qesnelle was
genuine, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Further, that at the
IAD hearing the Applicant tried to deflect blame for the misrepresentation to
his immigration consultant rather than admitting that he had been wrong in
seeking to obtain permanent resident status by way of the
marriage-of-convenience. The IAD concluded that the Applicant’s remorse was
motivated more by his efforts to have the appeal allowed than by a genuine sense
of wrong-doing.
[8]
The IAD found that, since becoming a permanent
resident, the Applicant had started his own family here and a successful
business, both of which weighed in his favour. However, it gave little
positive weight to a supportive letter provided by the Applicant’s landlord,
who also testified before the IAD, because it did not demonstrate that the
landlord had any knowledge of the nature and extent of the Applicant’s initial
misrepresentation. The IAD also found the Applicant’s testimony that if he
were removed from Canada he would simply walk away from or be forced to close
his business – a viable and successful business generating approximately $10
million per year – not to be credible.
[9]
Nonetheless, the IAD believed that the Applicant
had provided sufficient evidence of positive establishment in Canada on the
whole. It also accepted that the Applicant’s common law spouse would be
significantly affected by a day-to-day lack of contact and companionship should
the Applicant be removed to China. These factors also weighed positively in
the Applicant’s favour.
[10]
The IAD also noted that the Applicant’s parents
and siblings (and their families) still lived in China, that he has spent most
of his life there, and he has continuing ties to and frequently visits China. On
the balance, the IAD found that the Applicant and his family had several
options open to them that would mitigate many of the effects of the Applicant’s
removal to China.
[11]
The IAD stated that the best interests of the
Applicant’s children required they be united with both their parents. However,
it also noted that the children were very young and, as Canadian citizens, they
and their mother were not limited in the amount of time they could spend
outside of Canada. Increased visits to China, or a permanent move to China
which had been canvassed at the hearing, were options open to the Applicant and
his family. The IAD thus concluded that while the best interests of the
children was for their family to be united, this did not require their father
to remain in Canada per se.
[12]
The IAD concluded that when all of the evidence
was considered, the negative factors outweighed the positive and, taking into
account the best interests of the children directly affected by the decision,
there were insufficient H&C considerations to warrant special relief in
light of all of the circumstances of the case.
Issues
[13]
The Applicant in his submissions raises ten
separate issues, including the appropriate standard of review to be applied in
this case. In my view, however, those issues can be reframed as follows:
(1) Did the IAD commit a reviewable error with respect to the criteria
it used to assess the Applicant’s appeal on H&C grounds?
(2) Did the IAD commit a reviewable error in its analysis of the best
interests of the Applicant’s children?
(3) Did the IAD commit a reviewable error by finding that the Applicant
would not credibly be required to abandon his business in the event he is
removed to China?
(4) Did the IAD commit a reviewable error in finding that the
Applicant’s siblings and their families reside in China?
Standard of Review
[14]
The Applicant did not make any specific
submissions on the standard of review, noting only that this Court has
generally relied on the Ribic factors in assessing whether or not
special relief is warranted. The Respondent submits that the determination of
whether special relief is warranted is fact-driven and is properly subject to
the reasonableness standard (El Houkmi v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2015 FC 1306 at paras 8-9 [El Houkmi]).
[15]
I agree with the Respondent. It is well settled
that discretionary relief such as that given on the basis of H&C
considerations attracts a high level of deference and will normally be subject
to the reasonableness standard (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v
Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at paras 57-58 [Khosa]; Kanthasamy v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61 at paras 64, 111 [Kanthasamy];
Li v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 998 at para 23 [Xuilan
Li]). As for those issues relating more specifically to the IAD’s
purported failure to consider some of the Applicant’s arguments, it is likewise
settled that the adequacy of reasons is to be understood in light of the
reasonableness of the decision as a whole (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’
Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para 22
[Newfoundland Nurses]).
[16]
As such, the role of this Court on judicial
review is to determine if the outcome falls within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law (Dunsmuir
v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47).
Preliminary Issue
[17]
The Applicant filed two further affidavits, his
own sworn on May 6, 2016, and an affidavit of Michael F. Elterman, Ph.D. a
clinical and forensic psychologist, sworn on January 27, 2016. Both affidavits
post-date the IAD’s decision of July 17, 2015. It is well established that
judicial review of a decision of an administrative tribunal is, subject to
certain limited exceptions, to be conducted on the basis of the material that
was before the tribunal when it made its decision and that the parties cannot
supplement that material by way of affidavits (Assn of Architects (Ontario)
v Assn of Architectural Technologists (Ontario), 2002 FCA 218 at para 30; Bayavuge
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 65 at paras 1 and 20; Obot
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 208 at paras 15-16). No
exceptions to this rule arise in this matter and both affidavits, in essence,
respond to the IAD’s decision. They are, therefore, inadmissible.
Issue 1: Did the IAD commit a reviewable error with
respect to the criteria it used to assess the Applicant’s appeal on H&C
grounds?
[18]
The Applicant submits that the IAD erred in its
exercise of discretion by taking into account the “principle of ‘general
deterrence’”. In his view, this was contrary to the Ribic factors which
“focus on the individual seeking relief and not on
broad public interest concerns” (Li v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2009 FC 992 at para 12 [De Bing Li]). The Applicant’s
objection specifically relates to the following paragraph of the IAD’s
decision:
[11] The exercise of this discretion
must be consistent with the objectives of the Act, including the need to
protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of
Canadian society. In the context of a misrepresentation, this includes the
maintenance of the integrity of the immigration system and the potential
threats arising from errors in the administration of the Act that may result.
[19]
The Respondent, for its part, submits that the
IAD properly referenced the Ribic factors at paragraph 9 of its
decision. These factors include the seriousness of the offence or offences
leading to the deportation, which the IAD determined to be particularly
serious, and which it considered along with a number of other factors that
weighed in the Applicant’s favour.
[20]
I would note that in De Bing Li, Justice
Barnes stated that the Ribic factors focus on the individual seeking
relief and not on broader public interest concerns. The IAD is required to
consider whether the applicant should be allowed to remain in Canada on H&C
grounds and that the rationale for the principle of general deterrence in
criminal sentencing, to send a message to the community, has no place in the
process of immigration deportation (para 17).
[21]
However, and unlike De Bing Li, based on
the IAD’s reasons, including para 11, I am not persuaded that the principle of
general deterrence was applied by the IAD in this case. Rather, read in whole,
it is clear that the focus of the IAD’s analysis remained on the seriousness of
the Applicant’s own conduct and not on whether the results of this case would
deter others contemplating similar acts of misrepresentation. In my view, such
an approach is consistent with the Ribic factors, and I see no reason to
disturb the IAD’s decision on this basis.
[22]
Further, as stated in Khosa:
[57] ...The nature of the question
posed by s. 67(1) (c) requires the IAD to be “satisfied that, at the
time that the appeal is disposed of . . . sufficient humanitarian and
compassionate considerations warrant special relief”. Not only is it left to
the IAD to determine what constitute “humanitarian and compassionate
considerations”, but the “sufficiency” of such considerations in a particular
case as well. Section 67(1) (c) calls for a fact dependent and policy
driven assessment by the IAD itself…
Accordingly, it was not an error for the IAD
to consider the integrity of the immigration system as a part of a fact-dependent
and policy-driven assessment (El Houkmi at paras 15-16, 24, 25; Xuilan
Li at paras 36-40).
Issue 2: Did the IAD commit
a reviewable error in its analysis of the best interests of the Applicant’s
children?
[23]
The Applicant makes a number of submissions
pertaining to this issue. The first of these is that the IAD’s suggestion that
the children’s best interests could be served by having them visit China for
prolonged periods of time or by moving there permanently minimized their “rights [as Canadian citizens] to remain in Canada”.
Second, the Applicant submits that the IAD erred by not placing significance on
his role as the sole financial provider for the family and by failing to
consider his direct involvement as a caregiver for his two children (De Bing
Li at para 18). Finally, the Applicant submits that the IAD erroneously
applied a “basic needs” approach rather than
conducting a proper analysis of the best interests of his children (Williams
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 166 at para 66 [Williams]).
[24]
The Respondent submits that the IAD’s analysis
of the best interests of the Applicant’s children was reasonable. In its view,
the Applicant’s arguments amount to nothing more than a request for this Court
to re-weigh the Ribic factors, contrary to Justice Shore’s holding in Hernandes
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 54 at para 39.
[25]
The test applicable to the best interests of the
child analysis, as recently confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Kanthasamy,
requires that the IAD be “alert, alive and sensitive”
to the best interests of the child (Baker at para 75).
[26]
In this case, the IAD accepted that “it is in the best interests of the children for them to be
united with both their parents” [emphasis in original]. However,
it also considered that the children were very young, one being a newborn, and
that as Canadian citizens they and their mother were not limited in the time
that they could spend outside of Canada. This would allow them to have
increased visits with the Applicant or to move to China permanently, as
potential options to mitigate the separation from the Applicant. Further, that
sponsorship at a later date was also an option open to the Applicant’s common
law spouse. Thus, the IAD concluded that the children’s best interests did not
require their father to remain in Canada per se in light of the options
available to them and their mother to mitigate the separation. In my view,
this assessment did not, as the Applicant asserts, minimize the children’s
rights as Canadian citizens to remain in Canada.
[27]
As to the second point raised by the Applicant,
I would first note that the Supreme Court of Canada in Newfoundland Nurses
at para 16, stated that “[a] decision-maker is not
required to make an explicit finding on each constituent element, however
subordinate, leading to its final conclusion”. What matters is that the
reasons “allow the reviewing court to understand why
the tribunal made its decision and permit it to determine whether the
conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes”.
[28]
As the Supreme Court of Canada added in Communications,
Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v Irving Pulp & Paper,
Ltd, 2013 SCC 34 [Irving Pulp & Paper], “[i]n
the absence of finding that the decision, based on the record, is outside the
range of reasonable outcomes, the decision should not be disturbed”. The
reviewing Court may not substitute its own reasons, but is entitled to look at
the record when considering the overall reasonableness of a decision (Arbelaez
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1129 at para 14; Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v Abarquez, 2016 FC 682 at para 27).
[29]
It is true that here the IAD did not explicitly
address the Applicant’s role as a financial provider and care giver. However,
as is evident from the transcript of the hearing, the IAD was satisfied on the
evidence that the Applicant fulfilled the normal role of a father to young
children. And, in its decision, it acknowledged that a five year period of
inadmissibility was not inconsiderable in the context of family separation. However,
as discussed above, while the best interests of the children would be best
served by them being with both of their parents, the separation could be
mitigated.
[30]
At the hearing, the IAD also addressed in some
detail the Applicant’s business endeavour and its revenue. The transcript also
contains the testimony of both the Applicant and his common law spouse concerning
her employment. She came to Canada as an immigrant investor, bringing with her
$2.0 million which she stated that she earned from her advertising company in
China. In Canada, prior to the birth of her children, she ran her own real
estate investment company which still exists but is currently dormant although the
Applicant stated that it may still generate income. The Applicant’s common law
spouse also testified that she and the Applicant currently share child care
expenses and that she owns the home that they live in and also has a property
in China. In short, while the Applicant and his common law spouse made a
decision that she would not work after the children were born, the evidence on
the record does not suggest that the family would not be able to support itself
even if the Applicant were to close his company if he was removed from Canada.
Further, the IAD did not accept as credible the Applicant’s assertion that he
would not be able to find a manager or buyer for his company and would simply
walk away from it if he were removed from Canada. The IAD also stated that it
had taken into consideration the witnesses’ testimony, the documents provided
by the Applicant including information concerning his business, the contents of
the record and the written submissions of the parties. In my view, although the
Applicant asserts that a reviewable error arises from the fact that the IAD did
not explicitly acknowledge that the Applicant’s common law spouse is not
working and that he is the sole financial support for the family, based on the
record and its reasons, the failure to do so does not amount to a reviewable
error in these circumstances.
[31]
As to De Bing Li, there Justice
Barnes held that there was more evidence of the applicant’s positive
contributions to the welfare of his family than was fairly captured by his
acknowledged role as a financial contributor to the household. His wife’s
evidence was that the applicant was a good father, that he was directly
involved in a caregiving role and that she could not handle those
responsibilities on her own. Justice Barnes found that the IAD had failed to
acknowledge this evidence and chose instead to focus on its contrary perception
of him as a poor role model. However, in the instant case the IAD has not made
a similar error of focus nor is there evidence that the Applicant’s common law spouse
cannot manage on her own.
[32]
Finally, the Applicant refers to paragraph 66 of
Williams, which itself noted that the Federal Court of Appeal in Hawthorne
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 475 at para 9 had
found that a child “will rarely, if ever, be deserving
of any level of hardship”, such that “a
threshold test of undeserved or undue hardship or a threshold ‘basic needs’
approach to a best interests analysis… does not adequately determine… what is
in the child’s best interests” and asserts that the IAD attempted to use
a “basic needs” approach in its analysis of the
best interests of his children. In my view, the IAD’s reasons do not support
this submission.
[33]
As noted by Justice Gleason in Martinez Hoyos
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 998:
[32] First, in my view, the applicants
have misinterpreted the holding in Williams. As I read that decision, it
does not mandate that a particular formula must always be applied by an officer
in assessing the child’s best interests in every H&C application but,
rather, stands for the proposition that the best interests of impacted children
must be considered and weighed along with the other factors in an H&C
application. In addition, Williams turned on the fact that the officer
in that case erred in dismissing the application because he held that the
impacted children were not shown to have likely been subject to “undue”
hardship because it was not clear they would be beaten, malnourished or denied
medical care if they were required to leave Canada with their family. Justice
Russell found this “basic needs” assessment of the hardship factor to be
erroneous in Williams.
[34]
Such an approach was not relied on by the IAD in
the instant case. For the above reasons, I find that the IAD’s assessment of
the best interests of the children was reasonable.
Issue 3: Did the IAD commit a reviewable error by finding
that the Applicant would not credibly be required to abandon his business in
the event he is removed to China?
[35]
The Applicant refers to Cepeda-Gutierrez v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] FCJ No 1425 at
paras 27-28 (TD) for the proposition that an erroneous finding of fact without
regard to the evidence is an error of law. He also refers to Risco-Flores v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1412 at para 6 for
the proposition that, while there is a presumption that decision-makers have
considered all of the evidence before them even if they do not refer
specifically to each item, the more central a document is to the issue to be
decided, the greater the obligation on the decision-maker to deal with it
specifically, particularly when the document in question contradicts the
decision-maker’s own conclusions. The Applicant specifically takes issue with
the IAD’s purported failure to explicitly consider evidence of his essential
role within his business, such that the business might need to close should he
be removed from Canada.
[36]
The Respondent submits that an administrative
tribunal need not address each and every argument made before it (Xuilan
Li at para 21), and that disagreement with the weight accorded to
specific pieces of evidence does not constitute a proper basis for granting
judicial review (Patel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC
1224 at para 31).
[37]
I see no reason to disturb the IAD’s findings
with respect to the Applicant’s business. The fact that the Applicant’s role
is essential to its current operational structure does not necessarily entail a
complete abandonment and shutdown of operations in his absence. As noted by
the IAD, on any standard the business is viable and successful. The
Applicant’s testimony before the IAD was that his sales figures for 2014 were
approximately CDN$4.0 million and that his projections were for CDN$10 million
for 2015. He also testified that if he were to sell the business he would seek
CDN$4.0 million for it but that he had not yet decided to sell. Indeed, a
company with such rapid growth would certainly appear to be an attractive
acquisition for a potential purchaser and there was no evidence before the IAD
that the Applicant had tried and failed to find a purchaser. While the
Applicant indicated that he was of the view that he would be unable to attract
an experienced person to run his business profitably in his absence, other than
an existing shareholder whose English language proficiency would prevent him
from assuming the Applicant’s role, there was no evidence that he had attempted
to recruit someone to do so. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for the
IAD to conclude that the Applicant’s testimony, that he would simply walk away from
his business, not to be credible and that his testimony that he would be forced
to close his business in the absence of a suitable buyer to be an exaggeration.
Issue 4: Did the IAD commit a reviewable error in finding
that the Applicant’s siblings and their families reside in China?
[38]
It is undisputed that the IAD erred in fact in
finding that the Applicant’s siblings (and their families) live in China. His
testimony was that his parents live in China and that he is an only child.
When asked by the IAD if his common law spouse has siblings, he confirmed that
she has an older brother and sister who live in China with their families. The
Applicant submits that without siblings and their families to assist him it
will be more challenging for him to integrate into society in China and, if he
fails to do so, he will be unable to financially support his family.
[39]
The Respondent submits that the error is
immaterial to the outcome of the IAD’s overall determination, such that its
decision should not be set aside (Nyathi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2003 FC 1119 at para 24).
[40]
I would first note that, on the balance, the
IAD’s reasons do not appear to rely heavily on the Applicant having siblings in
China. This was mentioned in the context of his parents and siblings living in
China, that he has spent most of his life there, speaks Mandarin, returns often
and that he is not without business or personal contacts there. That is, the
existence of siblings was mentioned as one of several factors of the attachment
that the Applicant maintains with China. In this regard, the Applicant’s
testimony before the IAD was that before his first child was born he travelled
to China three to four times a year for personal and business reasons. This
supports ongoing ties to China even in the absence of siblings.
[41]
In any event, in my view, regardless of the
error of fact, the IAD’s conclusion remains reasonable in light of the record. As
stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Irving Pulp & Paper:
[54] The board’s decision should be
approached as an organic whole, without a line-by-line treasure hunt for error
(Newfoundland Nurses, at para. 14). In the absence of finding that the
decision, based on the record, is outside the range of reasonable outcomes, the
decision should not be disturbed. In this case, the board’s conclusion was
reasonable and ought not to have been disturbed by the reviewing courts.
[42]
The IAD’s reasons are not perfect, but nor are
they required to be (Mokhno v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010
FC 386 at para 27; Etiz v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2013 FC 308 at para 17). And, as recently stated by Justice LeBlanc in Wang
v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FC 705 at para
19, it is well-established that the IAD has considerable discretion to consider
and weigh the Ribic factors in accordance with the particular circumstances
of each case (Chieu at para 40; Khosa at para 65). Moreover,
this Court’s jurisprudence has established that balancing the Ribic
factors is a qualitative rather than a quantitative exercise (Dhaliwal v
Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 157 at para 106;
Ambat v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 292 at
para 32).
[43]
In conclusion, the Applicant’s principal
objection, both with respect to the best interests of his children and the fate
of his business, amounts to a complaint that the IAD did not explicitly
consider every individual argument he made in its analysis. In my view,
however, the IAD’s reasons are sufficiently detailed to understand the basis on
which it reached the decision that it did. Further, the criteria used by the
IAD to assess the H&C considerations at play generally conform to the Ribic
factors. As to the factual error, the IAD did not rely significantly on the
mistaken fact and, in any event, the decision, when approached as an “organic whole”, is reasonable and should not be
disturbed. The outcome may be viewed as harsh and it may be that another
member of the IAD would have weighed the factors differently. However, in my
view, the conclusion reached by the IAD falls within the range of possible
acceptable outcomes.
[44]
For the reasons set out above, I would therefore
dismiss the application for judicial review.
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