Docket: T-1814-14
Citation:
2015 FC 1117
Ottawa, Ontario, September 28, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Southcott
BETWEEN:
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WILLIAM RYAN MITCHELL
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Applicant
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and
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is a judicial review of a decision by the
Acting Director General of Aviation Security, on behalf of the Minister of
Transport [the Minister], made on July 24, 2014 to cancel the Applicant’s
transportation security clearance [TSC], thereby preventing his continued
employment at the Lester B Pearson International Airport. The Applicant
requests that such cancellation be set aside and the matter be remitted to the
Minister for redetermination.
[2]
For the reasons that follow, this application is
dismissed.
I.
Background
[3]
The Applicant is a Pilot at the Lester B.
Pearson International Airport.
[4]
On February 11, 2014, the Applicant was provided
with a letter from Transport Canada, Safety and Security Strategies and
Programs Integration, indicating that his TSC would be reviewed because of
information that had been made available regarding his involvement in four
incidents of a sexual nature described in the letter.
[5]
Following the first incident, occurring on
August 5, 2011, he was cautioned by the police about being nude when in view of
the public but was not charged. Following the next two incidents, occurring on
December 13, 2011 and December 24, 2011, which involved exposing himself to
minors, he was spoken to by the police and made an admission of guilt but was
not charged. He also provided anonymous letters of apology to the victims and
proof of counselling. The Applicant wanted the matter kept out of the courts,
stating that he did not wish for it to affect his job.
[6]
The most recent incident, on November 9, 2012,
involved online luring of a child of a close friend. Although the Applicant was
contacted by the police to discuss the matter, the victim and parents did not
wish to press charges. The Applicant admitted through his lawyer that there was
a problem with his behaviour and that he wished to work with the police. He had
previously stopped counseling due to the cost, but he agreed to resume
counselling with his father covering the cost. The Applicant was not charged.
[7]
The Applicant submitted, through counsel, a
response to the February 11, 2014 letter, enclosing letters from his treating
psychiatrist and psychologist, his employer, a colleague, a family friend, his
pastor, and the Windsor-Essex Children’s Aid Society.
[8]
On July 24, 2014, the Applicant’s was advised
that the Minister had cancelled his TSC, following which he applied for
judicial review on August 22, 2014.
II.
The Impugned Decision
[9]
The Minister’s decision is captured in a Record
of Decision dated July 19, 2014, which referred to the four incidents described
in the February 11, 2014 letter as raising concerns regarding the Applicant’s
judgment, reliability and trustworthiness. The Acting Director General,
Aviation Security, on behalf of the Minster, stated that, after reviewing all
the information on file, she had reason to believe on a balance of
probabilities that the Applicant may be prone or induced to commit an act, or
assist or abet an individual to commit an act that may unlawfully interfere
with civil aviation. She therefore concurred with the Advisory Body’s
recommendation and cancelled the Applicant’s TSC.
[10]
This decision was communicated to the Applicant
by letter dated July 24, 2014.
[11]
The Advisory Board referred to in the Record of
Decision is the Transportation Security Clearance Advisory Body. Its Record of
Recommendation dated May 20, 2014 recommends cancelling the Applicant’s TSC
based on a police report detailing four incidents of escalating sexual criminal
activities. The Advisory Board noted that the incidents demonstrated a recent
pattern of explicit sexual behaviour, which brought into question the
Applicant’s judgment, trustworthiness and reliability. These factors led it to
reasonably believe on a balance of probabilities that he may unlawfully
interfere with civil aviation. Furthermore, the written statement and
supporting documents provided by the Applicant’s lawyer did not provide
sufficient information to dispel the concerns.
[12]
In a Record of Discussion also dated May 20,
2014, the Advisory Body captured a summary of its discussions, including:
A.
Criminal record checks indicated that the
Applicant had no criminal convictions or charges.
B.
Transport Canada, Security Screening Programs
received a report from the RCMP on February 5, 2014 detailing the four
incidents.
C.
The Applicant made an admission of guilt to
police regarding two of the incidents and provided anonymous letters to the
four victims.
D.
The Applicant stated to police during the
interview in December 2011 that he wanted the matter kept out of the courts because
he did not wish for this to affect his job as a pilot.
E.
The Advisory Body was of the opinion that an
attempt to lure a child of a close friend was an abuse of a position of
authority, and his actions have led it to question his judgment, reliability and
trustworthiness.
F.
The Advisory Body noted the Applicant’s
submissions and supporting documents, including the statement from a forensic psychiatrist
who had been treating the applicant since November 19, 2012. The statement
described the Applicant as a minimal risk of reoffending; however, the Advisory
Body was of the opinion that the best predictor of future behaviour was past
behaviour.
G.
The Applicant was cautioned by police for his
behaviour and, even though he knew that his job may be at stake, his behaviour
continued to escalate.
H.
Due to the recent nature of the incidents, the
Advisory Body was of the opinion that not enough time had elapsed to
demonstrate a change in his behaviours.
III.
Issues and Standard of Review
[13]
The Applicant raises the following two issues
A.
Was there a breach of procedural fairness, as a
result of inadequacy in the reasons supporting the Minister’s decision?
B.
Is the Minister’s decision reasonable?
[14]
The Applicant submits that procedural fairness
issues are reviewable on a standard of correctness, including in the context of
the cancellation of a security clearance (Russo v Canada (Minister of
Transport, Infrastructure and Communities), 2011 FC 764 at para 22 [Russo]).
The Respondent also refers to the standard of correctness as applicable to
review of issues of procedural fairness but notes the conclusion in Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses Union v Newfoundland and Labrador, 2011 SCC 62
at paras 20-22 [Newfoundland Nurses] to the effect that, as long
as reasons are provided, the duty of procedural fairness is met and the
question for the Court is whether the conclusions reached were reasonable.
[15]
The parties agree, and I concur, that in security clearance cases
the appropriate standard of review applicable to the Minister’s decision is
reasonableness (Canada (Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and
Communities v Farwaha), 2014 FCA 56 [Farwaha]
at para 86).
IV.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
[16]
The legislation and policy documentation relevant to this matter are as follows:
Aeronautics Act, RSC 1985, c A-2 [the Act]:
4.8 The Minister may, for the purposes
of this Act, grant or refuse to grant a security clearance to any person or
suspend or cancel a security clearance.
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4.8 Le
ministre peut, pour l’application de la présente loi, accorder, refuser, suspendre
ou annuler une habilitation de sécurité.
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Canadian Aviation Security
Regulations, 2012, SOR/2011-318
146.(1) The operator of an aerodrome must not issue a restricted area
identity card to a person unless the person
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146. (1) Il est interdit à l’exploitant d’un
aérodrome de délivrer une carte d’identité de zone réglementée à une personne
à moins qu’elle ne réponde aux conditions suivantes :
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…
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…
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(c) has a security clearance;
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c) elle possède une habilitation de sécurité;
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165. A person must not enter or remain
in a restricted area unless the person
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165. Il
est interdit à toute personne d’entrer ou de demeurer dans une zone
réglementée à moins qu’elle ne soit, selon le cas :
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(a) is a person to whom a restricted area identity card has been
issued; or
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a) titulaire d’une carte d’identité de zone réglementée;
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(b) is in possession of a document of entitlement, other than a
restricted area identity card, for the restricted area.
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b) en possession d’un document d’autorisation, autre qu’une carte
d’identité de zone réglementée, pour la zone réglementée.
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Transportation
Security Clearance Program Policy [the Policy]
The objective of this Program is to prevent the uncontrolled entry
into a restricted area of a listed airport by any individual who;
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L'objectif de ce
Programme est de prévenir l'entrée non contrôlée dans les zones réglementées
d'un aéroport énuméré de toute personne :
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1. is known or suspected to be involved in activities directed
toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence
against persons or property;
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1. mêlée ou soupçonnée d’être mêlée à
des activités relatives à une menace ou à des actes de violences graves
commis contre les personnes ou les biens;
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2. is known or suspected to be a member of an organization which
is known or suspected to be involved in activities directed towards or in
support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against people or
property;
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2. membre ou soupçonnée d'être membre
d'une organisation connue ou soupçonnée d'être mêlée à des activités de
menace ou à des actes de violence graves commis contre les personnes ou les
biens;
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3. is suspected of being closely associated with an individual
who is known or suspected of;
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3. soupçonnée d'être étroitement associée à une personne :
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- being involved in activities referred to in paragraph (a);
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- mêlée aux activités citées à l'alinéa (a);
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- being a member
of an organization referred to in paragraph (b); or
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- membre d'une organisation citée à l'alinéa (b);
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- bring a member
of an organization referred to in subsection (e) hereunder.
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- membre d'une organisation citée au
paragraphe (e) ci-après.
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4. the Minister
reasonably believes, on a balance of probabilities, may be prone or induced
to;
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4. que le ministre croit, en s'appuyant sur les probabilités,
être sujette ou susceptible d'être incitée à:
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- commit an act
that may be unlawfully interfere with civil aviation; or
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- commettre un acte d'intervention illicite visant l'aviation
civile;
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- assist or abet
any person to commit an act that may unlawfully interfere with civil
aviation.
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- aider ou inciter toute autre personne à commettre un acte
d'intervention illicite visant l'aviation civile.
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5. is now or suspected to be or to have been a member of or a
participant in activities of criminal organizations as defined in Subsection
467.1 and 467.11 (1) of the Criminal Code of Canada;
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5. mêlée
à une organisation criminelle ou soupçonnée d'être ou d'avoir été membre de
celle-ci ou d'avoir pris part à des activités d'organisations criminelles,
telles que définies aux paragraphes 467.1(1) et 467.11(1) du Code criminel du
Canada;
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6. is a
member of a terrorist group as defined in Section 83.01 (1)(a) of the
Criminal Code of Canada.
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6. membre d'un groupe terroriste, tel que défini à l'article
83.01(1)(a) du Code criminel du Canada.
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V.
Submissions of the Parties
A.
The Applicant’s Position
[17]
On the adequacy of the Minister’s reasons, the
Applicant submits that they amount to nothing more than bald and conclusory
statements. There is no meaningful path of reasoning that can be ascertained to
demonstrate: i) how or why the Applicant is prone or induced to commit an act
that may unlawfully interfere with civil aviation; or ii) how or why the
Applicant is prone or induced to assist or abet an individual to commit an act
that may unlawfully interfere with civil aviation.
[18]
On the reasonableness of the Minister’s
decision, the Applicant references recent jurisprudence surrounding the
revocation of security clearances and notes that these cases include
individuals who were members of criminal organizations, possessed weapons, were
involved with drug activity, or committed fraud. Distinguishing these cases,
the Applicant submits that it cannot reasonably be concluded that he may be
prone or induced to commit an act or assist or abet any person to commit an act
that may unlawfully interfere with civil aviation. In particular, he argues
that there is no adverse correlation between the circumstances of his impugned
actions and his maintaining access to restricted areas of the airport.
[19]
The Applicant also disputes that the acts he is
alleged to have committed are relevant to his reliability or trustworthiness
and argues that, even if they could be considered relevant to his judgment,
there must be a link between the exercise of poor judgment and the protection
of the security of aviation that that section 4.8 of the Act is intended to
address. The Applicant argues that this link is missing in his case and
distinguishes his conduct from the association with criminals or acts of
dishonesty that have been held to represent reasonable bases for cancellation
of a TSC in the authorities cited by the Respondent.
[20]
Rather, the Applicant describes his conduct as
sexual indiscretions which are a function of a psychiatric or psychological
disorder. He has not demonstrated bad judgment at large, only the propensity to
commit a particular type of act linked to this disorder. He also notes that the
evidence of his psychiatrist indicates that he poses a minimal risk of
re-offending and takes issue with the Advisory Body’s rejection of this
evidence in favour of an opinion that the best predictor of future behaviour is
past behaviour. The Applicant argues that there is no evidentiary basis for
this opinion adopted by the Advisory Body. While the psychiatrist’s evidence
includes a statement that clinically the strongest predictor of future
behaviour is past behaviour, this statement is made in the context of the
psychiatrist’s conclusion that the Applicant is at a very low risk to
re-offend.
B.
The Respondent’s Position
[21]
On the adequacy of the reasons, the Respondent
submits that, where a decision is based on a recommendation, reasons may be
gleaned not only from the ultimate written decision but also from the
recommendation on which it is based (Irani v Canada (Attorney General),
2006 FC 816 at paras 17-18)). The Respondent submits that in this case reasons
for the decision clearly emerge from the Advisory Body’s Record of Discussion.
[22]
On the reasonableness of the Minister’s
decision, the Respondent notes that in MacDonnell v Canada (Attorney
General), 2013 FC 719, Justice Harrington emphasised the relatively low
standard of proof applicable to transportation security clearance decisions.
The rationale for this standard is that, unlike criminal proceedings which
attempt to assign responsibility for clearly defined past events, security
clearance decisions are an inherently more speculative exercise in predicting
future risk (Farwaha at para 94). In weighing an applicant’s privilege
against the public interest in preventing acts of unlawful interference with
civil aviation, this Court has held that the interests of the public take
precedence and that the Minister “is entitled to err on
the side of public safety” (Farwaha at para 85).
[23]
In the Respondent’s submission, the causal
connection to the Applicant’s allegations and civil aviation is clear. Security
clearance provides the clearance-holder with access to highly sensitive areas
within Canadian airports. The consequence if this access if abused is grave.
Clearance-holders must be reliable, trustworthy and exercise sound judgment.
[24]
The Respondent notes that, in assessing an
applicant’s reliability and judgment, this Court has held that the decision
maker is not limited to considering past conduct in an aviation context. Other
conduct, that has been found to reasonably support the inference that an
applicant may be prone or induced to unlawfully interfere with civil aviation,
has included insurance fraud (Salmon v Canada (Attorney General), 2014
FC 1098 [Salmon] at para 79), retail theft (Lavoie v Canada (Attorney
General), 2007 FC 435 [Lavoie]), public mischief (Rivet v Canada
(Attorney General) 2007 FC 1175 [Rivet] and prior involvement in
drug trafficking (Russo).
[25]
The Respondent also notes the decision’s
reference to the Applicant’s escalating misconduct, despite persistent warnings
and knowing his job was at stake, as displaying disregard for the legal and
employment consequences of his actions.
[26]
The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s
history of sexual misconduct involving children makes him uniquely vulnerable
to coercion to assist or abet others’ propensity to interfere with civil
aviation. With his desire for secrecy, it is not unreasonable for the decision
maker to infer that the Applicant could be vulnerable to inducement by others with
knowledge of his misconduct.
[27]
Further, the Respondent notes that it is unclear
from his character references whether these individuals were aware of the
Applicant’s misconduct and that the psychiatric opinion is limited to the risk
of sexual recidivism and does not address the Applicant’s reliability or
judgment in other contexts such as aviation security.
VI.
Analysis
[28]
On the issue of the adequacy of the reasons for
the Minister’s decision, I agree with the Respondent that the documentation
generated on behalf of the Minister and that generated by the Advisory Board
are to be considered part of the decision. In that respect, this case is
similar to Thep-Outhainthany v Attorney General of Canada, 2013 FC 59,
in which Justice Rennie held as follows at paragraph 15:
[15] … The applicant has argued that an
Advisory Board document entitled “Key Points for Discussion” should also be
considered part of the Minister’s decision. This document is a summary of the
Advisory Board’s discussion. In my view, it forms an integral part of the
reasons. Indeed, without it, the Minister’s decision is arguably conclusionary.
This document is, on its face, significant. It is titled “Key Points of
Discussion” and the factors listed in the document were “noted” by the Advisory
Body in formulating its recommendation. This document also formed part of the
record that was before the Minister.
[29]
The letter sent to the Applicant on behalf of
the Minister, communicating the decision, expressed that:
A. the decision was based on four incidents of sexual indiscretion
and/or sexual violence, which raised concerns about the Applicant’s judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness;
B.
the Applicant had a valid TSC at the time of
these incidents and appeared to want to hide his actions from the public and Transport
Canada in order to maintain his TSC;
C.
the conclusion was that the Applicant may be
prone or induced to commit an act, or assist or abet an individual to commit an
act that may lawfully interfere with civil aviation.
[30]
The Record of Decision dated July 17, 2014
expressly noted that the Acting Director General, Aviation Security, on behalf
of the Minister, concurred with the Advisory Body’s recommendation. When that
decision is combined with the material generated by the Advisory Board, the
decision also includes the following content:
A. the incidents demonstrated an “escalating pattern of sexual
indiscretion”;
B.
this escalation occurred continued despite
multiple warnings by police and the Applicant’s own apparent recognition that
his job could be affected;
C.
an attempt to lure a child of a close friend was
an abuse of a position of authority, which actions led the Advisory Body to
question the Applicant’s judgment, reliability and trustworthiness;
D. the recency of the latest incident is noted; and,
E.
despite the Applicant’s submissions and the
opinion of his treating psychiatrist that he posed a minimal risk of
reoffending, the Advisory Body concluded that the best predictor of future
behaviour is past behaviour.
[31]
I have no difficulty concluding that these reasons
meet the minimum threshold for procedural fairness, as referred to at paragraph
20 of Newfoundland Nurses, such that the main issue for consideration in
this case is whether the reasoning and result of the decision are reasonable.
In my view, this is consistent with the approach taken by the Federal Court of
Appeal in Farwaha where Justice Stratas at paragraphs 104-106 considered
the adequacy of the Minister’s reasons, which included the record upon which
the Minister made his decision, as part of the Court’s overall assessment
whether the decision was reasonable.
[32]
Turning to the reasonableness of the decision,
the operation of Section 4.8 of the Act, the Policy and the jurisprudence
considering their application was canvassed as follows by Justice Kane in Salmon
at paras 71-81:
[71] Section 4.8 of the Aeronautics
Act gives the Minister, and the Director General on his or her behalf, wide
discretion to “grant or refuse to grant a security clearance to any person or
suspend or cancel a security clearance” and to take into account any relevant
factor in doing so.
[72] The Director General requires only
a reasonable belief on a balance of probabilities that an individual “may be
prone or induced to commit an act that may unlawfully interfere with civil
aviation; or assist or abet any person to commit an act that may unlawfully
interfere with civil aviation” (subsection 1.4(4) TSCPP).
[73] The Director General based her decision
on Mr. Salmon’s conduct, regardless of his association with Subject “A”. The
reliable human source information, the RCMP investigation and the TPS
observations of his drug deals were more than sufficient to support the
Advisory Body and Director General’s belief. The applicant’s conduct in
providing a false address to benefit from lower insurance was also a relevant
consideration in assessing his judgment and character.
[74] As noted, by Justice Harrington,
in MacDonnell v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 719 at para 29, 435
FTR 202 (Eng):
The Policy is forward looking; in
other words, a prediction. The Policy does not require the Minister to believe
on a balance of probabilities that an individual “will” commit an act that
“will” lawfully interfere with civil aviation or “will” assist or abet any
person to commit an act that “would” unlawfully interfere with civil aviation,
only that he or she “may”.
This has been characterized as something
less than a balance of probabilities (Ho, above; Clue, above).
[75] As noted, the Minister and the
Director General on behalf of the Minister, has very broad discretion in
relation to decisions regarding security clearances. Air safety is of
substantial public importance and takes precedence over the interests of
individuals.
[76] In Rivet, above, at para
15, Justice Pinard notes that in the balancing of interests, those of the
public take precedence:
[15] Moreover, both the purpose of
the Act and the nature of the question deal with protecting the public by
preventing acts of unlawful interference in civil aviation. Although the
Minister’s decision directly affects the applicant’s rights and interests, it
is the interests of the general public that are at stake and that take
precedence over the applicant’s ability to have his TSC to be able to work as a
pilot. The purpose of the Act emanates from a larger problem that encompasses
the interests of society as a whole, not just those of the applicant.
[77] Contrary to the applicant’s
position, the decision to revoke the applicant’s security clearance was not
arbitrary. The allegations of involvement in drug possession and trafficking in
his community and drug importation at the Airport, as well as the conduct
related to insurance fraud are clearly linked to the TSCPP and civil aviation.
[78] The allegations speak to the
applicant’s trustworthiness and respect for the law, which, in turn, affects an
assessment of his future propensity and the possibility of his committing or
aiding and abetting another to commit an act that may unlawfully interfere with
civil aviation.
[79] There is no requirement that the
individual be directly involved in acts that interfere with civil aviation.
That would be very limiting and would not serve the objectives of the policy.
[80] In Thep-Outhainthany v Canada
(Attorney General), 2013 FC 59, 224 ACWS (3d) 538 [Thep-Outhainthany],
where the applicant’s husband was involved in dial-a-dope scheme and the
applicant denied any involvement, the Court notes the connection between
trafficking drugs at the community level and aviation security. Specifically,
Justice Rennie notes at para 27:
Cocaine and heroin are imported into
Canada and the applicant’s access to a restricted area of an Airport could
attract the attention of her husband or his criminal associates.” In the
present case, it is the applicant himself, an Airport employee, who is alleged
to be trafficking drugs, and this is a more direct connection with unlawful
interference with civil aviation.
[81] Other cases also support the
proposition that the conduct at issue need not be directly interfere with
aviation security; in Pouliot, above, the applicant, a get-away driver,
denied knowledge of a scheme to rob a bank; in Russo, above, the
applicant had a previous drug record and now only purchased marijuana; in Rivet,
above, the applicant was charged with two counts of fraud; and in Farwaha,
above, the applicant was associated with members of a known criminal
organization. Yet in all these circumstances, the link with civil aviation was
recognized.
[33]
As noted by Justice Kane in Salmon, the
conduct in issue need not itself directly involve interference with aviation
security to reasonably support a decision to cancel or refuse to issue a TSC.
Conduct that has supported such a decision in other cases has included
involvement in a bank robbery (Pouliot v
Canada (Minister of Transport, Infrastructure & Communities), 2012 FC 347), drug cultivation and association with criminals
through purchasing drugs (Russo), fraud (Rivet) and fraud and theft (Lavoie).
[34]
Rivet addressed
expressly an argument that the applicant’s fraud conviction had nothing to do
with his TSC or his employment as a pilot. Justice Pinard rejected this
argument, holding at paragraph 22 that, given that the applicant had committed
fraud while he was in a position of trust in another employment, it was not
unreasonable to conclude that he could pose a risk to air security. Justice
Pinard also noted the fact that the applicant had the opportunity to tell the
Advisory Body about his fraud charges and chose not to do so in a full and
frank manner.
[35]
There are similarities between the reasoning in Rivet
and that of the Advisory Body in the case at hand. The Advisory Body
characterized the Applicant’s attempt to lure a child of a close friend as an
abuse of a position of authority, which caused it to question his judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness. The Advisory Body, and later the Minister’s
decision, also referred to the Applicant’s wish to hide his actions from the
public and Transport Canada in order to maintain his TSC. As in Rivet, I
do not find this reasoning to be unreasonable.
[36]
It is apparent from the material generated by
the Advisory Body that its recommendation was also influenced by the
continuation and, as characterized by the Advisory Body, escalation of the
Applicant’s behaviour, notwithstanding the fact he had been cautioned by the
police and was concerned about the implications for his employment. The
Advisory Body commented that not enough time had passed since the incidents to
demonstrate a change in this behaviour, following which it expressed its
conclusion that it had reason to believe, on a balance of probabilities, that
the Applicant may be prone or induced to commit an act, or assist or abet an
individual to commit an act, that may unlawfully interfere with civil aviation.
[37]
I have considered the Applicant’s argument that
his conduct is of a different nature than the incidents of drug possession and
trafficking, robbery, theft, fraud and association with criminals that were the
subject of the authorities relied on by the parties. While noting that the
Applicant had not been charged or convicted of any criminal offence, the
Applicant’s counsel did not dispute that his conduct could constitute an
offence. Rather, he argued that there is a difference because the Applicant’s
conduct did not represent either association with criminals or intentional
dishonesty.
[38]
I agree that there is a difference, which might
have influenced the Minister to decide not to cancel the Applicant’s TSC.
However, I am conscious that the Court’s role in judicial review is not to
substitute its opinion for that of the decision-maker but rather to consider
whether the decision is within the range of acceptable outcomes (Dunsmuir v
New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paragraph 47). I am guided in particular by
the analysis at paragraphs 77-78 of Salmon, upholding the cancellation
of a TSC based on conduct which spoke to the applicant’s trustworthiness and
respect for the law which, in turn, affected an assessment of his future
propensity and the possibility of his committing or aiding and abetting another
to commit an act that may unlawfully interfere with civil aviation. While the
Applicant’s conduct does not involve dishonesty as did the conduct in Salmon,
it does speak to his respect for the law and it is not unreasonable for the
Advisory Board to have analyzed the matter as it did and for it and the
Minister to have reached an adverse conclusion as to the Applicant’s
trustworthiness, reliability and judgment based on such conduct.
[39]
The Advisory Body considered the psychiatrist’s
opinion that the Applicant was at minimal risk of re-offending but adopted
instead the opinion that the best predictor of future behaviour is past
behaviour. I appreciate that, when the Applicant’s psychiatrist expressed this
clinical principle in his letter, it was a prelude to the expression of his
opinion that the absence of any history of relationship or employment problems,
past non-sexual violent offences or past non-violent offences, or causing
physical harm to others correlated with low recidivism risk. However, given the
record before the Advisory Body, which included the number of incidents, their
recency, their escalation, and the fact that the Applicant had received but
stopped counselling before the online luring incident, I cannot conclude that
it was unreasonable for the Advisory Body to rely on the clinical principle
expressed by the psychiatrist without accepting the psychiatrist’s opinion that
the Applicant was at minimal risk of re-offending.
[40]
It is accordingly my conclusion that the
Minister’s decision falls within the range of acceptable outcomes and is
reasonable, such that this application must be dismissed.
VII.
Costs
[41]
Each of the parties claimed costs and, at the
hearing of this application, counsel agreed that the appropriate quantification
of such costs, regardless of which party prevailed, was in the amount of $2500.
I accordingly award costs of $2500 to the Respondent.