Docket: IMM-4903-13
Citation:
2015 FC 266
Ottawa, Ontario, March 3, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
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BETWEEN:
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ARNOLDO MAXIMILIANO ASCENCIO GUTIERREZ
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The applicant’s claim for refugee protection was
denied by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board
of Canada (the Board). He now applies for judicial review of that decision
pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
SC 2001, c 27 [the Act].
[2]
The applicant seeks an order setting aside the
negative decision and returning the matter to a different member of the Board
for redetermination.
I.
Background
[3]
The applicant, born on August 15, 1985, is a
citizen of Mexico. He lived in the state of Aguascalientes.
[4]
Prior to coming to Canada, the applicant took
over his family’s real estate business in January 2006. In March 2006, he
received extortion threats from the criminal organization La Familia Michoacán
(LFM) to pay money to Carlos Zamarripa. After this threat, his father informed
the applicant that there is a history of extortion demands. The applicant
decided not to comply against the advice from his father. He did not report it
to the police but instead sought help from the son of the local mayor and also
his friend. It was inconsequential.
[5]
In April 2006, the LFM kidnapped the applicant
and demanded payment of 25,000 pesos every month or they would kill him. On May
16, 2006, two men approached the applicant, warned him to pay and then hit him.
The applicant reported to the police later that day, but police stated they
were unable to protect him. On June 5, 2006, he was again kidnapped. The next
day, his family helped him to go to Mexico City and on June 22, 2006 he left Mexico to come to Canada.
[6]
Since arriving in Canada, the applicant returned
to Mexico twice. The first time was for a month from December 2006 to January
2007 and the second time was for a month from January 2008 to February 2008.
The first time was to get money from his father to pay for his education in Canada and renew his visa. The second time was also to renew his student visa. On January
23, 2008 while in Mexico City during his second visit, an unidentified person
shot at the applicant’s car. The police informed him to report the incident in
his hometown.
[7]
The applicant left Mexico on February 15, 2008
before his student visa was renewed and arrived in Canada on the same day. His
student visa was ultimately not renewed. In March 2008, he signed a voluntary
deportation form when he met with an immigration officer in Calgary. He stayed
in Canada and married a Canadian citizen. His then-wife never filed a spousal
sponsorship application. The applicant learned from a community center that he
could not file for refugee status while being married to a Canadian citizen. He
divorced his then-wife with reasons unclear as to whether or not it was
connected to his claim for refugee status. He claimed refugee status on
September 27, 2011.
II.
Decision Under Review.
[8]
The Board refused the applicant’s claim and
communicated its decision on July 10, 2013.
[9]
After summarizing the applicant’s claims and its
analysis, the Board concluded that it did not find the applicant to be a
Convention refugee and/or a person in need of protection.
[10]
The Board made its decision and reasoning based
on three grounds: i) the lack of subjective fear, ii) credibility issue, and iii)
the presence of a viable internal flight alternative (IFA).
[11]
First, on the ground of subjective fear, the
Board did not accept the applicant’s explanations for failing to claim refugee
status on his first available opportunity in Canada. Here, the applicant
explained that he had a student permit and did not know about refugee
protection because he had not spoken with any Spanish speakers in Canada. The Board found the applicant’s reason “unsatisfactory and
implausible.”
[12]
Also, the Board found the applicant’s reasons
for returning on two occasions to Mexico unreasonable and perceived the
repeated reavailment being inconsistent with a subjective fear of persecution.
[13]
The Board noted the applicant’s then-wife, a
Canadian citizen, failed to file a spousal sponsorship application on his
behalf. The applicant explained his then-wife told him not to worry and he
trusted her. He provided into evidence his divorce certificate. The Board found
the applicant’s explanation “for not making any efforts
to acquire status, in light of his alleged fear of persecution, to be unreasonable.”
[14]
The Board then went on to address the three and one-half
years in the applicant’s delay in filing for protection after he had arrived in
Canada, the last time in 2008. The Board first found it was unreasonable that
when the applicant’s student visa was not renewed, he did not inquire into
other options of staying in Canada. It then found it unreasonable that the
applicant divorced his then-wife after he received misinformation from a
community center in 2011, advising him that he could not apply for refugee
status while married to a Canadian. The Board further stated it found it
unreasonable that since 2008, he did not know about applying for refugee
protection, that he did not connect with the Spanish community considering he
is an “independent, resourceful, outgoing, educated
person”.
[15]
The Board acknowledged in its reasoning that, “[w]hile delay in claiming is not a decisive factor it is
relevant to an assessment of a claimant’s subjective fear.” The Board’s
negative inference was based on the applicant’s cumulative failures to seek
protection when he had the opportunities and the reavailment to Mexico, which it
concluded were inconsistent with a showing of subjective fear.
[16]
Second, the Board found the applicant had
credibility issues. This included that there were family secrets regarding the
extortion demands and the fact that no family member resumed the family
business after the applicant left. In particular, the Board found it was not
plausible that the applicant’s family did not inform him of every aspect of
running the family business, especially the history of extortion demands. The
Board also found the applicant’s “explanation for his
brothers’ decisions not to continue the family business to be unreasonable and
not credible.”
[17]
For these issues, the Board found that it had
insufficient reliable or trustworthy evidence to find the applicant faces “a well-founded fear of persecution or credible risk of harm
in Mexico today given the demonstrated lack of subjective fear noted above.”
[18]
Third, the Board found the applicant did have a
viable and reasonable IFA in Mexico City, Merida or Hermosillo. In reaching its
determination on this issue, the Board relied on documentary evidence. The
evidence provides that the comprehensive personal identification database is
lacking in Mexico.
III.
Issues
[19]
The applicant submits three issues for my
consideration:
1.
Did the Board err in finding that the applicant
had a reasonable IFA?
2.
Were the Board’s findings on subjective fear
unreasonable?
3.
Did the Board err in making plausibility
findings?
[20]
The respondent replies that there is only one
issue: “whether the Applicant has raised an arguable
case for the success of a future judicial review application.”
[21]
I prefer the applicant’s separation of issues
and thereby state the issues as follows:
A.
What is the standard of review?
B.
Did the Board assess IFA unreasonably?
C.
Did the Board assess subjective fear
unreasonably?
D.
Did the Board assess plausibility unreasonably?
IV.
Applicant’s Written Submissions
[22]
The applicant submits, based on Dunsmuir v
New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 [Dunsmuir], the issues
in this case are of mixed fact and law, and therefore reviewable on a standard
of reasonableness.
[23]
The applicant submits that on the issue of IFA,
the Board erred in evaluating the two criteria in establishing the existence of
an IFA: 1) a serious risk of persecution throughout the country, and 2) a proposed
alternative must not be unreasonable given the circumstances of the individual
claimant.
[24]
First, regarding the presence of a serious risk
of persecution throughout the country, the Board did not consider the
motivation or other means the LFM might have to track down the applicant beyond
an electronic database, such as the widespread reach of gang violence.
[25]
Second, regarding whether or not the proposed
alternative is unreasonable, the Board did not assess the specific risks to the
applicant in the identified IFAs, instead the Board looked at overall
corruption or crime rates in the IFAs. Mexico City is an unreasonable
identified IFA, because the applicant was shot at while in Mexico City after
calling his parents in Aguascalientes. Also, the Board is required to assess
the IFAs’ reasonableness beyond good employment prospects and lower crime
rates.
[26]
On the issue of subjective fear, the applicant
submits it was unreasonable for the Board to base its finding on a delay in a
refugee claim, reavailment and the applicant’s ex-wife’s failure to apply for
spousal sponsorship.
[27]
First, regarding the delay in claiming, the
applicant cites Gyawali v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2003 FC 1122, [2003] FCJ No 1387 [Gyawali], that a valid temporary
status was a legitimate reason for not claiming refugee protection at an
earlier opportunity. Here, the applicant had a valid study permit and then got
married. As for the subsequent denial of a study permit, it was based on
insufficient funding, not because he only remained in school for two months.
Also, the applicant’s delay was not indicative of a lack of subjective fear,
but a lack of knowledge of his legal options.
[28]
Second, regarding reavailment, the applicant
submits that his return to Mexico lacks voluntariness and an intention to
reside there. He cites Camargo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FC 1434 at paragraph 35, [2003] FCJ No 1830 at paragraph
35 that “a temporary visit by a refugee to the country
where persecution was feared without an intention to permanently reside there
should not result in the loss of refugee status.” Here, the applicant
went back to Mexico the first time to apply for his visa and the second time
again to apply for his visa. However, he never returned to his home state at Aguascalientes and did not intend to remain in Mexico.
[29]
Third, regarding the applicant’s ex-wife’s
failure to sponsor him, the applicant submits it was “unreasonable
for the Member to make such sweeping generalizations about how the Applicant
should have behaved in his marriage.” Also, the Board unreasonably
considered the applicant’s marital breakdown as a solely premised desire to apply
for refugee protection.
[30]
On the issue of plausibility, the applicant
submits the Board did not make a clear distinction between credibility and
plausibility findings and the plausibility findings were not based on any clear
evidence. He cites Giron v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2013 FC 7, [2013] FCJ No 5 [Giron], which requires there to be a
distinction between credibility findings and the threat posed being implausible
and that implausibility findings must only be made in the clearest of cases.
The applicant submits he wants a clean break in Canada so he did not contact
anyone in the Spanish community and such is not outside of the realm of
possibility. The applicant argues that the Board’s plausibility findings are
based on mere speculation and therefore this is a reviewable error under Ortega
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 182, [2012] FCJ
No 201. This includes speculation on the lack of continuation of the
applicant’s family business and the lack of communication on extortion history
to the applicant.
V.
Respondent’s Written Submissions
[31]
The respondent submits the standard of review in
this case should be reasonableness. Referencing Alberta (Information and
Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3
SCR 654 and Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12,
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 [Khosa], the respondent submits significant deference
should be given to the Board. The respondent argues that the Board did not make
any reviewable error.
[32]
On the issue of subjective fear, the respondent
reiterates the Board’s finding that the delay in claiming refugee status is
inconsistent with a subjective fear. Relying on Rodriguez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 292, [2002] FCJ No 402, the
respondent submits the failure to show a subjective fear of persecution is
fatal to a claim. It is not unreasonable to expect the applicant to make some
inquires about his immigration options in the three and one-half year delay, if
he was truly afraid for his life.
[33]
For reavailment, the respondent relies on Kostrzewa
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1449, [2012]
FCJ No 1550 [Kostrzewa], where the Court in that case found multiple
reavailments to the country of persecution undermined an applicant’s subjective
fear in the absence of a compelling reason for such reavailment. In particular,
the respondent emphasizes the similarity between that case and the present
case, quoting Kostrzewa “[a]lthough Mr.
Kostrzewa testified that he had a valid student visa during that period and was
unaware of the possibility of applying for refugee protection until shortly
before he submitted his application, it was not unreasonable for the Board to
draw a negative inference regarding his subjective fear, based on his failure
to apply for protection within a reasonable period of time after his arrival in
Canada (Kaur v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2012 FC
1379 at para 20; Duarte v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2003 FC 988 at paras 14-15; Espinosa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FC 1324 at para 17; Huerta v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 271 (CA)).”
[34]
The respondent further submits that most of the
applicant’s arguments constitute a request to reweigh the evidence, which is
not the role of this Court. It argues that the Board considered all the
material before it and the reasons for its decision clearly state why the claim
failed.
[35]
On the issue of plausibility, relying on Sellan
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 381, [2008]
FCJ No 1685, the respondent submits the applicant did not provide independent
documentary evidence to alleviate the Board’s concerns. It is the Board’s role
to assess the credibility of the evidence, which includes inconsistencies and
contradictions. Further, the applicant has not overcome the presumption that
the Board considered all the evidence, and rather, the applicant’s argument is
based on the assessment of weight assigned to the evidence.
[36]
On the issue of IFA, citing Rasaratnam v
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706 [Rasaratnam],
the respondent agrees with the applicant that there are two criteria in
establishing an IFA. The respondent submits the alleged risk of the IFAs to the
applicant was properly assessed and the applicant has a high burden to show an
IFA location is unreasonable: “[i]t requires
nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life
and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe
area. In addition, it requires actual and concrete evidence of such conditions.” (see Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 FC 164 at paragraph 15, [2000] FCJ
No 2118). The respondent submits the Board considered the applicant’s assertion
that if returned, he will be located by the LFM and concluded it as a matter of
speculation lacking solid evidence.
VI.
Analysis and Decision
A.
Issue 1 - What is the standard of review?
[37]
Both parties in this case submit the
reasonableness standard should be adopted. I agree. Here, the issues under
review are a mix of fact and law. Where the jurisprudence has satisfactorily
resolved the standard of review, the analysis need not be repeated (see Dunsmuir
at paragraph 62).
[38]
It has been established in Dunsmuir, at
paragraph 53, that the standard of reasonableness is applied “where the legal and factual issues are intertwined with and
cannot be readily separated.” (see also Aguebor v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 732 at paragraph 4, 160 NR 315; and
Rahal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 319,
[2012] FCJ No 369 at paragraphs 22 to 40).
[39]
The standard of reasonableness means that I
should not intervene if the Board’s decision is transparent, justifiable,
intelligible and within the range of acceptable outcomes (see Dunsmuir
at paragraph 47). Here, I will set aside the Board’s decision only if I cannot
understand why it reached its conclusions or how the facts and applicable law
support the outcome (see Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at paragraph 16, [2011] 3 SCR
708). As the Supreme Court held in Khosa at paragraphs 59 and 61, a
court reviewing for reasonableness cannot substitute its own view of a
preferable outcome, nor can it reweigh the evidence.
B.
Issue 2 - Did the Board assess IFA unreasonably?
[40]
Pursuant to Rasaratnam and further
confirmed in Thirunavukkarasuv Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), in determining whether a reasonable IFA exists, it is well
settled that the applicant bears the onus to prove that 1) on a balance of
probabilities, there is a serious possibility of persecution throughout the
country, including the area which is alleged to afford an IFA; and 2) the
conditions in the proposed IFA must be such that it would be unreasonable, upon
consideration of all the circumstances, including the applicant’s personal
circumstances, for the applicant to seek refuge.
[41]
Here, I do not agree with the applicant that the
Board assessed IFA unreasonably. It seems to me the applicant’s arguments are
based on the appropriateness in weighing evidence. The applicant submits the
Board’s determination is unreasonable because it did not consider the
motivation or other means the LFM might have to track down the applicant beyond
electronic database. Also, he states the Board failed to assess the IFA’s
reasonableness beyond good employment prospects and lower crime rates. The
applicant submits the identified IFA, Mexico City, is unreasonable because of the
gang’s widespread violence and alternative means to track him. In particular,
the applicant asserted during his Board hearing that an unidentified person
shot at him during his second visit to Mexico.
[42]
As demonstrated from the Board’s reasoning, I am
satisfied that it considered the evidence before it, including both the
documentary evidence and the applicant’s assertions. The Board is not required
to mention every piece of evidence in the decision (see Akram v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 629 at paragraph 15,
[2004] FCJ No 758). Under the standard of reasonableness, my role is not to
reweigh the evidence, but to assess whether or not the Board’s decision falls
within a range of acceptable outcomes. I agree with the respondent that the
applicant is asking this Court to reweigh the evidence, which is not my role. Here,
the Board ultimately found the proposed IFAs were reasonable. To be reasonable,
the Board does not have to come to the same conclusion as the applicant.
[43]
Also, I see no reason to infer the Board has
either ignored or misconstrued evidence. I find that the Board’s conclusion
that the agents of persecution do not have the interest, motivation, means or
resources to pursue the applicant in the IFA areas does fall within the range
of acceptable outcomes.
C.
Issue 3 - Did the Board assess subjective fear
unreasonably?
[44]
The Board based its negative inference on
subjective fear on two major grounds: i) the delay in the refugee claim and ii)
reavailment. In the area of delay, the applicant submits the Board unreasonably
inferred from it the lack of subjective fear. The applicant states the delay
was reasonable because he had legal student visa status, then married his then-wife
and entrusted her to apply for spousal sponsorship. In Gyawali at
paragraphs 16 and 18, this Court found an applicant’s valid temporary status
was a legitimate reason for not claiming refugee protection at an earlier
opportunity:
[16] Although case law generally indicates
that failure to apply for refugee status immediately upon arrival or within a
reasonable delay can be an important factor to consider in determining a
claimant’s credibility (Huerta v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) (1993), 157 N.R. 225 (FCA) , there exist situations in which
negative inferences may not be drawn and failure to apply for refugee status
immediately upon arrival in a Convention country cannot be the sole basis for
questioning a claimant’s credibility.
…
[18] In the case at bar, the applicant had a
student visa and had also made an application for permanent residency. It is
clear that it was not until he lost his financial support from his family in Nepal that he feared having to return there because he could no longer pay for his studies.
Clearly there is a direct parallel with the sailor on the ship who is finally
given leave and has nowhere to go but home. Both had left home for fear of
persecution and had found a safe place to stay and work, so much so that they
did not feel the need to apply for refugee status as they were safe for the
time being. Suddenly, both found themselves in peril of returning home through
circumstances over which they had no power or influence and immediately filed a
claim.
[45]
On the other hand, the Court in Kostrzewa
found a valid student visa does not make a board’s negative inference
unreasonable (see paragraph 33 of these reasons).
[46]
Here, I find the present case is more similar to
Kostrzewa and agree with Chief Justice Paul S. Crampton in Kostrzewa
that the Board’s negative inference falls within the range of acceptable
outcomes.
[47]
I now turn my analysis to reavailment. In Kostrzewa,
this Court found multiple reavailments to the country of persecution undermined
the applicant’s subjective fear in the absence of a compelling reason for such
reavailment.
[48]
In Camargo, this Court found at paragraph
35, “a temporary visit by a refugee to the country
where persecution was feared without an intention to permanently reside there
should not result in the loss of refugee status.”
[49]
Here, the applicant went back to Mexico twice, each time for the renewal of his student visa. He did not return to his home
state and only stayed in Mexico temporarily for one month each time. In my
view, his returns do not constitute reavailment. Since the determination of
subjective fear was made based on both grounds of delay and reavailment, I
cannot guess what decision the Board would have made if not for this error.
Therefore, the Board made an error here.
D.
Issue 4 - Did the Board assess plausibility
unreasonably?
[50]
In Giron, this Court clarified a
distinction between credibility findings and the threat posed being implausible
and stated implausibility findings must only be made in the clearest of cases. Mr.
Justice Richard Mosley explained in Santos v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2004 FC 937 at paragraph 15, [2004] FCJ No 1149:
… [P]lausibility findings involve a distinct
reasoning process from findings of credibility and can be influenced by
cultural assumptions or misunderstandings. Therefore, implausibility
determinations must be based on clear evidence, as well as a clear
rationalization process supporting the Board’s inferences, and should refer to
relevant evidence which could potentially refute such conclusions.
[51]
This rationale is again emphasized by this Court
in Ansar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC
1152, [2011] FCJ No 1438.
[52]
Here, the Board found the applicant had
credibility issues because of unreasonable explanations related to family
secrets regarding the extortion demands and the fact that no family member
resumed the family business after the applicant left. The Board found that it
had insufficient reliable or trustworthy evidence to find the applicant faces “a well-founded fear of persecution or credible risk of harm
in Mexico.” These speculations concern the applicant’s family dynamic,
instead of the refugee claim at hand. I think they were influenced by possible
cultural assumptions.
[53]
Therefore, I do not see the clear rationalization
process supporting the Board’s negative inferences. The Board’s plausibility
findings fail under the review of reasonableness.
[54]
Although the Board made errors on the assessment
of subjective fear and plausibility findings, these errors are not dispositive
of the matter. I have found that the Board’s decision with respect to the
existence of an IFA for the applicant to be a reasonable decision. This means
that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution in his
country of nationality. For a refugee claim to succeed, the applicant must have
a well-founded fear of persecution in his country of nationality. Because of
the existence of an IFA, he does not have such a fear.
[55]
As a result, the applicant’s application for
judicial review must be dismissed.
[56]
Neither party wished to submit a proposed
serious question of general importance for my consideration for certification.
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