Docket: IMM-13181-12
Citation:
2015 FC 300
Toronto, Ontario, March 10,
2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Fothergill
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BETWEEN:
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ANDOR ZOLTANNE JUHASZ
IMRE NAGY
IMRENE NAGY
ZOLTAN MARTIN
JUHASZ
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Applicants
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and
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THE
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
This is an application for judicial review,
pursuant to s 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC
2001, c 27 (IRPA), of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board (Board) dated October 24, 2012. The Board
determined that the Applicants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in
need of protection (the Decision).
[2]
For the reasons that follow, the application for
judicial review is allowed and the matter is remitted to a different
decision-maker for re-determination.
II.
Facts
[3]
Andor Zoltanne Juhasz (the Principal Applicant)
is an ethnic Hungarian who fears persecution at the hands of her estranged
husband. Her claim was joined with those of her daughter Imrene Nag, her
son-in-law Imre Nagy, and her minor son Zoltan Martin Juhasz (collectively the
Applicants).
[4]
Shortly after the birth of their first child in
1989, the Principal Applicant’s husband began a pattern of physical, emotional
and sexual abuse that lasted until she fled to Canada in 2009. This abuse is
described in the Principal Applicant’s Personal Information Form narrative.
[5]
The Principal Applicant gave birth to four more
children between 1992 and 1999. The abuse continued throughout these years, and
at times resulted in physical injury that required medical attention. She went
to the police on a few occasions, but they told her that they do not get
involved in family affairs.
[6]
The Principal Applicant’s fifth child, the minor
applicant in this case, showed signs of emotional problems when he was born.
The Applicant’s husband blamed her for these difficulties and began beating the
child, who experienced trauma as a result.
[7]
He also beat the eldest daughter, the Applicant
Imrene Nag, who often ran away from home to escape the abuse. The Principal
Applicant reported this abuse to the police, who initially did nothing.
However, in 2003, the police placed her daughter, at the age of 14, in a state
institution for children in Szeged, where she met her future husband (the
Applicant Imre Nagy). The Principal Applicant allowed her daughter to marry
when she was 17 so she would not have to return home.
[8]
In 2005, the Principal Applicant and her husband
moved from the city of Hódmezővásárhely to the smaller village of Borota. The abuse continued. At the hearing before the Board, the Principal
Applicant testified that she did not go to the police after moving to Borota
because she was “tired in asking for help.”
[9]
In 2009, the Principal Applicant decided that
she had to leave the country. Her sister, who had previously immigrated to Canada with her mother, helped her to obtain a passport and paid for her ticket to Canada. She did not bring her children because they did not have passports and she required
her husband’s consent to remove them from the country.
[10]
After the Principal Applicant left, her husband
turned his anger towards the Applicant Imrene Nag, who was living with her
husband in Szeged. He threatened them and, on one occasion, he physically
abused his daughter on her way to work. She reported this incident to the
police, but they did not come because she did not report any injuries.
[11]
In April 2011, the Applicants Imrene Nag and
Imre Nag relocated to Budapest to escape from Imrene’s father. A short time
later, they learned from their neighbours that “someone”
was looking for them, so they gave up their jobs and returned to Szeged. They lived in fear until they left for Canada in December 2011.
[12]
The Applicants’ claims were heard by the Board
on October 24, 2012. The Board’s decision, dismissing their claims, was
released on November 22, 2012. This application for judicial review was
commenced on December 27, 2012 and leave was granted on November 20, 2013.
[13]
On January 16, 2014, the Respondent brought a
motion for this proceeding to be held in abeyance until the Refugee Appeal
Division (RAD) had rendered a decision concerning an application for an
extension of time to file or perfect an appeal submitted by the minor
Applicant. Madam Prothonotary Milczynski made an order to this effect on
January 23, 2014.
[14]
The Respondent brought this motion after
discovering that as a result of amendments to the IRPA, effected by the Balanced
Refugee Reform Act, SC 2010, c 8, and the Protecting Canada’s
Immigration System Act, SC 2012, c 17, there was a small window of time in
which refugee claimants whose claims were referred on or after August 15, 2012
were inadvertently extended a right of appeal to the RAD. The minor Applicant’s
claim fell into this category.
[15]
The minor Applicant’s appeal was heard by the
RAD on May 1, 2014. On July 23, 2014, the RAD rendered a positive decision,
holding that the Board’s findings on internal flight alternative and state
protection were unreasonable. As a result, the matter was returned to the Board
for re-determination. The minor Applicant’s claim is no longer before this
Court.
III.
The Board’s Decision
[16]
The Board accepted the narrative on which the Applicants’
claims were based and did not make any adverse findings of credibility. Rather,
the Board’s decision turns on its finding that the Applicants failed to rebut
the presumption of state protection.
[17]
At the outset, the Board stated that it had
considered the Chairperson’s Guidelines Regarding Women Refugee
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (the Gender Guidelines).
The Board then reviewed the documentation regarding conditions in Hungary and found that, while there are some problems with police corruption, the
government has taken steps to address this and has demonstrated “concrete results.”
[18]
The Board remarked that the evidence related to
domestic violence is “mixed,” but ultimately
found that protection for victims of domestic violence is not inadequate. In
reaching this conclusion, the Board relied on three reports.
[19]
The Board also considered the Applicants’ own
interactions with the police. The Principal Applicant testified that after
moving to Borota in 2005, she did not call the police because she did not
believe they would assist her. The Board found this explanation to be
unreasonable on the basis that she never gave the police a chance to help her.
[20]
The Board found it unreasonable for the
Principal Applicant’s daughter and son-in-law to leave Budapest and return to Szeged when they suspected that the Applicant’s husband was looking for them. The evidence
did not suggest that it would have been futile for them to try and contact the
police in Budapest.
[21]
The Board also considered the documentary
evidence regarding the experiences of women who seek protection from domestic
violence in Budapest. This evidence demonstrated that, while there is only one
shelter for victims of domestic violence in Budapest, there is also a “Regional Crisis Management Network” made up of 14
crisis centres across the country. This same document also suggested that it is
difficult for victims of domestic violence to relocate to another city without
having their new location revealed to the father of their children. However,
the Board again concluded that despite this “mixed”
evidence, protective mechanisms are in place in Budapest.
[22]
The Applicants’ failure to rebut the presumption
of state protection resulted in their claims being dismissed under ss 96 and 97
of the IRPA.
IV.
Issues
[23]
This application for judicial review raises the
following issues:
A.
What is the applicable standard of
review?
B.
Is the Board’s finding of adequate state
protection reasonable?
C.
Did the Board apply the correct test for
determining whether the Applicants have an internal flight alternative in Budapest?
D.
Did the Board properly consider the Chairperson’s
Gender Guidelines?
V.
Analysis
A.
Standard of Review
[24]
The Board’s findings regarding the adequacy of
state protection involve questions of mixed fact and law, which are reviewable
on the standard of reasonableness (Hinzman v Canada (MCI), 2007 FCA 171
at paragraph 38). The Board’s decision on this issue should not be disturbed
provided that it “falls within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”
(Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 45, 47-48 [Dunsmuir]).
[25]
The Board’s determination of the legal test for
the existence of an internal flight alternative (IFA) is a question of law that
is not entitled to deference (Lugo v Canada (MCI), 2010 FC 170 [Lugo] at paragraph 30; Kamburona v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 1052 at
paragraph 17 [Kamburona]). Once that test has been correctly identified,
the Board’s application of the test to the facts is assessed on the reasonableness
standard (Lugo at paragraph 31; Kamburona at paragraph
18).
[26]
The reasonableness standard of review also
applies to the Board’s consideration of the Gender Guidelines (Juarez
v Canada, 210 FC 890 at paragraph 12).
B.
State Protection
[27]
The Applicants advanced a number of arguments to
demonstrate that the Board’s state protection analysis was unreasonable. In my
view, this issue may be distilled down to one fundamental question: in light of
the mixed documentary evidence, together with the Applicants’ testimony that
they had previously sought police protection with no results, was it reasonable
for the Board to conclude that state protection is available to the Applicants
in Hungary?
i.
Applicants’ evidence
[28]
The Principal Applicant, her daughter and her
son-in-law each submitted detailed narratives in their Personal Information Forms. The Board did not dispute any of this evidence and stated at paragraph 5 of
the Decision that the Applicants did not appear “to
evade questions or to embellish the accounts as set out in their Personal Information Forms.”
[29]
At paragraph 16 of the Decision, the Board
discussed the Principal Applicant’s testimony regarding her interactions with
the police:
From 2005 until
her departure to Canada, the PC lived in Borota, a small village of about 2,000
people in central Hungary. When the panel asked if there were a number to reach
police the PC replied that it was ‘112’. The panel asked the PC if she ever
called that number in response to threats from her partner. She said she had
not done so. She testified that she did not think they would help if she called
them. The panel does not find that explanation to be reasonable insofar as the
PC never gave the police a chance to help her in failing to contact them.
[30]
The Applicants submit that this finding is
unreasonable because the Applicant’s Personal Information Form narrative
described four occasions on which the Applicant personally attended at a police
station to ask for help. The narrative also referred to other occasions when
her mother, sister, or neighbour sought police assistance on her behalf.
[31]
At the hearing before the Board, the Applicant
confirmed that she contacted the police three or four times during a ten year
period while living in Hódmezővásárhely (Certified Tribunal Record (CTR)
at page 627). She also confirmed that after moving to Borota in 2005, she did
not seek police assistance even though the problems with her husband continued
(CTR at page 624).
[32]
The Board’s Decision does not accurately reflect
the Applicant’s explanation for why she did not call the police:
MEMBER: Okay. Did you ever have
occasion to call 112?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: No
MEMBER: Any particular reason?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: When I contact
the police I have went over there by, personally.
MEMBER: Okay, so but you told me that
during the time that you lived in Bardejov you never saw the police; is that is
that correct?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: No, no I did not
go, I did not call.
MEMBER: And yet you had problems
during that time.
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: Yes
MEMBER: So if you had problems and
you are aware that you could call 112, why would ... why over three and a half
years would you not seek protection from the police during that ... during that
whole period?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: I got tired of
it.
MEMBER: Tired of what; tired of what?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: Tired ... okay I
was tired in my life, I tired in asking for help.
MEMBER: Okay. Had you tried to get
help from the police in the other town, whose name I shall not try again?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: Yes
(Emphasis added.)
(CTR at pp 625 – 626).
[33]
This exchange is relevant to the question of
whether state protection “might reasonably have been
forthcoming” (Canada v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at 724 [Ward]).
According to Ward (per La Forest J.), in determining whether a
claimant’s failure to approach the state is fatal to his refugee claim, the
test is whether “it is objectively unreasonable for the
claimant not to have sought the protection of his home authorities” (supra).
Proof of the state’s inability to protect requires “clear
and convincing confirmation,” such as “testimony
of similarly situated individuals let down by the state protection arrangement
or the claimant's testimony of past personal incidents in which state
protection did not materialize” (Ward at 724 – 725).
[34]
Applying these principles to this case, it was
incumbent on the Board to address whether the Principal Applicant’s evidence of
“past personal incidents in which state protection did
not materialize” made it objectively unreasonable for her not to have
called the police in Borota. I agree with the Applicants that the Board’s
failure to consider her decision not to call the police in light of her
previous attempts to seek police assistance renders its finding on this issue
unreasonable. I note that the RAD reached the same conclusion at paragraph 15
of its decision respecting the minor child.
[35]
The Board also found it unreasonable for the
son-in-law not to seek police protection in Szeged:
The claimant’s
son-in-law testified how the agent of harm assaulted him at his workplace in a
busy shopping mall in front of at least 2 witnesses. The son-in-law testified
that he did not complain to the police following this assault. The panel finds
that the evidence does not suggest it would have been futile for the son-in-law
to have sought police protection. His failure to do so does not rebut the
presumption of adequate state protection in Hungary.
(Decision at
paragraph 17)
[36]
However, again, the Board’s Decision does not
accurately reflect the son-in-law’s explanation for why he did not approach the
police:
MEMBER: Did you
complain to the police?
CO-CLAIMANT: No I
did not.
MEMBER: Why not?
CO-CLAIMANT: What
I thought that what happened was not the type of assault what I should have
report.
MEMBER: Even
though you had two witnesses to it.
CO-CLAIMANT: If
it is not the witnesses which was the matter, it was him, if I accused him with
anything I would put in jeopardy my wife’s family.
MEMBER: Right.
CO-CLAIMANT: I do
not think it would prevent him to come several, to come in several times.
(CTR at p 653).
[37]
In my view, this evidence provides a reasonable
explanation for why the son-in-law did not go to the police. He was trying to
protect his wife. The fact that he thought calling the police would do more
harm than good is reminiscent of Justice LaForest’s comment in Ward that
“it would seem to defeat the purpose of international
protection if a claimant would be required to risk his or her life seeking
ineffective protection of a state, merely to demonstrate that ineffectiveness”
(at 724).
ii.
Documentary evidence
[38]
The Decision makes reference to three reports:
the United States Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2011 (the US DOS Report), and two Immigration and Refugee
Board Response to Information Requests about domestic violence in Hungary (the Information Requests). While the Board found this evidence to be “mixed,” it nevertheless held that state protection is
not inadequate for victims of domestic violence in Hungary.
[39]
The Respondent argues that the Board’s factual
findings are owed considerable deference. Nevertheless, I am unable to conclude
that the outcome of the Board’s analysis falls within the “range of reasonable outcomes that are defensible in respect
of the facts and the law” (Dunsmuir at paragraph 47). I agree
with the Applicants that the evidence relied on by the Board is not “mixed,” but rather is overwhelmingly negative.
[40]
For example, at paragraph 13 of the Decision,
the Board relies on an excerpt from the US DOS Report which includes the
following findings:
•
There
is no law prohibiting domestic violence or spousal abuse;
•
Hungary
lacks appropriate protection for victims and sufficient emphasis on
accountability of perpetrators;
•
Most
incidents of domestic violence go unreported due to fear on the part of victims
or prior bad experience with authorities;
•
Prosecution
for domestic violence is rare;
•
During
the year, the Ministry of National Resources reduced the number of state-funded
shelters from 80 to 40.
[41]
The Information Request referenced at paragraph
14 of the Decision offers some evidence in the other direction by mentioning
that “Hungarian police reportedly receive mandatory
training on handling domestic violence at vocational schools for five hours per
year”. However, the author of that report also notes that this finding
is unconfirmed. Even if this finding was confirmed, the jurisprudence of this
Court is clear that evidence of a state’s efforts to combat persecution is not
sufficient to establish that state protection is in fact adequate (Varadi v
Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 407 at paragraph 32; Harinarain v Canada (MCI),
2012 FC 1519 at paragraph 39 [Harinarain]).
[42]
Justice O’Keefe’s decision in Harinarain,
relied on by the Applicants, is instructive on this point. In that case, which
involved a woman fleeing from her abusive spouse in Guyana, the Board also
concluded that the documentary evidence on state protection was “mixed.” Justice O’Keefe, however, found that the
evidence was “really a mix of (1) clear statements that
state protection is inadequate and (2) descriptions of various efforts made by
the Guyanese state” (at paragraph 34). As a result, he concluded, at
paragraph 40, that the Board’s decision was unreasonable because it:
… justified its
decision on the basis that the evidence on state protection was mixed, but at
no point in its decision did the Board identify any document or statement
indicating that the evidence on the adequacy of state protection was mixed.
Rather, the Board saw the mixed result being due to evidence of inadequate
state protection being counter-balanced by evidence of serious efforts. As I
have described above, the latter category of evidence does not speak to the
proper test for state protection.
[43]
Similarly in this case, the evidence of
inadequate state protection referenced in the US DOS report is challenged only
by evidence of Hungary’s efforts to protect victims of domestic
violence. For example, at paragraphs 19 – 22 of the Decision the Board cites
the second Information Request, which discusses a network of crisis centres across
Hungary that provide a “variety of services to victims
of domestic violence” as well as regional crisis centres that provide
shelter beds to women fleeing domestic violence. However, that same report also
mentions that the number of shelter beds decreased from approximately 100 to
30-40 beds between 2010 and early 2012.
[44]
Without further comment from the Board, this
evidence cannot be taken as proof that Hungary’s efforts have “actually translated into adequate state protection at the
operational level” (Hercegi v Canada (MCI), 2012 FC 250 at
paragraph 6, citing Meza Varela v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 1364 at
paragraph 16).
C.
Internal Flight Alternative
[45]
In order to find that an IFA exists in a refugee
claimant’s home country, the Board must be satisfied on a balance of
probabilities that (1) there is no serious possibility of the claimant being
persecuted in the proposed IFA location; and (2) it is not unreasonable, in all
the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for the claimant
to seek refuge in that part of the country (Rasaratnam v Canada (MEI),
[1992] 1 FC 706 at paragraph 10 (CA)). The test is objective and the onus of
proof rests with the claimant (Thirunavukkarsu v Canada (MCI), [1994] 1
FC 589 at paragraph 12 (CA)).
[46]
The Applicants argue that the Board
misunderstood the two-pronged nature of this test, and as a result, it failed
to properly apply the second prong. I agree. Not only did the Board fail to
identify the second prong of the test, it did not even state the first prong. Instead,
it considered the documentary evidence regarding state protection, and
concluded that there is adequate protection for victims of domestic violence in
Budapest because there is one shelter with room for 24 people and two crisis
centres with a total of eight designated spaces for victims of domestic
violence (Decision at paragraphs 19 – 21).
[47]
It is unclear how the Board arrived at the
conclusion that one shelter amounts to adequate state protection for victims of
domestic violence in Budapest. Nevertheless, assuming that this finding
satisfies the first prong of the IFA test, the Board did not then assess
whether it would have been unreasonable, in all of the circumstances, for the
Applicants to relocate to Budapest. Rather, it states that “neither the [Principal Applicant] nor her daughter ever
explored the possibility of seeking protection in Budapest before seeking
protection in Canada” (Decision at paragraph 23).
[48]
By requiring the Applicants to demonstrate that
they had already sought protection in the location identified as the
IFA, the Board imported an additional requirement into the IFA analysis. This
is an error of law. In Lugo, the Board stated that the applicants had an
onus to move to an IFA before leaving the country. In finding that the Board’s
comments were incorrect, Justice O’Keefe stated the following at paragraph 36:
The Board must not only state the correct test but it must also
apply the correct test. Adding an additional requirement in the application of
the test will cause the Board to run afoul of the reasonableness standard.
Adding the requirement that the applicants must have tried living in another,
safer region of the country demonstrates a misunderstanding of the legal test
for an IFA. As noted above, this was an error.
[49]
In Kamburona, Justice Strickland relied
on Lugo to conclude that the Board “misapplied
and misstated the test for IFA” by requiring the Applicants to have
already sought protection in the proposed IFA (at paragraph 29). She also
referred to Justice Snider’s decision in Ramirez Martinez v Canada (MCI),
2010 FC 600 at paragraph 6, in which she held that there is no obligation on
refugee claimants to try living in the proposed IFA in order to demonstrate
that they face persecution in that part of the country. Justice Strickland
concluded in Kamburona that because the Board erred in stating the
correct legal test, the Court was not required to show deference to the Board’s
decision (at paragraph 33).
[50]
Similarly in this case, I do not see any reason
to defer to the Board’s finding that the Applicants have a viable IFA in Budapest.
[51]
In light of my conclusion that the Board erred
in applying the correct legal test for an IFA, it is not necessary to consider
whether its finding that the Applicants have a viable IFA in Budapest is
reasonable. However, I think it is important to briefly comment on one of the
findings the Board made in support of its decision. At paragraph 19 of the
Decision, the Board states:
The panel asked
the [Principal Applicant] if the police in Budapest would respond to her
concerns if she returned to live there with her family. She replied she thought
they would. The PC’s daughter and son-in-law echoed this testimony.
[52]
It appears that the Board’s finding is based on
the Applicant’s answers during the following exchange:
MEMBER: […] So I am wondering if,
if in fact you could ... you went back to live in Budapest could you not avail
yourself of the, of the services available in the capital which might not have
been available in Bardejov for example?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: Yes
MEMBER: […] But the documentary
evidence suggests to me that Budapest is better equipped to deal with women in
your situation. And I am wondering is there some reason why you did not
consider that option when you were leaving Bardejov to come to Canada instead
of coming all the way to Canada, where you got family granted, move to
Budapest?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: My situation
would have not been resolved by that I getting a better service.
MEMBER: And why do you say that?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: Because my
husband would came over there and could find me over there.
MEMBER: Right, but it might be that
the, that the services available would offer you better protection in Budapest than in Bardejov for example. And that, and that brings back the question of state
protection which we also talked about; the two issues are sort of intertwined
at that point.
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: It is ... .it is
very likely that the service like anywhere else in the world in the big cities
are better than in small town, like for the homeless people or the left alone
children
MEMBER: Yes, yes.
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: But it would
not protect ... sorry; it would not protect me to, for my husband to give up
his emotional tenor and, and abuses just because I move to a bigger city where
the social service is better, but the corruption and the crime it is even
higher in the big cities.
[…]
MEMBER: So do you think, are you
suggesting that you could not adequate protection for yourself in Budapest?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: I do not think
I would get it.
(Emphasis added.)
(CTR at pp.
633-634).
[53]
Nor did the daughter say unequivocally that she
thought the police in Budapest would be able to help her:
MEMBER: […] If you had, if you went
back to Hungary now and lived in Budapest do you think that, do you think you
would have problems from your father; yes or no?
CO-CLAIMANT: Yes
MEMBER: Okay and what sort of
problems would you have from him if you went back to Hungary today?
CO-CLAIMANT: He would find us again.
MEMBER: And do what?
CO-CLAIMANT: Maybe he would assault
me, maybe he would visit me at my workplace.
MEMBER: Okay, if he did that and
you went to the police what, how do you think they would react in Budapest?
CO-CLAIMANT: They would listen to
me for sure.
MEMBER: So they would?
CO-CLAIMANT: They would listen to
me for sure, but ... but, but I do not know that they would be able to do
anything.
MEMBER: Well how, how would you
know if you never tried?
CO-CLAIMANT: I tried. I called
them on the telephone and nothing happened, they did not do anything.
(Emphasis added.)
(CTR at p 650).
[54]
These passages demonstrate that the Applicants
did not say that they thought the police would assist them in Budapest. Rather,
their testimony demonstrates that they thought the opposite. Therefore, the
Board’s finding on this point is erroneous because it was made “without regard to the evidence” (Cepeda-Gutierrez
v Canada (MCI) (1998), 157 FTR 35 at paragraph 17).
D.
Gender Guidelines
[55]
While the Board mentioned the Gender
Guidelines at the outset of the Decision, this Court has held that “it is not sufficient to merely mention the Guidelines
without demonstrating their application” (D.T. v Canada (MCI),
2012 FC 478 at paragraph 5, citing Evans v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 444 and
Yoon v Canada (MCI), 2010 FC 1017).
[56]
I agree with the Applicants that the Board
failed to demonstrate “a special knowledge of gender
persecution and to apply the knowledge in an understanding and sensitive manner
when dealing with domestic violence issues” (Keleta v Canada (MCI), 2005 FC 56 at paragraph 14 [Keleta]).
[57]
The Board’s failure to demonstrate “a special knowledge of gender persecution” is evident
in its finding that it was unreasonable for the Principal Applicant not to have
called the police when she moved to Borota. As discussed above, this finding
fails to acknowledge the Principal Applicant’s explanation that she was “tiring in asking for help” because the police had not
helped her in the past. The expectation that a victim of domestic violence, who
has previously sought the assistance of the police on more than one occasion to
no avail, should call the police because she has moved to a new city “demonstrates a measure of insensitivity that is inconsistent
with the Board’s guidelines,” to borrow the language of Justice
Tremblay-Lamer in Keleta (at paragraph 18).
VI.
Conclusion
[58]
For the foregoing reasons, the application for
judicial review is allowed and the matter is remitted to a different
decision-maker for re-determination.
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