Docket:
IMM-2086-13
Citation: 2014 FC 8
Ottawa, Ontario, February 5, 2014
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
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LAMA BARRY
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Applicant
|
and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
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“AMENDED” REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1]
In situations where an applicant has not
established identity, a negative conclusion as to credibility will almost
inevitably be drawn, and can, in and of itself, be dispositive of the claim (Uwitonze
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 61, 403 FTR
217).
II. Introduction
[2]
The Applicant seeks a judicial review of a
decision by the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of the Immigration and
Refugee Board, dated February 26, 2013, wherein, it was determined that the
Applicant was not a Convention refugee under section 96 nor a person in need of
protection under section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
SC 2001 c 27 [IRPA].
III. Background
[3]
The Applicant, Mr. Lama Barry (a.k.a. Mohamed
Barry) is a citizen of Guinea.
[4]
The Applicant alleges he began facing serious
mistreatment by his family in Guinea in late 2009 for his religious conversion
to Christianity and mental illness. He explains he was chained to a tree in
front of the family home for several months as a means of calming his mental
illness, and was beaten and forced to take medication by his father.
[5]
The Applicant explains he was eventually
released from his father’s confinement by men from a local church. He
subsequently moved from Dalaba to Conakry, and then to a friend’s residence
until he left for Canada.
[6]
In February 2010, the Applicant and his
companion, Mrs. Agnes Haba, submitted an application for a temporary resident
visa to come to Canada using false documents; documents which were allegedly
obtained by Mrs. Haba’s aunt without the Applicant’s direct involvement. The
application was refused.
[7]
The Applicant finally left Guinea in October 2010 and travelled to France. In France, the Applicant made a second application
for a temporary resident visa to come to Canada, again using false documents,
and this time portraying himself as a government accountant performing an audit
on the Guinean Embassy in Canada. The application was granted.
[8]
The Applicant arrived in Canada on October 25, 2010, under the name “Mohamed” Barry.
[9]
The Applicant subsequently made a refugee claim
on November 15, 2010, under the name “Lama” Barry.
[10]
The RPD heard the Applicant’s refugee claim on
December 6, 2012.
[11]
The Applicant’s refugee claim was denied on
February 26, 2013.
IV. Decision
under Review
[12]
In its decision, dated February 26, 2013, the RPD
concluded that the Applicant was not a Convention refugee or a person in need
of protection. The RPD concluded that the Applicant did not prove his identity
and, in addition, that his narrative and testimony, in and of themselves, were
not credible due to significant implausibilities, contradictions and ambiguity
as specified by the RPD.
[13]
Relying on the Canada Border Services Agency expertise
assessment that documents were counterfeit, the RPD determined that the
identity documentation provided by the Applicant had been altered,
counterfeited or obtained through previously altered documents. Specifically,
the RPD found that a number of the documents contained photo substitutions and
important typographical alterations. The RPD rejected the Applicant’s
explanation that these irregularities were a consequence of poor government
administration.
[14]
Given the lack of probative value of any of the
identity documentation provided by the Applicant and his lack of overall
credibility, the RPD gave the other documentary evidence provided by the
Applicant no weight in establishing his identity; these documents include a
summons, a priest’s letter, a newspaper article dated August 31, 2010, and a
letter from the vicar of a Canadian parish.
V. Issue
[15]
Was the RPD’s conclusion on identity reasonable?
VI. Relevant
Legislative Provisions
[16]
The following legislative provisions of the IRPA
are relevant:
Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who,
by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion,
(a) is
outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of
that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries; or
(b)
not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
return to that country.
Person in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need of
protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries
of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their
country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to
a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to
a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment if
(i) the
person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of that country,
(ii) the risk
would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced
generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the
risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk
is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or
medical care.
Person in need of protection
(2) A person
in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations
as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection.
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Définition de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la
Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être
persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son
appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et
ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de
chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays
dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette
crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne à protéger
97. (1) A qualité de personne à
protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par
son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de
nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être
soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la
torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines
cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne
peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y
est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires
de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à protéger
(2) A
également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada
et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par
règlement le besoin de protection.
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VII. Standard
of Review
[17]
The RPD’s findings of fact on issues regarding identity
attract a standard of reasonableness (Liu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2012 FC 377; Wang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2011 FC 969; Najam v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2004 FC 425).
[18]
The standard of reasonableness is termed as such,
wherein, an analysis demonstrates “the existence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility in the decision-making process” and, wherein, the decision
falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para 47).
VIII. Analysis
[19]
This Court has found on numerous occasions that the
issue of identity is at the very core of the RPD’s expertise, and the Court
should be cautious about second-guessing the RPD. As stated by Justice Mary
Gleason in Rahal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2012 FC 319:
[48] … In my
view, provided that there is some evidence to support the Board’s
identity-related conclusions, provided the RPD offers some reasons for its
conclusions (that are not clearly specious) and provided there is no glaring
inconsistency between the Board’s decision and the weight of the evidence in
the record, the RPD’s determination on identity warrants deference and will
fall within the purview of a reasonable decision. In other words, if these
factors pertain, the determination cannot be said to have been made in a
perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the evidence. [Emphasis
added].
[20]
In its decision, the RPD based its identity finding on
numerous false documents referring to the name Lama Barry, and on the
Applicant’s own admission of the falsehood of the identity documents in
the name Mohamed Barry.
[21]
This Court’s jurisprudence clearly shows that failure
by a refugee claimant to establish his or her identity is fatal to a claim (Balde
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 438; also, more
recently, Yang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009
CF 681).
[22]
In situations where an applicant has not established
identity, a negative conclusion as to credibility will almost inevitably be
drawn, and can, in and of itself, be dispositive of a claim (Uwitonze,
above).
[23]
The Applicant principally argues that the RPD erred in
failing to assess a number of documents provided by him because of its negative
findings in regard to other [fraudulent] documents on the record. The Applicant
states that each of the documents should have been assessed in its own right
and not be limited to the problems regarding other documents; even if there was
a link between the documents.
[24]
The Court cannot agree with the Applicant’s contention
that the RPD erred in this regard. Firstly, in the circumstances, none of the
documents to which the Applicant refers was “key” to the decision as to make
the RPD’s failure of assessment thereon in detail, an error. Not one of the
documents was an identity document, nor could one be used to definitively
establish the Applicant’s identity. Each document simply mentioned the name
“Lama Barry”.
[25]
Moreover, the Court must examine the overall reasoning
with regard to the Applicant’s identity in the RPD’s decision. It cannot limit
its review only to an assessment of the few documents highlighted by the
Applicant. As stated in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, the evidence
must be examined in its totality and in light of the record to evaluate whether
the RPD’s conclusion is reasonable.
[26]
The Court finds that there was ample evidence before
the RPD that supports its decision to reject the Applicant's identity documents
and to conclude that his identity could not be satisfactorily established. The
Court does not find that the RPD erred in limiting its assessment to only a
portion of the documents submitted by the Applicant or in neglecting to review
the other documents “in their own right”. As the record of the RPD hearing,
through the transcript, clearly demonstrates the evidence, through questioning
was evaluated in its totality; and, it is thereby that the RPD reached its
conclusion.
[27]
In any event, as mentioned above, the documents, which
were not identity documents, were by no means sufficient to cure the
irregularities found in the specific identity documentation on record.
[28]
The Court is of the view that the RPD’s identity
finding was reasonable.
IX. Conclusion
[29]
For all of the above reasons, the Applicants’
application for judicial review is dismissed.