Docket: IMM-6035-13
Citation:
2014 FC 572
[UNREVISED
ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, June 17, 2014
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice St-Louis
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BETWEEN:
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LEONARDO DOMINGUEZ ROMO
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LEONARDO DOMINGUEZ GOMEZ
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ANDREA DOMINGUEZ GOMEZ
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VANESSA MONTSER GOMEZ GUTIERREZ
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an application for judicial review
pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the Act) of a decision [the decision] rendered on
August 30, 2013, by Patrick Lemieux, of the Refugee Protection Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (the panel), in which it was found that
the applicants were neither Convention refugees nor “persons in need of
protection” under sections 96 and 97 of the Act.
[2]
For the reasons set out below, I am of the view
that the application must be dismissed.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[3]
Vanessa Montserrat Gomez Gutierrez (the female applicant),
her spouse and their two minor children (collectively, the applicants) are citizens
of Mexico. They all base their claim on the female applicant’s narrative.
[4]
According to the female applicant’s statements,
she worked for the Mexican government in the Servicio de Administración Tributaria [tax administration service] (the
SAT). In this capacity, she began in June 2009 an investigation of the
activities of a company, “Incomersat”, which allegedly revealed fraudulent
practices. In May 2010, near the end of the investigation, she was informed
that a certain Jose Carlos Calleja Lopez (Calleja) would be joining her division.
The female applicant submits that she knew Calleja as he had intervened in some
of her investigative activities in 2007 and 2008 and she then concluded that he
was linked with the criminal group the “Zetas”. For fear of working with Calleja,
the female applicant resigned from the SAT in June 2010.
[5]
On December 25, 2012, some two and a half years
after her resignation, and when the female applicant worked for another organization,
she allegedly received, at her home, a call from an unknown individual who
identified himself as a member of the Zetas. Said individual allegedly warned her
to watch out for herself and her family because of the harm she could inflict
on Calleja.
[6]
The following day, on December 26, 2012, an
individual allegedly stole the female applicant’s camera and cellular telephone
while strolling through downtown Léon with her son, at whom the man allegedly pointed
a gun. The man then allegedly informed the female applicant that Calleja was
demanding that she leave the country.
[7]
On December 27, 2012, the female applicant filed
a denunciation with the police. She then resigned from her work, took her
children out of school and allegedly spent the next four months at home without
leaving the house.
[8]
On April 27, 2013, the female applicant left the
house to go to the amusement park with her children. She was allegedly approached
by a man who threatened to teach her a lesson for not leaving the country, as
previously requested. She allegedly sprayed her assailant with pepper spray
and managed to escape with her children.
[9]
Furthermore, the female applicant purchased
airline tickets for her and her family to Canada on April 22, 2013, that is, a
few days before the incident at the amusement park, planning to travel on May 4
to reside permanently in Canada.
[10]
On May 4, 2013, the female applicant and her family
left Mexico for the United States, where they stayed for two weeks. They then
travelled to Canada, where they made a claim for refugee protection about two
months later.
II.
THE IMPUGNED DECISION
[11]
After analyzing all the evidence presented by
the applicants, the panel concluded that the female applicant’s credibility was
irremediably compromised on a number numbers of fronts. Having regard to all of
the evidence, the panel stated that the applicants did not discharge their
burden of proof.
[12]
First, at the hearing, the female applicant testified
that Calleja personally made veiled threats against her in June 2010. However, she
made no mention of that threat, a key element, in any of her previous statements.
The female applicant submits that [Translation] “Calleja wished to eliminate her because he believed she could
incriminate him” and that this submission is partly based on the
aforementioned threat of June 2010. However, although the female applicant amended
her previous statements twice, she did not note such a threat and she confirmed
under oath at the start of the hearing that her Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form)
was complete. Only once confronted with this omission by the panel did the
female applicant state that she thought she had mentioned it before. The panel
found this explanation not to be credible and the likelihood of fear of reprisal
by Calleja consequently reduced.
[13]
The panel also found not credible the explanation
provided by the female applicant to justify the two-and-a-half-year delay between
the aforementioned threat of June 2010 and the telephone call from the member
of the Zetas of December 25, 2012. The panel did not accept the female
applicant’s assertion that Calleja had begun to pay attention to her again
because he was soon going to [Translation]
“go before the courts”. Indeed, the balance of probabilities
showed that no such trial had been scheduled to take place and the female
applicant was unable to adequately explain why, if this allegation was
well-founded, she had not yet been contacted by the authorities responsible for
the proceedings involving Calleja or Incomersat. The panel rather found that
the lack of expressed interest from Calleja in the female applicant during that
period of over two years was inconsistent with the possibility of reprisal based
on information held by the female applicant. The panel therefore found the
female applicant’s allegation that the threat of December 25, 2012, was in
connection with Calleja or the Zetas to be implausible.
[14]
The female applicant provided a recent notarized
written statement of a member of her investigation team at the SAT specifically
mandated to document any ties between Calleja and the Zetas. The panel found that
the absence of any mention of Calleja, the Zetas, an ongoing investigation or
the very existence of a problem in that statement spoke volumes. The panel was
not satisfied with the explanations provided by the female applicant for her
omission.
[15]
As for the incident dated December 26, 2012, the
panel did not find the female applicant’s testimony to be credible. It was not
until the very end of her account of the incident that the female applicant indicated
that the individual who stole her cellular telephone and her camera referred to
Calleja, and it was only at the panel’s suggestion that she confirmed that said
individual allegedly told her to leave the country. She could not initially
remember what he had told her.
[16]
In addition, the denunciation regarding that
incident, dated December 27, 2012, does not contain any reference to words
uttered by the assailant in connection with Calleja or threats about leaving
the country. Thus, having regard to all of the evidence presented, the panel concluded
that the female applicant did not establish that the incident of December 26, 2012,
was related to Calleja and the Zetas.
[17]
The panel found that the circumstances relied on
by the female applicant, the decision to tender her resignation, to take her
children out of school and to remain at home during the months that followed
the events of December 2012 were inconsistent with the alleged threats because
the individuals she was hiding from knew where she lived. Indeed, they had
contacted the female applicant by telephone at that location, and she also
confirmed in her testimony that her telephone number and her address were published.
The panel found that the explanations provided by the female applicant to
justify her behaviour were unreasonable and concluded that she did not take
precautions consistent with threats from Calleja or the Zetas.
[18]
The panel found that the event of April 27, 2013,
in the amusement park was improbable given the female applicant’s allegations. Indeed,
the panel concluded that the decision to go to the park was inconsistent with
the existence of threats from Calleja and the Zetas and with the female
applicant’s stated fear, considering that this fear was so intense that she had
already planned to leave the country permanently with her family one week later,
after abandoning her job and electing to stay confined to her home for four
months.
[19]
In light of the foregoing, the panel concluded
that the female applicant did not establish her principal allegations in a credible
manner and on a balance of probabilities. It gave no probative weight to the
other evidence from the female applicant to support the principal allegation that
Calleja or the Zetas sought or are still seeking to eliminate the female
applicant or the other applicants. It did not, therefore, consider it necessary
to elaborate further on other evidence.
[20]
In light of these findings, the panel also considered
to be unfounded the argument made by the female applicant at the hearing that Calleja
is today aware of her presence in Canada owing to the steps taken by the Immigration
and Refugee Board (the Board) that led to the Response to Information Request –
MEX104543.F: Information on a fraud case against the national government and
the legal proceedings allegedly involving, among others, the Mexican company
“Incomersa, S.A. de C.V.” and the criminal organization Los Zetas; information on
the protection available to employees of the Servicio de Administración Tributaria who are allegedly being threatened
for having investigated corruption or fraud cases (Response to Information
Request) dated August 7, 2013.
[21]
Thus, the panel found that the applicants did
not establish the principal allegations regarding the past,
current or future interest of Calleja or the Zetas to eliminate the
female applicant or otherwise threaten or mistreat her, and that, accordingly,
they did not establish (i) a serious possibility of persecution, (ii) a risk to
their lives, or (iii) a risk of torture or cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment.
III.
ISSUE AND STANDARD
OF REVIEW
[22]
The issue raised in the present application is
as follows:
Were the panel’s negative findings with respect
to the applicants’ credibility made in a perverse or capricious manner without regard for the material before it?
[23]
It is well established that the applicable standard
of review concerning credibility issues is reasonableness (Hidalgo Carranza
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 914, at paragraph
16; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 (Dunsmuir); Wa
Kabongo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 348, at
paragraph 7. Indeed, the case law teaches that the panel is in a better position than this Court to assess a
claimant’s credibility and to determine the merits of his or her explanations
(Berber v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 497,
at paragraph 31; Cortes v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2009 FC 583). The Court must defer when confronted with the panel’s
determinations and intervene only if the panel based its decision on an
erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse or capricious manner or
without regard for the material before it (Aguebor v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 732 (Aguebor), at paragraph
4; Dunsmuir, at paragraph 47).
IV.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
[24]
Sections 96 and 97 of the Act read as follows:
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REFUGEE PROTECTION, CONVENTION REFUGEES AND PERSONS IN NEED OF
PROTECTION
Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of
their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear,
unwilling to return to that country.
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NOTIONS D’ASILE, DE RÉFUGIÉ ET DE PERSONNE À PROTÉGER
Définition de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié —
la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race,
de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou
de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et
ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de
chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays
dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette
crainte, ne veut y retourner.
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Person in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose
removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have
a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would
subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of
torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to
avail themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would
be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced
generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk
is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk
is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or
medical care.
Person in need
of protection
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons
prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person
in need of protection.
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Personne à protéger
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve
au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle
a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait
sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être
soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la
torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou
peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la
protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres
personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement
pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes
— sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à
celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays
de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à protéger
(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se
trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est
reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
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V.
FEMALE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
[25]
According to the female applicant, the panel erred
in its assessment of the credibility of her testimony. The female applicant
essentially objects to the assessment of various facts by the panel and submits
that it made a number of errors.
[26]
She first submits that the Response to Information
Request was only disclosed to her on August 7, 2013, that is, the day before
the hearing before the panel, therefore outside the limitation period. Thus, according
to the female applicant, the analysis of that Response to Information Request during
the hearing was [Translation]
“unlawful” and constitutes a procedural error. She also disputes the respondent’s
statement that said document constitutes evidence undermining the female
applicant’s credibility. In addition, the female applicant submits that the
mere fact that the Board requested an investigation into possible legal
proceedings against Cajella and the Zetas means that the female applicant’s
life and the lives of her family members are now even more at risk than before.
[27]
The panel noted that although the female applicant
testified at the hearing that Calleja personally made veiled threats against
her in June 2010 when she left the SAT, she had up until that point failed to
disclose that threat in her previous statements. The female applicant rather
submits that a reading of the explanations provided to Question 2(a) of her BOC
Form leads to the conclusion that she implicitly mentioned in her previous
statements that her life was in danger.
[28]
She then submits that the panel erred in considering
as one single proceeding two distinct types of proceedings, i.e., one
administrative and the other judicial. Thus, the female applicant claims that
the two-and-a-half-year delay was reasonable, as it was attributable to the
time required for administrative proceedings and subsequently for the
prosecution of the case. It therefore follows that the panel’s conclusion that
it “considers implausible the female claimant’s
allegation that on December 25, 2012, after two and a half years of
silence, she was threatened by Las Zetas in connection with Calleja” does
not take into account the time required for these two separate proceedings, which,
according to the female applicant, is unreasonable.
[29]
As for the recent notarized written statement of
a member of her investigation team specifically mandated to document any ties between
Calleja and the Zetas, she submits that the document was evidence of her good
behaviour, and not a statement about facts regarding the investigation of Incomersat
and the Zetas. Consequently, she submits that the passage which states that “the absence of any mention of Calleja, Las Zetas, an ongoing
investigation or even the existence of a problem in this respect . . . speaks
volumes, and the panel is not satisfied with the female claimant’s numerous
attempts to explain this silence” is incorrect. The female applicant submits
that she specifically stated at the hearing that it was a statement that they
worked together and, therefore, the conclusion of the panel was not reasonable.
[30]
The female applicant submits that the panel
undermined her credibility with respect to errors that were superficial and insufficient
to cast doubt on her statements about the circumstances surrounding the incident
of December 26, 2012.
[31]
Regarding the denunciation of December 27, 2012,
that did not report the statements in question of the individual who stole her
cellular phone and her camera, the female applicant submits that the panel
erred by not accepting her explanations that the public ministry officer refused
to record some elements of the complainant’s statement when, according to her,
her explanations were more than reasonable, i.e., that the officer only
recorded what was
pertinent, that is, that it was a theft. The
other facts mentioned were totally irrelevant.
[32]
The female applicant submits that the panel did
not take into account the country’s context relating to male-female relations.
Essentially, she submits that she wished to leave the house more quickly but
that, for his part, her husband wanted to stay, believing that the situation would
calm down. She had to respect his decision.
[33]
Finally, with respect to the decision to go to
the amusement park with her children after electing to stay confined to the
house for four months, the female applicant submits that she had no choice, despite
the risk. She submits that the panel’s assessment of her motivation as a desperate
mother was defective.
VI.
RESPONDENT’S
SUBMISSIONS
[34]
Essentially, the respondent relies on the
panel’s findings.
[35]
The respondent submits that the panel’s decision
is reasonable, that is, that the findings of credibility are reasonable. The
respondent is also of the view that the deficiencies contained in each of the essential
aspects of the narrative as alleged by the female applicant justify the finding
of a lack of credibility reached by the panel. Thus, the panel was justified in
concluding that the female applicant did not discharge her burden of proof of
establishing the merits of her allegations, having been unable to “establish [her] claims on a balance of probabilities” (Daissala
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 324, at paragraph
14).
[36]
With respect to the assessment of the female
applicant’s credibility and relying on Zeferino v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 456, at paragraphs 31-32, the respondent
submits that the panel may take into account the female applicant’s failure to mention
in her BOC Form the threat Calleja personally made against her at the time she
resigned from Incomersat in June 2010:
This Court has confirmed on
a number of occasions that all the important facts of a claim must appear in
the PIF and that failing to mention them could affect the credibility of part
or all of the testimony. Furthermore, the RPD is entitled to review the
contents of the PIF before and after its amendment and may draw negative
inferences about credibility if matters it considers important were added to
the PIF by an amendment later (Taheri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 886, [2001] F.C.J. No. 1252, at paragraphs
4 and 6; Grinevich
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1997) 70 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1059, [1997] F.C.J.
No. 444).
It was open to the panel to
gauge the principal applicant's credibility and to draw negative inferences
about the disparities between her statements in the original PIF, in the
interview notes, in the amended narrative of the PIF and in the viva voce testimony, for which the principal applicant
provided no satisfactory, plausible or credible explanation in the
circumstances (He
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1994), 49 A.C.W.S. (3d) 562, [1994] F.C.J.
No. 1107). In this case, and the Court agrees with counsel for the respondent,
the evidence shows that the applicants' story and narrative changed over the last
two years.
[37]
The panel also had just cause to rely on rationality
and common sense to assess the plausibility of the alleged story, which allowed
it to first find implausible that the female applicant was harassed by Calleja two
and a half years after resigning from her position at the SAT and when no trial
was in sight, and second, that the Zetas attempted to kidnap her with her
children in a public place when if such a kidnapping had truly been their
objective, they could have executed it while the female applicant and her
children were living in hiding in their home, whose location was known to the Zetas.
[38]
Consequently, the defendant submits that the
panel’s decision falls “within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”
(Dunsmuir, at paragraph 47).
VII.
ANALYSIS
[39]
The proceeding before this
Court is an application for judicial review. As indicated
in Ortez Villalta v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2010 FC 1126, at paragraph 3, in the context of the
panel's assessment of credibility, the Court must show considerable deference
and analyze the decision according to the standard of reasonableness.
[40]
In the
circumstances, it is not
this Court’s function to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that
made by the panel. Indeed, “[t]he
administrative tribunal . . . has had the opportunity of hearing the testimony viva
voce and is thus in a much better position to assess the credibility of
witnesses. The role of this Court is to ascertain that the Panel has carried
out its mandate in accordance with the legal framework set out by its
constitutive legislation and with due regard to the rules of fairness and of
fundamental justice” (Utrera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2010 FC 360, at paragraph 13).
[41]
In light of the facts, after reviewing the
evidence in the record and after having heard counsel for the parties with
respect to the issue raised in this case, namely, the assessment of the facts
by the panel, the Court is satisfied that the
inferences drawn by the panel could reasonably
have been drawn (Aguebor, at paragraph 4). The implausibility and inconsistencies noted by the panel
are generally well-supported by the evidence.
[42]
The panel’s reasoning allows the Court to
conclude that the panel considered the parties’ submissions and all of the
evidence presented before it, both the documentary and testimonial evidence, of
approximately five hours’ duration. Thus, because the panel had the benefit of
hearing and assessing the scope of the testimonies, the Court finds that the decision
reached by the panel fits within the range of decisions it was reasonable for
the panel to reach.
[43]
There was no error warranting the intervention
of this Court.