Docket:
T-937-13
Citation:
2014 FC 260
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, March 17,
2014
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Gleason
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BETWEEN:
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FRANÇOIS MÉNARD
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a
decision at the third level of the grievance procedure established under
section 74 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620
[the Regulations] and section 90 of the Corrections and
Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20 [the Act]. The
decision in this case was issued on March 18, 2013, by the Senior Deputy
Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada [the CSC]. In her decision,
the Senior Deputy Commissioner denied the applicant’s grievance and refused to
remove a note from his file indicating that he had been associated with the Hell’s
Angels and was known as their [translation]
“special” doctor.
[2]
For the reasons set out below, this application
for judicial review will be dismissed.
Factual
background
[3]
The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment
with no possibility of parole for 12 years for second degree murder and
received a second sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment to be served concurrently
with a possibility of parole half-way through his sentence for manslaughter.
[4]
In May 2005, after the applicant’s first
conviction, the CSC performed the necessary assessments to determine his applicable
security classification, which was necessary in order to transfer him to an
appropriate penitentiary. To do so, the CSC gathered information from various
sources including the Sûreté du Québec [the SQ]. On May 25, 2005, the CSC
informed the applicant in writing that he had been identified as [translation] ”an associate of the Quebec
Hell’s Angels, known as the Hell’s Angels’ ‘special’ doctor” in a document
entitled “Referral Sheet—Identification of Membership or Association with a
Criminal Organization”. According to that sheet, the SQ was the source of this
information. Specifically, the information obtained from the SQ indicated that
a reliable source had identified the applicant as the Hell’s Angels’ special
doctor, that the SQ had observed the applicant spending time with one or more known
members or associates of the Hell’s Angels on a regular basis, that there was
tangible written, electronic and photographic evidence showing or suggesting
that the applicant was a member or associate of the Hell’s Angels and that he
himself had admitted being a member or associate of the Hell’s Angels.
[5]
After receiving this document, the applicant
denied in writing any association with the Hell’s Angels except for the fact
that he had treated some members of the group as a doctor, just as he had also
treated other members of society like lawyers and members of the Knights of
Columbus.
[6]
On May20, 2008, the CSC decided that the
applicant would no longer be considered as affiliated with the Hell’s Angels. This
decision was provided to the applicant in a document entitled “Referral
Sheet—Termination of Membership or Association with a Criminal Organization”.
In that sheet, the CSC gave the following reasons to support the applicant’s “disaffiliation”
with respect to the Hell’s Angels:
[translation]
For almost three
years, Ménard has been in a restricted contact area; he no longer lives in the
area where most of the gang’s sympathizers are located. No telephone contact or
email between the parties. Checks with the SQ and the SPVM were done, and there
is no information confirming ties between Ménard and the Hell’s Angels.
[7]
Although it no longer considered him affiliated
with the Hell’s Angels, the CSC nonetheless continued to refer to the
applicant’s past affiliation with the group in other documents in his prison record.
That is why the applicant is still concerned about the issues identified in
this application, even though he is no longer considered to be affiliated with
the criminal organization.
[8]
On May 23, 2012, the applicant filed a
complaint with his parole officer asking that his prison record be corrected
and that the reference to his association with the Hell’s Angels be removed in
the places where it appeared in his record. He also sought disclosure of the
information the CSC had obtained from the SQ that led the CSC to conclude, in
2005, that the applicant was affiliated with the Hell’s Angels.
[9]
On June 7, 2012, the applicant received a
response to his complaint stating that the CSC could not go back in time and
change documents that were prepared based on the information available at the
time. In addition, in its response the CSC invited the applicant to also communicate
directly with the SQ to obtain the information and clarifications sought because
the CSC, which has [translation] “no
authority over them”, was unable to do it.
[10]
Subsequently, the applicant filed a grievance at
the first level of the grievance procedure established under section 74 of
the Regulations. On August 2, 2012, his grievance was denied, stating
that the information concerning his affiliation with the Hell’s Angels in 2005
was not erroneous and would not be deleted. In addition, the response indicated
that the CSC could not give the applicant a statement from a reliable source in
order to protect the source. As for the report received from the SQ, the CSC
stated that it did not have the report at the institution. With respect to his
admission, the CSC confirmed that it did not have any documents in that regard.
[11]
The applicant brought his grievance to the
second level, reiterating his position. On September 13, 2012, his
grievance was again denied, stating again that the applicant should apply to
the SQ to obtain the information about him, that this information was
considered between May 25, 2005, and May 20, 2008, and that if he believed
the information was erroneous he should submit a request for correction to his
parole officer.
[12]
The applicant then brought his grievance to the
third level of the grievance procedure. On March 18, 2013, his grievance
was denied in the decision that is the subject of this judicial review. In that
decision, the Deputy Commissioner first summarized the applicant’s initial
complaint, noting that he claimed to have never had a relationship with the Hell’s
Angels and had never been their [translation]
“special” doctor. She went on to review the history of the case and summarized
the previous decisions made regarding his complaint as well as the decisions
from the first and second levels of the grievance procedure. The Deputy
Commissioner then referred to paragraph 2 of the Commissioner’s Directive (CD) 568-3
(2008-07-11), Identification and Management of Criminal Organizations, which
recognizes that an association with a criminal organization is a significant
risk factor and a serious threat to the safe, secure, orderly and efficient
management of penal institutions and is thus important information to obtain.
The Senior Deputy Commissioner reiterated that the applicant’s file did not
raise reasonable grounds to believe that the validity and reliability of the
information from the SQ was questionable. Accordingly, she concluded that the
applicant’s grievance should be denied. She provided other reasons for denying
it, such as the fact that the applicant did not follow the proper procedure for
obtaining a correction to his prison record and that his grievance was filed late.
[13]
Because a review of the CSC’s various responses
did not identify exactly what information was in the records, counsel for the
respondent filed an affidavit of a legal assistant that attached as an exhibit
a letter from Daniel Mélançon, senior project manager at the CSC for the
Quebec region. In his letter, Mr. Mélançon confirmed that the CSC did not
currently have any report from the SQ about the applicant’s criminal
affiliation. Accordingly, even if such documents existed, they were no longer
in the CSC’s possession. It therefore appears that the only documents the CSC
currently has regarding the applicant’s past criminal affiliation are limited
to the sheets that were already given to the applicant, in which the CSC
summarized the information provided by the SQ.
Issues and standard of review
[14]
The parties set out two issues in their
memoranda and in their counsel’s oral argument:
1. Is the CSC required to provide the applicant with the information
from the SQ concerning his association with the Hell’s Angels?
2. Did the CSC’s Deputy Commissioner err by refusing to
remove from the applicant’s prison record the reference concerning his
affiliation with the Hell’s Angels, which was provided to the applicant in the
“Referral Sheet—Identification of Membership or Association with a Criminal
Organization” dated May 28, 2005?
[15]
Both these issues are reviewable on a
reasonableness standard. In this regard, in Tehrankari v The Attorney
General of Canada, 2012 FC 332 [Tehrankari], my colleague
Justice Mosley concluded at para 22 that “the standard of review for
interpretation of the [Act is] correctness, and that the standard would
be reasonableness for the application of the law to the facts and for the
decision as a whole”. In Scarcella v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC
1272 [Scarcella] at paragraph 14, Justice Snider also applied the
reasonableness standard to a judicial review concerning the reliability of
information the CSC had relied on in identifying an inmate as belonging to or
associating with a criminal organization. Similarly, my colleague
Justice Gagné in Nagy v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 137 [Nagy]
also applied the reasonableness standard on an application for judicial review questioning
the soundness of a decision by the CSC following an offender’s grievance that
challenged the assignment of his security classification. In that case, as in
this one, the applicant argued that the CSC’s decision was based on erroneous
information.
[16]
A court called upon to apply the reasonableness
standard must show deference and be concerned mostly with the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision‑making
process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law (on this point, see Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC
9 at paragraph 47; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC
12; and Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’
Association, 2011 SCC 61).
Positions of the parties
[17]
The applicant argues that the Deputy
Commissioner’s decision is unreasonable because the CSC could not have concluded
that the applicant was affiliated with the Hell’s Angels if it had not received
a report from the SQ in this regard that set out various information that the
CSC summarized in certain documents in his prison record including the Referral
Sheet—Identification of Membership or Association with a Criminal Organization,
which was completed immediately after he was incarcerated. On this point, the
applicant relies on sections 23 and 27 of the Act, which require
the CSC to obtain reliable information about inmates’ sentence or imprisonment
and disclose that information to them.
[18]
The relevant provisions of sections 23 and
27 of the Act read as follows:
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Information
Service to obtain certain information
about offender
23. (1) When a person is sentenced, committed or
transferred to penitentiary, the Service shall take all reasonable steps to
obtain, as soon as is practicable,
(a) relevant information about the offence;
(b) relevant information about the person’s personal
history, including the person’s social, economic, criminal and young-offender
history;
(c) any reasons and recommendations relating to the
sentencing or committal that are given or made by
(i) the court that convicts, sentences or commits the person,
and
(ii) any court that hears an appeal from the conviction, sentence
or committal;
(d) any reports relevant to the conviction, sentence
or committal that are submitted to a court mentioned in subparagraph (c)(i)
or (ii); and
(e) any other information relevant to administering
the sentence or committal, including existing information from the victim,
the victim impact statement and the transcript of any comments made by the
sentencing judge regarding parole eligibility.
Access by offender
(2) Where access to the information obtained by the Service
pursuant to subsection (1) is requested by the offender in writing, the
offender shall be provided with access in the prescribed manner to such
information as would be disclosed under the Privacy Act and
the Access to Information Act.
Information to be given to offenders
27. (1) Where an offender is entitled by this Part or
the regulations to make representations in relation to a decision to be taken
by the Service about the offender, the person or body that is to take the
decision shall, subject to subsection (3), give the offender, a reasonable
period before the decision is to be taken, all the information to be
considered in the taking of the decision or a summary of that information.
Idem
(2) Where an offender is entitled by this Part or the
regulations to be given reasons for a decision taken by the Service about the
offender, the person or body that takes the decision shall, subject to
subsection (3), give the offender, forthwith after the decision is taken, all
the information that was considered in the taking of the decision or a
summary of that information.
Exceptions
(3) Except in relation to decisions on disciplinary offences,
where the Commissioner has reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure of
information under subsection (1) or (2) would jeopardize
(a) the safety of any person,
(b) the security of a penitentiary, or
(c) the conduct of any lawful investigation, the
Commissioner may authorize the withholding from the offender of as much
information as is strictly necessary in order to protect the interest
identified in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
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Renseignements
Obtention de renseignements
23. (1) Le Service doit, dans les meilleurs délais après la
condamnation ou le transfèrement d’une personne au pénitencier, prendre
toutes mesures possibles pour obtenir:
a) les renseignements pertinents concernant l’infraction en
cause;
b) les renseignements personnels pertinents, notamment les
antécédents sociaux, économiques et criminels, y compris comme jeune
contrevenant;
c) les motifs donnés par le tribunal ayant prononcé la
condamnation, infligé la peine ou ordonné la détention — ou par le tribunal
d’appel — en ce qui touche la peine ou la détention, ainsi que les
recommandations afférentes en l’espèce;
d) les rapports remis au tribunal concernant la condamnation,
la peine ou l’incarcération;
e) tous autres renseignements concernant l’exécution de la
peine ou de la détention, notamment les renseignements obtenus de la victime,
la déclaration de la victime quant aux conséquences de l’infraction et la
transcription des observations du juge qui a prononcé la peine relativement à
l’admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle.
Accès du délinquant aux renseignements
(2) Le
délinquant qui demande par écrit que les renseignements visés au paragraphe
(1) lui soient communiqués a accès, conformément au règlement, aux
renseignements qui, en vertu de la Loi sur la protection des
renseignements personnels et de la Loi sur l’accès à
l’information, lui seraient communiqués.
Communication
de renseignements au délinquant
27. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3), la personne ou
l’organisme chargé de rendre, au nom du Service, une decisionau sujet d’un
délinquant doit, lorsque celui-ci a le droit en vertu de la présente partie
ou des règlements de présenter des observations, lui communiquer, dans un
délai raisonnable avant la prise de décision, tous les renseignements entrant
en ligne de compte dans celle-ci, ou un sommaire de ceux-ci.
Idem
(2) Sous
réserve du paragraphe (3), cette personne ou cet organisme doit, dès que sa decisionest
rendue, faire connaître au délinquant qui y a droit au titre de la présente
partie ou des règlements les renseignements pris en compte dans la décision,
ou un sommaire de ceux-ci.
Exception
(3) Sauf
dans le cas des infractions disciplinaires, le commissaire peut autoriser,
dans la mesure jugée strictement nécessaire toutefois, le refus de
communiquer des renseignements au délinquant s’il a des motifs raisonnables
de croire que cette communication mettrait en danger la sécurité d’une
personne ou du pénitencier ou compromettrait la tenue d’une enquête licite.
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s
[19]
The applicant argues that if the CSC was unable
to obtain or keep the SQ’s report on his alleged criminal history, the Court
should order it to obtain this relevant information from the SQ under
subsection 23(1) of the Act and to disclose it to him under
subsections 23(2) or 27(1) and (2) of the Act.
[20]
Conversely, if the CSC does not obtain this
information, the applicant contends that all references to his alleged
affiliation with the Hell’s Angels should be removed from his prison record
because there is no factual basis to support them. He adds that the Deputy
Commissioner’s refusal to do so is unreasonable.
[21]
The applicant relies on the decisions in May v
Ferndale Institution, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809 and Demaria v Regional
Classification Board, [1986] FCJ No 493 A-185-86 to justify his right to
this information. In those decisions, the CSC was ordered to disclose the
information it had consulted in the decision‑making process regarding the
security classification of inmates.
[22]
For his part, the respondent submits that the
application should be dismissed because there is no obligation on the CSC to obtain
information to support references in prison records. In this regard, the
respondent relies on the Tehrankari decision, above, in which
Justice Mosley found that there was no such obligation on the CSC. In
addition, the respondent argues that the mere fact that the CSC referral sheets
do not contain a detailed report from the SQ does not mean that the findings
with respect to the applicant’s past affiliation should be removed from his
record. On this point, he relies on Tehrankari and Scarcella, in
which it was decided that findings that rely on information obtained from bodies
responsible for applying the Act are a sufficient basis for
institutional decisions by the CSC.
Analysis
[23]
First, with respect to the applicant’s
submission that the CSC is required to obtain a report from the SQ concerning
his past affiliation with the Hell’s Angels, I share the respondent’s view: as
the Tehrankari decision confirmed, such a requirement does not exist. In
that case, Mr. Tehrankari’s prison record, maintained by the CSC,
contained a summary of 76 incidents of institutional misconduct that he was
accused of during his detention at the Ottawa‑Carleton Detention Centre. Mr. Tehrankari
argued that the CSC was required to obtain this information from the Ottawa
police and the Ottawa‑Carleton Detention Centre so that he could dispute
the allegations of misconduct, which he considered erroneous.
Justice Mosley came to a different conclusion, stating the following at para
35:
Mr. Tehrankari is
correct that s.24(1) of [the Act] does oblige CSC to “take all
reasonable steps to ensure that any information about an offender that it uses
is as accurate, up to date and complete as possible.” However, that does not
mean that CSC must reinvestigate information obtained from reliable sources
such as provincial ministries, police forces and the courts. The Offender
Complaint and Grievance Procedures Manual indicates that matters under
provincial jurisdiction, matters relating to convictions and sentencing by
courts, matters relating to the administration of justice including courts and
police forces, and matters relating to treatment by non CSC agencies are
non-grievable within the institutional grievance process.
[24]
Justice Mosley’s conclusion applies in this
case. The CSC is not required to obtain information from the SQ to support the
references it made in his referral sheets to the information from the SQ
dealing with the applicant’s affiliation with the Hell’s Angels. Furthermore,
considering that the CSC has already provided the applicant with all the
information it has, as Mr. Mélançon’s letter indicates, there is no reason
for the Court to order the CSC to provide more.
[25]
With respect to his second submission, that the
Deputy Commissioner’s refusal to remove the information from his prison record
was unreasonable, the applicant did not provide any evidence beyond a systematic
denial of his affiliation with the Hell’s Angels. Moreover, he admitted having
treated a number of Hell’s Angels’ members over the course of his career as a doctor.
Consequently, the Deputy Commissioner’s decision to deny his grievance was not
unreasonable because the applicant did not submit any evidence questioning the
truth of the information received from the SQ, which was, in fact, confirmed by
some of the evidence adduced at his trial and which was summarized in some of
the CSC reports that the applicant filed as exhibits to his affidavit. Given
the lack of evidence provided by the applicant and his admission that he had
been the treating physician of a number of Hell’s Angels’ members, it was not
unreasonable to find, as the Deputy Commissioner did, that the reference to the
applicant’s prior association with the Hell’s Angels should not be removed from
his prison record. In summary, this conclusion falls within a range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and
law.
[26]
In this regard, the situation is similar to the Scarcella
case where Justice Snider noted the following at paragraph 23:
The problem with Mr.
Scarcella’s position is that there is no evidence that any further information
was available or that the information considered was somehow erroneous. Mr.
Scarcella could have adduced further evidence to show that, while he may have
been associated or involved with a criminal organization, that was no longer
the case. He did not do so. Given the nature of the information and the fact
that nothing new was brought forward by Mr. Scarcella, I am satisfied that the
SDC was entitled to rely on information before it as “accurate, up to date and
complete”. There was, on these facts, no obligation on the Service to go so far
as to ask the police to re-investigate its initial opinions, or to conduct
investigations on its own.
[27]
Accordingly, this application for judicial
review will be dismissed because the CSC is not required to seek additional
information or documents from the SQ and the decision that there are no
reasonable grounds to believe that the validity and reliability of the
information from the SQ was questionable, is reasonable.
[28]
However, I note, as counsel for the respondent acknowledged,
that it remains open to the applicant to argue, considering the lack of
supporting evidence, that no probative value should be assigned to the finding
that he was at one time affiliated with the Hell’s Angels if the CSC or any
other organization attempts to rely on his prison record to establish that
fact. Indeed, a decision on the part of the CSC or other organizations that
relies solely on the information in the applicant’s prison record to establish
this prior association could well be unreasonable, as my colleague Justice Gagné
found in circumstances that were, on balance, similar in the Nagy case.
[29]
Exercising
the discretion conferred on me, I make no order as to costs because this
application seems to be, in part, the result of the CSC’s ambiguous responses
at the various levels of the grievance procedure. Indeed, this ambiguity forced
counsel for the respondent to seek out and file the letter from Mr. Mélançon to confirm what information from the SQ the
CSC actually had in its possession about the applicant’s alleged past
affiliation with the Hell’s Angels.