Docket:
T-1428-12
Citation: 2014 FC 88
Ottawa, Ontario, January 27, 2014
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Reilly
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BETWEEN:
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MICHAL HALLEN
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1]
After a long career in the federal public
service, Mr Michal Hallen moved to the private sector in 2000, taking a
position with Loba Limited. He directed that his public service pension
benefits be transferred to the Loba pension plan under a Reciprocal Transfer
Agreement (RTA).
[2]
In 2003, the Canada Revenue Agency revoked the
Loba pension plan retroactively to April 2000. That decision was upheld by the
Federal Court of Appeal, 2004 FCA 342.
[3]
The Treasury Board advised Mr Hallen in July 2005
that, in the circumstances, he could either accept a reduced annual allowance
or receive a deferred annuity when he turned 60. If he did not reply, he would
be presumed to have elected the latter option. Mr Hallen did not reply.
[4]
In due course, Mr Hallen learned that his
deferred annuity would become payable on April 21, 2007, his 60th birthday. He
was asked to confirm his address and SIN number. Again, he did not reply.
[5]
In 2010, the administrator of the Loba plan
contacted the Treasury Board to inquire about Mr Hallen’s transfer request.
Treasury Board wrote to Mr Hallen and confirmed the options that had been
described in its 2005 letter to him.
[6]
Mr Hallen began receiving pension cheques in
2011, but has not cashed any. In 2012, his lawyer asked Treasury Board to
review Mr Hallen’s situation. In response, a Treasury Board representative sent
a letter dated June 26, 2012, simply confirming the information that had been
provided to Mr Hallen in 2005.
[7]
Mr Hallen argues that the refusal to transfer
his pension benefits was unreasonable and asks me to declare his entitlement to
a transfer. The respondent submits that Mr Hallen’s application for judicial
review is out of time, the refusal was not unreasonable, and Mr Hallen is not
entitled to a declaration given his delay in seeking redress in this Court.
[8]
I agree that Mr Hallen’s application is out of
time. Therefore, I need not deal with the other issues.
II. Can Mr Hallen bring an application for judicial review of the
transfer refusal?
[9]
Mr Hallen argues that the letter he received in
2005 did not set out a “decision”. Rather, it set out Treasury Board’s ongoing
overall policy with respect to transfers under RTAs. While a “decision” is
subject to a 30-day limitation period for applications for judicial review
under s 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, other
matters, including ongoing policy decisions, can be challenged at any time.
[10]
In my view, Mr Hallen is challenging a decision
of Treasury Board and is bound by the 30-day time limit for launching an
application for judicial review.
[11]
Mr Hallen relies on a number of cases in which
conduct by the respondent was characterized as a “matter” or policy or course
of conduct, rather than a “decision”. He cites Krause v Canada, [1999] 2 FC 476 at para 24; Airth v Minister of National Revenue, 2006 FC 1442 at
para 10; Apotex Inc v Canada (Minister of Health), 2010 FC 1310; May
v CBC/Radio Canada, 2011 FCA 130 at para 11.
[12]
In my view, these cases are distinguishable.
[13]
Krause dealt with
a challenge brought in 1997 by a group of contributors to and beneficiaries of
a government pension plan. They disputed a general policy decision taken by the
Government of Canada in 1989-90. That decision was implemented by way of
actions taken each fiscal year beginning in 1993-94. The Federal Court of
Appeal found that the applicants were not contesting the original policy
decision; rather, they were challenging the actions taken each year to
implement that policy. Accordingly, the application for judicial review was
directed at those acts, not a particular decision or order, and the 30-day time
limitation did not apply.
[14]
In Airth, on a motion to strike, Justice
Michael Phelan concluded that the applicants were challenging an entire course
of conduct carried out by a range of persons and entities, not just the
particular requests for information with which they had been served. Therefore,
the application for judicial review did not relate to a singular decision or
order; rather, it was directed at a broader “matter”, and the 30-day time
limitation, therefore, did not apply (at para 5). (Justice Phelan noted that it
was open to the judge hearing the merits to conclude otherwise, at para 13).
[15]
Similarly, in Apotex, on a motion to
strike, Justice Yvon Pinard found that the applicants appeared to be
challenging a series of decisions and actions taken by the Minister of Health,
allegedly motivated by bias, rather than a single decision. Therefore, the
30-day time limitation did not apply. However, he, too, left the issue to be
decided definitively by the judge hearing the merits at para 14). Justice
Robert Barnes ultimately concluded that the applicant was actually challenging
“three discrete administrative decisions” and was bound by the 30-day time
limitation (2011 FC 1308, at para 18).
[16]
Finally, May involved a 2011 challenge to
an ongoing policy of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission (CRTC) relating to election broadcasts. The CRTC had been applying
the policy since 1995, and had published it in Guidelines that same year.
Justice Marc Nadon, writing for the Court, found that the applicant could have
challenged that “matter” at any time and did not have to wait until the CRTC
issued a bulletin relating specifically to the 2011 election (at para 11).
Accordingly, he concluded that the issue was not “really urgent” and denied the
applicant’s request for an expedited hearing in advance of that election.
[17]
In Mr Hallen’s case, it is clear to me that he
is challenging a singular decision – the CRA’s revocation of the Loba pension
plan. The consequences of that decision in respect of Mr Hallen’s pension – the
refusal to transfer his pension benefits – was communicated to him by way of
the July 2005 letter. He is not challenging a general policy position, a course
of conduct, or a series of decisions and acts.
[18]
Regarding the letter sent by Treasury Board in
June 2012, this did not set out a decision and, therefore, does not provide a
basis for judicial review. It was merely a courtesy letter (as in Batkai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 514 at para 13; Hughes v Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2004 FC 1055 at para 6; and Phillips v Canada (Librarian and Archivist), 2006 FC 1378 at para 2).
[19]
In my view, Mr Hallen could have launched his
application for judicial review in 2005 when Treasury Board informed him of the
consequences of the de-registration of the Loba pension plan. Alternatively,
when those consequences materialized in the form of his receipt of pension
cheques in 2011, he could have commenced an application for judicial review at
that point. In either case, his application for judicial review is now clearly
out of time.
IV. Conclusion
and Disposition
[20]
I must dismiss this application for judicial
review with costs, because it was brought out of time.
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