Docket: IMM-1035-14
Citation:
2014 FC 984
Ottawa, Ontario, October 16, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Martineau
BETWEEN:
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MARIAN CONKA, TATIANA CONKOVA, ROZALIA CONKOVA, MATUS CONKA, ZUZANA
CONKOVA, BRANISLAV CONKA
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
The applicants are challenging the legality of a
decision, dated January 6, 2014, by which a senior immigration officer
[Officer] rejected their application for a pre-removal risk assessment [PRRA]
under section 112 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC
2001, c 27 [Act]. This application is being heard in concert with file
IMM-3593-13, an application for judicial review of the decision on humanitarian
and compassionate [H&C] grounds made with regards to the same applicants
(2014 FC 985).
[2]
The applicants are all citizens of Slovakia of
Roma ethnicity. Marian Conka and Tatiana Conkova are the parents of Rozalia,
Matus, Zuzana and Branislav. They entered Canada on November 16, 3009 and filed
a refugee claim upon arrival. The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] rejected
the refugee claim on March 23, 2012 based on the availability of state
protection and the application for leave of that decision was dismissed on May
30, 2012. Afterwards, the applicants applied for H&C on May 11, 2012. The
application for H&C was refused on February 28, 2013 and the applicant
subsequently filed an application for leave and judicial review of the H&C
decision. The applicants also applied for a PRRA on April 6, 2013. A negative
PRRA decision was made on January 6, 2014 and the applicants applied for leave
and judicial review of the PRRA decision. The applicants were the subject of a
removal order to be executed on March 17 and March 19, 2014, but they made
a motion for an order to stay the execution of the removal order. While the
motion pertaining to the H&C decision was denied, the motion for a stay
pertaining to the PRRA decision was granted on March 13, 2014.
[3]
With regards to the PRRA application, the
Officer in this case found that the applicants had essentially reiterated the
same material facts that were expressed before the RPD and had not rebutted any
of its findings, including those on state protection. In addition, the Officer
found that the documentary evidence submitted by the applicants was general in
nature and did not establish a linkage directly to the applicants’ personal
circumstances and that in any case, the evidence did not show that new risk
developments in country conditions or personal circumstances had arisen since
the decision by the RPD. The Officer did recognize that the Roma population in
Slovakia faces discrimination but found that the government had put in place various
measures to remedy that discrimination and that the state had the necessary
institutions to adequately protect its citizens.
[4]
In a nutshell, the applicants submit two grounds
of review. First, the Officer ignored relevant evidence of a material change of
facts in the country conditions since the RPD decision. Second, the Officer
applied the wrong legal test for assessing the availability of state
protection. The first point in issue raises questions of fact and mixed
questions of fact and law, and the applicable standard of review is therefore
that of reasonableness, while the second point in issue raises a question of
law reviewable on the correctness standard (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9).
[5]
Paragraph 113(a) of the Act is relevant with
regards to the first point in issue:
113. Consideration of an application for protection shall be as
follows:
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113. Il est disposé de la demande comme il suit
:
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(a) an applicant
whose claim to refugee protection has been rejected may present only new
evidence that arose after the rejection or was not reasonably available, or
that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the
circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection
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a) le demandeur
d’asile débouté ne peut présenter que des éléments de preuve survenus depuis
le rejet ou qui n’étaient alors pas normalement accessibles ou, s’ils
l’étaient, qu’il n’était pas raisonnable, dans les circonstances, de
s’attendre à ce qu’il les ait présentés au moment du rejet
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[6]
As established by the Federal Court of Appeal in
Raza v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 [Raza],
a PRRA officer must respect a negative refugee determination by the RPD unless
there is new evidence under subsection 113(a) of the Act of facts that could
have altered the RPD’s conclusions if that evidence had been presented to the
RPD (at para 13). The Court of Appeal goes on to explain what constitutes “new
evidence” for the purpose of paragraph 113(a) of the Act:
Is the evidence new in the sense that it is
capable of:
(a) proving the current state of affairs in the
country of removal or an event that occurred or a circumstance that arose after
the hearing in the RPD, or
(b) proving a fact that was unknown to the
refugee claimant at the time of the RPD hearing, or
(c) contradicting a finding of fact by the RPD
(including a credibility finding)?
If not, the evidence need not be considered. (Raza, above at
para 13).
The Court adds
that to be considered, the evidence also has to be “material”, in the sense
that had it been made available to the RPD, the refugee claim would probably
have succeeded (Raza, above at para 13).
[7]
In this case, the applicants take issue with the
Officer’s treatment of what they submit is new evidence for the purposes of
paragraph 113(a) as it contradicts the findings of the RPD on state protection
and shows that since the RPD hearing, the situation for Roma in Slovakia has worsened. The applicants refer specifically to a January 2013 report by the
Center for Civil and Human Rights and People In Need Slovak Republic that refutes
the RPD’s findings that there are remedies against police violence and that the
anti-discrimination legislation is effective. This report was not mentioned by
the Officer. The applicants also refer to various responses of July 2012 to
information requests on Slovakia from the RPD, as well as to the US DOS report
of May 2012, which speaks to pervasive discrimination against Roma in Slovakia. The applicants’ submits that this new evidence would have allowed the PRRA
Officer to conclude that the serious violations of human rights and the
cumulative effect of the discriminatory measures affecting the Roma amounted to
persecution and the applicants had rebutted the presumption of state protection.
[8]
The respondent replies that there was already extensive
documentary evidence of general country conditions in Slovakia speaking to the
same issues of fact in front of the RPD and that facts contained in the new evidence
submitted by the applicants were not substantially different from the facts
that had already been considered by the RPD, including evidence of police
brutality, societal discrimination against Roma and racist climate, lack of
effectiveness of anti-discrimination legislation, forced sterilization, and
shortcomings in the government’s measures. The respondent submits that there
has been no finding of persecution by the RPD who nevertheless found that the
state protection would be available. The respondent adds that the documentary
evidence actually shows some improvements in the situation of Roma and that it
is not the role of the Court in judicial review to re-evaluate the evidence,
nor to review in a PRRA context the decision rendered by the RPD with respect
to persecution and state protection.
[9]
I must agree with the respondent that this Court
cannot reweigh the documentary evidence and does not need to redefine the
applicable legal tests with respect to persecution and state protection, at
least in this case which turns on the interpretation of the evidence related to
country conditions. The applicants did not raise any new material fact related
to their personal situation or individualized risk of return. The applicants
have not demonstrated that the new evidence contradicts the findings of fact of
the RPD, who concluded that there was discrimination against Roma but state
protection existed, although it was not perfect. The new evidence simply adds
to the evidence of discrimination that was already in front of the RPD, and it
is debatable whether the situation of Roma in Slovakia has worsened to the
point that it now amounts to persecution. I must assume that the Officer
considered the totality of the evidence, and further, I am not satisfied that,
in this case, the Officer’s findings are based on a selective reading the
evidence. Similar documentary evidence on the issues raised by the applicant,
including evidence with regards to police violence, and remedies against police
violence as well as criticism of the effectiveness of the anti-discrimination
legislation, were already considered at length by the RPD. Although a different
conclusion of fact was perhaps opened, it was not unreasonable for the Officer
to find in this case that the new evidence of country conditions was not
sufficient by itself to contradict the RPD’s findings of state protection.
[10]
As a subsidiary argument, the applicants also
argue that the Officer applied the wrong test to the evaluation of state
protection where he stated: “Consequently, I find the
Slovakian government does not subject its citizens to a sustained and systemic
denial of their core human rights.” The reasons of the Officer must be
read in their entirety. The Officer refers elsewhere to the measures put in
place by the government to remedy the discrimination faced by the Roma. The
Officer goes on to say that the government has effective control over the
state’s territory and the necessary institutions to adequately protect its
citizens, and finally, concludes that the applicants would not face more than a
mere possibility of persecution and that the applicants are not more likely
than not to face a danger of torture, a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Officer knew and
applied the correct test and that the statement on the lack of sustained and
systemic denial of the core human rights was not a determinative in the
disposal of the PRRA application.
[11]
For these reasons, the application must fail.
Counsel did not raise a question of general importance.