Date: 20130822
Docket: T-13-12
Citation: 2013 FC 895
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, August 22, 2013
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Roy
BETWEEN:
|
|
MARTIN
LAPOSTOLLE
|
|
|
|
Applicant
|
|
and
|
|
|
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
|
|
|
|
Respondent
|
|
|
|
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an application for judicial review, pursuant to
section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, of a decision
of a Public Service Labour Relations Board adjudicator (the adjudicator) dated
December 5, 2011, 2011 PSLRB 138, in which the adjudicator dismissed the
grievance of Martin Lapostolle (the applicant) and upheld his termination.
[2]
The applicant, Martin Lapostolle, was terminated by his
employer. The Treasury Board is the employer under the Financial
Administration Act, RSC, 1985, c F-11; Martin Lapostolle worked for the
Correctional Service of Canada. He filed a grievance over his termination; the
grievance was dismissed by the Public Service Labour Relations Board, in a
decision dated December 5, 2011. It is this decision for which a
judicial review is being sought.
[3]
At the time of his termination, the applicant was a
correctional officer at the CX-02 level at the Regional Reception Centre in
Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines, Quebec.
[4]
The termination was ordered as a result of the individuals
the applicant associated with, including a sponsorship he failed to declare to
the employer, in spite of warnings that had led to another disciplinary measure.
[5]
As for the applicant, he adopted a “musket” approach before
this Court: scattering buckshot in all directions. He tried to minimize the seriousness
of the facts, alleged he had not received sufficient warning and claimed
numerous errors and omissions on the adjudicator’s part, in addition to
claiming that his privacy rights had been breached.
[6]
Furthermore, there are no indications that would point to a
standard of review. Without saying so, the applicant argued as if the
applicable standard was correctness, or, when he acknowledged that the
appropriate standard was reasonableness, he was content to note alleged errors
or omissions, no matter how minimal. By piling on alleged errors and omissions,
he was probably trying to achieve some sort of critical mass that would show
the decision to have been unreasonable.
[7]
The respondent argues that the appropriate standard of
review is reasonableness, which commands deference from a reviewing court. What
the applicant is complaining of, submits the respondent, is the adjudicator’s
assessment of the evidence. Mere disagreement with that assessment is not
sufficient.
Standard of Review
[8]
There is no doubt in my mind that matters of termination
are reviewable on a reasonableness standard. In Payne v Bank of Montreal,
2013 FCA 33, [2013] FCJ No 123 (QL), it was determined that issues of whether a
dismissal was unjust are reviewable on a standard of reasonableness (see also King
v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FCA 131, [2013] FCJ No 551 (QL)).
[9]
It follows that a Court conducting a judicial review must
show deference toward the adjudicator’s decision. As a result, there may be
more than one possible solution and the Court is not permitted to choose the
one that it prefers. In Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1
SCR 190, the Court described the parameters of reasonableness. Paragraph 47
reads as follows:
[47] Reasonableness is a
deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development
of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come
before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific,
particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible,
reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the
range of acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for
reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable,
referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In
judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is
also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.
[10]
The applicant must therefore show, on a balance of
probabilities, that the adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable, having regard
to the facts and law. It is not enough to argue that there is another possible
solution or interpretation that should be favoured. If the impugned decision
falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes, after having been
reviewed for justification in a transparent and intelligible decision-making
process, it shall not be overturned. As the Court noted in Dunsmuir,
above, at paragraph 48, courts of law “(cannot) be content to pay lip service
to the concept of reasonableness…while in fact imposing their own view”.
Decision
[11]
After reviewing the record, I have found that the applicant
has not discharged his burden of showing that the adjudicator’s decision was
unreasonable. This application for judicial review must therefore fail.
[12]
This matter was argued throughout an entire day, during
which the applicant chose to impugn the decision under judicial review by
claiming that the adjudicator had made no less than 64 errors or omissions with
respect to the evidence. The respondent replied by arguing that the applicant
was submitting new and untested evidence, by means of a 445-paragraph affidavit
personally submitted by the applicant. This claim by the respondent was itself
supported by a long affidavit of an employee of the Correctional Service of
Canada who had attended hearings held by the adjudicator between August 29 and
September 1, 2011.
[13]
The Court’s task was made particularly difficult by the
fact that the allegations from both parties could not be examined in light of
the evidence. In fact, the record does not contain the transcripts from those
hearings. Counsel for the parties confirmed this and did not offer copies of
them. The docket, as filed, is limited to that which is before the Court.
[14]
As such, the allegations regarding the adjudicator’s
assessment of the evidence, which was erroneous according to the applicant,
cannot be examined with any thoroughness because the evidence adduced before
the adjudicator in not available. Similarly, the respondent’s allegations to
the effect that the applicant attempted to introduce new evidence also cannot
be examined in detail due to the same problem.
[15]
The applicant’s memorandum of fact and law alone was 47
pages in length, or 50% more than what the Rules of our Court allow. After
hearing the parties, the respective theories of the case, given the dispersed
arguments, remained somewhat uncertain. Ultimately, the applicant tried to find
holes and to create breaches in the adjudicator’s decision. The respondent
challenged these attempts at creating breaches and argued that the decision was
reasonable within the meaning of the Act. I examined the applicant’s
allegations as thoroughly as I could, in order to determine whether, light of
the adjudicator’s decision and having regard to the available evidence, the
decision was reasonable.
Facts
[16]
Martin Lapostolle was employed at the Correctional Service of
Canada until January 19, 2010. He was terminated on that date,
following a decision made in that regard on January 18, 2010.
[17]
The factual backdrop can be summarized as follows. The
applicant was subject to disciplinary action on February 28, 2008. The
applicant and respondent do not agree on the scope of this measure. The
respondent contends that the suspension was imposed as a result of the
applicant’s acquaintances. This factor also, to a large degree, led to his
termination.
[18]
For the applicant’s part, he maintains that he was
suspended without pay for one day for having gained unauthorized access to privileged
information. By privileged information, I mean information that is protected by
the employer and to which access is limited.
[19]
The applicant’s position does not correspond to the wording
of the disciplinary action report. On its face, the disciplinary action report deals
with two different subjects. The second subject, which the applicant claims was
what the disciplinary action was based on, was apparently the access to privileged
information. Yet this incident is presented in the report as being secondary. It
reads as follows:
[translation]
2. The report also
establishes that in the six months prior to the investigation, you looked at a
number of inmates’ files that, by all appearances, were not under your
responsibility or whose consultation was not directly related to your specific
functions as an AC-II
The section of
the report in which the employee’s version appears shows that the applicant
checked inmates’ files for his own personal reasons on at least three occasions.
[20]
The report also contains a much lengthier description of
the first incident that led to a disciplinary action. This incident occurred on
November 3, 2007. I feel it is important to reproduce the excerpt describing
the facts:
[translation]
1. On November 3, 2007, you
were seen in public in the company of the owners of the Le Garage strip
club and getting into a limousine with the logo of the Le Garage bar and
subsequently going to eat at a restaurant with them. This incident was brought
to our attention during a briefing meeting of various police corps’ and
attended by the CSC. During that outing, an intervention by the police was
necessary and you were found to be linked to an incident that required a police
report to be filled out due to the conduct of certain individuals in the group.
By publicly associating with persons who could be involved with criminal
elements, you place yourself in a vulnerable position, exposing yourself to
risks such as blackmail and corruption (influence peddling, extortion, loan
sharking, etc.). The investigation report also reveals that you sought funding
for ball hockey league jerseys from the owner of the same bar, reinforcing the
dangers of extortion and corrupt dealings. By associating with individuals
known to police and identified as being persons of interest, you were likely to
tarnish the image of the Correctional Service. ...
In the part
reserved for the employee’s comments, it states that the other passengers in
the limousine were the manager and the owner of the said bar, a third person
who would later be involved in an incident that would result in the applicant’s
termination, and other persons unknown. In the report the applicant indicates
that he has changed his behaviour and avoids [translation]
“going to the Le Garage bar and refusing offers to go out ‘with the
manager of the establishment’ because you could not predict whom he might be
with.”
[21]
In the part of the report describing the disciplinary
action taken, namely, the one-day suspension without pay, there are two
elements that stand out:
[translation]
- Considering that you
acknowledged that your conduct was likely to tarnish the service’s image du
service and that you stated that you had changed your behaviour since then;
- Considering that you continue
to defend having looked at offenders’ files for personal purposes, and refuse
to acknowledge the seriousness of your actions in this regard.
[22]
In my opinion, there is no doubt that the disciplinary
measure covered the applicant’s associations. And there was also no doubt about
the warning issued to him. The report states: [translation]
“any recidivism on your part could result in more severe disciplinary
action, including termination of employment”.
[23]
Moreover, the applicant’s subsequent conduct confirms that
the measure included acquaintances. In fact, it is not disputed that the
applicant sought to clarify which persons were to be excluded. The testimony of
the Associate Warden of the Regional Reception Centre and the president of the
union local confirm this. What remains less clear is the subject matter of the
conversation.
[24]
The Court does not have access to the testimony that was
given. We have only the adjudicator’s brief summary. In addition, the
respondent submitted an affidavit of an employee who attended the hearings
before the adjudicator. In it, she states that at the hearing, the Assistant
Warden [translation] “testified
that he had warned the applicant not to associate with individuals who were
known to police or go to places that were known to police”. The testimony of
the president of the union local, as reported by the adjudicator, confirms that
clarifications were sought as to whom the applicant could associate with outside
of working hours. I will cite a few paragraphs 26 of the decision under review:
... One person in the St-Janvier
bar limousine was a long-time friend. The grievor wanted to know if he could go
out for lunch with him and continue to see him. [The witness] and the grievor
met with [the Assistant Warden] for about a half-hour to discuss the matter. [The
Assistant Warden] would not clarify the conditions for the grievor’s
association with friends but did state that it would not be wise to associate
with them in a public place. No mention was made of excluding anyone else from
the grievor’s associations. ...
[25]
The summaries of the testimony of the Assistant Warden and
the applicant in this regard, as presented by the adjudicator, do not strike me
as diverging from the adjudicator’s later finding. In fact, the applicant
apparently characterized the Assistant Warden’s answer as being vague. One can
understand why. The disciplinary measure speaks for itself and it was not up to
the Assistant Warden to change its scope. In fact, the Assistant Warden’s
testimony is presented as specifically warning the applicant about “mixing with
people associated with organized crime”: that it would harm the Correctional
Service of Canada’s image and would also put him at risk of threats and
blackmail.
[26]
The applicant’s position is that he was not warned to avoid
the individuals who are named and who were in the limousine on November 3,
2007. With respect, upon reviewing the testimony before the adjudicator as
thoroughly as I could, the only logical inference I could make was that it was
not unreasonable to conclude that the applicant had been forewarned about the
occupants of the said limousine. That he tried to limit the number of people he
was supposed to avoid seems entirely plausible to me. That he was given this
kind of assurance seems much less plausible. Indeed, the summary of the
testimony of the three individuals present and that of another person who
attended the hearings lead to the same conclusion. The report detailing the
disciplinary measure on February 28, 2008 clearly refers to the operators of
the establishment. It is difficult to imagine that this would not include the
owner of the establishment.
[27]
Therefore, the applicant knew he was supposed to refrain
from associating with certain individuals. At least that is the conclusion that
should be made based on the balance of the evidence. This leads to an
examination of the evidence with regard to the incidents leading up to the
termination of employment in January 2010.
[28]
Having already been sanctioned, the applicant was criticized
by his employer for two incidents in 2009 in which he was involved. First, the
applicant was stopped by police on two occasions, June 11 and 17, 2009, in the
company of a passenger in the limousine who also happened to be the bar owner.
Later, the applicant was sponsored by another passenger in the said limousine
to enable him to participate in a poker tournament for which the entry fee was
$10,000. The applicant was to collect 40% of the winnings, to reflect his
financial contribution, while his partner’s share was 60%.
[29]
The applicant was suspended without pay on November 5,
2009, while the allegations in relation to the incidents of June 11 and 17,
2009, were subject to an internal disciplinary investigation. Reference was
made the damaging effect on the reputation of the Correctional Service of
Canada.
[30]
The investigation concluded with a report on December 7,
2009. The report found that the applicant was in the company of a specifically
named person he was not to associate with. In response to this, the applicant
sought to minimize the seriousness of the matter by pleading ignorance about
the consequences and the coincidental nature of the June 2009 encounters.
[31]
The same investigation also dealt with the sponsorship. Two
issues emerged from this. First, the report criticizes the applicant for having
missed work, without prior authorization, to attend the said poker tournament
in Las Vegas, between July 2 and 16, 2009. The report acknowledges a certain
amount of confusion about the applicant’s status for some of the days during
this period, but concludes that for a number of those days he had not received
prior authorization for leave, whether sick leave or annual leave, as was
required. Second, the applicant is criticized for his ties to the sponsor for
the poker tournament, as that person was one of the individuals identified in
the February 26, 2008, disciplinary measure. The report also notes that the
measure warned of the risk of termination of employment in the event of a
repeated incident. In addition to this, the inherent financial advantage gained
by the sponsorship, which ultimately resulted in winnings of $179,000, was
never disclosed to the employer.
[32]
It was on the basis of this report that the termination of
employment was ordered on January 18, 2010. The termination letter provides few
details: it lists his inappropriate associations on June 11 and 17, 2009. It
states that the image of the Correctional Service of Canada having been
tarnished, the relationship of trust with the employer was irreparably broken,
and that both the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector and the Corrections
Service of Canada’s Standards of Professional Conduct and Code of Discipline
had been breached. The letter also refers to the disciplinary record.
[33]
The report on disciplinary measures goes into rather more
explicit detail. The entire issue of the confusion surrounding leave resulted
in no disciplinary measures being applied. However, the report does note that
the applicant’s disciplinary record worsened in 2009 (attendance, abusive
language towards a Correctional manger, inappropriate and sexual remarks in the
workplace, playing card games with tokens in view of inmates). The incidents on
June 11 and 17, 2009, and [translation]
“your two-year contractual relationship,” referring to the sponsorship by one
of the individuals identified as being someone a correctional officer should
not have any connection with, were those which were used as a basis for
terminating the applicant’s employment.
The Adjudicator
[34]
In light of these entanglements, the adjudicator was to
conclude that the dismissal was justified.
[35]
After having gone over the evidence adduced, the
adjudicator determined that the incidents on June 11 and 17, 2009, and the
two-year sponsorship involving individuals the applicant was to avoid under the
February 26, 2008, disciplinary sanction were sufficient to warrant dismissal.
A correctional officer is a peace officer, and is therefore a public official, which
requires integrity and fairness. These are constraints that come with the job,
and they are necessary for maintaining the image of integrity of the
Correctional Service of Canada.
[36]
The adjudicator determined that the February 2008
disciplinary measure constituted a direct warning that went so far as to threaten
termination of employment. Furthermore, the adjudicator did not believe the
explanation that the June 2009 incidents involving the bar owner were
coincidences (paragraph 73 of the decision). She found that the applicant had
demonstrated wilful ignorance about the individual who sponsored him for the
poker tournament. With regard to the issue of whether leave had been authorized
to go to Las Vegas for the poker tournament, she ruled that this was irrelevant.
It was only the non-disclosed sponsorship that was sanctioned. The adjudicator
was clearly concerned about the applicant’s having placed himself in a position
of vulnerability and the fact that his behaviour tarnished the image of the
employer, whose integrity must remain beyond reproach. Paragraph 93 of the decision
reads as follows:
By associating publicly with
individuals involved in organized crime, the grievor tarnished the CSC’s image.
Given all the circumstances, the conduct of which the employer accused him
renders him unable to perform his duties with integrity. The evidence is
sufficient to convince me that the relationship of trust with the employer has
been irreparably broken end that, given the mandate of the Regional Reception
Centre, the grievor would pose a risk to its security were he reinstated.
The grievor’s years of service and rank do not mitigate my findings. [Emphasis
added.]
Analysis
[37]
The only issue before a reviewing judge in a case such as
this is whether the decision is reasonable, in other words, whether it is
justified, and whether the decision-making process was transparent and
intelligible. The burden on the applicant entails demonstrating that the
decision is unreasonable, on a balance of probabilities. While criminal law
requires the Crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in this case the
onus is on the applicant to prove that the decision was not reasonable.
[38]
The applicant has been busy in his search for often
insignificant or imaginary factual errors or omissions. To illustrate one such
example, the applicant describes, at great length, the adjudicator’s errors
regarding the July 2009 leave. As was previously noted, the adjudicator
dismissed this issue as being irrelevant (paragraph 75 of the decision). In a
similar vein, the applicant is adamant that the arrangement is not a
sponsorship but a partnership. What difference there exists between the two is
never explained, nor what the significance of any such distinction would be, in
the event that one could be made.
[39]
At other times, the errors or omissions conjured up by the
applicant are no more than disagreements over inferences drawn from the
evidence. Here again, to illustrate an example of this, the applicant places
much emphasis on alleged errors or omissions in the testimony of an
investigator from the Sûreté du Québec, whose credibility is called into
question because he provided hearsay evidence or because he was unable to
answer certain questions. Not only are these allegations impossible to confirm
by this Court, which has no access to the evidence submitted, they are
immaterial to the question before the adjudicator.
[40]
It is worth recalling the words of Justice Abella, writing
on behalf of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Newfoundland and Labrador
Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland-and-Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62,
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 708:
[14] Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir as standing for the
proposition that the “adequacy” of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing
a decision, or as advocating that a reviewing court undertake two discrete analyses
— one for the reasons and a separate one for the result (Donald J. M. Brown and
John M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (loose-leaf),
at §§12:5330 and 12:5510). It is a more organic exercise —
the reasons must be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of
showing whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes. This, it
seems to me, is what the Court was saying in Dunsmuir when it told reviewing
courts to look at “the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring
both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes” (para 47).
...
[16] Reasons may not include
all the arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the
reviewing judge would have preferred, but that does not impugn the validity of
either the reasons or the result under a reasonableness analysis. A
decision-maker is not required to make an explicit finding on each constituent
element, however subordinate, leading to its final conclusion (Service Employees'
International Union, Local No 333 v Nipawin District Staff Nurses Assn,
[1975] 1 S.C.R. 382, at p 391). In other words, if the reasons allow the reviewing
court to understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it to
determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes,
the Dunsmuir criteria are met.
...
[18] Evans J.A. in Canada
Post Corp. v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2010 FCA 56, [2011] 2
F.C.R. 221, explained in reasons upheld by this Court (2011 SCC 57) that
Dunsmuir seeks to “avoid an unduly formalistic approach to judicial review”
(para. 164). He notes that “perfection is not the standard” and suggests that
reviewing courts should ask whether “when read in light of the evidence before
it and the nature of its statutory task, the Tribunal’s reasons adequately
explain the bases of its decision” (para. 163). I found the description by the
Respondents in their Factum particularly helpful in explaining the nature of
the exercise:
When reviewing a decision of an
administrative body on the reasonableness standard, the guiding principle is
deference. Reasons are not to be reviewed in a vacuum – the result is to be
looked at in the context of the evidence, the parties’ submissions and the
process. Reasons do not have to be perfect. They do not have to be
comprehensive. [para. 44]
[41]
The kind of attack launched by the applicant can possibly succeed
in cases where one need only demonstrate reasonable doubt. However, in judicial
review, not only is the onus on the applicant, who does not benefit from any
presumption, but he or she must satisfy the Court on a balance of probabilities.
[42]
Upon reviewing the 64 errors and omissions alleged by the
applicant, it is of note that none attacks the heart of the decision. One would
have thought that this kind of challenge would require a direct reference to
the evidence before the adjudicator, evidence that was not available to the
Court. That in itself, in my opinion, would suffice to dismiss the application
for judicial review, given the applicant’s heavy burden of proof. But there is
more to it than that. The examination of the 64 errors or omissions convinces
me that, when considered individually, they lead nowhere when measured against
the reasonableness test. Their cumulative effect, in terms of the quality of
the allegations of errors or omissions (or lack thereof), is equally pointless.
[43]
The adjudicator’s decision, as far as the applicant’s
factual questions are concerned, cannot be successfully challenged on a
reasonableness standard, which dictates that a decision fall within “a range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and
law” (Dunsmuir, above at para 47). In my opinion, the applicant also
fails to propose any other possible outcome than the one arrived at by the
adjudicator. Perhaps it bears repeating: the 2008 disciplinary measure directly
warned the applicant that associating with certain individuals would not be
tolerated. The adjudicator reasonably concluded that, in spite of this, the
applicant chose to ignore the warning on June 11 and 17, 2009. The coincidences
claimed by the applicant are difficult to believe and it was reasonably open to
the adjudicator to make the determination she did. It was also open to the
adjudicator to infer that the applicant had demonstrated wilful ignorance about
his sponsor (or partner). The adjudicator clearly stated that this was the crux
of the matter (paragraph 67 of the decision). The errors or omissions, even if
they were to exist, would in no way undermine the decision as such. At best,
the allegations are tangential. The reasons given to justify the decision are
unassailable in terms of their reasonableness within the meaning of Dunsmuir,
above. The adjudicator chose from a range of possible, acceptable outcomes in
respect of the facts and law.
[44]
At errors 59, 65, 67 (which brings the total number of
alleged errors to 67), the applicant raises what would appear to be questions
of law. But he does not flesh out any of these questions, and they are akin to
generalizations. Therefore, there is no reason for dwelling upon them any
further.
[45]
Additional evidence, involving incidents that occurred
after the termination of January 18, 2010, but which occurred around the same
time, having taken place in 2010, was admitted by the adjudicator. That
evidence, which tended to link the applicant with individuals involved in
organized crime, seemed ambiguous to me, as far as I could tell. In my opinion
it had little probative value; but at any rate, the adjudicator did not make
much of it, stating that it was relevant because it “tends to show that the
employer’s fears about breach of trust are justified” (paragraph 94 of the
decision). Such usage is consistent with the law (Cie minière Québec Cartier
v Quebec (Grievances arbitrator), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1095). In any event, the
adjudicator had already determined that the dismissal was justified in the
circumstances and her decision was not shown to have been unreasonable (Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association,
2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654).
[46]
The applicant’s behaviour was a serious problem in the
adjudicator’s view. The Court must show deference as well as “a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be
offered in support of a decision” (Dunsmuir,
above at para 48).
[47]
At the end of the day, the applicant failed to discharge
his burden. A reviewing court will not substitute its opinion for that of the
decision-maker. It will seek only to determine whether it was reasonable. The
approach adopted by the applicant of attacking alleged errors and omissions
would have had a better chance of success if those errors could have been
proved and if they had compromised the integrity of the process.
[48]
In this case, not only could the alleged errors and omissions
not be demonstrated, but they involved subjects that were, at best, tangential.
As for what was at the crux of the matter, the adjudicator’s decisions all bear
the imprimatur of reasonableness. The applicant, who held a position for which
integrity was an essential requirement, had received a clear warning that some
of his associations were inappropriate. If he had been unaware of this at the
beginning of his career, which would be surprising, he was clearly warned in 2008
that the dubious character of the company he kept could lead to his dismissal. He
was even issued a disciplinary sanction in this regard. The adjudicator
reasonably found that, in spite of this, he chose to maintain contact with
certain individuals who were nonetheless identified, while at the very same
time his disciplinary file was growing thicker. Yet he entered into a two-year
sponsorship deal, or partnership, without informing his superiors or his
employer; a sponsorship that, on top of everything, involved one of the occupants
of the limousine in the incident that had given rise to the February 2008
disciplinary measure. It was up to the adjudicator to weigh the evidence, to
draw inferences from it and to make a determination with regard to the penalty
of dismissal. The applicant failed to demonstrate that the adjudicator was
unreasonable. As a result, the application for judicial review fails.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that the application for judicial review be dismissed. With costs to the
respondent.
“Yvan
Roy”
Certified
true translation
Sebastian
Desbarats, Translator
Email this Content