Date:
20130709
Docket:
IMM-7106-12
Citation:
2013 FC 768
Ottawa, Ontario,
July 9, 2013
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Scott
BETWEEN:
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SUMIT ROY
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] of a decision rendered
by the Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Protection Division (the Board)
dated May 22, 2012, which determined that Mr. Sumit Roy (the Applicant) is not
a Convention Refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96
and 97 of the IRPA. The determinative issues for the Board were the
Applicant’s credibility and the existence of an internal flight alternative [IFA].
[2]
For
the reasons that follow, this application for judicial review is allowed.
II. Facts
[3]
The
Applicant is a 31 year old citizen of Bangladesh. He is a Hindu from the city
of Sylhet.
[4]
The
Applicant alleges to have been targeted by Islamic extremists, including
supporters and members of the Jamaat-e-Islami. The lead members of this group were
identified as Mr. Ponki Miah, Mr. Tera Miah and Mr. Kalam Ullah. The Applicant claims
they wanted to kill him.
[5]
The
Applicant is an active member of the Ramakrishna Mission Temple and the
Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist & Christian Unity Council. In August 2007, a
group of “Muslim fundamentalists” disrupted the religious festival of
Janmaastami. Mr. Ponki Miah and Mr. Tera Miah assaulted the Applicant during
the incident and, in a series of Unity Council meetings after this, including a
large meeting of the Council in February 2008, the Applicant specifically
mentioned the name of his assailants in public. Mr. Tera Miah and Mr. Kalam
Ullah heard about it and the Applicant was found, threatened and beaten up. The
Applicant was continually harassed in the months that followed.
[6]
Mr.
Kalam Ullah was leading an effort to expropriate part of the property of the
Ramakrisna Mission. When the Applicant, with the help of others, tried to
intercede, he was assaulted. The Applicant sought protection from the police
but to no avail.
[7]
From
that point on, the Applicant was targeted by Mr. Ullah and his cohorts. They came
to his business with the intent of extorting money from him and assaulted his
employee, Mr. Bhuvan Das, as the Applicant was absent at the time. The
targeting of the Applicant later expanded to include his family.
[8]
In
the middle of June 2009, two Jubo Shibir leaders (labelled by the Applicant as
the youth front of the Jamaat-e-Islami) identified as “Hanif and Kohinoor”
began harassing the Applicant’s sisters, Ms. Nandita Roy and Ms. Bidita Roy.
The Applicant and his father filed a complaint with the police. In response,
these members of Jubo Shibir came to the Applicant’s home, threatened him and
his father and demanded that they withdraw the complaint. The Applicant’s
sisters ceased attending school as a result of these threats and harassment.
[9]
Hanif
and Kohinoor then assaulted the Applicant in July 2009. He was treated at a
clinic. In November 2009, Mr. Ullah and his cohorts once again called upon the
Applicant at his business, demanding money. When the Applicant refused, they beat
him. The Applicant once again sought assistance from the police but none was
forthcoming.
[10]
Finally,
in February 2010, Mr. Ullah and his gang attacked the Applicant’s home
searching for him. The Applicant was absent at the time. His father warned him not
to return. The Applicant hid and, with the assistance of his family, secured an
agent and traveled to Canada. The Applicant arrived on May 25, 2010, and made a
refugee claim on July 13, 2010. The Applicant has since heard that his agents
of persecution still visit his home.
III. The
Board’s decision
[11]
The
Board determined that the Applicant was neither a convention refugee nor a
person in need of protection. The determinative issues were credibility and the
existence of an IFA.
IV. Legislation
[12]
Sections
96 and 97 of the IRPA provide as follows:
Convention
refugee
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Définition
de « réfugié »
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96. A Convention
refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion,
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96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la
Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être
persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son
appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques :
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(a) is outside each of
their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear,
unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
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a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont
elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se
réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
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(b) not having a country
of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and
is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
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b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité
et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne
peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
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Person
in need of protection
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Personne
à protéger
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97.
(1)
A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their
country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of
nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them
personally
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97.
(1) A
qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
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(a) to a danger,
believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
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a) soit au risque, s’il y a des
motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article
premier de la Convention contre la torture;
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(b) to a risk to their
life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
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b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou
au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
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(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk,
unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
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(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce
fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
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(ii) the risk would be faced by
the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other
individuals in or from that country,
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(ii) elle y est exposée en tout
lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui
s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
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(iii) the risk is not inherent
or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted
international standards, and
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(iii) la menace ou le risque ne
résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des
normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
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(iv) the risk is not caused by
the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
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(iv) la menace ou le risque ne
résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé
adéquats.
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Person
in need of protection
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Personne à protéger
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(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in need of
protection is also a person in need of protection.
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(2)
A
également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada
et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par
règlement le besoin de protection.
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V. Issues
and standard of review
A. Issues
1. Was
there a breach of procedural fairness as a result of the interpretation issues
during the hearing? If there was a breach, was it material to the decision?
2. Did
the Board breach the Applicant’s right to procedural fairness by relying on a
non-disclosed document? If there was a breach, was it material to the decision?
3. Did
the Board err in making its credibility finding?
4. Did
the Board err in determining that the Applicant had an internal flight
alternative (IFA) in Chittagong?
B. Standard
of review
[13]
A
number of issues have been raised in this application.
[14]
The
Court owes no deference to the Board in determining whether there was a breach
of procedural fairness. When procedural fairness is an issue, the correct
approach is to verify whether the requirements of natural justice in the
particular circumstances of the case have been met (Canadian Union of Public
Employees (C.U.P.E.) v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29; Sketchley
v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404 at para 53; Zheng v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1359 [Zheng] at para 7). The
standard of review is correctness.
[15]
The
standard of review applicable to the Board’s credibility findings is
reasonableness (Wu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2009 FC 929 at para 18; Elmi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 FC 773, at para 21; Aguebor v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 732 (FCA)).
[16]
The
standard of review as to the existence of an IFA is reasonableness (Singh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 342 at para 17; Navarro v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 358 at paras 12-14).
VI. Parties’
submissions
A. Applicant’s
submissions
[17]
The
Applicant submits that he did not have a fair hearing because the interpretation
provided was not “continuous, precise, competent, impartial and
contemporaneous” (see Mohammadian v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2001 FCA 191 [Mohammadian] at para 20).
[18]
The
Applicant argues that the interpreter’s work was deficient in the following
three ways: 1) she did not interpret some English words at all (e.g. “internal
flight alternative”) or failed to ask for clarification of terms which she was
not familiar with in both English and Sylhety; 2) she also misinterpreted
certain words and phrases (e.g. “activist” instead of “active member”); and 3) she
did not know the translation for several key words and phrases and, in some
cases, needed to ask the Applicant (who is not fluent in English) for his input
(e.g. terrorist organization, district, religion).
[19]
The
Applicant submits that the cumulative effect of all these errors is such that
the quality of the interpretation fails to meet the test of being “continuous,
precise, competent, impartial, and contemporaneous”. Specifically, the
interpretation was not “precise” or “competent”.
[20]
While
the Applicant asserts that it is not necessary to demonstrate that a prejudice
was caused by the errors of interpretation, he notes that in this case, such a
prejudice ensued. The Board referred to deficiencies in the Applicant’s
testimony, including a lack of clarity. The Applicant asserts that some of
those deficiencies could have been caused by poor interpretation. For example,
the Board’s negative decision was largely based on the existence of an IFA. As
mentioned above, the term “internal flight alternative” was not interpreted to
the Applicant.
[21]
The
Applicant submits that this breach of procedural fairness should void the
hearing and decision. He also posits that the limited exception described in Mobil
Oil Canada Ltd v Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1 SCR
202 [Mobil Oil] and Yassine v Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration, [1994] FCJ No 949 (FCA) [Yassine] does not apply in
this instance because his case is not so unmeritorious that a rehearing of it
would be pointless.
[22]
The
Applicant’s next contention is that the Board erred in relying on evidence that
was not disclosed to the Applicant. In its reasons, the Board refers to the
February 2009 UK Operational Guidance Note in support of its IFA finding. The
report indicates that internal relocation is a viable option for victims of
religious violence in Bangladesh.
[23]
The
Applicant emphasizes that while the October 2010 UK Operational Guidance Note
was included in the National Documentation Package disclosed to the Applicant,
the February 2009 version was not. The Applicant notes that the October 2010
version does not mention being of the Hindu faith as a category of claim.
[24]
Citing
a number of decisions rendered by this Court, the Applicant argues that
reliance on a non-disclosed document constitutes a breach of procedural
fairness (Zheng, cited above, at paras 6-13).
[25]
The
Applicant insists that he was not afforded the opportunity to respond to the
information on which the Board based its adverse finding. While that
information was not the sole element the Board took into account in making its
IFA finding, the Applicant submits that it is impossible to determine what
would have been the Board’s conclusion, absent that error.
B. Respondent’s
submissions
[26]
The
Respondent submits that the Applicant is barred from raising the issue of
interpretation in this judicial review because the Applicant was required to
raise it at the first opportunity which he failed to do (Mohammadian,
cited above, at paras 13-19).
[27]
In
this case, according to the Respondent, the interpretation issues were apparent
at the hearing and the Applicant consequently waived his right to raise these
grounds by failing to object at the first opportunity. The Respondent points
out that the Applicant was aware of the difficulties the interpreter encountered
as she mentioned, on more than one occasion, that she was not translating what
he said exactly. Furthermore, on at least one occasion, the difficulty was so
apparent that it led the Board to inquire, in the presence of the Applicant, as
to what language the interpreter was translating and what language the
Applicant was speaking.
[28]
The
Respondent concludes that this failure to raise the issue at the hearing is the
very determination the Court made in Mohammadian, cited above. It
constitutes an implied waiver of the Applicant’s right to bring this issue forward
in the current application.
[29]
The
Respondent further argues that even if the Court finds that the Applicant has
not waived his right to raise the issue of inadequate interpretation, there was
no breach of procedural fairness because the Applicant failed to demonstrate
that the errors were material to the Board’s determinative findings which are the
Applicant’s credibility and the existence of an IFA. The Respondent submits
that the issues relate rather to a difference in choice of words and sentence
structure.
[30]
With
respect to the Board’s reliance on non-disclosed documentary evidence, the Respondent
contends that this does not breach procedural fairness because the 2009 UK
Operational Guidance Note is publicly available. The Respondent claims that,
the Applicant is deemed to have had notice of the document. The 2009 UK
Operational Guidance Note was publicly available on the Board’s website. (Chen
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1218 [Chen]
at para 17).
[31]
The
Respondent also alleges that notwithstanding the question of notice, the
information contained in the 2009 UK Operational Guidance Note was immaterial
to the IFA finding. The Respondent argues that the Board relied principally on
the 2010 UK Operational Guidance Note contained in the disclosed National
Documentation Package. That Note did not include being of the Hindu faith as a
main category of claim. Consequently the Board’s conclusion that the Applicant
would have an IFA in Chittagong is valid according to the Respondent. The Board
only referenced the 2009 UK Operational Guidance Note to demonstrate that even when
religious violence against Hindus was a concern for refugee claimants, internal
relocation was nonetheless viewed as a viable option.
[32]
Finally,
the Respondent submits that the Court should dismiss the application on the
issue of procedural fairness because the Board’s decision can stand alone on
its negative credibility finding. Breaches of procedural fairness do not
command the return of a decision for re-determination when the result will
inevitably be the same (Mobil Oil, cited above; Yassine, cited
above).
VI. Analysis
1. Was
there a breach of procedural fairness as a result of the interpretation issues
during the hearing? If there was a breach, was it material to the decision?
[33]
The
first issue that needs to be addressed is whether the Applicant is required to
show that the interpretation failings impacted on the Board’s decision. Relying
on the decision in Mohammadian, cited above, the Applicant claims not to
have such an obligation. Citing this Court’s decision in Sherpa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 267 at para 60, the
Respondent submits that the Applicant must indeed indicate how the alleged
failings affected the Board’s decision.
[34]
While
there is no need to establish a prejudice in order prove a breach of procedural
fairness based on inadequate interpretation (see Mohammadian, cited
above, at para 20), the Applicant is required to demonstrate that the
breach of procedural fairness was material to the Board’s decision in order for
this Court to intervene (see Patel v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2002 FCA 55 at para 12; Mobil Oil, cited above, at p.
228).
[35]
Having
considered the evidence adduced in the present case, it is clear that
significant problems with the interpretation occurred at the hearing. Upon
examination of the Board’s reasons, however, the Court does not find that the
interpretation errors had any material impact on either of its determinative
findings. The Board’s credibility finding was largely based on the absence of
corroborative evidence and the Applicant’s inability to plausibly explain how
his persecutors came to have an interest in him. Neither of these findings was
the result of or was influenced by omissions or errors in interpretation.
[36]
Regarding
the Board’s IFA finding, the Applicant notes that the interpreter failed to properly
translate the expression for the Applicant. It is clear from the transcript of
the hearing, however, that the Applicant clearly understood that he was being
asked whether he might be free from persecution in Chittagong and whether it
would be unreasonably burdensome for him to relocate there. Having replied that
he did not have any family there and did not speak the language. It is clear to
the Court that the interpretation problems that occurred during the hearing did
not prevent the Applicant from addressing the Board’s ultimate IFA conclusion.
[37]
Consequently,
the Court finds that the Applicant’s right to a “continuous, precise,
competent, impartial, and contemporaneous” interpretation was violated but that
it was immaterial to the Board’s decision.
[38]
The
Court also notes that the Applicant failed to raise this breach at the first
opportunity, thereby waiving his right (see Mohammadian, cited above, at
paras 13-19; Mowloughi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2012 FC 662 at para 30).
2. Did
the Board breach the Applicant’s right to procedural fairness by relying on a
non-disclosed document? If there was a breach, was it material to the decision?
[39]
The
parties disagree over whether the Board’s reliance on a document that was not
part of the National Documentation Package disclosed to the Applicant
constitutes a breach of procedural fairness.
[40]
The
Applicant relies on the decision in Zheng, above, at para 10, where Justice
Mosley, citing the Federal Court of Appeal in Mancia v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 9066 (FCA), [1998] 3 FC 461 (CA)
[Mancia], stated that “document disclosure is important for procedural
fairness as it gives the applicant an opportunity to properly respond to the
Board’s concerns”. Relying on Justice Gleason’s decision in Chen, cited
above, the Respondent insists that there is no breach of procedural fairness
when the Board relies on publicly accessible information.
[41]
While
it is true that in the Federal Court of Appeal in Mancia, cited above, found
the following:
“CERTIFIED QUESTION from Mancia v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] F.C.J. No. 120 (T.D.)
(QL): Does an immigration officer conducting a review pursuant to the
Regulations respecting Post-Determination Refugee Claimants in Canada Class
violate the principle of fairness, when he fails to disclose in advance of
determining the matter, documents relied upon from public sources in relation
to general country conditions? Answer: It being understood that each case will
have to be decided according to its own circumstances and assuming that the
documents at issue are of a nature such as that described in these reasons for
judgment, (a) with respect to documents relied upon from public sources in
relation to general country conditions which were available and accessible when
the applicant made his submissions, fairness does not require disclosure in
advance of a determination; (b) where the documents became available and
accessible after the applicant filed his submissions, fairness requires
disclosure where they are novel, significant and evidence changes in the
general country conditions that may affect the decision.” [Emphasis added]
[42]
The
Court of Appeal was also careful to distinguish the case of a post-determination
refugee claimant in Canada (PDRCC) class proceeding from that of a refugee
claim hearing:
“(a) The nature of the proceeding and the rules
under which the decision-maker is acting
[24] The PDRCC class proceeding is not a new
hearing of a refugee claim (see Quintanilla v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), (1996), 105 F.T.R. 315 (F.C.T.D.), at pages
319-320, Rouleau J.). In a refugee claim hearing, the applicant is entitled
under subsection 68(5) [as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 18] of
the Act to be notified of those "facts, information or opinion" which
the Refugee Board claims to be within its specialized knowledge. No such
language is used in the PDRCC class regulations, where the sole procedural
right afforded is that of making written submissions.” (Mancia, cited
above, at para 24)
[43]
Applying
the principles outlined above, the Court finds that that Board’s reliance on
the non-disclosed 2009 UK Operational Guidance Note constituted a breach of
procedural fairness. Furthermore, the Applicant had a right to expect
the Board to limit its analysis to the more recent UK Operational Guidance Note.
The Applicant should not have expected the Board to reference an older,
outdated version of the Note.
[44]
The
Respondent argues that this breach of procedural fairness was not material to
the Board’s IFA determination because it relied primarily on the disclosed 2010
UK Operational Guidance Note. The Court disagrees. It is clear that the Board
did indeed rely on the non-disclosed report in arriving at its IFA finding. The
Board clearly cites the 2009 UK Operational Guidance Note (along with the 2010 UK
Operational Guidance Note and this Court’s decision in Roy v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 434) as objective support of
its IFA finding. While the 2009 UK Operational Guidance Note was one supporting
document among others, the Court agrees with the Applicant that the Board’s
reasoning on the IFA was cumulative and it is, therefore, impossible to determine
whether the conclusion reached would have been the same had it not taken that Note
into consideration. The Court refuses to speculate.
[45]
Finally,
the Court rejects the Respondent’s argument that the decision may still be
valid on the basis of the Board’s credibility finding. As the Respondent
himself noted in his memorandum, the Board disposed of the Applicant’s section
97 claim by virtue of its IFA finding (see Respondent’s Further Memorandum of
Argument at para 37). Consequently the decision cannot stand.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that
1. This
application for judicial review is allowed and the decision of the Refugee
Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board dated May 22, 2012, is
hereby set aside;
2. The
application is remitted for re-determination before a differently constituted
panel of the Refugee Protection Division; and
3. There
is no question of general interest for certification.
"André F.J.
Scott"