Date:
20130301
Docket:
IMM-6262-12
Citation:
2013 FC 213
Ottawa, Ontario,
March 1, 2013
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Boivin
BETWEEN:
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JOHN MICHEAL SUCCAR
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act] of a decision dated May
31, 2012, in which an Immigration Officer (the officer) determined that the
applicant was not eligible for permanent residence in Canada because he was a person described in paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act.
Background
[2]
Mr.
Succar (the applicant) was born in 1972 in Bechwat, Lebanon, and is a Lebanese
citizen. His admissibility as a permanent resident was under review because of
alleged membership to the Lebanese Forces (LF). The LF is a current political party
and former Christian militia involved in Lebanon’s civil war from 1975 to 1990.
At
the end of the civil war in 1990, the LF was disarmed and transformed into a
political party. It was banned in 1994, and had its political activities
restricted by the pro-Syrian government until 2005 when Syrian troops withdrew.
Today, the LF is a political party represented in the Lebanese parliament.
[3]
In
1985, at the age of thirteen (13) years old, the applicant started voluntarily
helping out at a barrack of the LF where members of his family were located.
The applicant initially volunteered by guarding the premises, getting water and
watching others do mechanical work. In 1987, at the age of fifteen (15), the
applicant was hired by the LF as a mechanic. The applicant allegedly fixed LF
members’ cars, but not vehicles used in combat. The applicant underwent a
two-month training in first-aid treatment and on how to use, dismantle and fire
personal firearms, at the end of which he was issued a firearm. He also
received medical coverage from the LF. The applicant worked as a mechanic for
the LF until the end of the civil war in Lebanon, in 1990.
[4]
After
the end of the civil war, and until 1999, the applicant continued working for
the LF by being responsible for a group of about twelve (12) to twenty (20)
young men in his home village. He also opened his own mechanic shop in Bechwat, Lebanon, in 1997. The applicant was married on January 4, 1997.
[5]
The
applicant moved to the United States and lived there from 1999 until 2004. The
applicant and his family arrived in Canada on August 26, 2004 and claimed
refugee status (Tribunal Record, p 2). Their refugee status was granted by the
Immigration and Refugee Board on January 31, 2005. Citizenship and Immigration
Canada received the applicant’s application for permanent residency on July 11,
2005. His application was approved in principle on March 1, 2006, pending an
officer’s decision on the issue of inadmissibility. The applicant considers
himself a member of the LF and has participated in meetings since his arrival
in the United States and Canada (Tribunal Record, CSIS interview, May 3, 2007,
p 340; Application Record, Applicant’s Affidavit, p 24). He currently owns a
mechanic shop where he works full-time to support his wife and children.
[6]
The
applicant was interviewed by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
on May 3, 2007. On July 23, 2007, the CSIS issued a brief concerning the
applicant (Tribunal Record, pp 339-40). This brief was reviewed by Citizenship
and Immigration Canada (CIC) and it was strongly recommended that the applicant
not be granted permanent residence because of inadmissibility under paragraph
34(1)(f) of the Act (Tribunal Record, pp 333-38).
[7]
On
November 30, 2011, the applicant’s counsel’s assistant discussed the upcoming
interview and the LF organization with the officer, who stated that she was not
familiar with all the details of the organization but would research it before
the interview (Applicant’s Record, Assistant’s Affidavit, p 26).
[8]
The
applicant was interviewed by CIC on December 5, 2011 (Tribunal Record, pp
265-68) and by the Canada Border Services Agency on March 7, 2012 (Tribunal
Record, pp 176-91). Following the December 5, 2011 interview, a decision was
rendered by the CIC officer on May 31, 2012, deeming the applicant ineligible
for permanent residence in Canada pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the
Act. This decision is under review in the present application.
[9]
After
the commencement of the applicant’s application for judicial review, the
respondent (the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) brought a motion for
non-disclosure of portions of the Tribunal Record, in accordance with section
87 of the Act. An order of non-disclosure was granted on January 15, 2013 by
Justice Noël.
[10]
In
a decision dated May 31, 2012, the officer concluded that the applicant was a
member of the LF, that the LF is an organization that falls under paragraph
34(1)(c) of the Act, and that consequently, the applicant was
inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act.
Issues
[11]
This
case raises the following issues:
a.
Did
the officer breach principles of procedural fairness by failing to disclose
documentation?
b.
Was
the officer’s decision reasonable?
Relevant Legislation
[12]
The
following sections of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act are the
relevant statutory provisions in the present application for judicial review:
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Division
4
Inadmissibility
Rules
of interpretation
33. The facts that
constitute inadmissibility under sections 34 to 37 include facts arising from
omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there are
reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may
occur.
Security
34. (1) A permanent
resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for
(a)
engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic
government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;
(b)
engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;
(c)
engaging in terrorism;
(d)
being a danger to the security of Canada;
(e)
engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety
of persons in Canada; or
(f)
being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to
believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph
(a), (b) or (c).
Exception
(2)
The matters referred to in subsection (1) do not constitute inadmissibility
in respect of a permanent resident or a foreign national who satisfies the
Minister that their presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the
national interest.
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Section
4
Interdictions
de territoire
Interprétation
33. Les faits – actes ou
omissions – mentionnés aux articles 34 à 37 sont, sauf disposition contraire,
appréciés sur la base de motifs raisonnables de croire qu’ils sont survenus,
surviennent ou peuvent survenir.
Sécurité
34. (1) Emportent
interdiction de territoire pour raison de sécurité les faits suivants :
a) être l’auteur d’actes
d’espionnage ou se livrer à la subversion contre toute institution
démocratique, au sens où cette expression s’entend au Canada;
b) être l’instigateur ou
l’auteur d’actes visant au renversement d’un gouvernement par la force;
c) se livrer au
terrorisme;
d) constituer un danger
pour la sécurité du Canada;
e) être l’auteur de tout
acte de violence susceptible de mettre en danger la vie ou la sécurité
d’autrui au Canada;
f) être membre d’une
organisation dont il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’elle est, a été
ou sera l’auteur d’un acte visé aux alinéas a), b) ou c).
Exception
(2)
Ces faits n’emportent pas interdiction de territoire pour le résident
permanent ou l’étranger qui convainc le ministre que sa présence au Canada ne
serait nullement préjudiciable à l’intérêt national.
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[13]
Subsection
83.01(1) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [the Criminal Code]
which defines “terrorist activity” is also relevant in establishing what
constitutes “terrorism” for the purpose of paragraph 34(1)(c) of the
Act. To facilitate reading, subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code is
reproduced in relevant parts in annex to this judgment.
Standard of
review
[14]
The
jurisprudence has established that, given the factual component of this
question, the appropriate standard of review to apply to immigration officers’
determination of inadmissibility under subsection 34(1) of the Act is that of
reasonableness (Ugbazghi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 694 at para 36, [2009] 1 FCR 454; Villegas v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 105 at para 39-40, 95 Imm LR (3d)
261). The standard of reasonableness was described in Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 [Dunsmuir]. The
Court will be “concerned mostly with the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process”, as well
as “whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes
which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.” (Dunsmuir, above
at 47).
[15]
When
the issue of procedural fairness is raised, as is the case here, the question
the Court must ask itself is whether the procedure employed was fair (Pusat
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 428 at para 14,
388 FTR 49). The question of deference to the officer is not at issue when
procedural fairness is concerned (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration
v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339).
Analysis
1) Procedural
fairness
[16]
The
applicant has argued that, in the particular circumstances of this case,
procedural fairness was breached. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees.
[17]
The
Federal Court of Appeal has stated in Mancia v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 3 FC 461, 161 DLR (4th) 488 (FCA) [Mancia]
that documents readily available from public sources which are general in
nature (i.e. not relating to the applicant himself or prepared for the express
purpose of the applicant’s case) need not be disclosed. The Court notes that
the applicant received a list of seven (7) sources, and was apparently able to
locate three (3) of them. Given the applicant’s counsel’s difficulties in
locating the remaining four (4) documents, she requested that the officer send
her copies, but her request was declined. The applicant claims that the officer
breached procedural fairness by refusing to send her copies of the documents.
The Court cannot agree with this contention.
[18]
Firstly,
the applicant received a detailed list of references that were consulted by the
officer (Applicant’s Record, pp 34-35). Secondly, this list is comprised of
public documents, none of which were authored specifically for the applicant’s
case, related specifically to him, or were drafted and distributed internally
at CIC or CSIS. Finally, although the applicant’s counsel has submitted to this
Court that her efforts in locating the said documents were unsuccessful
(according to her, only three (3) of the seven (7) were found), nothing in the
record before this Court allows it to conclude that the documents were
unavailable. The only evidence is an email sent to the Immigration and Refugee Board
by the applicant’s counsel’s assistant, requesting assistance in locating the
documents (Applicant’s Record, p 33). The applicant has not presented the Court
with a response to this email. The record before this Court contains no other
evidence showing that efforts were made with other institutions, or that any
other steps were undertaken by the applicant’s counsel. Although the
applicant’s counsel has submitted that she could not find the documents, the
Court cannot conclude, based on the evidence in the record, that they were
unavailable or that reasonable efforts were made with no conclusive results.
The Court also notes that the additional documents listed in the final decision,
which were not disclosed to the applicant, were all publicly available documents
and needed not be disclosed pursuant to Mancia, above.
[19]
The
Court is satisfied that the applicant’s interviews made him aware of the
officer’s concerns (May 3, 2007 by CSIS, Tribunal Record, pp 339-40; December
5, 2011 by CIC, Tribunal Record, pp 265-68). General concerns of membership to
the LF were known to the applicant from 2007, and specific concerns regarding
certain events and activities of the LF were brought to the applicant’s
attention in the December 2011 interview. The applicant knew what his burden
was and what type of allegations were made by the officer. This knowledge and
information guided his submissions filed after the December 2011 interview, in
January 2012. In this particular context, Kablawi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 283 at para 12, [2009] FCJ No
348 (QL) [Kablawi, 2009], on which the applicant relied, is
distinguishable. For these reasons, the Court concludes that procedural
fairness was not breached in the present circumstances.
2) Reasonableness
of the decision
[20]
From
the outset, the Court agrees with the respondent that all sources used by the
officer were reliable, trustworthy and credible. The applicant raises the
following issues: i) that the officer erred by finding that the LF has engaged
in acts of terrorism pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(c) of the Act, and ii)
that the officer erred by finding that the applicant was a member of the LF.
[21]
The
applicant submits that the officer erred in concluding that the LF is an
organization that engaged in terrorism. According to the applicant, this
finding is not supported by the evidence and as such is unreasonable.
[22]
In
her decision, the officer listed nine (9) events which she considered were
terrorist acts committed by the LF during the civil war in Lebanon, in chronological order:
a. Murder
of Tony Frangié, leader of the Marada militia (June 1978)
b. Kidnapping
of four (4) Iranian diplomats (June 1982)
c. Sabra
and Chatila massacre involving civilians (September 1982)
d. Murder
of Rachid Karameh, Lebanon’s Prime Minister (June 1987)
e. Kidnapping of two (2)
civilians: Husayn Bahij Ahmad and Husayn Ahmad Rumayti (November 1987)
f. Kidnapping
of four (4) civilians on the Gardenia ship (December 1987)
g. Murder
of Elias Al-Zayek, leader of an opponent Phalangist party (January 1990)
h. Murder
of Dany Chamoun, political rival (October 1990)
i.
Attempted
murder of Michel El-Murr, Lebanon’s Defence Minister (March 1991)
[23]
The
officer grouped these events as follows for her analysis: kidnappings, murders
of political actors and the Sabra and Chatila massacre. She used the definition
of “terrorist activity” found in the Criminal Code (subsection 83.01).
[24]
The
officer held that the purpose of the kidnappings was to terrorize the
population and to have hostages available for trade. The officer examined
several incidents of reported kidnappings and held that kidnapping civilians
was a terrorist act because it endangered their lives and intimidated the
population, causing it to fear for its safety. Using the kidnapped victims as a
means to trade with other groups was also a way of controlling the population,
groups and organizations. The officer concluded that the kidnappings and
reported torture of kidnapped victims were acts of terrorism pursuant to clause
83.01(1)(b)(i)(B) when read with clauses 83.01(1)(b)(ii)(A) and
(B) of the Criminal Code.
[25]
After
reviewing the documentary evidence, the Court observes that many of the
documents referred to by the officer do not hold the LF directly responsible.
For instance, with regards to the kidnapping of the four (4) Iranian diplomats,
a document from Amnesty International dated July 9, 1997 (Source # 2), states
the following:
Iranian Hostages
In June 1982 four Iranian
diplomats, Ahmad Motavasselian, Mohammed-Taghi Rastegar Moghadam, Mohsen Musavi
(chargé d’affaires at the Iranian Embassy) and Kazem Akhavan, a
photographer, were abducted and later “disappeared”. They were apparently
arrested by members of the Lebanese Forces at a checkpoint near Beirut. Their fate and whereabouts remain unknown. […]
It is possible that they were
killed soon after their arrest. Families of the Iranian diplomats were
reportedly told in 1990 by Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces,
that they had been killed immediately after abduction. This account
appeared to confirm the testimony of a former sergeant in the Lebanese Forces
who had worked in the Qarantina Prison run by the Lebanese Forces.
(Tribunal Record, p 92)
[Emphasis
added; citation omitted.]
[26]
The
same document stated the following with regards to the kidnappings of civilians
Husayn Ahmad, Husayn Rumayti, and the four civilians on the Gardenia ship,
events which took place in 1987:
Husayn Bahij Ahmad, a worker in a shoe factory,
born in 1967, was arrested with Husayn Ahmad Rumayti, born in
1962, who worked in a glass shop, on 16 November 1987 by the Lebanese Forces
at a road block near Beirut. Both men are Shi’a Muslims. They were held at Adonis,
a Lebanese Forces centre on the outskirts of Beirut where they were allegedly
tortured. Their family only found out where they were after many months;
they were then allowed to receive visits from their families and the ICRC.
After two years’ detention their families were told that they were not to visit
any more as the detainees were to be moved.
…
Ahmad Muhammad Taleb and Ahmad Bahij Jallul,
two sailors, Ghassan Fares al-Dirani, a bank clerk on his way to the United States, and Husayn Muhammad Tlays, on his way to Germany, were arrested by the
Lebanese Forces in December 1987 from a ship, the Gardenia, in Beirut harbour. Other members of the crew and passengers arrested at the same time were
eventually released, but these four continued to be held at Adonis.
The families of the six, who saw them for the last
time in December 1989, were never informed of their whereabouts. The last
messages transmitted through the ICRC arrived in May 1990. Then they
“disappeared”.
(Tribunal Record, p 94)
[Emphasis added.]
[27]
Other
documents from the UNHCR (Tribunal Record, p 121) and Amnesty International
(Tribunal Record, p 103) also make reference to the LF but the extent of the
alleged involvement remains unclear.
[28]
With
regards to the murders of political actors, the officer referred to a source
which indicated that the LF is responsible for the murder of Tony Frangié (Tribunal
Record, p 72), while another only makes a general mention of Christian militia
(Tribunal Record, p 107). For the murders of political actors Chamoun, Karameh,
Zayek and El-Murr, the officer referred to a source from Amnesty International
which indicates that Mr. Geagea’s trial was unfair (Tribunal Record, p 77).
While the New York Times and the BBC news articles published in the 1990s
report that Mr. Geagea was found guilty of murdering Mr. Zayek (Tribunal
Record, p 42), Mr. Karameh (Tribunal Record, p 43), and Mr. Chamoun and his
family (Tribunal Record, p 44), the Amnesty International document dated
November 2004 (Tribunal Record, p 77) describes the unfair nature of Mr.
Geagea’s trial and depicts human rights violations.
[29]
However,
the officer relies on the unfair nature of the trial in support of her
conclusion. The Court therefore agrees with the applicant that it is
unreasonable for the officer to openly acknowledge that Mr. Geagea’s trial has
been deemed unfair, and that his detention involved circumstances which
violated human rights, but to still consider that the outcome of this trial can
be the basis of her conclusions on the LF’s responsibility for the murders of
these political actors. More particularly, the officer stated:
Bien que je sois consciente que M. Geagea n’a
malheureusement pas bénéficié d’un procès correspondant à toutes les normes de
droit internationales, il n’en reste pas moins qu’il a été accusé et reconnu
coupable. Selon moi, malgré les imperfections du système ayant conduit à ses
condamnations, le fait qu’il ait été accusé et condamné constitue un motif
raisonnable de croire qu’il a commis les crimes qui lui sont reprochés.
(Tribunal
Record, p 9)
[30]
With
regards to the massacre at Sabra and Chatila in 1982, a source
names the Phalangist movement under Bashir Gemayel as the responsible party
(Tribunal Record, p 241). Specifically, “[a]n Israeli independent judicial
inquiry found that the massacre was carried out by the Phalangists, but Israeli
commanders bore responsibility for not preventing it.” (Tribunal Record, p
241). Other sources subsume the Phalangist group under the LF, and generally
identify it as the responsible actor for the Sabra and Chatila massacre
(Tribunal Record, pp 19, 60, 73 and 258). The officer acknowledged the
confusion in western reports with regards to the Phalangist movement and the
LF, but nonetheless concluded that the LF was responsible.
[31]
Although
the respondent argued before this Court that the officer provided an analysis,
the Court finds that the officer’s analysis was insufficient to support her
conclusion. Indeed, the nature of the documentation and the lack of direct
evidence concerning the role of the LF deserved a more extensive analysis in
order to support the officer’s conclusion - i.e. the LF has engaged in acts of
terrorism. On this point, Justice Mosley observed the following in Jalil v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 246 at para 30, [2006] 4 FCR
471 :
[30]
…a
determination that the organization to which the applicant belonged engaged or
engages in terrorism must be supported by reasons that will withstand “a
somewhat probing examination”…
(Citation omitted.)
[32]
The
Court also makes reference to the case Dirar v Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 246 at para 31, 385 FTR 133,
where Justice Mactavish reiterated, in a similar context, the principle that
the analysis must be conducted with great care:
[31] The situation in Darfur is undoubtedly murky,
and atrocities have been committed by both sides of the conflict. Nevertheless,
a finding that an individual is inadmissible to Canada for being a member of a
terrorist organization is a serious one, with extremely negative potential
consequences for the individual involved. As a result, great care must be taken
to ensure that the finding is properly made…
[33]
On
the basis of the evidence before the officer, the Court therefore finds that
the officer’s analysis was insufficient and it was thus unreasonable, in these
circumstances, for the officer to determine that there were reasonable grounds
to believe that the Lebanese Forces was an organization that engaged in acts
described in subsections 34(1)(a), (b), (c).
[34]
Given
the Court’s conclusion regarding the reviewable error committed by the officer
in finding that the LF is an organization that has participated in terrorist
activities, there is no need to address the membership issue.
[35]
For
all of these reasons, the decision of the officer does not fall within a range
of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts
and law (Dunsmuir; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland
and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708)).
The application for judicial review will be allowed.
[36]
The
parties did not propose any question of general importance to be certified.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
1.
The
application for judicial review is allowed;
2.
The
officer’s decision is set aside and the matter remitted back for re-determination
by a different officer in accordance with these reasons;
3. No
question of general importance is certified.
“Richard Boivin”