Date: 20130117
Docket: IMM-4611-12
Citation: 2013 FC 41
[UNREVISED
ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, January 17,
2013
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice
Boivin
BETWEEN:
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THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
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Applicant
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and
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ROBERT DRAGICEVIC
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review, made under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act], of a decision of a
member of the Immigration Division, dated May 3, 2012, to release the
respondent. The application is moot because the respondent was released
immediately by the member. The applicant nevertheless asks this Court to
exercise its discretion and hear this application even though it is moot, in
light of the factors set out in Borowski v Canada (Attorney General),
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, 57 DLR (4th) 231 [Borowski].
Factual background
[2]
Robert
Dragicevic (the respondent) is a citizen of Bosnia–Herzegovina.
[3]
On
August 12, 2009, the Immigration Division made a deportation order against the
respondent, given that he was inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality
under subsection 36(1) of the Act. The respondent appealed that decision
to the Immigration Appeal Division, but the appeal was dismissed on
May 25, 2010. The Immigration Appeal Division noted that the risk of
re-offending was high in the respondent’s case (Applicant’s Record, Affidavit
of Hélène Jarry, Exhibit “B”, pp 31-38). The application for judicial
review of that decision was dismissed by this Court on October 13, 2010 (Applicant’s
Record, Affidavit of Hélène Jarry, Exhibit “C”, p 40).
[4]
The
respondent was incarcerated from April to September 2009 and from
April 2011 to January 2012. The respondent left the penitentiary on
January 14, 2012, and was arrested and detained by the Canada Border
Services Agency (CBSA). His detention was upheld on January 16, 2012.
[5]
On
January 23, 2012, Member Musto ordered that the respondent be released on
the following conditions (Applicant’s Record, Affidavit of Hélène Jarry, Exhibit “D”,
p 48):
a. that he live with his
mother at all times;
b. that a bond of $500 be
posted;
c. that he comply with
curfew every day from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m.;
d. that he report to CBSA
authorities two (2) times a month;
e. that he avoid contact
with anyone with a criminal record, except his brother;
f. that he report any
offence or arrest to the CBSA within five (5) working days.
After posting the $500 bond, the respondent was
released on February 1, 2012.
[6]
In a
danger opinion issued under paragraph 115(2)(a) of the Act and
dated April 11, 2012 (the danger opinion), a Minister’s delegate concluded
that the respondent is a danger to the public in Canada. An application for
leave regarding this opinion was dismissed by this Court on July 26, 2012
(docket IMM-4188-12).
[7]
On
April 24, 2012, when the respondent reported to the CBSA as agreed in his
release conditions, the CBSA arrested the respondent because he had allegedly
failed to report to the CBSA on April 17, 2012, as an officer had
requested. Member Musto continued the respondent’s detention in a decision
dated April 26, 2012 (Applicant’s Record, Affidavit of Hélène Jarry, Exhibit “E”,
pp 51-56).
[8]
On
May 3, 2012, at the respondent’s detention review, Member Nupponen ordered
his conditional release but did not require a bond. This decision by
Member Nupponen is the subject of the present application for judicial
review.
Impugned decision
[9]
Member Nupponen
reviewed the decisions of Member Musto, dated January 23, 2012, and
April 26, 2012, and found that there was some risk of flight and some
danger but that the conditions imposed could offset these risks adequately.
Member Nupponen noted that Member Musto had released the respondent
on January 23, 2012, and that there had been no changes in the file since
then. Member Nupponen stated that there [translation]
“is a danger opinion, but the opinion itself makes no changes” (Applicant’s
Record, p 7).
[10]
Member Nupponen
stated that one had to look at the facts in the past, and that the danger
opinion changed nothing, apart from confirming that the respondent had
committed crimes in the past. Member Nupponen noted that the respondent
had not committed any crimes since his release.
[11]
Having
heard the respondent’s testimony concerning his missed meeting with the CBSA on
April 17, 2012, Member Nupponen found that this had been a
misunderstanding rather than a breach of condition. The respondent explained to
the member that he was under the impression that the CBSA officer had not asked
him to report. The member agreed that it was not clear in the respondent’s mind
that he had to report to the CBSA officer on April 17. The member reiterated
that, in his view, there was no breach of condition, and that he would not
decide the issue of the $500 bond, stating that [translation] “if the Minister wants to seize the money, that
is a question for the Minister” (Applicant’s Record, p 8).
[12]
According
to Member Nupponen, the respondent had reported to the CBSA two (2) times
a month, as requested, confirmed that he would continue to do so, and had not
breached any of the conditions of Member Musto’s order. Member Nupponen
stated that nothing indicated that the respondent intended to flee, and he
found that the conditions previously imposed by Member Musto were
reasonable. He remarked that the respondent had complied with the conditions
imposed in the past with a $500 bond. The member thus determined that it was
not necessary to impose a new cash deposit upon release this time. He stated
that [translation] “it is a
change, and the Minister may do whatever the Minister wishes with the $500 that
was posted in the past” (Applicant’s Record, p 9). The other conditions
were the same ones imposed by Member Musto in January 2012.
Issues
[13]
This
case raises two (2) questions:
a.
Did the member err in
not considering the danger opinion issued by the delegate of the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration?
b.
Did the member err in
law by exceeding his jurisdiction in determining that the respondent had not
breached a release condition and in not requiring a bond further to this
determination?
Statutory provisions
[14]
The
relevant provisions of the Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [the Regulations], are reproduced in an appendix
to this judgment. However, it is useful to recall that section 58 of the
Act provides that the Immigration Division shall order the release of a
permanent resident or a foreign national unless it is satisfied that certain
factors exist, for example, that the permanent resident or the foreign national
is a danger to the public or is unlikely to appear for examination, an
admissibility hearing or removal from Canada. Section 244 of the
Regulations states that certain factors shall be taken into consideration when
assessing, among other things, whether a person is a danger to the public (paragraph 244(b)).
The factors to be taken into account to establish whether a person is a danger
to the public are set out in section 246 of the Regulations and include a
danger opinion issued by the Minister (paragraph 246(a)).
Subsection 49(4) of the Regulations, meanwhile, provides that a sum of
money deposited is forfeited upon failure to comply with a condition imposed.
Standard of review
[15]
The
parties did not make any arguments regarding the standard of review applicable
to the issues in this case. The Court stated in Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Steer, 2011 FC 423, 388 FTR 37 [Steer],
that deciding whether or not a member erred by failing to consider the danger
opinion as required under the Regulations is a question of law and therefore
reviewable on the standard of correctness. In Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Sall, 2011 FC 682 at para 27, 391 FTR
123 [Sall], the Court found, rather, that this was a matter of the
member’s application of legal standards to the facts in this case, and that the
standard of review to be applied is therefore reasonableness.
[16]
In
the present case, the respondent acknowledges that the member must consider the
danger opinion but argues, rather, that he did consider it and rejected it. The
Court should therefore examine whether the member adequately considered the
danger opinion, which is a question of mixed fact and law that must be reviewed
on the reasonableness standard. The Court will therefore intervene only if the member’s
finding falls outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190).
[17]
As
regards the issue of whether the member could act as he did regarding the bond,
this is a question of fact that must also be reviewed on the reasonableness
standard (Dunsmuir, above).
Arguments
Applicant’s arguments
[18]
As a
preliminary remark, the applicant acknowledges that this application for
judicial review is moot because the respondent has already been released, given
that there was no condition preventing his immediate release. The applicant
states that he did not have an opportunity to file a motion in this Court to
challenge the respondent’s release. The applicant argues that the Court should
exercise its discretion to hear this application on the basis of the factors
set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Borowski, above, insisting that
it is in the public interest for the Court to rule on this issue.
[19]
The
applicant further submits that Member Nupponen did not consider the danger
opinion as prescribed by paragraph 58(1)(a) of the Act. The
applicant argues that the member stated, on four (4) occasions, that the danger
opinion [translation] “makes no
changes” and [translation] “makes
no difference in [the] case”, that [translation]
“as regards the danger, there is no change”, and that there [translation] “is no difference” (Applicant’s
Record, Reasons for Decision, pp 7-8). According to the applicant, this
proves that the member did not consider the danger opinion dated April 11,
2012, as he should have.
[20]
The
applicant cites Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)
v Steer, 2011 FC 423, 388 FTR 37 [Steer], in which the member had
been aware of the danger opinion but had not taken it into account in his
analysis. According to the applicant, the Court stated in Steer, above, that
paragraphs 58(1)(a) of the Act and 246(a) of the Regulations
require that a danger opinion be taken into account and that it is an important new element that must be considered as part of the
analysis (Steer,
above, at paras 18-19). The applicant notes that the danger opinion in the
present case refers to an assessment report completed by Quebec corrections
authorities in May 2011 which indicates that the respondent [translation] “lacks motivation and plays
down his criminal dynamics” and [translation]
“shows little remorse or empathy towards his victims”, and that [translation] “previous and current
punishments have been insufficient to prod the respondent into making real
changes to his way of life” (Applicant’s Record, Affidavit of Hélène Jarry, Exhibit “A”,
p 22).
[21]
The
applicant notes that Member Musto had correctly concluded that the danger
opinion was [translation] “an
important factor, because there is an entire analysis that was done behind
[this opinion] . . .” (Applicant’s Record, Affidavit of Hélène Jarry,
Exhibit “E”, p 53). According to the applicant, Member Nupponen’s
approach is therefore inconsistent with the words of the Act and Parliament’s
intent.
[22]
As
regards the bond, the applicant argues that the $500 bond, ordered by
Member Musto on January 23, 2012, was maintained for the same amount
at the detention review (Applicant’s Record, Affidavit of Hélène Jarry, Exhibit “E”,
p 55). The applicant states that Member Nupponen wrote that, in his
opinion, there had been no breach of condition justifying the forfeiture of
this sum and that he did not have to rule on compliance with a release
condition (Applicant’s Record, p 8). According to the applicant, although
this statement is consistent with the Regulations, Member Nupponen went on
to err by stating that there would be no bond and that the CBSA could do with
the $500 as it saw fit (Applicant’s Record, pp 8-9). According to the applicant,
in the member’s reasoning, there is a causal connection between his belief that
there was no breach of condition and his decision not to require a bond, which
is an error.
[23]
According
to the applicant, this reasoning is incorrect, for two (2) reasons. First,
subsection 49(4) of the Regulations states that on failure to comply with
a condition imposed, the bond is forfeited. The applicant therefore argues that
the Immigration Division need not consider the issue of compliance with the
conditions, since judicial review of an officer’s decision in this regard lies
to the Federal Court (citing Domitlia v Canada (Minister of Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 419, [2011] FCJ no 539 (QL), and Theodoropoulos
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 818, 140 ACWS
(3d) 331). The applicant submits that Member Nupponen exceeded his
jurisdiction in making a determination on the breach of condition noted by the
CBSA and in not requiring a guarantee accordingly. According to the applicant,
the member usurped the functions of the CBSA in respect of compliance with
conditions and assumed the role of this Court on judicial review.
[24]
Second,
the applicant submits that the respondent’s release without bond is
inconsistent with the previous decisions by other members of the Immigration
Division. According to the applicant, Member Nupponen did not give clear
and compelling reasons for departing from the previous decisions of his
colleagues (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and IImmigration) v Thanabalasingham
(CA), 2004 FCA 4, [2004] 3 FCR 572 [Thanabalasingham]; Canada (Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Karimi-Arshad, 2010 FC 964 at
para 16, 373 FTR 292). The applicant argues that the mere fact that the
member was satisfied that the respondent had complied with the release
conditions would not allow him to depart from the decisions rendered by the
other members.
Respondent’s arguments
[25]
In
his memorandum, the respondent did not present any arguments regarding the
Court’s discretion in this case.
[26]
As
regards the decision of Member Nupponen, the respondent submits that the
member considered the danger opinion dated April 11, 2012, but decided to
disregard it in his assessment of the danger, choosing to base his decision on
the respondent’s current situation rather than his criminal past as set out in
the opinion. According to the respondent, the member instead relied on the fact
that there had been no changes since his release on January 23, 2012. The
respondent submits that where the member says, [translation]
“For me, the opinion itself makes no difference in your case”, this
shows that he knows that the danger opinion has to be taken into consideration
but that it changes nothing in the particular circumstances of this case.
[27]
The
respondent submits that in Sall, above, the Court had found that this
excerpt showed that the member understood that the danger opinion itself was a
new fact but did not contain any new facts that would increase the danger to
the public (Sall, above, para 38). According to the respondent, Member Nupponen
did the same in the present case.
[28]
The
respondent also argues that the objectives of a detention review are different
from those of a danger opinion, and that it is possible for the member to
disagree with the Minister’s findings in the danger opinion. The respondent points
to a passage in Sall which indicates that political considerations may
come into play in a danger opinion prepared for the purposes of a possible
removal but would not be relevant in a detention assessment by a member of the Immigration
Division (Sall, above, at para 39).
[29]
As
regards the $500 bond, the respondent submits that the bond was not [translation] “maintained” by
Member Musto at the detention review of April 26, 2012, contrary to
the applicant’s claims at paragraph 37 of his memorandum. According to the
respondent, Member Musto simply remarked that the sum had not been forfeited
and was therefore still available to be used in a new alternative to the
respondent’s detention (Applicant’s Record, p 55).
[30]
The
respondent states that the applicant is confusing the powers of the CBSA with
those of the Immigration Division. The respondent submits that
subsection 49(4) of the Regulations gives the CBSA an exclusive
discretionary power to declare a bond to be forfeit when there has been a
breach of condition. The wording of section 46 of the Regulations is such
that this power also encompasses conditions imposed by the Immigration Division
under subsection 58(3) of the Act. According to the respondent, section 46 and subsection 49(4)
of the Regulations grant an exclusive power to seize, not an exclusive power to
determine whether a breach of condition has occurred. The respondent submits
that nothing in the Act states that the other players in the Canadian
immigration system are bound by the CBSA’s conclusions regarding breaches of
conditions. The respondent notes that the member’s role is to order an
individual’s release or detention, and that to do so, the member must assess
whether the individual represents a flight risk or a danger (criteria in
paragraphs 58(1)(a) and (b) of the Act). Breaches of conditions
previously imposed by the Immigration Division are an element that must be
considered; according to the respondent, it is from this perspective that a
member can judge whether a breach has occurred. For the respondent, as the CBSA’s
findings are not binding on the Immigration Division, the findings of a member
cannot be imposed on the CBSA when it exercises its power to seize a bond.
[31]
The
respondent therefore submits that in finding there to be no breach of
condition, the member is not encroaching on the CBSA’s powers to seize the bond
but is, rather, reviewing the criteria in section 58 of the Act and
assessing whether the respondent will comply with the conditions on his
release.
[32]
Although
the respondent acknowledges that Member Nupponen departs from the decision
of Member Musto with regard to the need for a bond, he argues that the
member has good reason to do so. The respondent submits that his compliance is
new evidence that justifies not imposing a bond.
Analysis
[33]
In
his memorandum, the respondent did not submit any arguments regarding the
Court’s exercise of its discretion but did make submissions on this point at
the hearing. Having heard the parties at the hearing before this Court and
having taken into consideration the factors set out in Borowski, above,
as well as the specific circumstances of this case, the Court will exercise
its discretion.
[34]
The Court
will therefore begin by addressing the question of the danger opinion of the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.
A. The danger
opinion of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
[35]
It
is important to bear in mind that considering the opinion is relevant in
assessing the danger to public safety that the respondent represents. First,
the Court notes that Member Musto had doubts about the events of
April 16 and 17, 2012, and decided it would be more prudent to keep the
respondent in detention in her decision dated April 26, 2012. She also
stated that she did not think that detention until removal was necessary but
that there were facts that would have to be clarified by the CBSA. Upon reading
the decision of Member Nupponen, it becomes clear that
Member Nupponen did not depart from the decision: he was given a statutory
declaration by the CBSA officer, and he listened to the respondent’s testimony
regarding the misunderstanding surrounding the April 17 appointment. Member Nupponen
preferred the respondent’s testimony, thereby clearing up the doubts identified
by Member Musto. In this sense, he does not depart from the previous
decisions of Member Musto (Thanabalasingham, above).
[36]
The
Court is of the opinion that the present case parallels the findings made by
the member in Sall, above. At paragraph 18 of Sall, Justice de
Montigny states as follows:
18. . . . [The Member] also recognized that he had to consider
the danger opinion that had been issued by the Minister . . . . In
that regard, the Member explained that the opinion itself did not increase the
respondent’s degree of dangerousness, since the opinion merely recorded a
factual situation that was already true at the time of his conviction in 2009 . . . .
[37]
In
the present case, Member Nupponen mentions the danger opinion and is aware
of its contents, but he finds that the danger opinion does not alter the danger
that the respondent has represented since the decision to release him on
January 23, 2012. In Steer, above, a danger opinion had been issued
in 2006 and in 2010, but the member’s reasons showed that he thought that this
was essentially the same danger that had been considered and addressed in 2006.
In the case at hand, Member Nupponen did not ignore the danger opinion,
and the opinion which Member Musto and Member Nupponen refer to is
the same one. Furthermore, although the member’s reasons in Sall regarding
the danger opinion were more detailed, the underlying conclusion was the same:
[translation] “the danger opinion
in itself does not increase the degree—your degree of dangerousness—since the
danger opinion reports a factual situation that already existed when you were
convicted in 2009” (Sall, above, at para 37).
[38]
Moreover,
it appears from the reasons of Member Musto, dated April 26, 2012,
that she considers the danger opinion to be important, in that it makes the
individual’s removal likely: [translation]
“The effect of this decision is that the Agency may now proceed with a
removal or work towards an official removal from Canada. . . . Before,
it was possible; now, it becomes more likely. So it is an important factor, in
that sense” (Applicant’s Record, p 54). She appears to indicate, however,
as Member Nupponen reiterates in his decision, that the danger opinion in
itself does not mean that the respondent is more dangerous now than when the
conditions were imposed on him on January 23, 2012:
[translation]
What I have to look at today is whether this decision means that you
represent a greater danger today than yesterday or than when I released you on
January 23? I do not think that this decision, in itself, suddenly
makes you more dangerous. However, this decision, as I explained to you,
Mr. Dragicevic, has a significant impact on your future in Canada.
(Applicant’s Record, pp 53-54)
[Emphasis added.]
[39]
The
opinion is important for the flight risk criterion because it crystallizes the
likelihood of a removal, which previously was only hypothetical, but
Member Musto and Member Nupponen appear to agree that the opinion
alone does not affect the danger the respondent represents, apart from
confirming the crimes he committed in the past. In addition, Member Nupponen
acknowledges that the flight risk changed, stating that [translation] “yes, it is true that your
removal is a little closer at hand than before, but I see in the file that you
have fully complied with the conditions in the past and will continue to do so
in the future” (Applicant’s Record, p 8). The Court sees no contradictions
in how Member Musto and Member Nupponen treated the danger opinion,
and it cannot agree with the applicant’s argument to this effect.
[40]
The Court
notes that the standard of review is the reasonableness standard. Although Member Nupponen
could have dealt with the danger opinion at greater length in his reasons for
releasing the respondent, the Court must consider the decision as a whole, in
light of the record (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland
and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708). The
applicant’s argument regarding the member’s duty to analyze the danger opinion in
his decision must also be rejected in this case. On the one hand, the applicant
has not clearly defined the degree of analysis that is supposedly required; on
the other hand, a reading of the decision reveals that Member Nupponen had
the danger opinion in mind, as he made reference to it, and the Court can see
that he took it into consideration.
[41]
It
should also be noted that Member Musto had already dealt with the danger
opinion and that this item of evidence was therefore not before Member Nupponen
for the first time. The Court finds that, in the circumstances, it was
reasonable for Member Nupponen to find, as Member Musto had, that the
opinion did not increase the level of danger to society now represented by the
respondent, and that the conditions previously imposed were still adequate to
counter that danger. The applicant’s argument on this point, too, must
therefore be rejected.
[42]
The
Court will now turn to the issue of the $500 bond.
B. The $500 bond
[43]
The
applicant submits that the member erred in his reasons in finding that there
was a causal connection between his finding that there had been no breach of
condition and the decision not to impose a $500 bond. The respondent, however,
states that Member Nupponen considered the issue of the breach of
condition as a factor in assessing the flight risk, as required under
paragraph 245(d) of the Regulations.
[44]
The
Court notes that Member Nupponen stated that he could not tell the
Minister what to do with the $500 bond, which apparently had not been
forfeited. Member Nupponen stated that [translation]
“the Minister may do whatever the Minister wishes with the $500 that was
posted in the past” (Applicant’s Record, p 9). He then stated that he was
satisfied that the conditions had been respected in the past and that the
respondent and his mother were going to make every effort to comply with the conditions.
Member Nupponen decided that there was no need to post a new bond because,
in light of the testimony, he found that the respondent’s failure to report was
not a breach of condition, but was rather the result of a misunderstanding.
[45]
The
respondent acknowledges that this is a change in the conditions that had been
imposed previously by Member Musto but argues that this change is
justified. The Court is of the opinion that Member Nupponen did not err in
not requiring a new $500 bond. The Court finds that the member stated that if
the CBSA thought that there had been a breach of conditions, it could seize the
$500 sum, as subsection 49(4) of the Regulations permits. The Court notes
that the member is not suggesting that the CBSA should not act on a breach of
condition and not seize the sum offered as a deposit. On the contrary, he
states that the bond is still available to the Minister if the Minister decided
that there was cause to seize it, but he does not think that a new sum would be
necessary, given that, in his view, the respondent had complied with the
conditions in the past. Indeed, Member Nupponen is not saying that the
$500 sum is still serving as a bond because no breach of condition occurred;
rather, he is saying that, regardless of whether or not the CBSA decides to
seize the bond, he will not impose a new one.
[46]
Furthermore,
the Court notes that there is no suggestion here of Member Nupponen
carrying over the $500 bond imposed by Member Musto and issuing a
direction to that effect to the CBSA. Such a scenario could clearly have raised
some issues. Here, Member Nupponen stated that he would not impose a new
bond. That being the case, it is nevertheless important to note that, out of
respect for the respective roles of the CBSA and the member, Member Nupponen
would have done better to limit his remarks regarding the forfeiture of the
bond. Although Member Nupponen’s comments in this case are ill-considered,
it is nevertheless difficult for this Court to conclude in the circumstances,
as the applicant would have it, that Member Nupponen, in making his
comments, is usurping the CBSA’s jurisdiction.
[47]
Since
this is a departure from the previous decision of Member Musto, Member Nupponen
did, however, have to give clear and compelling reasons for this change,
namely, the lack of the need for a bond (Thanabalasingham, above).
[48]
Indeed,
if there is no change in the level of danger that the respondent represents,
the same conditions should apply: it is up to the member to justify why the
$500 bond is no longer needed. It appears from the reasons of Member Nupponen
that he thinks that a new bond is not needed because the respondent has
complied with the conditions in the past—the failure to report on April 17
having been deemed a misunderstanding—and that he is satisfied that the
respondent and his mother are committed to complying with the conditions in the
future. The Court also notes that the respondent was represented by counsel
before Member Nupponen, which was not the case before Member Musto. Upon
reading the record and hearing the parties, it becomes clear that the
applicant’s representations suggest a disagreement with the member’s
assessment. The Court is of the opinion that it was up to Member Nupponen to
assess the situation after hearing the parties and that he made no error,
having regard to the facts of this case, in maintaining the conditions imposed
by Member Musto without the $500 bond. The finding that Member Nupponen
made falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible
in respect of the facts and law.
[49]
In
light of the facts of this case and the evidence in the record, the applicant has
not satisfied this Court that its intervention is warranted.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that the application for judicial review be dismissed. No question is
certified.
“Richard Boivin”
Certified true translation
Michael Palles
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