Date: 20080801
Docket: T-1267-07
Citation: 2008 FC 932
Ottawa, Ontario, August 1, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
ALBERT
ANGUS and WALTER JANVIER
Applicants
and
CHIPEWYAN PRAIRIE FIRST
NATION TRIBAL COUNCIL
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The
Applicants seek judicial review of a Band Council Resolution passed by the
Respondent, Chipewyan Prairie First Nation Tribal Council (Band Council), dated
June 11, 2007 (Resolution). In the Resolution, the Band Council dismissed Mr.
Albert Angus, who was appointed by the previous band council as the Electoral
Officer for the nomination meeting and elections of the Chipewyan Prairie First
Nation (CPFN) Chief and Tribal Councillors held February 21, 2007 and February
28, 2007, respectively (the Election), as well as for any appeals launched in
relation to that Election. The Applicants also ask the Court to quash the Resolution
and to issue an order of mandamus requiring the Band Council to permit the
election appeal of the Applicant, Walter Janvier, to proceed in accordance with
the CPFN Election Code and, for that purpose, to provide the necessary funds to
allow Mr. Angus, who is the Electoral Officer, to complete his mandate regarding
the appeals pursuant to the Election Code.
BACKGROUND
The Election
and Appeals
[2]
Mr.
Albert Angus is a member of the Thunderchild Indian Reserve in Saskatchewan. He was
appointed as the Electoral Officer by the previous band council of CPFN by a Resolution
dated January 24, 2007.
[3]
The
other Applicant, Mr. Walter Janvier, is a member of the CPFN and was the
elected Chief of CPFN from 1984 to 2007, with the exception of one term in the
mid-nineties when
he ran for elected Chief
of CPFN but was unsuccessful.
[4]
The
CPFN Indian Reserve IR No. 194A is located in Fort McMurray, Alberta. The
Respondent Band Council currently consists of Councillors James Janvier, Marcel
Janvier, Stuart Janvier and Chief Vern Janvier, who were elected on February
28, 2007.
[5]
The Chief and
Councillors of the CPFN are elected by Band custom as permitted by section 2 of
the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 and are not subject to section 74 of
the Indian Act or the Indian Band Elections Regulations, C.R.C.,
c. 952. Rather, elections and appeals of elections of the Band Council are governed
by the CPFN Election Code (Election Code). At the time of the Election, no
regulations or by-laws had been passed pursuant to the Election Code. Under section
1 of the Election Code, CPFN holds staggered elections in which one-third of
the Band Council is elected each year.
[6]
The
Election Code allows an appeal of an election result in accordance with the
following provisions:
a.
An appeal
of an election result may be made by any five eligible voters if made in
writing and delivered to the electoral officer within 14 days of the election.
b.
Upon an
appeal being made, a Band meeting of eligible voters shall be called by the
electoral officer and at that meeting, an appeal committee of three persons
selected from a list of names of people, who are willing to serve on an appeal
committee for the Chipewyan Prairie First Nation and are recommended as
qualified by the electoral officer, will be appointed by the Band members to
hear the appeal.
c.
The appeal
committee will hear the reasons for the appeal and make any inquiry which it
decides is necessary to determine the appeal. Upon hearing the appeal and
completing any inquiry they might make, the appeals committee will decide on
the appeal.
d.
Grounds
for an appeal shall be:
1.
denial of
eligible voters’ right to vote;
2.
voting by
ineligible voters;
3.
the
candidacy of an ineligible candidate; or
4.
election
fraud.
e.
Where the
appeal committee finds that the appeal complaint is proven and its impact was
sufficient to affect the election result, the appeals committee will declare
the election invalid.
f.
If the
appeal committee is of the opinion that the appeal compliant [sic],
although proven, was not of significance, the committee may deny the appeal.
[7]
At
the conclusion of the Election, Mr. Angus prepared a report dated March 4, 2007
detailing the Election results and declaring Vern Janvier as the Chief and
Stuart Janvier as a Councillor of CPFN.
[8]
Subsequent
to the Election, two Notices of Appeal were filed in accordance with the
Election Code contesting the Election results. One appeal, dated March 5, 2007,
was filed by Mr. Walter Janvier (Janvier Appeal). The Janvier Appeal was signed
by the required 5 voters and was subsequently served on the Electoral Officer
within 14 days of the Election, which is the time allotted under the Election
Code.
[9]
The
Janvier Appeal sets out the following grounds of appeal:
a.
Many of
the eligible voters of the CPFN were intimidated and harassed by third parties
on the said election date in the Communiplex at which the voting took place.
b.
There was
insufficient security for the said voting process to proceed in an orderly
manner, and in one instance, the RCMP had to be called in when a candidate was
threatened with assault at the said Communiplex.
c.
Many
non-eligible voters were allowed to cast votes which spoiled the election
result.
d.
Ballot
boxes opened late and closed later than posted election times causing many
voters who were at the Centre to leave due to the tardiness as well as the
intimidating climate.
e.
The
Electoral Officer’s control over the Election was questionable, since the
Electoral Officer was kept distracted by persons inquiring about their names on
the list and trying to prove eligibility on the day of election while a line
built up behind them.
[10]
The
basis of the second appeal, also dated March 5, 2007, filed by Mr. Thomas
Morice, a former Councillor who was defeated in the Election, was that names
were added to the voters list on the day of the Election. Mr. Morice is not a
party to this application but both appeals remain outstanding and unresolved.
Correspondence
between Mr. Angus and the Band Council
[11]
By
letter dated March 16, 2007, Mr. Angus, in his capacity as Electoral Officer,
gave notice to Councillor Stuart Janvier that two Notices of Appeal were
received with respect to the Election. He advised that copies of the Appeals
were available upon request. Councillor Stuart Janvier, on behalf of the Band
Council, sent a letter, dated March 21, 2007, to Mr. Angus stating that the
Band Council would not recognize the validity of the Notices of Appeal unless
the Band Council received copies of the Notices.
[12]
It
is not altogether clear when the Respondent received copies of the Notices of
Appeal. Attached as an exhibit to the affidavit of Albert Angus sworn on July
13, 2007 is a facsimile transmittal cover sheet dated April 3, 2007 to former Councillor
Shaun Janvier in which Mr. Angus purportedly sent copies of the Notices of
Appeal. The facsimile, however, contains no indication that it was actually
transmitted. On April 10, 2007, Ms. Vivienne Beisel, previous counsel for the
Band Council, sent a letter to Mr. Angus stating that she had yet to receive
copies of the Appeals and again requested that Mr. Angus provide copies of the
Notices of Appeal. It is clear, however, that the Band Council received copies
of the Notices of Appeal by at least April 18, 2007.
[13]
By
letter to the Band Council, also dated April 10, 2007, Mr. Angus advised that
he had not yet received funds from the Band Council for the purpose of
initiating and completing the appeals. He warned that “If no funds are received
this week, I will have no choice but to hold all events at the Thunderchild
Reserve where I live and accept funds from the appellants who may offer to
contribute to the appeal costs.” Mr. Angus also provided the Band Council with
a budget which totalled $24,711.50, detailing the estimated fees and costs for
carrying out the appeals.
[14]
By
letter dated April 12, 2007, the Band Council informed Mr. Angus that, until it
received copies of the Notices of Appeal, the Band Council could not
acknowledge or participate in the appeals process. Further, the Band Council
stated that it was opposed to having CPFN business handled on a different
Reserve, especially one in another province.
[15]
By
letter dated April 18, 2007, Mr. Angus faxed and mailed copies of the Notices
of Appeal to the Band Council. He also requested a response from the Band
Council concerning the approval of a budget to conduct the appeals.
[16]
Ms.
Beisel informed Mr. Angus by letter dated May 3, 2007, that the Band Council
was discussing the appeals procedure and budget and that Chief Vern Janvier
would respond to Mr. Angus within two weeks. By letter dated May 29, 2007, Mr.
Angus, not having received a response, gave formal notice to the Band Council
that he would be taking action to effect the appeal hearings by the following
week if he did not receive written notification from the Band Council as to
whether or not the Council was “going to cooperate and provide funds to
finance” the appeals.
[17]
On
June 11, 2007, the Band Council passed a Resolution severing its ties with Mr.
Angus as Electoral Officer of the Election and stated that “for the genuine
purpose of the wellbeing and harmony of the membership of the [CPFN]” the Band
Council would not “approve or tolerate any suggestion that [the] community
should be burdened with another election other than what the norm has been for
years.” This BCR of June 11, 2007 constitutes the Resolution and decision under
review in this application.
The
Settlement
[18]
On
October 22, 2007, Chief Vern Janvier, Ms. Beisel, Mr. Angus, Mr. Walter
Janvier, and the Applicants’ previous counsel (Mr. David Holt) met to conduct
cross-examinations on the affidavits filed in this matter. However,
cross-examinations were not conducted and, according to the Applicants, a
settlement was reached to resolve the dispute underlying these proceedings. The
Respondents deny that any properly authorized settlement was ever concluded and
they say that further litigation may be necessary to resolve the differences
between the parties on this matter. However, for purposes of the present
application, the Applicants ask the Court to note that on October 25, 2007, the
terms of the Settlement, as drafted by Ms. Beisel, were confirmed by counsel
for both parties. Among other things the Settlement included the following
provisions:
a.
Chief and
Council undertake to revoke the BCR of June 11, 2007 to allow the election
appeal to proceed in accordance with the terms of the agreement set out below.
b.
Albert
Angus will qualify at least five candidates who are un-biased, objective, and
removed from the politics and business dealings of the CPDFN. Mr. Angus will
make best efforts to complete the initial selection and qualification of
candidates within 30 days of today. He will release the resumes of these
individuals to the community in advance of the Band meeting.
c.
Alberta [sic] Angus will
attend a Band meeting for the purpose of selecting three Appeal Committee
members from the five qualified candidates. Selection of Appeal committee
members will be some form of secret ballot.
d.
Upon
selection of the Appeal Committee, and writing a memo to the community and
Appeal Committee members, Albert Angus’ role as Electoral Officer will be
complete (subject to being called as a witness by the Appeals Committee).
e.
CPDFN will
pay to Albert Angus $13,000.00, by direct deposit into his bank account, to
carry out his duties as described above.
f.
Upon
payment to Albert Angus and the revocation of the BCR of June 11, 2007, Walter
Janvier will withdraw the petition circulating for the removal of the chief
from his office and the Plaintiffs Albert Angus and Walter Janvier undertake to
discontinue the above-named action [T-1267-07, the application herein] without
costs.
[…]
g.
The Appeal
Committee will hear the Appeal in the community.
[…]
[19]
On November 7, 2007,
pursuant to the terms of the Settlement, Mr. Angus forwarded a fax to the Band
Council, which contained the names and resumes of five individuals he had
qualified to be considered to sit on the Appeal Committee. In the facsimile
letter, Mr. Angus also acknowledged receipt of the “deposit of fees of
$13,000.00” from the Band Council.
[20]
However,
notwithstanding the above communications, the Band Council, by Resolution dated
January 28, 2008, reaffirmed its earlier Decision contained in the June 11,
2007 BCR to remove Mr. Angus as Electoral Officer and appointed Ms. Shirley
Janvier as Substitute Electoral Officer "to complete any unfinished duties
in relation to the election held on February 28, 2007."
[21]
The Applicants argue
that the Band Council has taken no further steps to allow the appeals to
proceed since making the payment of $13,000 to Mr. Angus, and has given no
notice to the Applicants of its decision not to allow the appeal to proceed.
The Applicant's further note that by April 3, 2008, in compliance with an Order
made by Case Management Prothonotary Lafrenière, all cross-examinations were
conducted but only a partial reply to the undertakings given by the Band
Council's affiants, namely Councilor Stuart Janvier and Chief Vern Janvier, was
provided by the time the Applicants filed their Memorandum of Law for this
application, despite several demands by the Applicants. The Applicants say that
the refused undertakings are relevant to the issues in this application and are
further evidence of the Band Council’s bad faith in resisting the appeals
process and refusing to acknowledge responsibility for the ensuing problems.
[22]
The Band Council
states that the $13,000 payment to Mr. Angus was not properly authorized and
argues that the Settlement is not legally enforceable.
[23]
At the hearing of
this matter in Vancouver on June 19, 2008, the Respondents
conceded that the appeals should be heard and that the Court should order that
this occur in accordance with consent wording to be agreed upon by both sides.
The Respondents agree that the only remaining issue, other than costs, is
whether Mr. Angus, as Electoral Officer, should play a role in the Appeals. For
various reasons the Respondents would like Ms. Shirley Janvier, the Deputy
Electoral Officer, to organize the appeals process.
[24]
Subsequent to the
hearing in Vancouver, the parties have provided to the Court
their consent wording for the holding on the appeals and have asked that it be
included in any Order I made for this application.
ISSUES
[25]
The issues on this
application for judicial review are:
[25]
a.
Is the June 11, 2007 Resolution
a decision reviewable by this Court pursuant to the Federal Courts Act?
b.
Did the Band Council
act without jurisdiction or act beyond its jurisdiction in passing the June 11,
2007 Resolution and reaffirming that Resolution on January 28, 2008?
c.
If the second issue
is answered in the affirmative, are the Applicants entitled to the remedy of
mandamus which they seek?
[26]
Because
the Respondents have now conceded that the appeals must be heard and have
agreed with the Applicants on consent wording to be included in an order of the
Court, I do not think that the third issue remains a point of contention
between the parties. Consequently, there is no longer a need to consider the
request for mandamus.
ANALYSIS
1.
Is the
June 11, 2007 Resolution a decision reviewable by this Court pursuant to the
Federal Courts Act?
[27]
The June 11, 2007 Resolution
is a final decision of the Band Council reviewable pursuant to the Federal
Court's jurisdiction under section 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 (the Act). Section 18.1(4) of the Act provides:
18.1(4) The Federal
Court may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the federal
board, commission or other tribunal
( a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its
jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
( b) failed to observe a principle of natural
justice, procedural fairness or other procedure that it was required by law
to observe;
( c) erred in law in making a decision or an
order, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record;
( d) based its decision or order on an erroneous
finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without
regard for the material before it;
( e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud
or perjured evidence; or
( f) acted
in any other way that was contrary to law.
|
18.1(4) Les mesures prévues au paragraphe (3) sont prises si la
Cour fédérale est convaincue que l'office fédéral, selon le cas :
a) a agi sans compétence, outrepassé celle-ci ou refusé de l’exercer;
b) n’a pas observé un principe de justice naturelle ou d’équité
procédurale ou toute autre procédure qu’il était légalement tenu de respecter;
c) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance entachée d’une erreur de
droit, que celle-ci soit manifeste ou non au vu du dossier;
d) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance fondée sur une conclusion de
fait erronée, tirée de façon abusive ou arbitraire ou sans tenir compte des
éléments dont il dispose;
e) a agi ou omis d’agir en raison d’une fraude ou de faux témoignages;
f) a agi de toute autre façon
contraire à la loi.
|
[28]
Section 2(1) of the
Act gives a broad definition to “federal board, commission or other tribunal”:
“federal
board, commission or other tribunal” means any body, person or persons
having, exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction or powers conferred
by or under an Act of Parliament or by or under an order made pursuant to a
prerogative of the Crown, other than the Tax Court of Canada or any of its
judges, any such body constituted or established by or under a law of a
province or any such person or persons appointed under or in accordance with
a law of a province or under section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867
; […]
|
« office fédéral » Conseil, bureau, commission ou autre
organisme, ou personne ou groupe de personnes, ayant, exerçant ou censé
exercer une compétence ou des pouvoirs prévus par une loi fédérale ou par une
ordonnance prise en vertu d'une prérogative royale, à l'exclusion de la Cour
canadienne de l'impôt et ses juges, d'un organisme constitué sous le régime
d'une loi provinciale ou d'une personne ou d'un groupe de personnes nommées
aux termes d'une loi provinciale ou de l'article 96 de la Loi
constitutionnelle de 1867. […]
|
[29]
In Gabriel v. Canatonquin, [1978] 1 F.C. 124, aff’d [1980]
2 F.C. 792 (FCA), this Court held that a band council falls within the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court where the election of the band council took
place pursuant to band custom and not in accordance with the Indian Act.
More recently in Vollant v. Sioui (2006) F.T.R. 48, 2006 FC 487, Justice
de Montigny succinctly summarized the state of the law on this issue as
follows:
25. It is now settled
law that decisions taken by a band council, when it exercises, or is deemed to
exercise, its power to govern the band may be judicially reviewed by the
Federal Court. The case law is replete with decisions holding that a band
council is, for purposes of section 18 of the Federal Courts Act, “a federal
board, commission or other tribunal:” see, inter alia, Rider v. Ear (1979),
103 D.L.R.(3d) 168 (Alta. S.C.); Canatonquin v. Gabriel, [1980] 2 F.C.
792 (F.C.A.) (QL); Coalition To Save Northern Flood v. Canada (1995),
102 Man R. (2d) 223 (Man. C.A.). This is true not only when a council exercises
the power it was explicitly granted by a federal statute, but also when the
contested decision is based on a custom; this is so simply because it is the Indian
Act itself, more specifically subsection 2(1) of the Act, that recognizes
the legal character of the custom: see Francis v. Mohawk Council of
Kanesatake, [2003] 4 F.C. 1133 (QL), at paragraphs 13-17 (F.C.); Conatonquin
v. Gabriel, supra; Frank v. Bottle, [1993] F.C.J. No. 670 (QL); Scrimbitt
v. Sakimay Indian Band Council (T.D.), [2000] 1 F.C. 513. Therefore,
resolutions of a band council are considered decisions under the Federal Courts
Act and may be subject to judicial review.
[30]
Following this line of jurisprudence, it is clear that the Band
Council is a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” within the meaning
of the Federal Courts Act and the June 11, 2007 Resolution at issue in
this application is a decision reviewable by this Court.
[30]
2. Did the Band
Council act without jurisdiction or act beyond its jurisdiction in passing the
June 11, 2007 Resolution?
Standard
of Review
[31]
The Applicants
submit that the issue is one of jurisdiction and thus the applicable standard
of review, following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, is correctness. The
Applicants rely on this Court's decision in Gamblin v. Norway (2000),
198 F.T.R. 242 at para. 39, citing C.P. Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band,
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 3, for the principle that, in matters of jurisdiction, any
decision by a band council must be correct and little deference is due by a
reviewing court. Further, as stated by Justice Beaudry in Martselos v. Salt
River First Nation, 2008 FC 8 at para. 16, “no deference is owed to the
council in determining whether their powers were exercised in accordance with
the Customary Election Regulations.”
[32]
The Respondent agrees
that, in matters of jurisdiction, the standard of review is correctness, but
argues that once it is determined that the Band Council had jurisdiction to
remove Mr. Angus as Electoral Officer, the Court should afford the Band Council
considerable deference as regards its decision to remove Mr. Angus as Electoral
Officer. The Band Council cites and relies upon Pete v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 993 at para. 75 [Pete],
wherein I held as follows:
75. It is true, of course, that there
might have been other ways for INAC and the Band Council to handle the
situation. But that does not mean they were wrong to do what they did. They
have obligations and feelings too. They needed to assess the situation and act
in accordance with their respective duties to the First Nation and the
Applicant. I can find no convincing evidence of any reason or motivation for
removing the Applicant as Chief Electoral Officer on this occasion other than
the clearly stated one of ensuring that the community retain its confidence in
the election process, and the Election itself be managed in a fair and
efficient manner. It is not for the Court to try and second guess, or
substitute its discretion, for the Band Council or INAC. There was nothing
unreasonable, or certainly patently unreasonable, about what they did.
[33]
In my view, the
jurisdictional issue in this case, specifically whether the Band Council acted
beyond its jurisdiction when it passed the June 11, 2007 BCR is reviewable on a
standard of correctness. If it is found that the Band Council acted within its
jurisdiction, then the applicable standard of review of the Band Council’s
decision to remove Mr. Angus as Electoral Officer and to halt further
proceedings regarding the Election raise issues of fairness and natural justice
and should also be reviewed under a standard of correctness.
Arguments
[34]
In support of their
argument that the Band Council acted without jurisdiction or beyond its
jurisdiction, the Applicants characterize the Band Council’s June 11, 2007 Resolution
as a decision refusing an election appeal and removing the Electoral Officer.
[35]
With respect to the
Band Council’s decision to terminate Mr. Angus as Electoral Officer, the
Applicants submit that, since the Election Code regulates all matters
pertaining to the election of the Band Council, any authority to terminate Mr.
Angus must flow from the Election Code. Relying on section 4 of the Election
Code, the Applicants argue that the Election Code expressly provides that the
Electoral Officer is appointed by the band council and his or her appointment
is to continue in order to “uphold the provisions of the Election Code,”
including any appeal of an election. The Applicants also argue that the present
Band Council has no authority under the Election Code to interfere with a
decision to appoint the Electoral Officer made by the previous band council.
They submit that the Electoral Officer occupies a public office and has the
powers and authority given to him by the Election Code. Thus, it is outside the
present Band Council’s jurisdiction to remove him.
[36]
The Applicants also
submit that the Band Council’s Decision constitutes a denial of an election appeal.
They argue that the Band Council has ignored the process set out in the
Election Code and that there is no authority conferred on the Band Council to
make a decision affecting the election procedure without first complying with
the rules for CPFN elections as codified in the Election Code. The Applicants
submit that the Election Code sets out a clear procedure to deal with election appeals.
As provided by section 1 of the Election Code, the Applicants submit that the
process begins with a notice of appeal made in writing by five eligible voters
and delivered to the electoral officer within 14 days of the election. The
Applicants argue that, in the present case, the Electoral Officer did receive two
Notices of Appeal within 14 days of the Election which were in writing and duly
signed by five eligible voters. The Applicants note that, upon receiving the
two Notices of Appeal, the Electoral Officer prepared a budget for the election
appeal and provided the budget and the Notices of Appeal to the Band Council. By
mid-April 2007, the Band Council required no further documentation from the
Electoral Officer to proceed with an appeal of the Election. Once the Band
Council was in possession of all necessary documentation, the Applicants say it
was required to allow the Electoral Officer to call a Band Meeting of eligible
voters to select an appeal committee pursuant to the Election Code. The
Applicants argue that the Band Council has ignored the established practice of
CPFN as set out in the Election Code and has acted without jurisdiction, or has
acted beyond its jurisdiction, by making a Decision affecting the election
procedure without first complying with the Election Code.
[37]
In response, the Band
Council argues that section 4 of the Electoral Code, contrary to the Applicants’
submission, does not expressly address the term of the Electoral Officer's
appointment, whether there is a power to remove the Electoral Officer, or
anything at all regarding election appeals. The Band Council also submits that
the Applicants submission that “the Band Council has no authority under the
Election Code to interfere with a decision to appoint the Electoral Officer
made by the previous Band Council” is incorrect. Beyond a general reference to
the Election Code, submits the Respondent, the Applicants offer no authority
for this legal premise.
[37]The Band Council argues that it was
within its jurisdiction to remove Mr. Angus as Electoral Officer, noting that
most statutes governing elections provide for the removal of election officials.
They refer to examples such as the Canadian Elections Act, S.C. 2009, c.
9, the Election Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-1, and the Local Authorities
Election Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-21.
[38]
The Band Council
relies on Pete, supra, wherein this Court considered whether
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, along with the Chief and Council of a first
nation, could remove an electoral officer. Although Pete involved an Indian
Act band election, the Respondents argue that the reasoning in that case is
instructive in the present case as the issue in Pete was also whether
the band council had the power to remove a sitting returning officer. In Pete,
the relevant provisions of the Indian Act, the Interpretation Act
and the Indian Band Election Regulations were considered and, although
there was no express provision providing for the removal of an electoral
officer, it was held that the band council in that case possessed such
authority based on the following reasoning at paragraphs 67-68:
67.
Any person fixed with
the role of ensuring, on behalf of the First Nation and the Minister, that band
council elections are carried out in accordance with the governing legislation
must have the confidence and approval of both the First Nation and the Minister
throughout the process. For instance, if they acted in a way that does not meet
with the Minister's approval and could not be removed, then the Minister would
have no means of ensuring that his or her general fiduciary duties are discharged.
Once the Minister perceives that the electoral process is threatened, it behooves
the Minister to act in any way necessary to discharge statutory and fiduciary
obligations. If this necessitates recommending the removal of an electoral
officer, then the Minister must be free to do this. If there was no way to
remove an electoral office once appointed, it would restrict the Minister's
ability to fulfill the statutory and fiduciary obligations imposed on the
Minister in this context as a matter of law, including the obligation to ensure
that band council elections are carried out in a fair and efficient manner that
is commensurate with the scheme of the Indian Act and the Regulations.
68. Consequently, I believe that INAC must
have the power to seek the removal of an electoral officer appointed under the
Regulations where such removal is required to ensure that the Minister's
obligations under the Indian Act and the Regulations are fulfilled. In a
situation where the electoral officer has been appointed by a band council with
the approval of the Minister, the appropriate procedure is to raise any
concerns with the band council in question and seek the council's concurrence
and approval. That is precisely what happened in this case. Of course, the
power cannot be exercised for any other purpose that is not commensurate with
the scheme, the specific provisions, and the general purpose of the Indian Act
and the Regulations. But there is no suggestion in this application that it
was.
[39]
After concluding that
the band council in Pete had the ability to remove an electoral officer,
the Court found that there were sufficient grounds for the electoral officer's
removal. In that case, the electoral officer had made an error in mailing out
ballots and had then attempted to correct her error by sending out further
corrected ballots. This caused confusion which was sufficient grounds for the
removal. It was also held that the electoral officer must have the confidence
of the First Nation. Because the electoral officer in Pete was found to
have lost the confidence of the First Nation, the electoral officer's
application for judicial review was refused.
[40]
The Band Council
submits that the CPFN Band Council has a similar power to remove an electoral
officer appointed under its Election Code, provided that the Electoral Officer
has lost the confidence of the CPFN Band Council. The Respondent puts forward
three arguments in support of its position.
[41]
First, it is argued
that the Election Code, which was created by CPFN, gives a general power to the
Band Council to make regulations, providing that “the Chief and Council may
approve such regulations and forms as is necessary to give effect to this
Indian Band custom election code.” This provision, argues the Band Council,
gives the Chief and Council a general power that includes the ability to remove
the Electoral Officer, provided that it is consistent with the general purposes
of the Election Code.
[42]
Second, the Band
Council submits that the general power given to the Chief and Council by the
Electoral Code includes a power to undo things that the previous Chief and
Council have done. According to the Election Code, the Chief and Council
appoint the Electoral Officer. Absent anything express to the contrary, the
Band Council submits that the Chief and Council have the authority to remove
the Electoral Officer provided that reasons for doing so are consistent with
the general purpose of the Election Code.
[43]
Third, the Band
Council submits that it has the authority to remove an electoral officer
appointed under its Election Code since it passed a Regulation on February 22,
2008 allowing for the removal and substitution of an electoral officer and, on
February 28, 2008, the Band Council passed a Resolution affirming the June 11,
2007 Resolution removing Mr. Angus as Electoral Officer and substituting Ms.
Shirley Janvier in his place.
[44]
The Band Council has
not addressed the Applicants’ challenge to its decision to refuse an election
appeal and, at the hearing of this matter, conceded that the election appeals
must take place in accordance with the consent wording contained in the Order
of the Court.
CONCLUSIONS
The Pete Decision
[45]
To
begin with, I think it has to be made clear that, apart from the fact that both
cases involve the removal of an electoral officer, the present case bears no
resemblance in fact or principle to the Pete case.
[46]
In
the Pete case, the Court was dealing with a pre-election removal of an
electoral officer under the Indian Act and governing regulations which
had been initiated by INAC in its fiduciary capacity, and which had the
cooperation of the pre-election band council.
[47]
In
the present case, the Court has been asked to deal with the purported removal
of an electoral officer by a post-election Band Council whose legitimacy has
been challenged by way of appeal under the CPFN’s own Election Code. After
resisting and thwarting the appeals for months, the Band Council has now
conceded that the appeals must be allowed to take place. All that remains in
dispute is whether Mr. Angus, the Electoral Officer appointed under the
Election Code by the previous band council, should be the one to identify and
present a list of possible Appeal Committee candidates to CPFN for
consideration by CPFN Band members.
[48]
The
Band Council has cited Pete to support a general power for a band
council to remove an electoral officer. But the facts and the reasoning in Pete
support no such general power.
General Principles in
the Present Case
[49]
In
the present case, any power of the Band Council to remove Mr. Angus as Electoral
Officer must be found in the CPFN Election Code or under some general principle
of elections law that has been incorporated into that Code.
[50]
The
Respondents in the present application occupy an extremely dubious position.
They are, in fact, now seeking to rationalize their previous thwarting of
legitimate appeals under the CPFN Election Code by saying they do not trust Mr.
Angus to do his duty. What they do not seem to appreciate is that, by delaying
and attempting to thwart the appeals process, they have undermined their own
legitimacy and have cast doubt upon their own motives and right to speak for
the CPFN people on this issue.
[51]
Mr.
Angus was properly appointed as Electoral Officer under the CPFN Election Code.
There is also no argument that the appeals in the present case have been made
in accordance with the Election Code. It is equally clear that, under the
Election Code, it is the Electoral Officer who must call a Band meeting of
eligible voters and place before them a list of names recommended by the
Electoral Officer. And, most important, it is the Band meeting of eligible
voters who will choose the Appeal Committee members.
[52]
As
the Election Code makes clear, no power is given to the newly-elected Band
Council to interfere in this process. And, of course, there is good reason for
this, as the present dispute makes abundantly clear. A band council whose
legitimacy to represent the CPFN people has been challenged following a
disputed election cannot have the power to interfere in, or thwart, the appeals
process laid down in the Election Code and the direct connection which the
Election Code prescribes between the Electoral Officer and eligible voters. Mr.
Angus’ duty is owed to the eligible voters of CPFN. It is not owed to a newly
elected Band Council with whom he may well find himself at loggerheads because
of election appeals. To allow the newly-elected Band Council to come between
the Electoral Officer and eligible voters would undermine the Election Code and
would thus thwart the will of the CPFN people as manifested in the Election
Code. The Electoral Officer must remain independent and free to operate within
the confines of the Election Code without interference from individuals or
groups who may well have a personal interest in ensuring that the obvious
intent of the appeals process under the Election Code is undermined.
[53]
In
the present case, the newly-elected Band Council has, a year and a half after
the disputed election, conceded that the appeals should be allowed to proceed.
In fact, the Band Council has had no good reason to resist those appeals and
the fact that it has taken significant effort and legal action to achieve this
concession reflects poorly upon the way they have handled this matter. If the
problem was Mr. Angus, that did not give the Band Council a right to resist the
whole appeals process. Their duty was to promptly address any concerns they had
regarding Mr. Angus in accordance with principles of fairness and natural
justice so that the legitimate appeals could be conducted efficiently and in a
timely manner under the Election Code. The fact that they chose not to proceed
in this way not only undermines the Election Code, it also casts considerable
doubt on the reasons they now put forward to attack Mr. Angus in an attempt to
rationalize the time and resources they have used to resist the appeals
process.
[54]
The
Band Council argues that the Election Code itself allows that “the Chief and
Council may approve such regulations and forms as is necessary to give effect
to this Indian Band Custom election code.”
[55]
Clearly,
however, this is a facilitating provision. It fixes the Band Council with the
duty of ensuring that the Election Code works in the way it says it works. It
does not provide a power to a newly-elected Band Council to modify or change
the primary functions and purpose of the Election Code by regulation or form.
Any such “regulation” or “form” must “give effect” to the Code. This provision
cannot be used by the Band Council to pass resolutions and enact Regulations
that allow it to thwart the appeals process or to come between the eligible
voters and their duly appointed Electoral Officer.
[56]
If a
newly-elected Band Council perceives problems regarding the Electoral Officer,
it is not without remedies to address such problems. Fixed with the obligation
to facilitate appeals under the Code, it clearly has a duty to ensure that the
financing required is appropriate and provided in a timely manner. It can also
bring its concerns to the attention of the Band at a duly convened band meeting
or, if they are relevant, at the meeting of eligible voters called to consider
the Appeals Committee proposals of the Electoral Officer. There are also legal
remedies available, including relief in this Court. In the present case,
however, the newly-elected Band Council has simply expended time and resources
in resisting legitimate election appeals and in attempting to rationalize its
conduct by leveling accusations at Mr. Angus that it has failed to substantiate
or address in a way that accords with the Election Code, other legal means
available to handle any concerns, or the principles of natural justice and procedural
fairness.
[57]
The
Band Council now says, after being brought into Court, that it will no longer
resist the election appeals but that it wants its own nominee, Ms. Shirley
Janvier, to replace Mr. Angus under the appeals process.
[58]
Ms.
Shirley Janvier may be an entirely qualified and disinterested officer who
would do a fine job. But that is not the point. To allow such a substitution
without a legal or substantive justification would be to accept the principle
that the Band Council is free to appoint its own nominee to conduct the appeals
process. Clearly, this is not contemplated by the Election Code and, in my
view, the Band Council has offered this Court no legal or factual basis that
would justify their acting outside of the Code or that can be reconciled with
the facts of this case and principles of natural justice and procedural
fairness.
[59]
The
Respondent Band Council has failed to establish any jurisdiction for its
attempt to remove Mr. Angus as Electoral Officer under the Election Code or
under any general law or procedure that might be applicable in the present
case.
The Complaints Against Mr. Angus
[60]
The Band Council
submits that it acted reasonably when it passed the June 11, 2007 Resolution to
remove Mr. Angus because he had lost the confidence of the Band Council and the
membership of the CPFN. In support of its argument on this point, the Band
Council lists the following factors:
a.
Mr. Angus only left Saskatchewan the evening before the election and did
not make adequate provision for preparation time;
b.
Polling opened late
on Election Day because Mr. Angus felt it necessary to go to the RCMP station
to make security arrangements (something that could have been done in advance,
with adequate preparation time);
c.
Mr. Angus needed to
summon the incumbent candidate for Chief to the polling station to try to keep
order;
d.
It took Mr. Angus
over a month to forward copies of the Notices of Appeal to the Band Council,
despite requests made by a councilor, legal counsel and the Chief and Council;
e.
Before forwarding
copies of the Notices of Appeal to Chief and Council, Mr. Angus drafted a
budget which, in the view of the Chief and Council, was excessive;
f.
Before forwarding
copies of the Notices of Appeal, Mr. Angus threatened to hold the appeal
process on a First Nation reserve in Saskatchewan – an idea that is offensive to the CPFN
people;
g.
Also before
forwarding copies of the Notice of Appeal, Mr. Angus threatened to fund the
appeal proceeding by asking appellants to pay what they were willing, which
raises fear that the appeal proceeding could be for sale and creates a reasonable
apprehension of bias;
h.
When Mr. Angus
assembled résumés of candidates for the appeal committee, he allegedly found
people from areas away from CPFN so as to avoid potential conflicts. CPFN
members assumed that members would be found from their surrounding community
and were not satisfied with an appeal committee comprised of people from so far
away or the costs associated with such process;
i.
Even though Mr. Angus
was seeking to avoid any candidates that would have a potential conflict, he
put forward someone contracted as a lead negotiator for a very important
transaction by the Athabasca Tribal Council – CPFN’s regional council. This
negotiator would have met with, taken instructions from, and would personally
be familiar with Walter Janvier, one of the appellants in the Election Appeal.
[61]
In addition to this
list, the Respondents point to the allegations made against Mr. Angus by the appellants
in their Notices of Appeal. These allegations, the Band Council argues,
directly impugn Mr. Angus’s conduct as Electoral Officer. Any further
involvement by Mr. Angus in the appeal process would, according to the Band
Council, undermine the CPFN’s confidence in the appeal process.
[62]
The Band Council also
argues that it is somehow “odd” that Mr. Walter Janvier has made common cause
with Mr. Angus while, at the same time, Mr. Walter Janvier is demanding that
Mr. Angus continue in his role as Electoral Officer, notwithstanding the
allegations of incompetence and malfeasance leveled against Mr. Angus by Mr.
Walter Janvier in his appeal of the Election. Further, the Band Council notes
that although one of the grounds of the Janvier Appeal was that “in one
instance, the RCMP had to be called when a candidate was threatened with
assault,” Mr. Walter Janvier was the candidate who became involved with the
RCMP and was asked by the RCMP to leave the polling station.
[63]
The Band Council further
argues that there is an additional oddity regarding the incident with the RCMP
on Election Day, namely an apparent dispute regarding the number of scrutineers
candidates were allowed to have at the polling site, and Mr. Angus refused to
control the situation himself and requested that Mr. Walter Janvier come to the
polling station to take control.
[64]
Finally, the Band
Council notes that, on March 2, 2007, Mr. Angus was suspended by the Law
Society of Saskatchewan and did not inform the Band Council. The Band Council
contends that Mr. Angus made a conscious choice not to inform them of his
suspension and that the Band Council learned of the suspension from their legal
counsel who had read about it in the Star Phoenix newspaper.
[65]
The Applicants argue
that Mr. Angus properly discharged his duties, and they submit that there is no
evidence of improper conduct or bias by the Electoral Officer. With respect to
the Band Council’s allegation that the budget drafted by Mr. Angus was
excessive, the Applicants submit that the funds enumerated in the budget were
required by the Electoral Officer in order to conduct the appeals. The
Applicants note that, although Councillor Stuart Janvier deposed in his
affidavit that the councilors collectively believed that the budget was
exaggerated, under cross-examination, Councillor Stuart Janvier conceded that
he had no experience in preparing such budgets and he had never seen such a
budget prior to reviewing the budget prepared by Mr. Angus. Further, Councillor
Stuart Janvier admitted that he did not speak for the other Councillors in
alleging the proposed budget was exaggerated. The Applicants also note that
Chief Vern Janvier admitted under cross-examination that he had no issue with
the Electoral Officer’s budget and that his real concern was with the three
days that Mr. Angus predicted would be required to complete the appeals
process. Chief Vern Janvier believed that the entire process could be completed
in one day.
[66]
In response to the
Band Council’s complaint regarding the candidates for the Appeals Committee put
forward for consideration by the eligible voters, the Applicants note that
under cross-examination Mr. Stuart Janvier asserted that he had “no issue” with
the candidates presented by Mr. Angus, save for Mr. Blaine Favel whom Mr.
Stuart Janvier identified as a person with a “potential conflict of interest”
and who was “not a good candidate.” The Applicants stress that both Mr. Stuart
Janvier and Chief Vern Janvier conceded under cross-examination that the
selection of the members of the appeal committee is conducted at a Band meeting
called for such a purpose. Thus, Mr. Favel’s alleged bias would be an issue
that the members of CPFN could consider at such time.
Conclusions
[67]
In my view, the
allegations made against Mr. Angus cannot reasonably support a decision to
remove Mr. Angus as Electoral Officer even if the Band Council had the power
and jurisdiction to remove him as they have attempted to do in this case.
[68]
The problem is that
all of the allegations remain unsubstantiated and none of them have been
subjected to the safeguards afforded by principles of natural justice and
procedural fairness. Some of the important ones have been contradicted in the
cross-examinations of Chief Vern Janvier and Councilor Stuart Janvier. The Band
Council is attempting to tarnish Mr. Angus by implication and innuendo as a
basis for saying that the people of CPFN have lost confidence in him.
[69]
But there is no
evidence before me that the people of CPFN have lost confidence in Mr. Angus.
The only evidence I have is that the newly-elected Band Council now objects to
Mr. Angus; but the Band Council has been at loggerheads with Mr. Angus because
it has tried to prevent him from doing his duty under the Election Code. The
Band Council has tried to prevent legitimate appeals from taking place. If
there were any concerns regarding Mr. Angus, such concerns could and should have
been subjected to due process and rules of natural justice and dealt with long
ago.
[70]
For example, the
Court is asked to assume that because Mr. Angus and Mr. Walter Janvier are
joint applicants in this application there is some apprehension of bias because
they are acting together. I see nothing “odd” in an Electoral Officer and an
election appellant putting their names on an application for judicial review of
a decision that was intended to prevent a legitimate appeals process from
taking place and, for that reason, thwarts both Mr. Angus as Electoral Officer
and Mr. Walter Javier as an appellant.
[71]
I am equally puzzled
as to why I should assume that Mr. Angus’ relationship with the Law Society of
Saskatchewan should give rise to a lack of confidence in Mr. Angus as an
Electoral Officer when the Band Council has failed to establish, or even ask,
why Mr. Angus has been suspended or what possible relevance that suspension
might have to the present situation or Mr. Angus’ duties or performance as
Electoral Officer.
[72]
Equally problematic
are the allegations in the appeals themselves and whether they can be
attributed in some way to Mr. Angus. The Band Council has blocked those appeals
and has prevented the grounds from being placed before the eligible voters of
CPFN. Now the Band Council wants the Court to accept those allegations as
grounds for its own decision to dismiss Mr. Angus. But these are matters for
the people of CPFN to assess and judge. The Band Council has simply prevented
that process from taking place.
[73]
A review of the
cross-examinations reveals that there has been no due process, natural justice
or procedural fairness behind the Band Council’s attempts to rid themselves of
Mr. Angus, who is attempting to do his duty under the Election Code.
[74]
The grounds in the
appeals are mere allegations that will be considered by the Appeals Committee.
If these allegations in and of themselves were sufficient to establish a loss
of confidence in the Electoral Officer, then the effect would be that the Band
Council could circumvent the entire Election Appeals process by removing the Electoral
Officer based on the grounds of appeal alleged in a Notice of Appeal. I do not
find that this is the purpose of the Notice of Appeals or the Election Code and,
as such, I decline to consider these grounds in my analysis of whether the Band
Council and the members of CPFN have reasonable grounds for their purported loss
of confidence in Mr. Angus's ability to act as Electoral Officer.
[75]
The Applicants have
also argued that the Band Council acted without or beyond its jurisdiction by
issuing the June 11, 2007 Resolution in which it effectively refused to allow
an appeal of the Election. The pertinent sections of the June 11, 2007 Resolution
are as follows:
[…]
WHEREAS The Chief and Council have reviewed the following for the purpose of
bringing closure to this past election:
-
the tenure of the past Chief and his failure to fully ratify the membership
list and
- the obvious oversight on his part once
again to consult with the membership for the purpose of endorsing a voters
list, despite concerns that were raised and
-
the fact that the elections were conducted regardless of these irregularities
and
- the margin in the final tally of votes
under your supervision and sanctioning were significant and
- the financial disarray that was left in
the hands of the newly elected Tribal Chief and Council, which has been
conveyed to you by this leadership, resulting in our inability to pay those
added dollars you were requesting to coordinate an appeal and
- the matter of your total comprehension
of all the above, leaves this leadership with no recourse but to call for a
halt in any future action surrounding the elections of the leadership of the
Chipewyan Prairie First Nation
THEREFORE
BE IT RESOLVED That for the genuine purpose of the wellbeing and harmony of the
membership of the Chipewyan Prairie First Nation that this Chief and Council
will not approve or tolerate any suggestion that this community should be
burdened with another election other than what the norm has been for years […]
[76]
When
cross-examined by the Applicants’ counsel on April 3, 2008, Councillor Stuart
Janvier provided the following explanation regarding the words that “for the
genuine purpose of the wellbeing and harmony of the membership of the Chipewyan
Prairie First Nation that this Chief and Council will not approve or tolerate
any suggestion that this community should be burdened with another election
other than what the norm has been for years”:
Q What
does that mean?
A That means that the Chief and Council
made a decision when consulting with the elders that the facts of the -- the
appeal process has been forward in the way things were transpiring, that the
community would not tolerate things to move forward.
Q So
that there would be no appeal; is that correct?
A Basically,
yes.
Q So
that the election results from February 28th, 2007, stand, correct?
A Yes.
Q So a Council resolution says, We’re
not going to have any appeals at Chipewyan; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Has
a Band Council Resolution ever been withdrawn?
A No.
Q So
this is still the decision of the Council, correct?
A Yes.
Q Has there been any subsequent Band
Council Resolutions passed that might change this decision?
A No.
Q So this is the only Band Council
Resolution that’s been passed as it relates to the elections that were held
February 28th?
A Yes.
Q So would it be fair to say, Mr.
Janvier, that the purpose of your Affidavit is to ensure that there is no
election appeal of the election results of February 28th, 2007?
A Yes, with – unless the circumstances
are changed that Albert Angus and his biases is not involved with the process.
(Cross-Examination of Councilor
Stuart Janvier, pages 37-38.)
[77]
The Applicants are
correct that there exists an established appeal procedure set out in the
Elections Code and that the Band Council was required to follow this procedure.
In this regard, I find that by issuing the June 11, 2007 Resolution, the Band
Council attempted to circumvent the procedure set out in the Elections Code and
denied the right of an appeal to the persons who filed Notices of Appeal under
the Election Code. In making such a Decision the Band Council, in my view,
acted beyond its jurisdiction. The Band Council cannot, simply by its own
resolution, decide that the Election Code can be disregarded and that an appeal
will not take place. Also, the Band Council cannot, by its own resolution, and
without due process and procedural fairness simply remove an Electoral Officer
who, under the Election Code, is fixed with the duty of overseeing the appeals
process and who, in effect, answers to the eligible voters of CPFN. In the
present case, the Band Council has not conducted itself with due process or in
accordance with established rules of natural justice and procedural fairness.
The Band Council has provided the Court with no authority or principle that
would authorize or justify its conduct so far in this matter. The
cross-examinations of Chief Vern Janvier and councilor Stuart Janvier do not
suggest a Band Council that is cognizant of its obligations under the Election
Code or under rules of procedural fairness. The Band Council has, in effect,
prevented the people of CPFN from making decisions that the Election Code says
are their’s to make.
[78]
The conduct of the
Band Council to date places them in a conflicted and dubious position regarding
the complaints they have now decided to raise regarding Mr. Angus’ suitability
to conduct the appeals as Electoral Officer under the Code. In addition, the
grounds raised remain unsubstantiated and/or contradicted by the Band Council
itself. They have not been dealt with fairly or in accordance with the usual
rules of natural justice and the Band Council’s position on this issue is, in
my view, unreasonable and unsustainable. Mr. Angus remains the duly appointed
Electoral Officer to conduct the appeals under the Election Code.
[78]
The
Remedy
[79]
A significant amount
has changed since the Applicants were compelled to bring this application. The
Respondents have now acknowledged that they cannot block the appeals and agree
that the Court should order that the appeals take place in accordance with an
agreed procedure that should be incorporated into a Court order.
[80]
Hence,
the only other matter for the Court to decide is whether Mr. Angus has been
removed as Electoral Officer and is no longer in a position to facilitate the
appeals in accordance with the Election Code.
[81]
For
reasons given, I have concluded that Mr. Angus has not been legally removed as
Electoral Officer. He remains in place to conduct the appeals in accordance
with the Election Code. Any concerns that the Band Council may wish to raise
regarding Mr. Angus’ fitness to facilitate the appeals and do his duty under
the Election Code can be raised and dealt with as part of the appeals process
and the selection of the Appeals Committee, if those concerns have any
relevance to that process and the issues and criteria that the Election Code
specifically asks the people of CPFN and the Appeals Committee to address. If
and when they are, those concerns must be dealt with in accordance with due
process and rules of natural justice and fairness.
[82]
At
this stage, the Court does not wish to pre-empt the people of CPFN from
considering these matters in their own way and in accordance with their own Code.
No order of mandamus is required because the Decision dismissing Mr. Angus is
quashed for reasons given, and the Band Council has agreed that the appeals
process must be conducted in accordance with the Court’s order.
[83]
If
the parties cannot agree on costs, then either side is at liberty to address
this Court on the matter of costs for this application which may be done by way
of written submission and/or before the Court at a time and in a manner to be
discussed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that:
- The Application is
allowed in part and the June 11, 2007 Resolution of the Band Council – and
any subsequent confirmation – is quashed for the reasons given so that Mr.
Angus remains the Electoral Officer for purposes of the appeals that both
sides agree should proceed in accordance with the Election Code;
- The
Appeals will proceed in the following manner as agreed by the parties and
mandated by the Court:
Within
14 days of the date of this Order, the Respondent, Chipewyan Prairie First
Nation Tribal Council shall take all necessary steps to hold a Band Meeting of
eligible voters for the purposes of selecting an Appeal Committee (the “Band
Meeting”), pursuant to the Chipewyan Prairie First Nation Election Code
enforced at the time of the election of February 28, 2007 (the “Election”), and
as attached at Exhibit “B” to the Affidavit of Albert Angus is this matter.
Within 14 days of the Band Meeting the newly elected Appeal Committee shall
meet for the first time and thereafter establish the process which it will
follow in hearing the appeal of the election. The Appeal Committee shall be
comprised of 3 members as selected at the above referred Band Meeting by
eligible votes pursuant to the order of this Honourable Court.
- The
Respondents may raise any concern regarding Mr. Angus’ conduct as
Electoral Officer as part of the appeal process and/or in accordance with
due process, procedural fairness and the rules of natural justice;
- The
parties may address the Court on the issue of costs in the manner outlined
in the reasons.
“James
Russell”
Judge