Date: 20080826
Docket: IMM-898-08
Citation: 2008 FC 964
Ottawa, Ontario, August 26, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Kelen
BETWEEN:
GREGORY CHRISTOPHER
ANNAMARY
CHRISTOPHER
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review of a decision by the Pre-Removal Risk
Assessment (PRRA) officer dated December 14, 2007, concluding that the
applicants would not be at risk of persecution if returned to Sri Lanka, their
country of citizenship.
FACTS
Background
[2]
The
principal applicant and his wife are both Tamils from Sri Lanka. They are 76
and 60 years old, respectively. They arrived in Canada on July 31,
2003 on visitor visas with the stated intent of visiting their three children.
Shortly after arriving, however, the applicants filed claims for refugee
protection.
[3]
On
April 1, 2004, the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board (the Board) concluded that the applicants were not Convention refugees or
persons in need of protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the IRPA). However, a
judicial review of that decision was allowed and, on May 20, 2005, the Federal
Court ordered a rehearing of the applicants’ refugee claim: see Christopher
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 730, 45 Imm. L.R. (3d) 225 per Mr.
Justice de Montigny.
[4]
On
May 9, 2006, a differently constituted panel of the Board reheard the applicants’
claim. The claim was rejected by the Board on October 6, 2006 on the basis
that the applicants were not credible with respect to their extortion claims.
The applicants filed an application for leave to judicially review the Board’s
decision, but leave was denied on February 5, 2007.
The PRRA application
[5]
On
June 23, 2007, the applicants initiated a PRRA application, wherein they argued
that due to their ethnic background, namely Tamils from the North of Sri Lanka,
they would face extortion if forced to return to Sri Lanka. Because
they have now been in Canada for several years and have three children
who are Canadian citizens, they will be perceived by militants as a “source of
funds” and will be targeted for extortion, abduction, and ill-treatment. The
applicants claim that the risk they face is not only with respect to the
militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), but also with respect to the
Sri Lankan government, police force, and Tamil paramilitary groups.
[6]
Before
the PRRA officer, the applicants submitted that the documentary evidence
establishes that since the signing of a cease fire agreement between the LTTE
and the Sri Lankan government in 2002, extortion of civilians and families with
foreign connections has increased significantly, and that elderly and affluent
Tamils such as the applicants are particularly susceptible. After reviewing the
evidence cited by the applicants, the PRRA officer stated at page 6:
… I have read the documentary evidence
provided by counsel and I find that the information provided indicates that in
general, extortion, abduction, and ill-treatment do occur. However, I find that
according to counsel’s evidence, the Tamil community is not the only group of
persons targeted for this type of abuse. The documentary evidence suggests that
both the LTTE and Karuna group engage in extortion and abduction for ransom of
affluent individuals regardless of where they may reside and regardless of
their ethnic background. Their goal seems to be the collection of valuables to fund
their cause. … Counsel failed to provide sufficient personal new evidence to
illustrate why the applicants, an elderly couple who resided in both Jaffna and Colombo with relatively few problems, will
personally suffer at the hands of these groups.
[7]
The
PRRA officer continued, noting that the purpose of a PRRA is not to reargue
issues that were before the Board at a refugee hearing, but rather to raise new
issues that have arisen since the refugee hearing took place. In that regard,
the PRRA officer states at page 7 that no new evidence had been proffered
regarding the applicants’ claim:
… I find I have not been provided with
new evidence that demonstrates that the applicants would be exposed to a new,
different, or additional risk development. The issue of extortion both as it
personally relates to the applicants and extortion in general amongst citizens
of Sri Lanka were considered by the
[Board] when making their decision in October of 2006. …
The [Board] assessed not only the
incident of extortion the applicants stated they experienced but also the issue
of extortion as it pertains to Sri Lankan citizens in general. They found the
applicants did not support their assertion that they were victims of extortion
with credible evidence and determined that based on the documentary evidence
extortion is not wide spread. …
[8]
Finally,
the PRRA officer concluded by stating that the applicants do not fit the
profile of those who are at particular risk of mistreatment and extortion. The
officer held at page 8:
… Extortion and abduction for ransom does
exist however according to documentary evidence targets of LTTE and
paramilitary groups are for the most part businesspersons and professionals.
The applicants do not fit the profile of persons described by the evidence as
likely to be harassed. Although the applicants have children residing in
Canada, based on the evidence before me, they are an older couple who resided
in Jaffna and Colombo without substantial obstacles. I have
been provided with insufficient objective new evidence to satisfy me that, if
returned, the applicants would personally face a serious possibility of
persecution or would be more likely than not to be at risk of torture, risk to
life, or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. …
[9]
On
this basis the PRRA officer rejected the applicant’s application. It is this
decision that the applicants seek to have judicially reviewed.
ISSUE
[10]
The
sole issue for consideration is whether the PRRA officer’s decision to deny the
PRRA application was unreasonable.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[11]
In
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, 372 N.R. 1, the Supreme Court of
Canada reconsidered the number and definitions to be given to the various
standards of review, as well as the analytical process employed to determine
the appropriate standard in a given situation. As a result of the Court’s
decision, it is clear that the standard of patent unreasonableness has been
eliminated, and that reviewing courts must focus on only two standards of
review, those of reasonableness and correctness. In Dunsmuir, the Court
also held that where the type of decision being reviewed has been thoroughly
assessed in the preceding jurisprudence, subsequent decisions may rely on that
standard.
[12]
The
issue raised by the applicants concerns the reasonableness of the PRRA
officer’s decision and whether the officer had proper regard to all the
evidence when reaching a decision. It is clear as a result of Dunsmuir,
above, that such factors are to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness:
see Ramanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008
FC 843 and Erdogu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 407, [2008] F.C.J. No. 546 (QL).
ANALYSIS
Issue: Was
the PRRA officer’s decision to deny the PRRA application unreasonable?
[13]
The
applicants allege that the PRRA officer failed to consider new evidence
pertaining to the applicant’s fear of extortion, and that his decision was
unreasonable for two reasons. First, the applicants argue that the PRRA
officer erred in considering the issue of extortion to be outside the purview
of the PRRA application because it had already been considered by the RPD
Board. Second, the applicants claim that the PRRA officer failed to consider
evidence that as elderly Tamils returning from a long stay in Canada, with
three expatriate children living in Canada, they would be
considered affluent and are thus likely to be targeted for extortion if they
are returned to Sri Lanka.
[14]
The
standard for “new evidence” was recently decided by the Federal Court of Appeal
in Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, 289 D.L.R. (4th) 675, per Sharlow
J.A.
¶ 13. 3. Newness: Is the evidence
new in the sense that it is capable of:
(a) proving the current state of affairs
in the country of removal or an event that occurred or a circumstance that
arose after the hearing in the ROD, or
(b) proving a fact that was unknown to
the refugee claimant at the time of the RPD hearing, or
(c) contradicting a finding of fact by
the RPD (including a credibility finding)?
If not, the evidence need not be
considered.
[15]
The
applicants contend that the PRRA officer excluded the entire issue of extortion
from his assessment because it had been previously considered by the RPD,
without giving consideration to new evidence presented about this issue. I
cannot agree. The PRRA officer did not exclude the issue of extortion from his
decision. Rather, the PRRA officer considered the documentary evidence and
concluded that the applicants were not at personal risk of extortion. The
officer noted at page 8:
The PRRA process allowed the applicants a
chance to corroborate their assertion that because they are Tamils from the
north and perceived to be financially well off, they personally have suffered
extortion and maltreatment in the past and are likely to suffer extortion and
maltreatment again. I find the applicants provide evidence that refers to
general conditions affecting Sri Lankan citizens and have failed to provide
sufficient new evidence to substantiate their assertion that they personally
have suffered extortion and mistreatment in the past and will likely suffer
extortion and mistreatment again.
[16]
It
is clear, then, that the PRRA officer did not preclude the possibility that the
applicants could submit new evidence supporting their claim that they face a
heightened risk of extortion, or that such new evidence, if sufficient, could
establish that the PRRA application should be granted. The fact that the PRRA
officer noted that the underlying facts – that the applicants feared extortion
because of their lengthy stay in Canada and their children’s presence here –
remained unchanged from the time of the second RPD decision is not evidence of
an error in his assessment.
[17]
However,
the applicants did present new evidence specifically relating to the extortion
of elderly Tamils who have travelled abroad, or have children living abroad. Moreover,
this evidence meets the standard of “newness” laid out in Raza.
[18]
In
Kaybaki v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 32, 128 A.C.W.S. (3d) 784, I held
that a PRRA officer’s evidence must refer to important evidence which
contradicts the PRRA decision:
…the presumption that the decision-maker
has considered all the evidence is a rebuttable one, and where the evidence in
question is of significant probative value this Court can make a negative
inference from the decision-maker’s failure to mention it…the more important
the evidence that is not mentioned specifically and analyzed in the agency’s
reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from the silence that the
agency made an erroneous finding of fact “without regard to the evidence”:
Bains v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 63 F.T.R. 312
(F.C.T.D.)
[19]
The
applicants submitted, as new evidence, the Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada’s Responses to Information Requests, entitled Sri Lanka: Treatment of
Failed Asylum Seekers Returning to Sri Lanka (2004-2006), and dated
December 22, 2006. In this report, the IRB deals directly with the issue of
extortion, stating:
Persons returning from abroad may also be
subject to extortion (Sri
Lanka 27 Nov.
2006; Hotham Mission Oct. 2006, 49). According to the Hotham Mission report,
in some instances, returnees have been pressured into paying immigration
officials to be able to pass through the airport without incident (ibid.). The
report also indicates that, across Sri Lanka,
wealthy businessmen are being kidnapped for ransom and that “people returning
from overseas may be a target, as it will be assumed that they have money”
(ibid.).
[20]
In
light of this new evidence, it is difficult to understand how the PRRA officer
concluded that “the applicants do not fit the profile of persons described by
the evidence as likely to be harassed” (p. 12). The report directly addresses
the precise circumstances of the applicants that they allege puts them at risk
of extortion, and confirms that these circumstances may cause them to be
targeted. As evidence that contradicts the PRRA officer’s risk assessment,
this document should have been specifically mentioned and addressed.
[21]
The
applicants also submit that the PRRA officer failed to consider the 2006 United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) Position on the International
Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka, which
post-dates the RPD decision and which they allege demonstrates the risk they
face upon returning to Sri Lanka.
[22]
The
UNHCR Report states that “all asylum claims of Tamils from the North or East
should be favourably considered” and that “those individuals who are found to
be targeted by the State, LTTE or other non-state agents” should be recognized
as refugees. The report also states that Tamils from the North or East who
reach Colombo may be
perceived by the authorities as potential LTTE supporters or members and may
face “arrests, detention, abduction or even killings.” The report concludes
that “[n]o Tamil from the North or East should be returned forcibly until there
is significant improvement in the security situation in Sri Lanka.” According
to the applicants, the failure of the PRAA officer to mention these
recommendations constitutes a reviewable error.
[23]
In
Sinasamy v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 67, 164 A.C.W.S. (3d) 667, Mr.
Justice de Montigny held that a PRRA officer must address the UNHCR Report,
which post-dated the refugee hearing in that case:
It is difficult to understand why the
officer did not address these findings. The least that can be said is that she
conducted a very selective reading of this document. No explanation was given
as to why the officer disregarded this document in concluding that the
applicant has an IFA in Colombo. After all, this is a most
credible source, and the leading refugee agency in the world. As so often
repeated by this Court, the officer’s burden of explanation increases with the
relevance of the evidence to the disputed facts: Cepeda-Guiterrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (1998),
157 F.T.R. 35 at para. 17.
[24]
Similarly,
here the UNHCR Report post-dates the RPD hearing and is directly relevant to
the risk faced by the applicants. They are Tamils from the North of Sri Lanka
and, if removed, would be returned to Colombo. Thus, the report contradicts
the assessment of risk in the PRRA decision. As I held in Kaybaki, above,
when important new evidence contradicts the PRRA decision, the officer should
specifically mention and analyze this evidence.
[25]
For
these reasons, this application for judicial review will be allowed and the
matter remitted to another PRRA officer for redetermination.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that:
- this application
for judicial review is allowed;
- the decision of the
PRRA officer dated December 14, 2007 is set aside; and
- this matter is
referred to another PRRA officer for redetermination.
“Michael
A. Kelen”
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