Date: 20080619
Dockets: T-210-05
T-1209-05
T-1210-05
T-1211-05
Citation: 2008 FC 766
Ottawa, Ontario, June 19,
2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Kelen
Docket: T-210-05
BETWEEN:
THE
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
Respondent
Docket:
T-1209-05
AND
BETWEEN:
THE
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Applicant
and
THE PRIME
MINISTER OF CANADA
Respondent
T-1210-05
AND
BETWEEN:
THE
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Applicant
and
THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
Respondent
T-1211-05
AND
BETWEEN:
THE
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER
OF TRANSPORT
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
Does
the public have the right to examine the Prime Minister’s appointment book?
Does the public have the right to examine the hand-written notes of a Cabinet
Minister’s Executive Assistant with respect to a departmental matter?
[2]
This
case involves four applications for judicial review filed by the Information Commissioner
of Canada (the Commissioner) pursuant to section 42 of the Access to
Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 (the Access Act or the Act). The
applications concern whether records located within the Prime Minister’s
Office, the Office of the Minister of National Defence, the Office of the
Minister of Transport, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are subject to
disclosure under the Act. The documents in question include the daily agenda
books of the former Prime Minister, agendas and documents originating from
meetings involving the former Minister of National Defence, and the itinerary
and meeting schedules of the former Minister of Transport.
[3]
The
question for the Court is not whether the documents should be accessible to the
public under Canada’s “freedom
to information” law, but whether the documents are currently accessible to the
public under Canada’s existing
law. The Court does not legislate or change the law; it interprets the existing
law.
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
Paragraph
I. FACTS................................................................................................................................... 4
II. ISSUES................................................................................................................................. 32
III. RELEVANT LEGISLATION............................................................................................... 33
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW................................................................................................... 34
V. BURDEN OF PROOF.......................................................................................................... 39
VI. ANALYSIS.......................................................................................................................... 41
Issue No. 1: Are the Prime
Minister’s Office, the Office of the Minister of Transport, and the Office of
the Minister of National Defence “government institutions” under subsection
4(1) and Schedule I of the Access Act?............................................................................. 41
Paragraph
Issue No. 2: What
constitutes a record “under the control of a government institution” as stated
in subsection 4(1) of the Act?.................................................................................. 78
Issue No. 3: What is the
meaning and scope of the following exemptions under the Act?......... 101
VII. APPLYING THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF
EACH APPLICATION.............................. 127
1) Minister of National Defence
(Docket T-210-05)............................................................ 127
2) Prime Minister (Docket
T-1209-05)................................................................................ 149
3) Commissioner of the RCMP
(Docket T-1210-05)........................................................... 179
4) Minister of Transport (Docket
T-1211-05)...................................................................... 188
VIII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT................................................................ 211
IX. LEGAL COSTS.................................................................................................................. 212
JUDGMENT.......................................................................................................................... Page
95
I. FACTS
[4]
The
facts with respect to each application follow. The records at issue have been
underlined for ease of reference.
1. Minister of
National Defence (Docket T-210-05)
[5]
On
October 29, 1999, an access to information request was made to the Department
of National Defence (the DND) for “the minutes or documents produced from the
M5 management meetings for 1999.” The term M5 was used to describe the informal
meetings among former Minister of National Defence, Art Eggleton (the Minister),
senior exempt staff from the Minister’s office, the Deputy Minister of Defence,
and the Chief of the Defence Staff.
[6]
The
DND’s initial response was that a search failed to uncover any documents
related to the request. On February 26, 2000, the requester complained to the
Commissioner, stating in part that “personally I find it very hard to believe
that no records whatsoever are produced from these management meetings.”
Thereafter, the Commissioner commenced an investigation as required under
section 30 of the Act.
[7]
As
a result of the Commissioner’s investigation, 1413 pages of records were
identified as relevant to the initial request. Of those 1413 pages, 765 pages
were found to be located within the DND itself, and outside the Minister’s
office. Accordingly, these records were processed and disclosed subject to any
applicable exemptions and exclusions as identified in the Act.
[8]
The
remaining 648 pages of records, which have become the subject of this
application, pertain to the M5 meetings and were located within the physical
confines of the Minister’s office. These records include:
1. 185 pages of
notes regarding the M5 meetings extracted from the notebooks of members of the
Minister’s exempt staff;
2. 342 pages of
e-mail correspondence containing approximately 539 exchanges. Of these,
approximately 101 e-mails are exchanges exclusively between members of the
Minister’s exempt staff, while approximately 438 are exchanges between exempt
staff and non-exempt staff in the Minister’s office or exchanges forwarded or
copied to non-exempt staff;
3. 82 pages of meeting
agendas listing the items to be addressed at the M5 meetings; and
4. 39 pages of
miscellaneous documents, including memoranda and briefing notes for the
Minister and the other attendees of the M5 meetings.
[9]
After
formally inviting the Minister to make representations as to why portions of
the records should be withheld, the Commissioner found the access complaint to
be well-founded – i.e., the Commissioner found that the records at issue
were “within the control of a government institution” as required under section
4 of the Act – and recommended that the records be released to the requester,
save for the portions exempted under the Act or otherwise excluded as Cabinet
confidences.
[10]
By
letter dated November 15, 2000, the DND advised that it would not abide by the
Commissioner’s recommendation on the basis of its legal position that the
records at issue were not “under the control of a government institution” and,
therefore, not subject to the Act. In response, and with the consent of the
requester, the Commissioner commenced this application for judicial review in
accordance with section 42 of the Act.
2. Prime
Minister (Docket T-1209-05)
[11]
On June 28, 1999, the Privy Council Office (the
PCO) received six access requests for the daily agenda books of the former
Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Jean Chrétien (the PM). The requests,
taken together, cover the period between January 1994 and June 25, 1999.
[12]
On July 13, 1999, the PCO advised the requester
that, with respect to five of the requests, there were no records that were under
the control of the PCO. With respect to the sixth request, the requester was
advised on August 11, 1999 that based on subsection 10(2) of the Act, the PCO
neither confirmed nor denied the existence of any records relating to the
subject matter of the request and, should such records exist, they would be
exempt as personal information under section 19 of the Act.
[13]
On August 24, 1999, the requester lodged a
complaint with the Commissioner, whereupon an investigation was commenced as
required under section 30 of the Act.
[14]
During the course of the Commissioner’s
investigation, 2006 pages of the PM’s daily agendas were found to be responsive
to the request. Of these, 2002 pages were located within the Prime Minister’s
Office (the PMO) itself. The remaining four pages of records, which were
responsive to one of the requests, were located in the office of the Executive
Assistant to the Clerk of the PCO. Those records
included the PM’s agenda for July 23, 1999, and weekly copies of the agenda
covering the period between May 23 and June 12, 1999.
[15]
Hard copies of the agendas were shared with
senior officials employed within the PMO. Until approximately the fall of 1999,
it was the practice of the PMO to fax a copy of the next day’s agenda to the
Clerk of the PCO. It was understood that this copy was for the sole information
of the Clerk and his Executive Assistant. In addition, a copy of the agenda
showing only the locations to be visited by the PM was made available to the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (the RCMP).
[16]
The practice of providing the RCMP with copies
of the PM’s agenda was discontinued in December 2001. Thereafter, the PMO
continued to fax a timetable indicating departure times and destinations of the
PM’s intended travel in Ottawa,
but included therein a directive to “please read and destroy.”
[17]
The respondent acknowledges that some portions
or pages of the records at issue were found in government institutions,
specifically within the PCO and the RCMP. However, it is the respondent’s
position that to the extent that those copies are “under the control” of a
government institution, they are subject to exemptions and exclusions in the
Act and are not to be released to the requester.
[18]
Upon completing his investigation, the
Commissioner determined that the complaint was well-founded and recommended
that the records at issue be released, save for portions validly withheld under
the Act’s exemptions and exclusions. The PCO responded that it would not adopt
the Commissioner’s recommendations and maintained that the records warrant
exemption in their entirety based on section 17, which relates to the safety of
individuals; that the records contained personal information pursuant to
subsection 19(1); that the records were excluded as Cabinet confidences under
section 69; and that severance under section 25 was not possible. In response,
and with the requester’s consent, the within application for judicial review
was commenced pursuant to section 42 of the Act.
3. Commissioner
of the RCMP (Docket T-1210-05)
[19]
On November 14, 2000, the RCMP received a
request “for all copies of the Prime Minister’s daily agendas provided to the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police by the Prime Minister’s Office, from Jan 1, 1997
to the present.” By letter dated December 7, 2000, the RCMP responded that it
had conducted a search of its records, that it did not receive copies of the
PM’s daily agenda, and that such information was held by the PMO.
[20]
On December 19, 2000, the requester complained
to the Commissioner that information provided in related proceedings before
this Court confirmed that the RCMP routinely received copies of the PM’s daily
agenda. During the Commissioner’s subsequent investigation, 386 pages of
records, entitled “Agenda du Premier Ministre,” were found to be located at the
RCMP in the branch known as the “PM’s Protection Detail.”
[21]
In a letter dated April 4, 2002, the RCMP
revised its response to the requester. While the RCMP acknowledged having
located the records, it stated that they were denying access to them based on
the exemptions contained in sections 17 and 19 of the Act, which deal with
security concerns and personal information, respectively. In addition, the RCMP
also stated that portions of the records were being excluded under subsection
69(1) of the Act, as they contained Cabinet confidences. By letter dated April
12, 2002, the requester made a further complaint to the Commissioner on the
basis that it was improbable that the entirety of the information contained in
the records located in the PM’s Protection Detail would fall under sections 17,
19(1), and 69(1) of the Act.
[22]
A second “Summary of Complaint” was provided to
the RCMP on May 31, 2002. The RCMP Commissioner responded by letter dated July
8, 2002, stating that the refusal to disclose the agendas was based on security
concerns for the PM and his security detail. The agendas provide clear and
distinct patterns of the PM’s daily departures from his residence, arrivals at
Parliament Hill, and other personal habits, such that the information, if
disclosed, would provide invaluable information to any individual intending to
harm the PM. The Commissioner responded on July 26, 2002, stating that the
representations made on behalf of the RCMP were insufficient to discharge the
burden by which access to records under the Act can be denied and that,
as a result, the Commissioner’s investigation would continue.
[23]
On May 3, 2005, the Commissioner concluded that
the requester’s complaint was well-founded and recommended that portions of the
requested records be disclosed. The RCMP Commissioner, on May 28, 2005,
responded that the RCMP maintained its position and therefore would not comply
the Commissioner’s recommendations. As a result, and with the consent of the
requester, the Commissioner commenced the within application for judicial
review pursuant to section 42 of the Act.
4. Minister of
Transport (Docket T-1211-05)
[24]
On
November 3, 1999, an access to information request was made to the Department
of Transport (the DOT) for a copy of all of the Minister of Transport’s (the
Minister’s) itinerary and/or meeting schedules for the period from June 1 to November
5, 1999. After consideration, the DOT provided an initial response to the
requester on December 22, 1999, stating: “No records exist in Transport Canada’s files
which respond to your request. It should be noted, however, that the Minister’s
itinerary/meeting schedules are prepared and maintained by his political staff,
and are not considered departmental records.”
[25]
On
February 1, 2000, the requester complained to the Commissioner, stating in part
that the schedules prepared for the Minister “regarding the department are
records of the department” and failure to disclose such records is a
“circumvention” of the Act. Thereafter, the Commissioner commenced an
investigation as required under section 30.
[26]
As
a result of the Commissioner’s investigation, 46 pages of records were
identified as relevant to the initial request. Each page of records contained
the Minister’s agenda for a one week period during the relevant timeframe. Of
those 46 pages, 23 pages were found to be archived in electronic form within
the Minister’s office.
[27]
The
remaining 23 pages of records, entitled “Agenda sent to the Deputy Minister for
the period of May 30, 1999 to November 6, 1999,” consisted of abridged versions
of the pages described above, and were archived in electronic form in the
Minister’s office, having at one point been provided to the Deputy Minister’s
office for administration of the DOT.
[28]
During
the investigation, the Commissioner carefully examined the content of the
records in question. Upon doing so, the Commissioner concluded that the agendas
related to matters falling within the Minister’s responsibilities vis à vis
the DOT, and were therefore under the control of a “government institution” as
defined in the Act.
[29]
After
formally inviting the Minister to make representations as to why the records
should be withheld, the Commissioner found that the access complaint was
well-founded and recommended that the records be released to the requester.
Further, the Commissioner also considered the DOT’s claims to exemptions under
the Act, but ultimately disagreed with a number of the exemptions claimed.
[30]
In
a letter dated March 12, 2005, the DOT advised the Commissioner that it would
not abide by his request, maintaining the same legal position as taken by the
DND; namely that the records at issue were not in the control of the DOT and
were, accordingly, not subject to the Act.
[31]
After
receiving the DOT’s letter, the Commissioner, with the consent of the
requester, commenced this application for judicial review in accordance with
section 42 of the Act.
II. ISSUES
[32]
In
deciding whether the records at issue are subject to disclosure under the
Access Act, there are three legal issues to be considered by the Court:
1. Are the Prime Minister’s Office, the Office of the Minister of
Transport, and the Office of the Minister of National Defence “government
institutions” under subsection 4(1) and Schedule I of the Access Act;
2. What
constitutes a record “under the control of a government institution” as stated
in subsection 4(1) of the Act; and
3. What is the
meaning and scope of the following exemptions under the Act:
i.
the
“personal information” exemption under section 19;
ii.
the
“advice or recommendations” and “account of consultations or deliberations” exemptions
under paragraphs 21(1)(a) and (b); and
iii.
the
exclusions under section 69 of the Act and section 39 of the Canada Evidence
Act, which relate to confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council.
The Court’s determination of these issues
will then be applied to the evidence in each individual application to determine
whether the records at issue are subject to disclosure under the Access Act.
III. RELEVANT
LEGISLATION
[33]
The
legislation relevant to these applications is as follows:
1.
Access
to Information Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 (the Access Act or the Act);
2.
National
Defence Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5;
3.
Department
of Transport Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. T-18;
4.
Federal
Accountability Act,
S.C. 2006, c. 9;
5.
Library
and Archives of Canada Act, S.C. 2004, c. 11;
6.
Privacy
Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. P-21;
7.
Financial
Administration Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11;
8.
Interpretation
Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. I-21; and
9.
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
The relevant provisions have been attached
to these Reasons as Appendix “A.” However a limited part of the provisions have
also been incorporated into the text of these Reasons for ease of reference.
IV. STANDARD OF
REVIEW
[34]
In
assessing the appropriate standard to apply to the respondents’ refusal to
follow the Commissioner’s recommendations, I am guided by the recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
[2008] S.C.J. No. 9 (QL). In that case, the Supreme Court reconsidered the
number and definitions to be given to the various standards of review, as well
as the analytical process employed to determine the appropriate standard in a
given situation. As a result of the Court’s decision, it is clear that the
standard of patent unreasonableness has now been eliminated, and that reviewing
courts must focus on only two standards, those of reasonableness and
correctness.
[35]
In
Dunsmuir, the Court held that the process of judicial review involves
two steps. As Justices Bastarache and Lebel stated at paragraph 62:
¶ 62 In summary, the
process of judicial review involves two steps. First, courts ascertain whether
the jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of
[deference] to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question.
Second, where the first inquiry proves unfruitful, courts must proceed to an
analysis of the factors making it possible to identify the proper standard of
review.
[36]
In the case at bar, the parties agree that the
appropriate standard of review to apply to the respondents’ refusal to disclose
the relevant records is that of correctness. In support, the parties cite the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Information Commissioner)
v. Canada
(Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police),
2003 SCC 8, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 66 (RCMP). In that case, the Court
considered the appropriate standard of review to apply to a decision of the
Commissioner of the RCMP to not disclose information relating to four officers
on the ground that it was personal information, and therefore exempt from
disclosure pursuant to subsection 19(1) of the Act. In that case, after
conducting a standard of review analysis (formerly called a pragmatic and
functional analysis), the Court held that the RCMP Commissioner’s decision
should be reviewed on a standard of correctness. This jurisprudence has
determined in a satisfactory manner that the Court should review the issues in
these four applications on a “correctness” standard of review.
[37]
Accordingly,
having been guided by the standard of review analysis mandated by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Dunsmuir, above, and the relevant jurisprudence, I
conclude that:
1. the issue of
whether the Prime Minister’s Office and other Ministerial offices fall within
the meaning of a “government institution” shall be reviewed on a standard of
correctness;
2. the meaning
of “under the control of a government institution” shall be reviewed on a
standard of correctness;
3. the issues of
whether a record falls within the meaning of one of the Act’s exemptions and
exclusions shall be reviewed on a standard of correctness; and
4. whether the
records at issue are subject to disclosure under the Access Act shall be
reviewed on a standard of correctness.
[38]
In
reviewing the respondents’ refusals on a standard of correctness, it is the
responsibility of the Court to determine through its own analysis whether such
a decision was justified or whether the documents requested should have been
disclosed in accordance with the Commissioner’s recommendations. As the Court
held at paragraph 50 of Dunsmuir:
¶ 50 … When applying the
correctness standard, a reviewing court will not show deference to the decision
maker’s reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the
question. The analysis will bring the court to decide whether it agrees with
the determination of the decision maker; if not, the court will substitute its
own view and provide the correct answer. From the outset, the court must ask
whether the tribunal’s decision was correct.
V. BURDEN OF PROOF
[39]
On judicial review, section 48 of the Act
provides that the head of a government institution bears the burden of
establishing that an access request was denied in accordance with law:
48.
In any
proceedings before the Court arising from an application under section 41 or
42, the burden of establishing that the head of a government institution is
authorized to refuse to disclose a record requested under this Act or a part
thereof shall be on the government institution concerned.
|
48. Dans les procédures
découlant des recours prévus aux articles 41 ou 42, la charge d’établir le
bien-fondé du refus de communication totale ou partielle d’un document
incombe à l’institution fédérale concernée.
|
[40]
The onus created by this section was recognized
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 S.C.R.
403, where Mr. Justice La Forest stated at paragraph 90:
¶ 90 Section 48 of the Access
to Information Act, however, places the onus on the government to show that
it is authorized to refuse to disclose a record. …
Accordingly, in the
review at bar the respondents must satisfy the Court, on the balance of
probabilities, that the decision to refuse to disclose the relevant records was
correct.
VI. ANALYSIS
Issue No. 1: Are the Prime Minister’s Office, the Office of
the Minister of Transport, and the Office of the Minister of National Defence
“government institutions” under subsection 4(1) and Schedule I of the Access
Act?
[41]
Subsection 4(1) of the Act provides for a right
of access “to any record under the control of a government institution.” What
constitutes a “government institution” is defined in section 3 of the Act as
meaning:
1. any department listed in Schedule I;
2. any ministry of state of the Government of Canada listed in Schedule
I; or
3. any body or office listed in Schedule I.
Subsection 4(1) reads:
4. (1) Subject to this Act, but
notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, every person who is
(a) a Canadian citizen,
or
(b) a permanent
resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act,
has a right to and shall, on request, be
given access to any record under the control of a government institution.
|
4. (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi mais
nonobstant toute autre loi fédérale, ont droit à l’accès aux documents
relevant d’une institution fédérale et peuvent se les faire communiquer sur
demande :
a) les citoyens canadiens;
b) les résidents permanents au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi
sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés.
|
Schedule I provides for an exhaustive list
of the entities that are to be viewed as “government institutions” for the
purposes of the Act. In relation to the case at bar, this includes the PCO, the DND, the DOT,
and the RCMP.
[42]
It is readily apparent from reading Schedule I
that the PMO and the Offices of the Ministers of National Defence and Transport
are not expressly listed therein. The question then arises whether these
Offices were implicitly intended by Parliament to be included as “parts” of the
government institutions listed, namely:
1. is the PMO intended to be included as a part of the PCO;
2. is the Office of the Minister of National Defence intended to be
included as a part of the DND; and
3. is the Office of the Minister of Transport intended to be included
as a part of the DOT?
The
Court must apply the principles of statutory interpretation to answer these
questions.
Principles of statutory
interpretation
[43]
Madam Justice Eleanor Dawson in Canada
(Attorney General) v. Canada (Information Commissioner), 2004 FC 431, 255
F.T.R. 56 (Attorney General) decided 25
applications for judicial review relating to the conduct of investigations by
the Commissioner concerning the requests to the PCO seeking access to the PM’s
daily agenda books, the request made to the DND for all records of the M5
meetings involving the Minister of National Defence, and the request to the DOT
for the Minister of Transport’s itinerary and meeting schedules. In deciding
these applications, Justice Dawson set out the legislative context of the Act
and the applicable principles of statutory interpretation.
[44]
Justice Dawson held that the proper approach
requires the Court to attribute a meaning to the Act that “best accords with
both the text and the context of the provision.” She stated at paragraph 18:
¶ 18 … the
clearer the ordinary meaning of the provision, the more compelling the
contextual considerations must be in order to warrant a different reading.
[45]
The Act is to be interpreted in a purposive and
liberal manner. Justice Dawson noted at paragraph 20 that the Act has been
characterized as a “quasi-constitutional right of access,” a factor for
interpreting the Act in that it recognizes the “special purpose” of the
legislation. I agree with this analysis.
[46]
More
recently, the Supreme Court of Canada provided further
guidance on interpreting statutes in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada,
2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601. For the Court, Chief Justice McLachlin and
Justice Major held at paragraph 10:
¶ 10 It has been long established as a matter of
statutory interpretation that “the words of an Act are to be read in their
entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with
the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of
Parliament”: see 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, at para. 50. The interpretation of a statutory provision
must be made according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find
a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole. When the words of a
provision are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words play a
dominant role in the interpretive process. On the other hand, where the words
can support more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the words
plays a lesser role. The relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and
purpose on the interpretive process may vary, but in all cases the court must
seek to read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole.
[Emphasis added.]
[47]
In addition to the general guidance provided by
the Supreme Court on statutory interpretation, the Court is guided by the
following rules of statutory construction:
1. the presumption against tautology provides that Parliament avoids
superfluous or meaningless words: Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 62, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 73;
2. courts must avoid altering the word choice selected by Parliament in
drafting legislation, particularly where the constitutional validity of
legislation is not at issue, as is the case here: R. v. Clay, 2003 SCC
75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735 at para. 55;
3. there is a presumption of consistent expression. That is, within a
statute the same words have the same meaning and different words have different
meanings: R. v. Zeolkowski, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1378 at p. 1387. The
inference to be made from this proposition is that where a different form of
expression is used, a different meaning is intended: Jabel Image Concepts
Inc. v. Canada (2000), 257 N.R. 193 at para. 12 (F.C.A.). Additionally, as
stated by Professor Ruth Sullivan in Sullivan and Driedger on the
Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Markham: Butterworths Canada Ltd., 2002) at p. 165: “The presumption of
consistent expression applies not only within statutes but across statutes as
well, especially statutes or provisions dealing with the same subject”;
4. the Supreme Court has provided that it is a basic principle of
statutory interpretation “that the court should not accept an interpretation
which requires the insertion of extra wording where there is another acceptable
interpretation which does not require any additional wording.” Legislative
silence in a statutory scheme with respect to particular issue implies that
Parliament did not intend to legislate on that issue: Markevich v. Canada,
2003 SCC 9, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 94 at para. 15; and
5. the latin maxim of statutory interpretation expression unius est
exclusion alterius: to express one thing is to exclude another. This
widespread and important rule of interpretation is also called “the implied
exclusion rule.”
[48]
The legislative context of the Act is to provide
a right of access to information in records “under the control of a government
institution,” and that government information should be available to the public
subject only to necessary exceptions.
[49]
In
Dagg, above, Mr. Justice La Forest, speaking for the
Supreme Court, held at paragraphs 61 and 63:
¶ 61 The
overarching purpose of access to information legislation, then, is to
facilitate democracy. It does so in two related ways. It helps to ensure first,
that citizens have the information required to participate meaningfully in the
democratic process, and secondly, that politicians and bureaucrats remain
accountable to the citizenry. As Professor Donald C. Rowat explains in his
classic article, “How Much Administrative Secrecy?” (1965), 31 Can. J. of Econ. and Pol. Sci. 479, at p. 480:
Parliament and the public cannot hope to call the Government to account
without an adequate knowledge of what is going on; nor can they hope to
participate in the decision-making process and contribute their talents to the
formation of policy and legislation if that process is hidden from view.
See also:
Canadian Bar Association, Freedom of Information in Canada: A Model Bill
(1979), at p. 6.
[...]
¶ 63 Rights to
state-held information are designed to improve the workings of government; to
make it more effective, responsive and accountable. Consequently, while the Access
to Information Act recognizes a broad right of access to “any record under
the control of a government institution” (s. 4(1)), it is important to have
regard to the overarching purposes of the Act in determining whether an
exemption to that general right should be granted.
(a) The
ordinary meaning according to the experts
[50]
The
evidence tendered from experts in government machinery, including Mr. Nicholas d’Ombrain,
a consultant on the machinery
of government and public sector management with over 30 years experience as an
adviser to governments; the findings of Mr. Justice John Gomery,
Commissioner of the Gomery Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program
and Advertising Activities; and a reference relied upon by Mr. d’Ombrain from
the Honourable Robert Gordon Robertson, Clerk of the Privy Council and
Secretary to the Cabinet from 1963 to 1975, states that the PMO is a separate and
distinct organization from the PCO. While the two entities work closely
together on some matters, the PMO is responsible for many matters unrelated to
the PCO. The same is true with respect to the relationship between a minister’s
office and the department over which the minister presides.
[51]
Accordingly,
the evidence demonstrates that in the ordinary sense of the words in subsection
4(1) of the Act, the PMO and the relevant ministerial offices are not part of
the “government institution” for which they are responsible. Mr. Robertson stated:
The Prime Minister’s Office is partisan,
politically oriented, yet operationally sensitive. The Privy Council Office is
non-partisan, operationally oriented yet politically sensitive. It has been
established between the principal secretary to the prime minister and his
senior staff on the one hand, and the clerk of the Privy Council and his senior
staff on the other, that they share the same fact base but keep out of each
other’s affairs. What is known in each office is provided freely and openly to
the other if it is relevant or needed for its work, but each acts from a
perspective and in a role quite different from the other.
Affidavit of Nicholas D’Ombrain, sworn September 29, 2000,
Application Record, Docket T-210-05, vol. 3, p. 1043 at para. 57.
[52]
Moreover,
Mr. Justice Gomery stated at page 31 of his fact finding report, “Who is
Responsible?”:
The Prime Minister is supported
politically by the PMO and bureaucratically by the Privy Council Office (PCO).
Although these are separate organizations, they are expected to work closely
together to ensure that consistent timely advice is provided on the subjects of
greatest importance to the Prime Minister.
Gomery
Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Phase
I Report: “Who is Responsible? – Fact Finding Report” at p. 31.
(b) The Minister and
Prime Minister are the head of their respective departments. Does that make
them part of the respective government institutions?
[53]
The
Commissioner submits that a minister is part of his or her department because
he or she is defined under the Access Act as being the “head” of the government
institution for the purposes of the Access Act:
3. In this Act,
“head”, in
respect of a government institution, means
(a)
in the case of a department or ministry of state, the member of the Queen’s
Privy Council for Canada who presides over the department or ministry, or
[ …]
|
3. Les
définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi
«responsable d’institution fédérale»
a) Le membre du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada sous
l’autorité duquel est placé un ministère ou un département d’État;
[ …]
|
[54]
As
well, the statutes creating the DND and the DOT both provide that their
respective ministers are responsible for the management of these departments. The
National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5 states at sections 3-4:
3. There is hereby established a
department of the Government of Canada called the Department of National
Defence over which the Minister of National Defence appointed by commission
under the Great Seal shall preside.
4. The Minister holds
office during pleasure, has the management and direction of the Canadian
Forces and of all matters relating to national defence and is responsible for
(a)
the construction and maintenance of all defence establishments and works for
the defence of Canada; and
(b)
research relating to the defence of Canada and to the development of and
improvements in materiel.
|
3. Est constitué le ministère de la
Défense nationale, placé sous l’autorité du ministre de la Défense nationale.
Celui-ci est nommé par commission sous le grand sceau.
4. Le ministre occupe sa charge à titre amovible et est responsable
des Forces canadiennes; il est compétent pour toutes les questions de défense
nationale, ainsi que pour :
a) la construction et l’entretien
des établissements et ouvrages de défense nationale;
b) la recherche liée à la défense
nationale et à la mise au point et au perfectionnement des matériels.
|
Similarly, the Department of Transport Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. T-18 states at section 3:
3. (1) There is hereby established a department of the
Government of Canada called the Department of Transport over which the
Minister of Transport appointed by commission under the Great Seal shall
preside.
(2) The Minister holds office during
pleasure and has the management and direction of the Department.
|
3. (1) Est
constitué le ministère des Transports, placé sous l’autorité du ministre des
Transports. Celui-ci est nommé par commission sous le grand sceau.
(2) Le
ministre occupe sa charge à titre amovible; il assure la direction et la
gestion du ministère.
|
[55]
Moreover,
the Commissioner submits that the budgets for ministerial offices and the PMO
are included in the budgets for their respective departments. The Court agrees
that these facts support the interpretation that ministers’ offices and the PMO
are part of their respective departments, and therefore included in their
respective government institution listed in Schedule I to the Access Act.
[56]
However,
the Court finds that the PM and the Ministers of National Defence and Transport
have many other functions unrelated to their respective departments for which
they are responsible. Accordingly, while the minister is responsible for the
department, and is the head of that department, that does not make the minister
or his or her office a component part of the department. While budgets for ministerial
offices and the PMO are included in their respective departmental budgets as a
separate line item, this does not make their respective offices part of the
department. Similarly, the Treasury Board has budgetary responsibility for the Office
of the Information Commissioner, but the Commissioner is not part of the
Treasury Board.
(c) The
intention of Parliament
[57]
The
legislative history of the Act and the contemporaneous understanding of the
intent of Parliament by the Commissioner are before the Court in evidence.
[58]
In
1981, prior to the Act’s enactment in 1982, the Honourable Francis Fox, Secretary
of State and Minister of Communications, the Minister responsible for this
legislation, stated in the House of Commons on January 29, 1981:
The purpose of the access
legislation is stated in clause 2 of schedule I – to provide a right to access,
subject to limited and specific exceptions and with an independent review
process to ensure that the right can be fully used.
Simply put, the [access to
information legislation] reverses the present situation whereby access to
information is a matter of government discretion. Under this legislation,
access to information becomes a matter of public right, with the burden of
proof on the government to establish that information need not be released.
The right of access created
by the [access to information legislation] is very broad: information in any
form, held by more than 130 government institutions. The right will be
exercised simply by making an application to the appropriate government
institution.
[Emphasis added.]
House of Commons Debates, Vol. 6 (29 January
1981) at 6690 (Hon. Francis Fox).
[59]
Parliament’s
intent is clear: first, the exemptions and exclusions provided in the Act are
“limited and specific”; second, the burden of proof, as noted above, lies with
the government to establish that the requested information need not be
disclosed; and finally, Parliament intended that the Act apply to information,
in any form, held by scheduled government institutions. This begs the question of
whether the legislation was intended to include the PMO and the Offices of the
Ministers of National Defence and Transport.
[60]
An
interpretation of “government institution” that included the PMO and offices of
the relevant ministers would dramatically extend the right of access from
records held by government institutions to records in those offices that are
wholly unrelated to the department, including political records with respect to
constituency matters, fundraising matters, Cabinet matters, and House of
Commons matters. In my view, Parliament would not have intended such a dramatic
result without express wording to that effect. The Commissioner agrees that
Parliament did not intend the Access Act to apply to political documents. For
reasons provided below, the Court finds no exemption or exclusion for such
political records. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Parliament did not
intend the PMO or ministerial offices be implicitly included as a component
part of the government institutions listed in Schedule I. Parliament would have
expressly so provided if it so intended.
(d) Original
interpretations by the Commissioner about the intent of Parliament
[61]
The
original interpretations by the Commissioner following the enactment of the
Access Act are evidence of the Commissioner’s understanding as to the intent of
Parliament at the time of the enactment. Under section 38 of the Act, the
Commissioner is required to submit an annual report to Parliament. In the
1988-1989 Report to Parliament, the Commissioner reported that ministers’
offices are not subject to the Access Act:
The detailed records given to the
complainant, including items paid by the Minister personally, were provided
voluntarily by the Minister for disclosure. (The House of Commons and
ministers’ offices are not subject to the Access to Information Act.)
[Emphasis added.]
[62]
In a 1991 letter to an access requester, the
Deputy Commissioner stated the following:
Our inquiries
confirm that the information you are seeking is not under the control of the
PCO; it is held by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). As that office is not
covered by the provisions of the Access to Information Act, there is no
requirement in law for the PMO to release that information to you.
Consequently it is my finding that your complaint is not well-founded and I
have so informed the PCO.
[Emphasis
added.]
Letter from J.
Alan Leadbeater, Deputy Commissioner, November 20, 1991, Application Record,
Docket T-1209-05, vol. 5, p. 1070).
[63]
Finally, in a letter dated September 8, 1997,
the then Information Commissioner, Mr. John W. Grace, wrote to a complainant
who had requested that the PCO disclose the daily schedules for the list of
appointments and engagements of the Prime Minister, stating:
I am writing to
report the results of our investigation into your complaint against the Privy
Council Office (PCO). Under the Access to Information Act, you asked for the
daily schedule or lists of appointments and engagements of the Prime Minister
for the month of November 1996. When PCO replied that it had no responsive
records, you complained to my office.
[…]
Further
discussions with the Office of the Clerk of the Privy Council and the Secretary
of Cabinet have convinced me that the information you seek is not under the
control of the PCO. You will know of course, that the PMO is not subject to
the Access to Information Act. I am therefore unable to support your
complain and will report it as not substantiated.
[Emphasis
added.]
Letter from John
W. Grace, Commissioner, September 8, 1997, Application Record, Docket
T-1209-05, vol. 5, p. 1071.
[64]
These
references from the Commissioner, in particular his official Report to
Parliament a few years after the Access Act was proclaimed in force, confirm
that the Commissioner understood the intent of Parliament was not to include
the PMO or a minister’s office in the government institutions listed in
Schedule I of the Act.
[65]
The
Commissioner has altered course and changed this position over time. More
recently, the position of the Commissioner has been that ministerial offices
are subject to the Access Act. In fact, the Commissioner acknowledged that this
has been an issue where there has been some doubt, and urged Parliament in one
of his recent official Reports to amend the legislation to clarify this.
(e) Legislative
silence can be relevent to determine intent
[66]
Since
the Commissioner publicly urged Parliament to amend the legislation to clarify
that the PMO and ministerial offices are subject to the Access Act, Parliament
has amended the Act several times and has not made this amendment. Most
recently, in 2006, Parliament enacted the Federal Accountability Act,
S.C. 2006, c. 9. At that time, 34 amendments were made to the Access Act. Prior
to the amendments, in October 2005, the Standing Committee on Access to
Information, Privacy and Ethics heard from the Commissioner with respect to
proposed amendments to the Act. Included in these proposed amendments, the
Commissioner advocated clarification of the definition of a “government
institution” so as to include the PMO and ministerial offices. The
Commissioner’s recommendations were then supported by Commissioner Gomery in
his recommendation report entitled “Restoring Accountability” (see Gomery
Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities,
Phase II Report: “Restoring Accountability – Recommendations” at p. 183).
[67]
If
Parliament intended that ministerial offices be part of a government
institution, it would have made the appropriate amendments in 2006. While
Parliament’s intention may not always be inferred from legislative silence, in
this case, the silence is clear and relevant evidence of legislative intent. The
office of a minister is not intended to be part of a scheduled government
institution. This rationale was recently applied by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario, 2008 SCC 12, [2008] S.C.J. No. 12 (QL) at
paragraph 42:
¶ 42 While it cannot be said that
legislative silence is necessarily determinative of legislative intention, in
this case the silence is Parliament’s answer to the consistent urging of Telus
and other affected businesses and organizations that there be express language
in the legislation to ensure that businesses can be reimbursed for the
reasonable costs of complying with evidence-gathering orders. I see the
legislative history as reflecting Parliament’s intention that compensation not
be paid for compliance with production orders.
(f) The Latin maxim of statutory interpretation: expressio
unius est exclusio alterius
[68]
The
Latin maxim of statutory interpretation expression unius est exclusion alterius
means “to express one thing is to exclude another.” This widespread and
important rule of interpretation is also called “the implied exclusion rule.”
In her text, Professor Sullivan states at page 186:
… [I]f the legislature had meant to
include a particular thing within its legislation, it would have referred to
that thing expressly. Because of this expectation, the legislature’s failure to
mention the thing becomes grounds for inferring that it was deliberately
excluded. Although there is no express exclusion, exclusion is implied. …
The obvious application of this rule of
statutory interpretation is that if Parliament had intended to include the PMO
and ministers’ offices in Schedule I, it would have referred to them expressly.
This is evidence that Parliament intended to exclude the PMO and ministers’
offices from the government institutions subject to the Access Act.
(g) Ministers
without portfolio
[69]
The
evidence demonstrated that there have been many ministers without portfolio
since Confederation. If the Access Act intended to apply to the offices of
ministers, the Act would not apply to a minister without portfolio because he
or she does not have a corresponding “government institution” listed in
Schedule I. Such a result is absurd.
(h) Internal structure of the Act
[70]
The internal structure of the Act also
provides insight into Parliament’s intention with respect to the relationship
between the office of a minister – including the PMO – and a government
institution. Paragraphs 21(1)(a)-(b), 21(2)(b) and section 26 of the Act make
reference to both “government institution” and “minister of the Crown,” which
includes the PM in his capacity as Minister of the PCO:
21. (1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any
record requested under this Act that contains
(a) advice or
recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister
of the Crown,
(b) an account
of consultations or deliberations in which directors, officers or employees
of a government institution, a minister of the Crown or the staff of a
minister participate…
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of a record that
contains
[…]
(b) a report prepared by a consultant or an adviser who
was not a director, an officer or an employee of a government institution
or a member of the staff of a minister of the Crown at the time
the report was prepared.
[…]
26. The head
of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record
requested under this Act or any part thereof if the head of the institution
believes on reasonable grounds that the material in the record or part
thereof will be published by a government institution, agent of the
Government of Canada or minister of the Crown within ninety days after
the request is made or within such further period of time as may be necessary
for printing or translating the material for the purpose of printing it.
[Emphasis added.]
|
21. (1) Le responsable d’une institution fédérale peut refuser la
communication de documents datés de moins de vingt ans lors de la demande et
contenant :
a) des avis ou recommandations élaborés par ou pour une
institution fédérale ou un ministre;
b) des comptes rendus de consultations ou délibérations auxquelles
ont participé des administrateurs, dirigeants ou employés d’une institution
fédérale, un ministre ou son personnel…
(2) Le paragraphe (1) ne
s’applique pas aux documents contenant :
[…]
b) le rapport établi par un
consultant ou un conseiller qui, à l’époque où le rapport a été établi,
n’était pas un administrateur, un dirigeant ou un employé d’une
institution fédérale ou n’appartenait pas au personnel d’un ministre,
selon le cas.
[…]
26. Le responsable d’une
institution fédérale peut refuser la communication totale ou partielle
d’un document s’il a des motifs raisonnables de croire que le contenu du
document sera publié en tout ou en partie par une institution fédérale, un
mandataire du gouvernement du Canada ou un ministre dans les
quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la demande ou dans tel délai supérieur
entraîné par les contraintes de l’impression ou de la traduction en vue de
l’impression.
[Nous soulignons.]
|
[71]
These sections demonstrate that Parliament distinguished
and differentiated between a “government institution,” and “a minister of the
Crown” under the Access Act. Parliament did not intend government institution
to include a minister of the Crown. To take a contrary view would be to go
against the presumption that Parliament avoids superfluous words: see Schreiber,
above. Using the words of Professor Sullivan, Parliament is an “idealized
speaker.” It says what it means and means what it says: see Sullivan, above, at
page 155. In Re Medical Centre Apartments Ltd. and City of Winnipeg (1969),
3 D.L.R. (3d) 525 at page 542 (Man. C.A.), Justice Monin for the Manitoba Court
of Appeal stated: “The Legislature is assumed to have used the clearest way of
expressing its intentions.” It must be assumed that when drafting legislation,
Parliament uses words precisely and carefully.
[72]
The Commissioner submits that paragraphs 21(1)(a)-(b)
and 21(2)(b) support the position that ministerial offices, including the PMO,
are subject to the Act. The Commissioner states that section 21 grants
discretion to the head of a government institution to refuse to disclose
records mentioned in section 21, for “a minister of the Crown or the staff of a
minister of the Crown.” It follows that such records are, at the outset,
covered by the Act if not exempt or excluded. The Court disagrees
because such a document developed for the Minister could be located in the
departmental offices, and this a reason for exempting it in section 21.
[73]
The distinctive use in the Act of “government
institution” and “minister of the Crown,” in my view, demonstrates that
Parliament intended them to have two different meanings. Otherwise, under
paragraph 21(1)(a), it would be redundant to directly follow “government
institution” with the express phrase “or a minister of the Crown.”
(i) Presumption of consistent expression in federal
legislation
[74]
Parliament, in other legislation, has
distinguished between a “ministerial record” and a “departmental record.” In
the Libraries and Archives of Canada Act, S.C. 2004, c. 11, a
“government institution” is defined as an institution listed in Schedule I of
the Act, a “ministerial record” is defined as
a record of a
member of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada who holds the office of a minister and that pertains to that
office, other than a record that is of a personal or political nature or that
is a government record,
and a “government
record” is defined as a record under the “control of a government institution.”
[75]
If Parliament intended a “minister’s office” to
be a component of a “government institution,” there would be no need to
distinguish between a “governmental record” and a “ministerial record.” By
definition, they would be the same. Subsection 7(c) of the Libraries and
Archives of Canada Act, under the heading of Objects and Powers, states:
7. The
objects of the Library and Archives of Canada are
[…]
(c) to be the permanent repository of publications of the
Government of Canada and of government and ministerial records that
are of historical or archival value.
[Emphasis
added]
|
7. Bibliothèque et Archives du Canada a pour mission :
[…]
c) d'être le dépositaire permanent
des publications des institutions fédérales, ainsi que des documents
fédéraux et ministériels qui ont un intérêt historique ou archivistique.
[Nous
soulignons.]
|
Again, the
legislation distinguishes between government and ministerial records.
[76]
Parliament’s consistency in distinguishing
between governmental records and ministerial records is encapsulated in the
principle of consistent expression. Professor Sullivan explains this principle in
the following terms at page 162 of her text: “Once a particular way of
expressing a meaning has been adopted, it is used each time that meaning is
intended.” Further, as Parliament uses language carefully and consistently,
Professor Sullivan states that the presumption of consistent expression applies
not only within statutes but across statutes as well, particularly statutes or
provisions dealing with the same subject: see Sullivan, above, at pp. 162, 165.
In my view, the different purposes of the Library and Archives of Canada Act
and the Access Act do not detract from the consistency of the
terminology employed by Parliament.
(j) Conclusion
[77]
When I apply the context of the Act, read the
words in their ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act and the
intention of Parliament, and apply the principles of statutory interpretation, I
conclude that the PMO cannot be interpreted as part of the PCO. Rather, the PMO
is a separate office with staff not connected with the PCO and having a number
of functions not related to the PCO. I am satisfied that the ordinary meaning
of the PCO is clear, and that no contextual consideration could warrant the
Court interpreting Parliament to have intended the PMO to be part of the PCO
for the purposes of the Act. The same is true with respect to ministers’
offices not being part of the respective government institutions.
Issue No. 2: What
constitutes a record “under the control of a government institution” as stated
in subsection 4(1) of the Act?
[78]
One
purpose of the Act is to “extend the present laws of Canada to provide a
right of access to information in records under the control of a government
institution.” In deciding whether the records at issue are subject to
access under the Act, the Court must interpret the meaning of “control” in
subsection 4(1).
[79]
The
meaning of “control” under the Act has been judicially considered by this Court
and by the Federal Court of Appeal. I refer to this jurisprudence below in
chronological order.
Jurisprudence regarding the
meaning of “control” under the Act
1st decision
[80]
In
Canada Post Corp. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works), [1993] 3 F.C.
320 (T.D.), Mr. Justice Rothstein, then a member of the Federal Court, determined
whether records in the possession of Public Works Canada pursuant to an agency
agreement with Canada Post were “under the control of a government institution,”
thereby making them subject to disclosure pursuant to the Act’s provisions.
Canada Post, which as a Crown corporation is not subject to the Act, argued
that such records were properly within its control and were, accordingly, not
subject to disclosure. In concluding that the relevant records were in the
control of Public Works Canada and were subject to disclosure, Justice
Rothstein addressed the issue of control through the guise of possession,
stating at pages 346-347:
… In my view, the fact that a government
institution has possession of records, whether in a legal or corporeal sense,
is sufficient for such records to be subject to the Access to Information
Act.
This dictum is pertinent to the copies of the PM’s agendas
located within the PCO and the RCMP.
2nd decision
[81]
This
decision was affirmed on appeal in Canada Post Corp. v. Canada (Minister of
Public Works), [1995] 2 F.C. 110 (C.A.). The majority decision by Mr.
Justice Létourneau stated how “control” should be interpreted for the purposes
of subsection 4(1) of the Act since “control” had been left undefined and
unlimited by Parliament. Justice Létourneau held at pages 127-128:
The notion of control
referred to in subsection 4(1) of the Access to Information Act (the
Act) is left undefined and unlimited. Parliament did not see fit to distinguish
between ultimate and immediate, full and partial, transient and lasting or “de
jure” and “de facto” control. Had Parliament intended to qualify and
restrict the notion of control to the power to dispose of the information, as
suggested by the appellant, it could certainly have done so by limiting the
citizen’s right of access only to those documents that the Government can
dispose of or which are under the lasting or ultimate control of the
Government.
[82]
Further,
Justice Létourneau stated that the fact that Parliament saw fit to leave the
term undefined lends support to the notion that Parliament’s intention in
passing the Act was to provide Canadians with a “meaningful right of access”
that is best achieved through a broad and liberal interpretation of the meaning
of control. He stated at page 128:
¶ 33 It is, in my view,
as much the duty of courts to give subsection 4(1) of the Access to
Information Act a liberal and purposive construction, without reading in
limiting words not found in the Act or otherwise circumventing the
intention of the legislature as “[i]t is the duty of boards and courts,” as
Chief Justice Lamer of the Supreme Court of Canada reminded us in relation to
the Canadian Human Rights Act, “to give s. 3 a liberal and purposive
construction, without reading the limiting words out of the Act or
otherwise circumventing the intention of the legislature.” … It is not in the
power of this Court to cut down the broad meaning of the word “control” as
there is nothing in the Act which indicates that the word should not be given
its broad meaning. On the contrary, it was Parliament’s intention to give the
citizen a meaningful right of access under the Act to government information. …
[Emphasis in original.]
3rd decision
[83]
In
Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Canada Labour Relations Board (2000),
257 N.R. 66 (F.C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal was faced with a similar
provision in the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21, namely whether the personal
notes taken by members of the Canada Labour Relations Board (the CLRB) during
hearings were subject to disclosure under the Privacy Act as “other
personal information about the individual under the control of a government
institution.” While the Court considered numerous issues, including judicial
independence, the Court decided the matter on the “threshold” question of
whether the personal notes were under the control of a government institution.
In quoting from Mr. Justice Marc Noël (as he then was), the Court of Appeal stated
at paragraph 6 that the personal notes taken were not part of the CLRB’s
official records and could not be seen as being under the CLRB’s control:
¶ 6 The
trial judge made the following statement with which we agree:
[...] The notes are viewed by their authors as their own. The CLRB members
are free to take notes as and when they see fit, and indeed may simply choose
not to do so. The notes are intended for the eyes of the author only. No other
person is allowed to see read or use the notes, and there is a clear
expectation on the part of the author that no other person will see the notes.
The members maintain responsibility for the care and safe keeping of the notes
and can destroy them at any time. Finally, the notes are not part of the
official records of the CLRB and are not contained in any other record keeping
system over which the CLRB has administrative control.
In my view, it is apparent from the foregoing that however broadly one
construes the word control, the notes in issue were not “under the control” of
the CLRB within any of the meanings that can be attributed to that term. […]
This dictum is pertinent to the
hand-written notes of the exempt staff in the Minister of National Defence file.
4th decision
[84]
In
Rubin v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade),
2001 FCT 440, 204 F.T.R. 313, Mr. Justice Blanchard was faced with an access
request for all environmental screening records related to the sale of Candu
nuclear reactors to China that were under the control of the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade. At paragraph 18 of his decision,
Justice Blanchard held that a determination of control must not be limited by
how and on what terms the information came into the hands of the government
institution:
¶ 18 … The
plain meaning of ss. 4(1) and ss. 2(1) of the Access Act is that the Act
gives access, subject to many exceptions, to any record, or information in a
record, which happens to be within the custody of the government regardless of
the means by which that custody was obtained.
[85]
Having held that the issue of control must be assessed on a
case-by-case basis, Justice Blanchard concluded that on there was no evidence
that at the time of the request the Department was in control of any of the
relevant records. He stated at paragraphs 20-21:
¶ 20 There is
uncontradicted evidence before this Court … that the “Shanghai Report” was
provided to FAIT under strict conditions, for a limited time frame, and on the
condition that it be promptly returned to AECL. …
¶ 21 The
evidence before this Court indicates that officials from FAIT used the
“Shanghai Report” for a matter of days, with the assurance to AECL that all
copies of the report would be returned to AECL. … There is no evidence in the
case at bar that FAIT returned the “Shanghai Report” to AECL for an
ill-motivated purpose, nor that FAIT contracted out of the Access Act.
Given this evidence, I am satisfied that FAIT did not have control of the
“Shanghai Report” when the applicant’s access request was filed at the end of
April 1997.
This dictum is pertinent to the copies
of the PM’s agendas, which were sent to the Clerk of the Privy Council, but
then destroyed.
5th decision
[86]
In
Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Information Commissioner), 2001 FCA
25, 268 N.R. 328 (Hartley), the Federal Court of Appeal was faced with
one of the same matters currently before the Court, namely whether the Prime
Minister’s daily agenda books are records under the control of the PCO and
therefore subject to disclosure under the Access Act. The issue before the
Court at that time was whether a subpoena duces tecum issued by the
Office of the Commissioner for the production of the agenda books should be
struck out. In its decision, which was issued collectively by the panel of
Chief Justice Richard and Justices Evans and Noël, the Court of Appeal upheld
the Commissioner’s subpoena and concluded that the agenda books should be
provided to the Commissioner, in confidence, for the purposes of his
investigation. Following the decision, the agenda books were provided to the
Commissioner, the Commissioner issued a report and recommendations regarding
whether they were under the control of the PCO, the PMO opted not to follow
that report, and the Commissioner commenced the within application for judicial
review before the Federal Court to determine whether the agenda books should be
produced in response to the access request.
[87]
While
the Court’s ruling in Hartley only applied to the context of the
Commissioner’s investigation and not to whether the records should ultimately
be disclosed to the access requester, the Court provided comments on the issue
of control. After quoting with approval the statement of Mr. Justice Létourneau
in the Court of Appeal decision in Canada Post, above – i.e.,
that the notion of control was left undefined and unlimited in the Act and that
Parliament did not see fit to qualify or limit the notion of control – the
Court stated that the content of the records at issue and the circumstances
surrounding their creation may be relevant to determining whether control lies
in the hands of a government institution:
¶ 29 Further, contrary to
the view seemingly held by the motions judge, the contents of the documents
sought by the Commissioner and the circumstances in which they came into being
may be relevant to determining whether they are under the control of the Privy
Council Office which, as noted, is a government institution for purposes of the
Act.
Despite
these statements, the Court of Appeal did not, at any point, comment on whether
the PMO is a component part of the PCO, which is listed as a government
institution in Schedule I of the Act. I can only assume that if the Court of
Appeal believed that this was the case, it would have explicitly stated as such
in its reasons. Nevertheless, this does not resolve the issue of whether the
records at issue were within the control of the relevant government institution
for the purposes of disclosure under the Act.
6th decision
[88]
In
a related matter before this Court, Madam Justice Dawson in Attorney General,
above, echoed the view of Justice Létourneau in the Court of Appeal decision in
Canada Post, above, and held at paragraph 104 that the interpretation of
control must be broadly interpreted so as to confer a meaningful right of
access:
¶ 104 Therefore, control is not to
be given a limited meaning, but rather a broad meaning so as to confer a
meaningful right of access. Things such as the content of a record may shed
light on control as could a right of partial or transient or de jure access.
[Emphasis added.]
Ultimately, Justice Dawson concluded that
the issue of control was “premature and unripe” for determination at that time,
in large part because the Commissioner’s investigation was still in progress
and many of the actual records in dispute were not in evidence before the
Court.
[89]
However,
despite these factors, Justice Dawson provided obiter comments on the
appropriate interpretation to be given to the term control for purposes of the
Access Act. As noted above, Justice Dawson made clear that the “content of a
record may shed light” on whether control lies within the appropriate
government institution, thereby making the record subject to disclosure under
the Act.
7th decision
[90]
Finally,
in another case involving Canada Post – see Canada Post Corp. v. Canada
(Minister of Public Works), 2004 FCA 286, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1453 (QL) (Canada
Post No. 2) – the Federal Court of Appeal made the following comments in obiter
on the notion of control per Mr. Justice Décary at paragraph 3:
¶ 3 The relationship of
CIG to the Minister responsible for Canada Post Corporation, who happens to
have been at the relevant time the Minister of Public Works and Government
Services Canada, is irrelevant for the determination of the issue of whether
the records were under the control of a government institution and thus subject
to the Act. That the records were provided to CIG to allow it to perform its
duty in relation to assisting the Minister in the administration of Crown
Corporations does not diminish, or alter, the fact that CIG is part of the
Department. We are not dealing here with records which are under the control
of the Minister himself or his exempt staff, which records counsel for the
respondent concedes are not under the control of a government institution for
purposes of the Act.
[Emphasis added.]
This
obiter dicta is pertinent to the records held exclusively in the PMO and
ministers’ offices.
Court’s conclusion
regarding the meaning of control
[91]
I
have found this jurisprudence illuminating on the proper meaning of control for
the purposes of the Access Act. The Court of Appeal decision in Hartley,
above, and the decision of Madam Justice Dawson in Attorney General,
above, have been of particular help due to their close connection to the
matters currently before the Court. From this jurisprudence, I have extracted
the following principles that will guide the Court’s analysis in the case at
bar:
1. control is
not a defined term;
2. in reaching a
finding of whether the records at issue are “under the control of a government
institution,” the Court can consider “ultimate” control as well as “immediate”
control, “partial” as well as “full” control, “transient” as well as “lasting”
control, and “de jure” as well as “de facto” control;
3. Parliament
did not restrict the notion of control to the power to “dispose” – i.e.,
get rid of the documents in question; and
4. the contents
of the records and the circumstances in which they came into being are relevant
to determine whether they are under the control of a government institution for
the purposes of disclosure under the Act.
[92]
Using
these principles, the Court will consider the contents of the records and the
circumstances in which they were created to surmise whether the government
institution could obtain a copy upon request from the PMO or the Offices of the
Ministers of National Defence and Transport.
Application of meaning
[93]
The
parties agree that the PMO and the offices of the relevant ministers deal with
departmental matters – i.e., matters related to the government
institution – as well as political, constituency, parliamentary, and Cabinet
matters. Upon review by the Court, if the content of the documents in the
PMO or the Offices of the Ministers of National Defence and Transport relate to
a departmental matter, and the circumstances in which the documents came into
being show that the deputy minister or other senior officials in the department
could request and obtain a copy of that document to deal with the subject
matter, then that document is under the control of the government institution.
The meaning of “control” is to be given a broad and liberal interpretation to
create a meaningful right of access to government information.
Ordinary meaning
[94]
The meaning of a word such as “control” in a statute is a question of law to be given its ordinary or
popular meaning. The Court can determine that meaning with the aide of
dictionaries: see Pfizer Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue for
Customs and Excise, [1973] F.C. 3 (C.A.) per Jackett C.J. at p. 7, rev’d on
other grounds [1977] 1 S.C.R. 456.
[95]
The Canadian Oxford Dictionary (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 2001) defines “control” as:
1. the
power of directing, command (under the control of).
While “control” is to be given its
broadest possible meaning, it cannot be stretched beyond reason. In this case,
the Court interprets “control” to mean that a senior official with the
government institution (other than the Minister) has some power of direction or
command over a document, even if it is only on a “partial” basis, a “transient”
basis, or a “de facto” basis.
Examples of documents under the control and not under the
control of government institutions
[96]
A document in the Minister’s office that relates to a
departmental matter does not necessarily mean that the document is under the
control of the government institution. If it was created by a departmental
official and sent to the Minister’s office, then that departmental official
should have a reasonable expectation that he or she can obtain another copy of
it upon request. If this is the case, then the document is under the control of
the government institution.
[97]
Similarly, if the document was prepared in the Minister’s office
in consultation with a government/departmental official, then that individual
should again have a reasonable expectation of obtaining a copy of it upon
request, and the document can be seen as being under the control of the
government institution.
[98]
If, however, the document was prepared by someone in the
Minister’s office, was to be used for the sole purposes of the Minister’s
office, and if no government/departmental official has, or should have, a
reasonable expectation of obtaining a copy of it, then that document is not
under the control of the government institution for the purposes of the Access
Act.
[99]
The
Commissioner submits, and the Court agrees, that political records are not
subject to access under the Act. However, there is no clear exemption or
exclusion under the Act for political records.
[100] Before
applying the meaning of “control” to the documents in issue, the Court will first
address relevant exemptions and exclusions at issue in these applications.
Issue No. 3: What is the
meaning and scope of the following exemptions under the Act?
[101] A consideration of the exemptions in the Access Act is only
necessary if the Court concludes that the records in question were under the
control of the relevant government institutions when the access requests were
made.
i.
Exemption
No. 1: “personal information” under section 19
[102] Section 19 of the Access Act prohibits the head of a government
institution from releasing any record that contains “personal information” as
defined by section 3 of the Privacy Act.
[103] The starting point for an analysis of the interrelationship between the
definition of personal information in section 3 of the Privacy Act and
section 19 of the Access Act is Mr. Justice La Forest’s
discussion at paragraph 68 of Dagg, above. While Justice La Forest was writing in dissent, the majority agreed with him that “personal
information” is to be broadly defined.
[104] Justice La Forest also held, and the majority agreed, that when interpreting the
Access Act and the Privacy Act, it should be kept in mind that
Parliament has woven the two pieces of legislation into a seamless code: see Dagg
at para. 45. Section 3 of the Privacy Act sets out what constitutes “personal
information” and section 19 of the Access Act states that a head of a
government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested that
contains personal information as defined in the Privacy Act. However, subsection
(j) of the definition of “personal information” in section 3 of the Privacy
Act (hereinafter section 3(j)) carves out an important exception. Personal
information may be disclosed about an individual who is an officer or an
employee of a government institution if that information relates to the
position or functions of that individual. This corresponds with the purpose of section
3(j), which is to ensure that the state and its agents are held accountable to
the general public:
Access Act
19. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the head of a government institution
shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains
personal information as defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act.
[…]
Privacy Act
3. In this
Act,
“personal
information” means information about an identifiable individual that
is recorded in any form including, without restricting the generality of the
foregoing,
[…]
but, for the
purposes of sections 7, 8 and 26 and section 19 of the Access to
Information Act, does not include
(j)
information about an individual who is or was an officer or employee of a
government institution that relates to the position or functions of the
individual including,
[…]
|
19. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le responsable d’une institution
fédérale est tenu de refuser la communication de documents
contenant les renseignements personnels visés à l’article 3 de la Loi sur
la protection des renseignements personnels.
[…]
3. Les
définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi.
«renseignements personnels» Les renseignements,
quels que soient leur forme et leur support, concernant un individu
identifiable, notamment :
[…]
toutefois, il demeure entendu que, pour l’application des articles 7, 8
et 26, et de l’article 19 de la Loi sur l’accès à l’information, les
renseignements personnels ne comprennent pas les renseignements concernant :
j) un cadre
ou employé, actuel ou ancien, d’une institution fédérale et portant sur son
poste ou ses fonctions, notamment :
[…]
|
[105] In RCMP,
above, Mr. Justice Gonthier held at paragraph 34 that Parliament intended to
give less protection to the privacy of federal employees when the information
requested relates to their position or function. As a result, the Commissioner
submits that the majority of the information in the agendas relate to the
official duties, functions, and activities of the PM and the Minister of
Transport so that this information is not exempt as personal information.
[106] The
respondents, however, submit that the PM and the Minister of Transport are not
“officers” or “employees” of a government institution as the terms are used in
section 3(j) of the Privacy Act and that, accordingly, their information
does not fit within the scope of the section 3(j) exception and is exempt from
disclosure. With respect to the respondents’ characterization of the PM and
Minister of Transport as not being officers within the meaning of section 3(j),
the Court disagrees.
[107] The Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11,
defines “public officer” as including “a minister of the Crown and any person
employed in the federal public administration.” The Interpretation Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, defines “public officer” as including “any person in the
federal public administration who is authorized by or under an enactment to do
or enforce the doing of an act or thing or to exercise a power, or on whom a
duty is imposed by or under an enactment.” The Court finds this latter
definition broad enough to include the PM and a minister of the Crown.
[108] I see no difference between the use of the word “officer” in section
3(j) of the Privacy Act and “public officer” as defined in the Interpretation
Act. This is particularly the case in light of the fact that the Access Act
imposes duties on Ministers as the heads of government institutions.
[109] The respondents submit that the information at issue is contained in
the personal agendas of the PM and the Minister of Transport. They are a personal
history of the person for that day, week, month, or year, and are personal
documents. The agendas list what the person has done or will do with his or her
time in a given period. The Court cannot agree. If the agendas are subject to
production under subsection 4(1) of the Act, then the agendas are not exempt in
their entirety as personal information. They list the meetings and appointments
of the PM and the Minister of Transport, which include information relating to their
duties and functions as the Minister responsible for a “government institution.”
However, the private appointments not related to the job are exempt as
“personal information.”
[110] The names of
private individuals (not government employees) in the agendas are personal
information, which must be redacted. If the PM meets with a political person, a
businessman, a lobbyist, or even the CEO of a Crown corporation, the name of
that individual is the private and personal information of that individual, and
is exempt from disclosure. This exemption may spoil the curiosity of any access
requester seeking information about who the PM met on different dates regarding
different issues.
ii. Exemption No. 2: “advice
or recommendations” and “account of consultations or deliberations” under
paragraphs 21(1)(a) and (b)
[111] Subsection
21(1) of the Act exempts from disclosure, inter alia, advice, recommendations,
and accounts of consultations or deliberations with or developed for a Minister.
If the records are subject to disclosure, the respondents have claimed section
21 exemptions to parts of the agendas of the PM and the Minister of Transport.
The respondents also claimed a section 21 exemption to parts of the notebooks
of the exempt staff of the Minister of National Defence with respect to the M5
meetings. These latter claims for exemption were accepted by the Commissioner
and are not in issue before the Court. Subsection 21(1) states, in part:
21. (1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any
record requested under this Act that contains
(a) advice or recommendations developed by or for a
government institution or a minister of the Crown,
(b) an account of consultations or deliberations in which
directors, officers or employees of a government institution, a minister of
the Crown or the staff of a minister participate,
[ …]
|
21. (1) Le responsable d’une institution fédérale peut refuser la
communication de documents datés de moins de vingt ans lors de la demande et
contenant :
a) des avis ou recommandations élaborés
par ou pour une institution fédérale ou un ministre;
b) des comptes rendus de
consultations ou délibérations auxquelles ont participé des administrateurs,
dirigeants ou employés d’une institution fédérale, un ministre ou son
personnel;
[ …]
|
[112] In Canadian
Council of Christian Charities v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1999] 4
F.C. 245 (T.D.), Mr. Justice Evans, then a member of the Federal Court, stated
at paragraphs 31-32 that the section 21 exemption balances the public’s
entitlement to openness to government documents with the necessary requirement
that ministers and their advisors be able to develop policy in confidence
without public scrutiny of the internal evolution of policies ultimately
adopted:
¶
31 It would be an intolerable burden to force ministers and their advisors
to disclose to public scrutiny the internal evolution of the policies
ultimately adopted. Disclosure of such material would often reveal that the
policy-making process included false starts, blind alleys, wrong turns, changes
of mind, the solicitation and rejection of advice, and the re-evaluation of
priorities and the re-weighing of the relative importance of the relevant
factors as a problem is studied more closely. In the hands of journalists or
political opponents this is combustible material liable to fuel a fire that
could quickly destroy governmental credibility and effectiveness.
¶ 32 On the other hand,
of course, democratic principles require that the public, and this often means
the representatives of sectional interests, are enabled to participate as
widely as possible in influencing policy development. Without a degree of
openness on the part of government about its thinking on public policy issues,
and without access to relevant information in the possession of government, the
effectiveness of public participation will inevitably be curbed.
[113] Justice Evans
stated that subsection 21(1) exempts a wide range of documents generated in the
internal policy making process of a government institution. He stated at
paragraph 39:
¶ 39 It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the combined effect of paragraphs 21(1)(a) and
(b) is to exempt from disclosure under the Act a very wide range of
documents generated in the internal policy processes of a government
institution. Documents containing information of a factual or statistical
nature, or providing an explanation of the background to a current policy or
legislative provision, may not fall within these broad terms. However, most
internal documents that analyse a problem, starting with an initial
identification of a problem, then canvassing a range of solutions, and ending
with specific recommendations for change, are likely to be caught within
paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection 21(1).
[114] The
Commissioner submits that the items in the agenda do not constitute advice,
recommendations, or accounts of consultations or deliberations. The Court
agrees. There is no subject matter included in the agenda entries, only the
scheduling of meetings. Notice of a meeting does not disclose the advice or
deliberations at the meeting. Accordingly, the subsection 21(1) exemptions claimed
by the respondents would not apply.
iii. Exemption No. 3: exclusions
under section 69 of the Act and section 39 of the Canada Evidence Act,
which relate to confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council
[115] The application of section 69 of the Access Act and section 39 of
the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 (the CEA), which exclude
from disclosure information found to contain Cabinet confidences, originally arose
in the PM and Minister of Transport files currently before the Court.
[116] In addition to invoking section 69 of the Act, on March 19, 2001,
with respect to the PM’s daily agenda books, the Clerk of the Privy Council
issued a certificate pursuant to section 39 of the CEA. That certificate excluded
portions of the PM’s agendas requested by the Commissioner on the grounds that they
contained Cabinet confidences as defined in the CEA.
[117] On May 4,
2001, the Clerk of the Privy Council also issued a certificate under section 39
of the CEA objecting to the disclosure of portions of the Minister of
Transport’s weekly agendas on the grounds that they contained Cabinet
confidences. However, on January 6, 2004, counsel for the Minister of Transport
notified the Deputy Commissioner that as a result of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 57, [2002] 3
S.C.R. 3, the Clerk had elected to not issue a subsequent section 39
certificate and was no longer claiming a Cabinet confidence exclusion. The
letter stated, in part:
As a result of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Babcock … the Clerk of the Privy Council will not
be signing a certificate under s.39 of the Canada Evidence Act with
respect to this document. Accordingly, the enclosed agenda contains additional
information that was severed from the version provided to you on August 18,
2000.
Letter from Peter K. Doody to J. Alan Leadbeater, Deputy
Commissioner, January 6, 2004, Application Record, Docket T-1211-05, vol. 2, p.
104.
[118] Accordingly,
the respondent only relies on the Cabinet confidence exclusion in the PM file
and not within the Minister of Transport file.
The Legislation
[119] Subsection 69(1) of the Access Act stipulates that
“confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada” are outside the scope of
the Access Act and are therefore not subject to disclosure. The section also
sets out a non-exhaustive list of what constitutes a Cabinet confidence for the
purposes of the Act:
69. (1)
This Act does not apply to confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, including, without restricting
the generality of the foregoing,
(a) memoranda the purpose of which is to present
proposals or recommendations to Council;
(b) discussion papers the purpose of which is to present background
explanations, analyses of problems or policy options to Council for
consideration by Council in making decisions;
(c) agenda of Council or records recording deliberations
or decisions of Council;
(d) records used for or reflecting communications or
discussions between ministers of the Crown on matters relating to the making
of government decisions or the formulation of government policy;
(e) records the purpose of which is to brief ministers of
the Crown in relation to matters that are before, or are proposed to be
brought before, Council or that are the subject of communications or
discussions referred to in paragraph (d);
(f) draft legislation; and
(g) records that contain information about the contents
of any record within a class of records referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f).
[…]
|
69. (1)
La présente loi ne s’applique pas aux documents confidentiels du Conseil
privé de la Reine pour le Canada, notamment aux :
a) notes destinées à soumettre des
propositions ou recommandations au Conseil;
b) documents de travail destinés à
présenter des problèmes, des analyses ou des options politiques à l’examen du
Conseil;
c) ordres du jour du Conseil ou
procès-verbaux de ses délibérations ou décisions;
d) documents employés en vue ou
faisant état de communications ou de discussions entre ministres sur des
questions liées à la prise des décisions du gouvernement ou à la formulation
de sa politique;
e) documents d’information à
l’usage des ministres sur des questions portées ou qu’il est prévu de porter
devant le Conseil, ou sur des questions qui font l’objet des communications
ou discussions visées à l’alinéa d);
f) avant-projets de loi ou projets
de règlement;
g) documents contenant des
renseignements relatifs à la teneur des documents visés aux alinéas a) à f).
[…]
|
[120] Under section 69, the Court can review the records at issue to
determine if they are Cabinet confidences, and therefore excluded from the
scope of the Act.
[121] Subsection 39(1) of the CEA sets out another procedure that can be
followed by the Clerk of the Privy Council in certifying information as a
Cabinet confidence. In so doing, this prevents that information from being
disclosed or examined by a reviewing court:
39. (1) Where a minister of the Crown or the Clerk of the Privy Council
objects to the disclosure of information before a court, person or body with
jurisdiction to compel the production of information by certifying in writing
that the information constitutes a confidence of the Queen’s Privy Council
for Canada, disclosure of the information shall be refused without
examination or hearing of the information by the court, person or body.
|
39. (1) Le tribunal, l’organisme ou la personne qui ont le pouvoir de
contraindre à la production de renseignements sont, dans les cas où un
ministre ou le greffier du Conseil privé s’opposent à la divulgation d’un
renseignement, tenus d’en refuser la divulgation, sans l’examiner ni tenir
d’audition à son sujet, si le ministre ou le greffier attestent par écrit que
le renseignement constitue un renseignement confidentiel du Conseil privé de
la Reine pour le Canada.
|
[122] Like subsection 69(1) of the Access Act, subsection 39(2) of the CEA
sets out, in general terms, what constitutes a Cabinet confidence. In the
matters currently before the Court, the Clerk followed the formal requirements
of subsection 39(1) of the CEA and stated that various portions of the
PM’s agendas were excluded from disclosure pursuant to paragraphs 39(2)(c)-(f):
39. (2) For the purpose of subsection (1), “a confidence of the Queen’s
Privy Council for Canada”
includes, without restricting the generality thereof, information contained
in
[…]
(c) an agendum of Council or a record recording
deliberations or decisions of Council;
(d) a record used for or reflecting communications or
discussions between ministers of the Crown on matters relating to the making
of government decisions or the formulation of government policy;
(e) a record the purpose of which is to brief Ministers
of the Crown in relation to matters that are brought before, or are proposed
to be brought before, Council or that are the subject of communications or
discussions referred to in paragraph (d); and
(f) draft legislation.
|
39. (2) Pour l’application du paragraphe (1), un « renseignement
confidentiel du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada » s’entend
notamment d’un renseignement contenu dans :
[…]
c) un ordre du jour du Conseil ou
un procès-verbal de ses délibérations ou décisions;
d) un document employé en vue ou
faisant état de communications ou de discussions entre ministres sur des
questions liées à la prise des décisions du gouvernement ou à la formulation
de sa politique;
e) un document d’information à
l’usage des ministres sur des questions portées ou qu’il est prévu de porter
devant le Conseil, ou sur des questions qui font l’objet des communications
ou discussions visées à l’alinéa d);
f) un avant-projet de loi ou projet
de règlement.
|
The purpose of Cabinet confidences
[123] The purpose of a certificate issued under section 39 of the CEA was
addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Babcock, above. In my view,
this applies equally to a Cabinet confidence under section 69 of the Access
Act. In Babcock, Chief Justice McLachlin stated at paragraph 18 that the
maintenance of Cabinet privilege ensures that
¶ 18 … [t]hose
charged with the heavy responsibility of making government decisions [are] free
to discuss all aspects of the problems that come before them and to express all
manner of views, without fear that what they read, say or act on will later be
subject to public scrutiny…
and at paragraph
21, that section 39 amounts to “Canada’s response to the need to provide a mechanism for the responsible
exercise of the power to claim Cabinet confidentiality in the context of
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.”
Cabinet confidence under subsection
69(1) of the Access Act
[124] Unlike the CEA, the Access Act does not have any formal
requirements that must be satisfied in order to obtain protection under
subsection 69(1). Under section 69, the Court reviews the records. The protection
will attach if the records fit within the meanings ascribed under paragraphs
69(1)(a)-(g). Further, this list is not exhaustive, as indicated by
Parliament’s use of the phrase “without restricting the generality of the
foregoing.”
[125] There is overlap between section 69 and the certification process
provided for in section 39 of the CEA. Specifically, the items that constitute
a Cabinet confidence are identical in both sections – i.e., paragraphs
39(1)(a)-(f) of the CEA are identical to paragraphs 69(2)(a)-(f) of the Access
Act. Despite these similarities, the Access Act is broader in terms of what it
protects because of the non-exhaustive nature of the section and the inclusion
of paragraph 69(2)(g), which removes from the reach of the Act “records
that contain information about the contents of any record within a class of
records referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f).”
[126] It is within this context that I will later address the application
of section 69 of the Access Act and section 39 of the CEA as they relate to the
disclosure of the PM’s agendas in Docket T-1209-05.
VII. APPLYING THE LAW
TO THE FACTS OF EACH APPLICATION
1. Minister of
National Defence (Docket T-210-05)
The records at issue
[127] As a result
of the Commissioner’s investigation, 1413 pages of records were identified as
relevant to the request. Of these, 765 pages were found within the DND and were
disclosed to the requester, subject to the application of the Act’s exemptions.
These records are not at issue in this proceeding.
[128] The remaining
648 pages of records were located within the Minister’s office and fall into
four categories:
1. 185 pages of
notes regarding the M5 meetings extracted from the notebooks of members of the
Minister’s exempt staff;
2. 342 pages of
e-mail correspondence containing approximately 539 exchanges. Of these,
approximately 101 e-mails are exchanges exclusively between members of the
Minister’s exempt staff, while approximately 438 are exchanges between exempt
staff and non-exempt staff working in the Minister’s office or exchanges
forwarded or copied to non-exempt staff;
3. 82 pages of M5
meeting agendas; and
4. 39 pages of
miscellaneous records, including memoranda and briefing notes for the Minister
and the other attendees of the M5 meetings.
[129] Despite the
respondent’s position that the records are not in the control of the DND for
the purposes of the Access Act, the respondent applied the Act’s exemptions and
exclusions to the records and disclosed them, without prejudice, to the
Commissioner during his investigation. Upon reviewing the records, the
Commissioner concluded that all of the claimed exemptions were justified under
the Act. Accordingly, the only issue to be determined is whether the records
were under the control of the DND.
Purpose of the M5
meetings
[130] The term “M5”
was used to describe informal meetings attended by the former Minister of
National Defence, Art Eggleton, the Deputy Minister of Defence, the Chief of
the Defence Staff, and senior members of the Minister’s exempt staff.
[131] During the
course of his investigation, the Commissioner heard evidence from the following
individuals, all of whom took part in the M5 meetings:
1.
Art Eggleton (Minister of National
Defence);
2.
Jim Judd
(Deputy Minister);
3.
Gen.
Maurice Baril (Chief of the Defence Staff);
4.
Emechete
Onuoha (Executive Assistant to the Minister);
5.
Meribeth
Morris (Director of Operations to the Minister); and
6.
Randy
Mylyk (Director of Communications to the Minister).
[132] The
Commissioner states in his Report that the purpose of the M5 meetings was to
provide a forum for the Minister to obtain information and clarification on
various subject matters relating to the DND. The meetings were intended to
address areas of current operational and administrative interest, and to
facilitate the flow of information between the Minister, Deputy Minister, and
Chief of the Defence Staff. In his testimony before the Deputy Commissioner,
the Minister stated that the M5 meetings were largely informal (Application
Record, Docket T-210-05, vol. C-2, p. 268):
Mr. Eggleton: … There is no particular –
there is no formality to the M5 agenda, there are no minutes produced from it.
[133] On this
basis, the Minister described the meetings as an opportunity for him to obtain
clarification on matters or gain a better understanding about how the Department
is operating (Application Record, Docket T-210-05, vol. C-2, p. 270):
Mr. Eggleton: They are information meetings. They
are for me to get further information, to better understand how things are
operating or why the press have reported it in a certain way. …
The only thing that distinguishes the
stuff that goes to the M5 is if it’s not major in nature, it’s not something
that’s going to take a long period of time or just need a little clarification.
…
[134] Further, the
Minister underlined the informal nature of the M5 meetings by stating that in
situations where the issues were more significant, a more formal briefing was
held (Application Record, T-210-05, vol. C-2, p. 270):
Mr. Eggleton: Now, there are many others, many
other reports that I get that are more major in nature and require a more
detailed briefing. And for that purpose, we would set up a separate meeting. I
could have a full briefing with all sorts of people in the room, telling me
about a certain policy that is being proposed or a certain purchase that is
being proposed or whatever. …
[135] However,
despite the informal and informative nature of the meetings, the Chief of the
Defence Staff made clear that “there are some pretty difficult decisions that
will start, originate or finish” within the context of the M5 meetings
(Application Record, Docket T-210-05, vol. C-1, p. 201).
[136] As well, it
is not in dispute that the subject matter of the M5 meetings was directly
related and limited to departmental matters. During the course of the
Commissioner’s investigation, this was confirmed by the Minister, the Deputy
Minister, and by the Chief of the Defence Staff, who stated the following
before the Deputy Commissioner (Application Record, Docket T-210-05, vol. C-1,
pp. 188-89):
Mr. Leadbeater: Is it fair to say, that the
discussions at the M-5 concern matters which fall within the Minister’s
responsibilities as Minister of Defence?
General Baril: Of course.
Mr. Leadbeater: Are there any matters
discussed that are not departmental business?
General Baril: Sometimes we will joke
around, but I mean beside that … The time of the Minister and my time and the [Deputy
Minister] are pretty tight during the day. And besides the opening niceties
that – no, until something happens it’s business all the time.
Notes of the exempt
staff at the M5 meetings
[137] The 185 pages
of notes regarding the M5 meetings are from the notebooks of the Minister’s
Executive Assistant (Mr. Onuoha), Director of Operations (Ms. Morris), and
Director of Communications (Mr. Mylyk).
[138] The evidence is
that these individuals played a major role in the facilitation of the M5
meetings. As the Commissioner acknowledged at page 10 of his Report (Application Record,
Docket T-210-05, vol. 5, p. 1472):
The evidence confirms that, ordinarily,
agendas were decided upon in advance by the Minister’s Executive Assistant in
consultation with the Minister. From time to time, the Minister’s EA also
sought input from the offices of the CDS and DM concerning agenda items. The
agendas were prepared by the Executive Assistant and their content was
communicated to members either in advance … or by being distributed at the
meeting. …
[139] At those
meetings, the evidence is that the Minister, Deputy Minister, and Chief of the
Defence Staff did not take notes. As well, no “minutes” were taken of the meetings,
only notes by the Minister’s exempt staff. As the Commissioner further stated
at page 10:
… The evidence also confirms that notes
of the M5 discussions were routinely taken by the Minister’s Executive
Assistant. The other exempt staff also made less extensive notes, from time to
time.
[140] According to
the Minister, the notes were to ensure that the proper follow up was taken with
respect to any relevant item discussed (Application Record, Docket T-210-05,
vol. C-2, p. 291):
Mr. Eggleton: … Most of the time I rely upon the
notes that my staff keeps, ensure that we get the proper follow up.
As the Minister further
explained in his oral testimony, the exempt staff members were charged with the
task of following up on items arising within the context of the M5 meetings
(Application Record, Docket T-210-05, vol. C-2, p. 291-92):
Mr. Leadbeater: That was going to be my next
question. How is follow up managed, and do you rely on the notes of your staff
in order to ensure proper follow up?
Mr. Eggleton: Yes. My staff are charged; the
executive assistant and the other assistants, as may be appropriate, are
charged with the responsibility of doing any follow up.
I might say, for example, “Well, okay,
that’s very interesting. Now, I would like a report on that, please. And it’s
an urgent issue, so I would like it in two weeks.” So my staff write down, “he
wants it in two weeks”. So in two weeks, if it isn’t there, I may have
forgotten it since I am dealing with 100 items a day or so, they follow it up
and make sure I get the report in two weeks.
[141] While the
Minister relied upon the notes taken by his exempt staff during M5 meetings, he
had never personally seen the notebooks, nor did he have any knowledge with
respect to how extensive the notes were (Application Record, Docket T-210-05,
vol. C-2, p. 304):
Mr. Eggleton: Yes, but I have never seen these
notes that my staff keep, so I don’t know how extensive they would be. … They
would make a note on that, but they wouldn’t make a note on each and everything
if there wasn’t any follow up to be done, I would not expect they would. But I
don’t know for sure, because I never asked to see their notes.
This was confirmed by the Minister’s
Director of Communications, Mr. Mylyk, who stated in his Affidavit, sworn
October 25, 2006, that the content of the notes were considered personal and
were not shared with anyone in either the Minister’s office or the DND
(Application Record, Docket T-210-05, vol. 5, p. 1759):
¶ 33 I have always considered these
notebooks to be personal to me. They are not shared with anyone in the
Minister’s office.
¶ 34 No official of the Department of
National Defence ever asked to look at my notebooks. No such official, up to
and including the Deputy Minister or the Chief of the Defence Staff, had
authority to compel me to produce them.
The other exempt staff gave similar
evidence.
Does the DND have
control over the M5 documents?
[142] In
determining whether the records relating to the M5 meetings were “under the
control” of the DND despite being ultimately controlled by the Minister and his
exempt staff and held within the Minister’s office, the Court will examine the
content of the records and the circumstances in which they were created.
[143] The M5
meetings were a vehicle to facilitate the flow of information between the
Minister, Deputy Minister, and Chief of the Defence Staff. According to the
Minister, they were informal in nature and were not intended to cover major
matters related to the policy and direction of the DND. When considering the
purpose of the meetings, it is clear that the M5 meetings related to the
departmental business of the DND. The circumstances in which the records were
created will now be examined for each category of record.
The
notes
[144] The notes were
the personal notes of the exempt staff. No person in the DND or the Minister
ever asked to see the notes or be provided with a copy of them. The evidence is
that the notes would not have been produced to departmental officials. If some
information in the notes had ever been requested, which was not the case, the
Court reasonably assumes that the exempt staff who took the notes would prepare
a type-written record of the discussion.
[145] It is clear
that the government institution did not have de facto, transient, or
partial access to the notes of the meetings. When the Court reviewed the notes,
it is evident that they were not intended for any third person. The writing is
barely legible and the substance is not coherent to anyone other than the
author. Accordingly, the notes in their original form would not be produced to
a senior official of the DND upon request, and they are not under the control
of the DND.
The e-mail
correspondence within the Minister’s office
[146] The e-mail
exchanges dealt with scheduling of the Minister. They are not substantive
information about departmental matters and they are not under the control of
the government institution according to the criteria set out above.
The agendas
[147] The agendas
listing the items to be addressed at M5 meetings were provided to the attendees,
including the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff. In such
cases, the departmental official would most likely be given another copy of the
agenda from the Minister’s office if he was missing his copy. Accordingly,
these agendas are under the control of the DND and are subject to disclosure.
The miscellaneous records
[148]
The
39 pages of miscellaneous records include memoranda and briefing notes for the
Minister and the other attendees of the M5 meetings. If this is the case, then
these records would be provided to a senior departmental official upon request.
Presumably, the Minister’s office would cooperate with a request for a copy of
a document if it had already been provided to the Deputy Minister or Chief of
the Defence Staff. The Court will refer these records back to the respondent to
identify which documents were originally provided to the Deputy Minister or
Chief of the Defence Staff. The records are under the control of DND.
2. Prime Minister
(Docket T-1209-05)
The records
at issue
[149] The records relevant to this application consist of the daily agenda
books of the former Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Jean
Chrétien (the PM), for the period between January 1994 and June 25, 1999. In
their entirety, the records total 2006 pages; 2002 pages of which were archived
in electronic form within the PMO on a computer assigned to Bruce Hartley, the
PM’s Executive Assistant and a member of his exempt staff. The remaining four
pages of records are comprised of hard copy versions of the above-noted records
and were located within the PCO.
[150] As the
Commissioner found in his Report, the agendas consist of a listing, by day and
date, of the PM’s daily appointments. He described the variety of different
entries included in the agendas at page 5 of his Report (Application Record,
Docket T-1209-05, vol. 4, p. 683):
Some entries relate to the former Prime
Minister’s private life, such as family birthdays, medical appointments and
social engagements. Some entries relate to the former Prime Minister’s official
functions (such as meetings to discuss government business, Question Period
preparation meetings, cabinet meetings and official travel). Some entries
relate to activities of the former Prime Minister which were public in nature
(such as appearances at the War Memorial on Remembrance Day, appearances in
Parliament for Question Period, and attendance at weekly caucus meetings). Some
entries relate to meetings or functions which took place in the Prime Minister’s
Centre Block office, at 24
Sussex Drive or
at other private venues. For some days, no entries appear on the agendas.
Further, the
Commissioner noted that absent from the agendas is any reference to the subject
matter of the meetings or functions listed therein.
Creation of
the records
[151] All of the records at issue were created on a single computer
located in the office of Mr. Hartley, the PM’s Executive Assistant. Mr. Hartley
deposed at paragraph 8 of his Affidavit, sworn October 25, 2006, the agendas served
as a means by which he and the PM “communicated” for the purpose of managing
the PM’s time. Effectively, the agendas were a “plan for how the day may
unfold” (Application Record, Docket T-1209-05, vol. 5, p. 824). Changes to the
document were notated by Mr. Hartley on a paper copy throughout the day. These
alterations may or may not have been recorded by Mr. Hartley’s assistant in the
electronic version of the agenda.
[152] Access to the computer on which the agendas were located was restricted
to only Mr. Hartley and his assistants. A limited number of people within the
PMO had “read-only” access to the agendas; however, such access was not granted
to anyone outside the PMO.
Use of the records
[153] As the
Commissioner reported in his investigation, hard copies of the agendas were “shared”
within the PMO to assist in managing the PM’s daily activities. On this basis,
copies were shared with the PM’s Chief of Staff, his senior policy advisor,
Director of Communications, Director of Operations, and Press Secretary.
[154] As well, an
edited copy of the agenda showing only the locations to be visited by the PM
was forwarded to the RCMP and the House of Commons Security office to assist
them in protecting the PM. Mr. Hartley states at paragraph 10 of his Affidavit
(Application Record, Docket T-1209-05, vol. 5, p. 825):
¶ 10 As well, on my instructions, a
copy of the agenda showing only the locations to be visited by the Prime
Minister was regularly made available to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(“RCMP”) and the House of Commons Security (also referred to as Parliament Hill
Security). However, it is my understanding that on certain occasions, in error,
the RCMP was provided with a copy of the agenda that included additional
information beyond just the locations to be visited by the Prime Minister.
[155] Until
September 1999, it was also the practice to fax an edited copy of the next
day’s agenda to the Clerk of the Privy Council (the Clerk) for the sole
information of the Clerk and his or her Executive Assistant. According to Mr.
Hartley’s testimony before the Deputy Commissioner, these copies were faxed as
a “courtesy” so that the Clerk would know the PM’s whereabouts over the course
of the next day (Application Record, Docket T-1209-05, vol. C-1, p. 185):
Mr. Leadbeater: … Are you familiar with why
those copies were sent to the Clerk of Privy Council?
Mr. Hartley: Yes, purely as a courtesy. So
the Clerk would know where to go the next day.
When asked whether
providing a copy of the agenda to the Clerk was more than a courtesy – i.e.,
whether the Clerk had a “work-related need” to know the PM’s agenda – Mr.
Hartley testified that the purpose of providing a copy to the Clerk was largely
to facilitate the daily meetings between the Clerk and the PM (Application
Record, Docket T-1209-05, vol. C-1, p. 186):
Mr. Leadbeater: So it’s possible that the
Clerk might [have] a work-related need to know the Prime Minister’s agenda?
Mr. Hartley: Frankly, this – it was to make
sure we knew we were having our meetings every day.
[156] The records
provided to the Clerk were “modestly expurgated, or edited” from the original
copies held by Mr. Hartley. As explained in the following exchange between the
former Clerk, Mel Cappe, and the Deputy Commissioner (Application Record,
Docket T-1209-05, vol. C-2, p. 660):
Mr. Leadbeater: … Have you ever seen any
other version of the Prime Minister’s agenda, other than those you reviewed for
the purpose of Cabinet confidences?
Mr. Cappe: Well, as I said earlier, from
time to time I’ll see them on the corner of his desk. He’s got his daily agenda
there. I understood from Mr. Koops that the version we were getting, of which
you have four pages here, were modestly expurgated, or edited. I don’t know
that, but I – I – my recollection is that the version we got wasn’t the only
version that existed….
In his testimony before
the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Hartley confirmed that while the agendas may have
been edited to remove “highly personal” information, often the changes between
the original and the copy sent to the Clerk was reflective of changes made to
the PM’s schedule throughout the day (Application Record, Docket T-1209-05,
vol. C-1, p. 207):
Mr. Leadbeater: Did you give any instruction
as to severing the agendas that were to go to the Clerk of Privy Council?
Mr. Hartley: Like I said earlier, there was
the odd time that I know of items of a highly personal nature, I would not …
[…]
Mr. Leadbeater: So it would be fair to say
that in general, the version of the agenda that went to the Clerk of the Privy
Council was the agenda that was available to everyone in the Prime Minister’s
Office, except it may have been somewhat out of date because things happen on a
regular basis and you might have updated yours and not updated the Clerk’s?
Would that be correct?
Mr. Hartley: I believe it’s possible, yes.
[157] With respect
to the disposal of the copies sent to the Clerk, it was Mr. Hartley’s
expectation that those copies would be destroyed once they were out of date. As
the Commissioner notes in his Report, the practice of the Clerk’s office was to
destroy the dated copies. However, despite this practice, at the time of the
access requests on June 25, 1999, four pages of agenda records were located
within the PCO. These records include the PM’s agendas for July 23, 1999 and the
weekly periods of May 23 to June 12, 1999. As stated by the Commissioner, these
records were not destroyed due to oversight on the part of the PCO.
[158] Further, the
Commissioner noted at page 6 of his Report that the fact that these records
were not destroyed became a point of contention between the PMO and the PCO,
and led to the cessation of the practice of providing the Clerk with a copy of
the upcoming day’s agenda (Application Record, Docket T-1209-05, vol. 4, p.
688):
The fact that these few records did exist
in the Clerk’s office at the time of the access requests (and, hence, were
indisputably subject to the right of access) was of concern to the PMO. Upon
being informed of these circumstances, (in the late Summer, early Fall of 1999)
the former Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister ordered the cessation of
providing copies of the former Prime Minister’s agenda to the Clerk of the
Privy Council. Thereafter, the Clerk of the Privy Council was to receive only
oral notification of the Prime Minister’s schedule….
This altered
practice continued until the PM’s retirement in 2003.
Does the PCO
have control over the Prime Minister’s agendas?
[159] With respect
to the four pages of the PM’s agendas found within the PCO, there is no dispute
that these records were under the control of the PCO and are subject to the
right of access under subsection 4(1) of the Act. However, the respondent
maintains that these records are exempt from disclosure as “personal
information” under section 19.
[160] With respect
to the original electronic copies of the unedited PM agendas located on Mr.
Hartley’s computer, these records are in the possession of Mr. Hartley and are
under the ultimate control of his superior, the former Prime Minister of
Canada. However, the question is whether these records are also under the
control of the PCO for the purposes of the Access Act. In that regard, it is
important to consider the following finding of the Commissioner at page 61 of
his Report (Application Record, Docket T-1209-05, vol. 4, p. 743):
1.
A the time
of the access request it was the practice for the PMO to send paper copies of
the PM’s agendas to the Office of the Clerk of the Privy Council. The
arrangement was that there was no need for the Clerk’s Office to keep copies
because the agendas were archived in the PMO.
I find that the decision to archive the
agendas in the PMO only, does not remove these records from the control of the
PCO for the purpose of section 4 of the Act. These copies were created for the
use of the Clerk of the Privy Council and his officials. There is no contention
that the Clerk could not have, at any time, retrieved previous copies from the
Prime Minister’s archived version. Indeed, subsection 4(3) of the Act mandates
the retrieval/re-creation of records kept in computer databases.
In other words, even under the theory of
control offered by the PCO, I find that the Prime Minister’s agendas were under
the control of the PCO at the time of the access request.
[…]
[161] I agree with
the Commissioner that the fact that the records were archived in the PMO does
not remove the records from the control of the PCO for the purpose of section 4
of the Access Act. The PM’s agendas were prepared for the PMO to facilitate
their work supporting the PM. The Clerk received a copy to facilitate his work
meeting with and assisting the PM.
[162] However, I
disagree with the Commissioner’s finding that there is “no contention that the
Clerk could not have, at any time, retrieved previous copies from the Prime
Minister’s archived version.” The evidence of Mr. Hartley is that he would have
refused any request for a copy of previous agendas unless directed to do so by
one of his superiors, namely the PM or the PM’s Chief of Staff. As Mr. Hartley
stated at paragraph 14 of his Affidavit (Application Record, Docket T-1209-05,
vol. 5, p. 825):
¶ 14 The agendas belong to the Prime
Minister. If asked, I would have refused to provide the agendas to the Clerk of
the Privy Council and his officials, unless I had been directed to do so by the
Prime Minister or the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff.
[163] The PMO prepared an edited version of the agendas, which was sent
daily to the Clerk of the Privy Council for a limited timeframe on the
condition that these edited versions were to be destroyed at the end of each
day. The Clerk never required or requested from the PMO a past copy of the
edited agenda after the day had passed. Unlike the agendas for the Minister of
Transport, there was no archived version of the edited copy provided to the
Clerk.
[164] The unequivocal evidence from the PM’s Executive Assistant is that
he would have refused to provide the agendas to the Clerk if requested; that
is, unless he was directed to do so by the PM.
[165] The Court will not speculate whether if the Clerk needed a past copy
of the edited agendas for a matter related to PCO business, the PM would have
instructed his Executive Assistant to provide the Clerk with an edited version
of a past agenda. Such a case never arose. However, the Executive Assistant may
simply have sent the Clerk a memo with the required information about a past
meeting, instead of sending the old agenda.
(a) Contents
[166] The evidence before the Court is that the contents of the abridged
and unabridged agendas primarily related to the business of the PM and the PMO.
However, part of the agenda did relate to PCO business, such as the PM’s
meeting with the Clerk, Cabinet functions, and general government
administration.
(b) Circumstances
[167] The evidence
before the Court is that the edited agendas were provided to the Clerk under
strict conditions, for a limited timeframe, and on the condition that the
agendas be destroyed after their relevant date had passed. The evidence also
showed that but for compliance with these conditions, the Clerk would never
have received a copy of the agendas. In fact, after it was discovered that the
Clerk had not destroyed four pages of the agendas, the Clerk stopped receiving
copies of the agendas from the PMO.
[168] The evidence
also established that the Clerk would not have been provided with past versions
of the agendas if requested.
The four pages of edited
agendas located at the PCO and the exemptions claimed
[169] The parties
agree that these four pages of edited agendas are under the control of the PCO.
The issue before the Court is: “Are the four pages of
the edited agendas at the PCO exempt from disclosure as ‘personal
information’ under section 19?” First, agenda items related to the duties
and functions of the PM as an officer of the government are not personal
information. Second, the names of any individual not an employee or officer of
a scheduled government institution is personal information exempt from
disclosure. This would include individuals who met the PM such as the CEO of
Air Canada, a political party
fundraiser, a lobbyist, or a business man. Third, agenda items related to the
PM’s personal life are exempt as personal information.
[170] With respect to the application of section 69 of the Access Act
and section 39 of the CEA regarding Cabinet confidences, this issue only arises
for the agendas located at the PCO. Since the agendas do not contain any of the
subject matter of the meetings, they do not disclose any confidences of the
Privy Council under section 69.
[171] Section 69 is broader in scope than section 39 of the CEA. The
Court questions how the same records at issue can be Cabinet confidences under
section 39. The words of Chief Justice McLachlin in Babcock, above, at
paragraph 25, are exactly on point:
¶ 25 A third
requirement arises from the general principle applicable to all government
acts, namely, that the power exercised must flow from the statute and must be
issued for the bona fide purpose of protecting
Cabinet confidences in the broader public interest. The function of the Clerk
under the Act is to protect Cabinet confidences, and this alone. It is not to
thwart public inquiry nor is it to gain tactical advantage in litigation. If it
can be shown from the evidence or the circumstances that the power of
certification was exercised for purposes outside those contemplated by s. 39, the
certification may be set aside as an unauthorized exercise of executive power….
[172] The
certificate issued by the Clerk on March 19, 2001 with respect to portions of
the PM’s agendas pre-dates the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Babcock,
above, which provides very important new guidelines for the certification
process. The Commissioner argues that the certificate does not comply with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Babcock.
[173] The certificate for the PM’s
agendas was issued with respect to a previous Court file.
[174] The certificate with
respect to the excerpts of the agendas of the Minister of Transport was
executed on May 4, 2001. On January 6, 2004 counsel for the respondents advised
that the Clerk will not be signing a new certificate under section 39 of the
CEA with respect to the excerpts from the agendas of the Minister of Transport
in the current Court file as a result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
in Babcock. There was no such advice from counsel for the respondents
with respect to the PM’s agendas. The Court asked counsel for the respondent “why.”
Counsel was not able to provide any answer. Counsel said he was given no
instructions with respect to the discrepancy.
[175] According
to Babcock, the Clerk must answer two questions before certifying
information: 1) whether the information being certified is a Cabinet confidence
within the meaning of subsections 39(1) and (2); and 2) whether the information
being protected should be protected when accounting for the competing interests
in disclosure and retaining confidentiality: see Babcock at para. 22. The
protection of subsection 39(1) is engaged only when the Clerk answers these two
questions in the affirmative.
[176] The
Court concludes that the certificate dated March 19, 2001 with respect to portions
of the PM’s agendas is not valid for this case. First, the certificate was
filed with respect to previous Court files and a new certificate should have been
filed with respect to the application at bar. Second, the certificate should be
considered in accordance with the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Babcock,
which provides very important new guidelines for the certification process.
Third, there should be a rationale provided by the respondents why the
certificate regarding the agendas of the Minister of Transport is not being
relied upon because of Babcock, while the certificate with respect to
the PM’s agenda is still being relied upon. During the Court hearing there was
no logical explanation for this juxtaposition and inconsistency. The Court is
not prepared to rely blindly on a certificate issued prior to Babcock,
with respect to a previous Court file, and which is inconsistent with the
position of the respondents regarding a similar certificate filed regarding the
agendas of the Minister of Transport.
[177] Finally, the agendas do not contain any “advice or recommendations”
for the Prime Minister or “an account of consultations or deliberations” with
the Prime Minister, and would not be exempt under section 21. The fact
that a meeting took place does not disclose the subject matter of the meeting.
Conclusion
[178] The 2002 pages of the PM’s agendas archived in electronic form
within the PMO are not under the control of the PCO. The four pages of the
agendas located within the PCO are under the control of the PCO and subject to
disclose under the Access Act after the personal information referred to above
is severed. No other exemptions or exclusions are applicable.
3. Commissioner of
the RCMP (Docket T-1210-05)
The records at issue
[179] The records
in this application are the agendas of the former Prime Minister of Canada, the
Right Honourable Jean Chrétien. The application applies to 386 pages of the
PM’s agenda that were located on RCMP premises in the branch known as the “PM’s
Protection Detail.”
[180] The records
sent to the RCMP were edited copies of the original agendas possessed by the
PM’s Executive Assistant, Mr. Hartley. They generally included only the
locations to be visited by the PM, and contained no information regarding
subject matter of the meetings. However, Mr. Hartley deposed in his Affidavit,
sworn October 25, 2006, that on certain
occasions the RCMP was provided with a copy of the agenda that included
additional information beyond just the locations to be visited.
[181] According to
the submissions of the Commissioner, the records located within the RCMP can be
classified into seven categories:
1.
agendas that contain no information. That is,
there are no scheduled events or there are blank pages, save for title and
times;
2.
agendas that contain items of a public nature
and/or items that refer to events which, within public knowledge, were attended
by the PM;
3.
agendas that contain some items that are purely
public and others that are non-public. These include meetings with the PM’s
Chief of Staff and/or the Clerk of the Pricy Council;
4.
agendas that contain items that are of a
personal nature;
5.
agendas that contain items relating to the PM’s
official duties;
6.
agendas that contain a mix of both work and
personal items; and
7.
agendas in which it is difficult to determine
whether the entries refer to personal or government business.
Purpose of the records
[182] The records
were sent to the RCMP to provide the PM with 24-hour protection. Former
Commissioner of the RCMP, Giuliano Zaccardelli, in his oral testimony before
the Deputy Commissioner, stated (Application Record, Docket T-1210-05, vol.
C-1, p. 399):
Mr. Zaccardelli: It’s basically the Prime
Minister’s Protective Detail Branch. They’re the people that move the Prime
Minister and provide the protection for him on the 24-hour basis wherever he is
in Canada – in Ottawa, in Canada and around the world.
[183] According to
the evidence before both the Commissioner and this Court, the RCMP did not
issue any specific policies, post-orders, instructions, or other directives
governing the handling, receipt, use, or destruction of the agendas received
from the PMO. Any agenda that came into the RCMP’s possession was placed in a
bulk file after it served its purpose. Those files were then disposed of at the
expiration of an established retention period (see letter from counsel for
Commissioner Zaccardelli, February 13, 2003, Application Record, Docket
T-1210-05, vol. 3, p. 598).
[184] In 2001, the
PMO discontinued the practice of forwarding copies of the PM’s agenda to the
RCMP. Thereafter, the PMO faxed a “timetable” of the PM’s schedule indicating
departure times and destinations of the PM’s intended travel with a directive
to “please read and destroy.”
Processing the access
request
[185] Once the
records were located, the RCMP stated that the agendas were exempt under
sections 17 and 19 of the Act, and would therefore not be disclosed. In
addition, the RCMP stated that some portions of the records were also excluded
under subsection 69(1) of the Act as they contained Cabinet confidences.
[186] The claim
under section 17 of the Act was abandoned due to the lapse of time. The
respondent maintains that the records are exempt from disclosure under section
19 of the Act, and that portions therein should also be excluded from the scope
of the Act as Cabinet confidences under subsection 69(1).
Court’s conclusion
[187] The Court
concludes as follows:
(a)
the
agendas in the possession of the RCMP are records in the “control” of a
“government institution” under subsection 4(1) and Schedule I of the Access
Act;
(b)
the
section 17 exemption for “information which could reasonably be expected to
threaten the safety” of the Prime Minister has been abandoned since the passage
of time makes the former PM’s pattern of travel irrelevant to the present time;
(c)
the
section 19 exemption for personal information is applicable to the same
portions of the PM’s agendas as outlined in paragraph 169 above with respect to
the PM’s agendas; and
(d)
the
section 69 Cabinet confidence exclusion is not applicable because the agendas
do not disclose the subject matter of any meetings or any substantive facts that
could constitute a confidence of the Privy Council.
Accordingly, the records are subject to
disclosure after the respondent has severed the personal information referred
to above.
4. Minister of Transport
(Docket T-1211-05)
The records at issue
[188] The records relevant
to this application consist of the weekly agendas of the former Minister of
Transport, David Collenette, for the period of May 30 to November 6, 1999.
[189] Of the 46
pages of records at issue, 23 pages consist of the original agendas of the
former Minister, each accounting for a one week period during the relevant
time. As the Commissioner found in his investigation, the contents of the agendas
contain both daytime and evening entries, and relate to the full range of the
Minister’s activities. This includes the Minister’s duties as head of the DOT,
political and constituency activities, Cabinet and caucus responsibilities, and
personal appointments or engagements. According to the Commissioner, the
contents of the Minister’s agendas can be classified within four broad
categories related to:
1.
the
Minister as a Member of the Cabinet;
2.
the
Minister as the head of the DOT;
3.
the
Minister as a private individual; however, these activities may relate
specifically to:
i.
his
political party;
ii.
his
constituency or his role as an elected Member of Parliament;
iii.
the
personal information of others; and
iv.
travel
arrangements; and
4.
the
Minister’s public activities.
The entries do not address the subject to be
discussed at the listed meetings/events. Some logistical information such as
airline flight numbers, phone numbers, hotel addresses, and car rental rates
has been included.
[190] The remaining
23 pages of records consist of abridged copies of the above-noted agendas, and
were entitled “Agenda sent to the Deputy Minister for the period of May 30,
1999 to November 6, 1999.” The abridged versions were sent regularly to the
Deputy Minister of Transport for departmental purposes.
Creation and use of the
records
[191] The agendas
were created by the Minister’s private secretary with Sue Ronald, the
Minister’s Executive Assistant. Ms. Ronald and the Minister’s private secretary
were members of the Minister’s exempt staff. The records were stored
electronically on a computer in the Minister’s office. No electronic copies of
the full agenda or any abridged version were stored elsewhere.
[192] Access to the
agenda was restricted to four individuals: the Minister; the Minister’s private
secretary; the Minister’s Executive Assistant; and the Executive Assistant’s
assistant.
[193] The abridged
versions of the agendas were produced for and provided to the office of the
Deputy Minister to aid in the administration of the DOT. As the Commissioner
stated at page 5 of his Report (Application Record, Docket T-1211-05, vol. 3,
p. 656):
The investigation determined that the
practice of providing a censored version of the Minister’s agenda to the Deputy
Minister was to facilitate the conduct of departmental business. For example,
the agenda assisted the Ministerial Affairs Coordinator (a departmental public
servant) to ensure that appropriate departmental officials attended meetings
with the Minister and to ensure that briefing notes and speaking notes on
matters of departmental business, were produced for the Minister.
[194] This fact was
confirmed by the former Deputy Minister of Transport, Margaret Bloodworth, in
the following exchange with the Deputy Commissioner (Application Record, Docket
T-1211-05, vol. C-1, pp. 75-76):
Mr. Leadbeater: Can you tell me why you are
provided with a copy of this agenda?
Ms. Bloodworth: Yes. The Ministerial Affairs
Coordinator, and you can see this by the handwritten notes on this copy, would
use this as a means of determining which Briefing Notes are required.… There
will be a Departmental official who will be asked to go with that. So that’s
one of the things she will determine and make sure is happening, and that there
will also be a Briefing Note done by the Department since that’s clearly a
Transport related meeting.
[195] The Executive
Assistant, Ms. Ronald, stated in the following exchange with the Deputy
Commissioner that there was no definitive process for performing the edits
(Application Record, Docket T-1211-05, vol. C-1, pp. 150-51):
Mr. Leadbeater: … Or how is it decided what
detail is going to be in the version of the agenda that is not immediately
apparent on its face?
[…]
Ms. Ronald: There’s no process. There’s no
straight rule. It’s a subjective thing. It might be a determination by myself.
It might be a determination by the Minister’s private secretary. It might also
be a determination by the Minister himself. When he asks his private secretary
to schedule something, he might indicate to her he would like it to be private
on his agenda.
In his Report, the Commissioner noted that
the “details removed from the agendas … concerned private or political matters
usually unrelated to departmental business.”
[196] Once edited,
paper copies of the abridged agendas were provided to the Deputy Minister’s
office for each upcoming four week period, with updated versions being sent two
or three times a week to reflect changes in the Minister’s schedule.
[197] Once sent to
the Deputy Minister, the Commissioner found that there was “no practice in the
Deputy Minister’s office to keep or archive copies of the version of the
Minister’s agenda received from the Minister’s office.” Once the agendas became
dated – i.e., the timeframe to which they applied had passed or a new
version for an upcoming time period had been provided by the Minister’s staff –
the dated copies were destroyed by DOT officials. The Deputy Minister testified
(Application Record, Docket T-1211-05, vol. C-1, p. 79):
Ms. Bloodworth: … We treat them as a
transitory record that helps us tell what we have to do and then we prepare
what has to be done to prepare for the Minister, and it’s discarded.
The Minister’s Executive
Assistant also testified that the Minister’s staff destroyed outdated copies of
the agendas.
Does the DOT have
control over the Minister’s weekly agendas?
[198] On the basis
of the evidence before him, the Commissioner concluded that the records at
issue were under the control of the DOT for the purposes of the Act since the
content of the records related to the “portfolio business” of the Minister as
head of the DOT. In that regard, the Commissioner made the following findings
at pages 36-37 of his Report (Application Record, Docket T-1211-05, vol. 3, pp.
685-86):
1. At the time of the access request,
the paper copy, severed version of the former Minister’s agenda, which had been
sent to the Deputy Minister, no longer existed in the files of the Deputy
Minister’s office.
I find that the decision to archive this
version in the Minister’s office does not remove these records from the control
of the DOT for the purposes of section 4 of the Act. These versions were
created for the Deputy Minister and her officials. There is no contention that
the Deputy Minister could not have, at any time, retrieved previous copies from
the Minister’s attached version. Indeed subsection 4(3) of the Act mandated the
retrieval/re-creation of records kept in computer data bases. In other words,
even under the theory of control offered by the DOT, I find that this version
of the Minister’s agenda was under the control of the DOT at the time of the
access request.
2. I find that, taking into account
the factors set out previously, including the content, purposes and uses of the
minister’s agenda, as well as the role and the status for the Minister and
creators of the records, the unsevered copy of the records were under the
control of the DOT at the time of the access request.
[…]
[199] I agree with
the Commissioner that the archived agendas being in the Minister’s office does
not automatically remove them from the control of the DOT. A proper
interpretation of the meaning of “control” requires that the Court look beyond physical
possession to the content of the records and the circumstances in which they
were created.
(a) Contents
[200] With respect
to the abridged copies of the Minister’s weekly agendas, the evidence is clear
that those records were provided to the Deputy Minister to facilitate the
administration of the DOT. Further, while the Minister’s Executive Assistant
testified that the Deputy Minister could perform her functions without being
provided with a copy of the abridged agenda, she nevertheless admitted that
more work would be required of the Executive Assistant in order to effectively
coordinate departmental meetings. The abridged copies of the agenda were
created for the department and were used to facilitate departmental matters.
(b) Circumstances
[201] The evidence
before the Court is that copies of the abridged agendas were provided to the Deputy
Minister for a limited timeframe, and on the understood condition that the
abridged agendas would be destroyed after their relevant date had passed. The Deputy
Minister confirmed this in her evidence and confirmed that she did not
reasonably expect to be able to obtain another copy of the agenda after the
relevant date had passed because these agendas were restricted to the
Minister’s office. The agendas were kept strictly confidential by the
Minister’s office. This is reflected in the following exchange between the
Deputy Minister and the Deputy Commissioner (Application Record, Docket
T-1211-05, vol. C-1, p. 87):
Mr. Leadbeater: Now, if these versions are the
same versions as the ones in the Minister’s Office, it is something that we
don’t know at this point, and if they had been destroyed already by your staff,
would it not be reasonable to go and get those versions that had already been
provided to your office from the Minister’s Office?
Ms. Bloodworth: No.
Mr. Leadbeater: And explain to me why you
think that wouldn’t have been, assuming they’re the same?
Ms. Bloodworth: In my view, and I think this
view is consistent with, as you know, around town on at least the government
side, is that records in a Minister’s Office are not covered by the Access to
Information requests. I’m not arguing the legal debate about that.
I’m just saying my understanding of that.
[202] Given this
evidence, I am satisfied that the DOT did not have control of the past abridged
agendas when the access request was filed. This case is similar to the fact
scenario in Rubin, above, where Mr. Justice Blanchard came to the same
conclusion. The agendas are under the exclusive (and guarded) control of the
Minister’s office, which the Federal Court of Appeal in 2004 said, in obiter,
are records not under the control of a government institution: see Canada
Post No. 2, above, at para. 3 per Décary J.A.
[203] With respect
to the unabridged agendas, the evidence is that they were not provided to the
Deputy Minister or anyone else in the DOT. The remaining contents of the
unabridged agendas compared with the abridged agendas dealt with broad
categories identified by the Commissioner at the hearing, which did not relate
to the Minister’s responsibilities as the head of the DOT. For this reason, the
Court concludes that these unabridged agendas do not constitute records under
the control of a government institution for which the public has a right of
access under subsection 4(1) of the Access Act.
[204] In the
alternative, the Court will deal with the exclusions and exemptions claimed
with respect to the agendas in this application.
Application
of section 19 – the personal information exemption
[205] With respect
to the application of section 19 of the Act, the respondent’s argument mirrors
that taken by the respondent in the PM file; namely, that the information
contained in the agendas is “inextricably linked” to the Minister as an
individual and, for that reason, the agendas should be exempted from disclosure
in their entirety.
[206] The
Commissioner, however, is of the view that while certain information contained
within the agendas falls within the meaning of personal information under
section 19, the remainder can be reasonably severed and disclosed in accordance
with the Act.
[207] Since the
Court has found that the unabridged agendas do not constitute records under the
control of a government institution, the application of section 19 does not
arise. If they did arise, the Court would apply section 19 as follows:
1.
that information
relating to the position, functions, or responsibilities of the Minister as an
officer of the government is not exempt as personal information;
2.
that the
unabridged agendas be remitted to the respondent so as to separate the agenda
items that relate to his appointments as a Minister from those that relate to
his appointments as a private individual; and
3.
that personal
information, such as the name of individuals in the agendas who are not
government officers or employees, be redacted since they constitute “personal
information.”
Application
of subsection 21(1) – the advice and recommendations exemption
[208] Paragraph
21(1)(a) of the Act exempts from disclosure that information containing “advice
or recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister
of the Crown.” The Commissioner argues that the exemptions claimed by the
respondent are not justified as the records were of a “bare bones” nature, and
did not include anything that could be seen as being “advice or
recommendations” or “an account of consultations or deliberations” within the
meaning of subsection 21(1).
[209] I agree with
the Commissioner that the listing of appointments does not disclose any subject
matter that would be exempt under section 21. A listing of meetings does not
disclose “advice or recommendations” or “an account of consultations or deliberations.”
Conclusion with respect
to the Minister of Transport file
[210] Upon review
by the Court, while the contents of the abridged agendas relate to departmental
matters, the circumstances in which the abridged agendas came into being show
that the Deputy Minister could not request and obtain a past copy of the abridged
or unabridged agenda. Past copies were restricted to the Minister’s office. The
copy that had been sent to the Deputy Minister was for a limited timeframe and
on the understood condition that it would be destroyed after its relevant date.
Accordingly, the Court must conclude that the government institution did not
have any kind of control over past agendas at the time the access request was
filed.
VIII. GENERAL
CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT
[211] The
conclusions of the Court are as follows:
The three
general issues
1.
the PMO, the Office of the Minister of Transport,
and the Office of the Minister of National Defence are not “government
institutions” or part of “government institutions” under subsection 4(1) and Schedule
I of the Access Act;
2.
a record “under the control of a government
institution” as stated in subsection 4(1) of the Act includes documents in the
PMO or other ministerial offices that:
i.
relate to a departmental matter; and
ii.
were created in such circumstances that the
Deputy Minister or other senior official in the government institution could
request and reasonably obtain a copy of that document to deal with the subject
matter included therein;
3.
the meaning and scope of the following
exemptions under the Access Act include:
i.
the section 19 exemption for “personal
information” does not exempt the agendas of a minister, including the Prime
Minister, with respect to appointments related to their duties and functions as
a minister;
ii. however, private appointments not related to the job are
exempt as “personal information.” Also, the names of private individuals
contained within the agendas who are not government officers or employees are “personal
information” exempt from disclosure under the Access Act. Accordingly, if the
PM meets with a political person, a businessman, a lobbyist, or even the CEO of
a Crown corporation, the name of that individual is the private and personal
information of that individual, and is exempt from disclosure;
iii.
in the agendas of the PM and the Minister of Transport,
there is no subject matter details included in the agenda entries, only the
scheduling of meetings. Notice of a meeting does not disclose advice or recommendations
of that meeting. Accordingly, the exemption in subsection 21(1) does not apply;
and
iv.
the exemption for Cabinet confidences under
section 69 of the Access Act and section 39 of the CEA does not apply to the
agendas because they do not contain the subject matter of the meetings thereby
disclosing any confidences of the Privy Council. The fact that a meeting took
place does not disclose a Cabinet confidence;
The Minister of National Defence
records
4.
the 648 pages of records within the Office of
the Minister of National Defence relating to the M5 meetings are partly subject
to disclosure under the Act:
i.
the personal notes of the Minister’s exempt
staff would not, if ever requested, have been produced to DND officials. The
Court reasonably assumes that any request for information from the notes would
be prepared by the exempt staff in a typed-written record of the discussion.
Accordingly, the DND did not have any form of control over the personal notes
of the exempt staff taken at the meetings;
ii.
the e-mail correspondence within the Minister’s office
is not under the control of the DND;
iii.
the agendas for the M5 meetings, which were
originally provided to the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff,
would reasonably be provided upon request so that they are under the control of
the DND; and
iv.
the 39 pages of miscellaneous documents, which include
memoranda and briefing notes for the Minister and were originally provided to
the Deputy Minister and/or the Chief of the Defence Staff, would be reasonably
provided again to the Deputy Minister and/or the Chief of the Defence Staff and,
accordingly, are under the control of the DND;
The PM agendas
5.
of the 2006 pages of records uncovered during
the Commissioner’s investigation, only the four pages located within the PCO
are subject to disclosure under the Act:
i. the 2002 pages of the PM’s agendas archived in the PMO could
not have been obtained by the Clerk of the Privy Council upon request after
their relevant date. The PMO prepared an edited version of the agendas, which
was sent daily to the Clerk for a limited timeframe on the condition that these
edited versions be destroyed each day. The unequivocal evidence from the PM’s
Executive Assistant is that he would have refused to provide the agendas to the
Clerk after the fact unless directed to do so by the PM or the PM’s Chief of
Staff. The Court reasonably assumes that the Executive Assistant would have
sent the Clerk a memo with any requested information about a past meeting rather
than sending a copy of the old agenda. Accordingly, these agendas were not
under the control of the PCO;
ii. the four pages of the edited agendas located within the
PCO are under the control of the PCO and must be disclosed under the Access Act
except for appointments of the PM that relate to his private life and not his
functions or duties as Prime Minister, and names of any individual not an
employee or officer of the government (including individuals such as the CEO of
a Crown corporation, a political party fundraiser, a lobbyist, or a businessman).
Such information is the personal and private information of the individual and is
exempt as “personal information” under section 19 of the Access Act; and
iii.
since the agendas do not contain any of the
subject matters of the meetings, they do not disclose any confidences of the Queen’s
Privy Council subject to exclusion under section 69 of the Access Act or
section 39 of the CEA. Similarly, the agendas do not contain any advice or
recommendations for the Prime Minister or an account of consultations or
deliberations with the Prime Minister which would be exempt under subsection
21(1) of the Access Act;
The RCMP records
6.
the 386 pages of the PM’s agendas located on
RCMP premises are under the control of the RCMP and are subject to disclosure
under the Access Act except for the “personal information” exempt under section
19, which is referred to above;
The Minister of Transport records
7.
the 46 pages of weekly agendas of the former
Minister of Transport are not subject to disclosure under the Act:
i. an abridged copy of these agendas, which account for 23
pages of the records, were archived in the Minister’s office and were created
and provided to the Deputy Minister to facilitate the administration of the DOT.
However, these abridged agendas were provided for a limited timeframe on the
condition that they be destroyed after their relevant date had passed. The
Deputy Minister testified that she did not reasonably expect to be able to
obtain another copy of the agendas after the relevant date had passed because
the agendas were restricted to the Minister’s office. In view of this evidence,
the DOT did not have control over the past abridged agendas when the Access
request was filed; and
ii.
with respect to the unabridged agendas of the
Minister of Transport, which accounted for the remaining 23 pages of records, the
evidence is that they were not provided to the Deputy Minister or anyone else
in the DOT. For this reason, these unabridged agendas do not constitute records
under the control of a government institution;
General Comments
8.
while the PM’s agendas are not subject to disclosure
under Canada’s current Access
Act, the Court notes that even if the PM’s agendas were accessible, the names
of individuals not employed with the government would be redacted as “personal
information” under section 19 of the Act. This would frustrate an access
requester who was seeking information about whether the PM met with a
particular private individual; and
9.
the Court does not decide whether documents such
as the PM’s agendas should be accessible to the public. The Court does
not legislate or change the law. If Parliament wants the PM’s agendas open to
the public, Parliament must amend the Access Act in such a way as to make this
possible.
IX. LEGAL COSTS
[212] These four applications have been dismissed with respect to the
majority of the records sought. However, the applications are allowed with
respect to a small part of the Minister of National Defence file (Docket
T-210-05), a small part of the PM file (Docket T-1209-05), and a large part of
the RCMP file (Docket T-1210-05). The application in the Minister of Transport
file (Docket T-1211-05) has been dismissed in its entirety. Since the result is
divided, the Court shall make no order as to costs.
[213]
The Commissioner requested that the Court
exercise its jurisdiction under subsection 53(2) of the Act to award costs to
the Commissioner even if the Commissioner has not been successful in the result
because the Court is of the opinion that these applications raised important
new principles in relation to the Act. The Court cannot agree. The Court has
applied the existing jurisprudence to the actual records in issue to assess
their content and the evidence regarding the circumstances in which the records
were created. While the Commissioner asked the Court to interpret the meaning
of “control” to mean any record in a minister’s office that relates to a
departmental matter, this interpretation is not supported by the jurisprudence
and, in the Court’s view, would stretch the meaning of “control” beyond reason.
If that interpretation prevailed, then any document in the minister’s office
which related to the department would be under the control of the government
institution. That would make the government institution synonymous with the
minister’s office for the purposes of the current Access Act. If Parliament
wants such documents open to the public, then Parliament must amend the Access
Act.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
1. The
application for judicial review with respect to the records in the Office of
the Minister of National Defence in Docket T-210-05 is allowed in small part:
(a)
the
personal notes of the Minister’s exempt staff and the e-mail correspondence
within the Minister’s office are not subject to access under the Act; and
(b)
the
agendas and the miscellaneous documents for the M5 meetings originally
provided to the Deputy Minister and/or the Chief of the Defence Staff are
subject to access, while the remainder of the agendas and miscellaneous
documents are not subject to access under the Act;
2. The
application for judicial review with respect to records in the Prime Minister’s
Office in Docket T-1209-05 is allowed in small part:
(a)
the 2002
pages of the former PM’s agendas archived in the PMO are not subject to access
under the Act; and
(b)
the 4
pages of the edited agendas located in the PCO are subject to access except for
portions of the agendas related to the private life of the PM and except for the
names of private individuals not employees or officers of the government;
3. The
application for judicial review with respect to the former PM’s agendas in RCMP
premises in Docket T-1210-05 is allowed in large part:
(a) the 386 pages of
the PM’s agendas are subject to access under the Act except for portions related
to the private life of the PM and except for the names of private individuals
not employees or officers of the government;
4. The
application for judicial review with respect to the records in the Office of
the former Minister of Transport in Docket T-1211-05 is dismissed:
(a) the abridged and
unabridged agendas of the former Minister of Transport are not subject to
access under the Act;
5. Within
60 days of the date of this Judgment the respondents shall disclose to the
access requesters the portions of the records subject to access under the Act after
severing the portions identified above. If there is a disagreement with any
disclosure or severance, the Commissioner may refer the matter back to this
Court within 30 days after the respondents have completed the severance and
disclosure; and
6. There
is no order as to costs.
“Michael
A. Kelen”
APPENDIX “A”
1. Access
to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1
3. In this Act,
“government
institution” means
(a) any department or
ministry of state of the Government of Canada, or any body or office, listed
in Schedule I, and
(b) any parent Crown
corporation, and any wholly-owned subsidiary of such a corporation, within
the meaning of section 83 of the Financial Administration Act;
“head”,
in respect of a government institution, means
(a) in the case of a
department or ministry of state, the member of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada
who presides over the department or ministry, or
(b)
in any other case, either the person designated under subsection 3.2(2) to be
the head of the institution for the purposes of this Act or, if no such
person is designated, the chief executive officer of the institution,
whatever their title;
[…]
4. (1) Subject to
this Act, but notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, every person who
is
(a) a Canadian citizen, or
(b) a permanent resident within
the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act,
has a right to and shall, on request, be
given access to any record under the control of a government institution.
[…]
10. (1) Where the head of a government institution refuses to
give access to a record requested under this Act or a part thereof, the head
of the institution shall state in the notice given under paragraph 7(a)
(a) that the
record does not exist, or
(b) the
specific provision of this Act on which the refusal was based or, where the
head of the institution does not indicate whether a record exists, the
provision on which a refusal could reasonably be expected to be based if the
record existed,
and shall state in the notice that the person who made the request has a
right to make a complaint to the Information Commissioner about the refusal.
(2) The head of a government institution
may but is not required to indicate under subsection (1) whether a record
exists.
[…]
17. The head of a government institution may refuse to
disclose any record requested under this Act that contains information the
disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to threaten the safety of
individuals.
[…]
19. (1) Subject to
subsection (2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose
any record requested under this Act that contains personal information as
defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act.
(2) The head of a government institution
may disclose any record requested under this Act that contains personal
information if
(a) the
individual to whom it relates consents to the disclosure;
(b) the
information is publicly available; or
(c) the
disclosure is in accordance with section 8 of the Privacy Act.
[…]
21. (1) The head of a
government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this
Act that contains
(a) advice or
recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister of
the Crown,
(b) an
account of consultations or deliberations in which directors, officers or
employees of a government institution, a minister of the Crown or the staff
of a minister participate,
(c) positions
or plans developed for the purpose of negotiations carried on or to be
carried on by or on behalf of the Government of Canada and considerations
relating thereto, or
(d) plans
relating to the management of personnel or the administration of a government
institution that have not yet been put into operation,
if the record came into existence less than twenty years prior to the
request.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in
respect of a record that contains
(a) an
account of, or a statement of reasons for, a decision that is made in the
exercise of a discretionary power or an adjudicative function and that
affects the rights of a person; or
(b) a report
prepared by a consultant or an adviser who was not a director, an officer or
an employee of a government institution or a member of the staff of a
minister of the Crown at the time the report was prepared.
[…]
25. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Act, where a request is made to a government institution for access to a
record that the head of the institution is authorized to refuse to disclose
under this Act by reason of information or other material contained in the
record, the head of the institution shall disclose any part of the record
that does not contain, and can reasonably be severed from any part that
contains, any such information or material.
26. The
head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested
under this Act or any part thereof if the head of the institution believes on
reasonable grounds that the material in the record or part thereof will be
published by a government institution, agent of the Government of Canada or
minister of the Crown within ninety days after the request is made or within
such further period of time as may be necessary for printing or translating
the material for the purpose of printing it.
[…]
30. (1) Subject to this
Act, the Information Commissioner shall receive and investigate complaints
(a) from
persons who have been refused access to a record requested under this Act or
a part thereof;
(b) from
persons who have been required to pay an amount under section 11 that they
consider unreasonable;
(c) from persons
who have requested access to records in respect of which time limits have
been extended pursuant to section 9 where they consider the extension
unreasonable;
(d) from
persons who have not been given access to a record or a part thereof in the
official language requested by the person under subsection 12(2), or have not
been given access in that language within a period of time that they consider
appropriate;
(d.1) from
persons who have not been given access to a record or a part thereof in an
alternative format pursuant to a request made under subsection 12(3), or have
not been given such access within a period of time that they consider
appropriate;
(e) in
respect of any publication or bulletin referred to in section 5; or
(f) in
respect of any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to
records under this Act.
(2) Nothing in this Act precludes the
Information Commissioner from receiving and investigating complaints of a
nature described in subsection (1) that are submitted by a person authorized
by the complainant to act on behalf of the complainant, and a reference to a
complainant in any other section includes a reference to a person so
authorized.
(3) Where the
Information Commissioner is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to
investigate a matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to records
under this Act, the Commissioner may initiate a complaint in respect thereof.
[…]
38. The Information Commissioner shall, within three months
after the termination of each financial year, submit an annual report to
Parliament on the activities of the office during that financial year.
[…]
42. (1) The Information
Commissioner may
(a) apply to
the Court, within the time limits prescribed by section 41, for a review of
any refusal to disclose a record requested under this Act or a part thereof
in respect of which an investigation has been carried out by the Information
Commissioner, if the Commissioner has the consent of the person who requested
access to the record;
(b) appear
before the Court on behalf of any person who has applied for a review under
section 41; or
(c) with
leave of the Court, appear as a party to any review applied for under section
41 or 44.
(2) Where the Information Commissioner
makes an application under paragraph (1)(a) for a review of a refusal
to disclose a record requested under this Act or a part thereof, the person
who requested access to the record may appear as a party to the review.
[…]
48. In any proceedings before the Court arising from an
application under section 41 or 42, the burden of establishing that the head
of a government institution is authorized to refuse to disclose a record
requested under this Act or a part thereof shall be on the government
institution concerned.
[…]
53. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the costs of and incidental
to all proceedings in the Court under this Act shall be in the discretion of
the Court and shall follow the event unless the Court orders otherwise.
(2) Where the Court is
of the opinion that an application for review under section 41 or 42 has
raised an important new principle in relation to this Act, the Court shall
order that costs be awarded to the applicant even if the applicant has not
been successful in the result.
[…]
69. (1) This Act does not apply to confidences of the Queen’s
Privy Council for Canada, including, without restricting the generality of the
foregoing,
(a) memoranda
the purpose of which is to present proposals or recommendations to Council;
(b)
discussion papers the purpose of which is to present background explanations,
analyses of problems or policy options to Council for consideration by
Council in making decisions;
(c) agenda of
Council or records recording deliberations or decisions of Council;
(d) records
used for or reflecting communications or discussions between ministers of the
Crown on matters relating to the making of government decisions or the
formulation of government policy;
(e) records
the purpose of which is to brief ministers of the Crown in relation to
matters that are before, or are proposed to be brought before, Council or
that are the subject of communications or discussions referred to in
paragraph (d);
(f) draft
legislation; and
(g) records
that contain information about the contents of any record within a class of
records referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f).
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), “Council”
means the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, committees of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, Cabinet and
committees of Cabinet.
(3) Subsection (1) does
not apply to
(a)
confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada that have been in existence for more
than twenty years; or
(b)
discussion papers described in paragraph (1)(b)
(i) if the decisions to which the discussion papers
relate have been made public, or
(ii) where the decisions have not been made public, if
four years have passed since the decisions were made.
|
3. Les
définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi
«institution
fédérale»
a) Tout ministère ou
département d’État relevant du gouvernement du Canada, ou
tout organisme, figurant à l’annexe I;
b) toute société d’État mère ou filiale à cent pour cent d’une
telle société, au sens de l’article 83 de la Loi sur la gestion des
finances publiques.
[…]
«responsable d’institution fédérale »
a) Le membre du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada sous
l’autorité duquel est placé un ministère ou un département d’État;
b) la personne désignée en vertu du
paragraphe 3.2(2) à titre de responsable, pour l’application de la présente
loi, d’une institution fédérale autre que celles visées à l’alinéa a) ou, en l’absence d’une telle désignation, le premier
dirigeant de l’institution, quel que soit son titre.
[…]
4. (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi mais
nonobstant toute autre loi fédérale, ont droit à l’accès aux documents
relevant d’une institution fédérale et peuvent se les faire communiquer sur
demande :
a) les citoyens canadiens;
b) les résidents permanents au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi
sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés.
[…]
10. (1) En cas
de refus de communication totale ou partielle d’un document demandé en vertu
de la présente loi, l’avis prévu à l’alinéa 7a) doit mentionner, d’une
part, le droit de la personne qui a fait la demande de déposer une plainte
auprès du Commissaire à l’information et, d’autre part :
a) soit le
fait que le document n’existe pas;
b) soit la
disposition précise de la présente loi sur laquelle se fonde le refus ou,
s’il n’est pas fait état de l’existence du document, la disposition sur
laquelle il pourrait vraisemblablement se fonder si le document existait.
(2) Le
paragraphe (1) n’oblige pas le responsable de l’institution fédérale à faire
état de l’existence du document demandé.
[…]
17. Le
responsable d’une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication de
documents contenant des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait
vraisemblablement de nuire à la sécurité des individus.
[…]
19. (1) Sous
réserve du paragraphe (2), le responsable d’une institution fédérale est tenu
de refuser la communication de documents contenant les renseignements
personnels visés à l’article 3 de la Loi sur la protection des
renseignements personnels.
(2) Le
responsable d’une institution fédérale peut donner communication de documents
contenant des renseignements personnels dans les cas où :
a)
l’individu qu’ils concernent y consent;
b) le
public y a accès;
c) la
communication est conforme à l’article 8 de la Loi sur la protection des
renseignements personnels.
[…]
21. (1) Le responsable
d’une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication de documents datés
de moins de vingt ans lors de la demande et contenant:
a) des
avis ou recommandations élaborés par ou pour une institution fédérale ou un
ministre;
b) des
comptes rendus de consultations ou délibérations auxquelles ont participé des
administrateurs, dirigeants ou employés d’une institution fédérale, un
ministre ou son personnel;
c) des
projets préparés ou des renseignements portant sur des positions envisagées
dans le cadre de négociations menées ou à mener par le gouvernement du Canada
ou en son nom, ainsi que des renseignements portant sur les considérations
qui y sont liées;
d) des
projets relatifs à la gestion du personnel ou à l’administration d’une
institution fédérale et qui n’ont pas encore été mis en oeuvre.
(2) Le
paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas aux documents contenant :
a) le
compte rendu ou l’exposé des motifs d’une décision qui est prise dans
l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire ou rendue dans l’exercice d’une
fonction judiciaire ou quasi judiciaire et qui touche les droits d’une
personne;
b) le
rapport établi par un consultant ou un conseiller qui, à l’époque où le
rapport a été établi, n’était pas un administrateur, un dirigeant ou un
employé d’une institution fédérale ou n’appartenait pas au personnel d’un
ministre, selon le cas.
[…]
25. Le responsable d’une institution
fédérale, dans les cas où il pourrait, vu la nature des renseignements
contenus dans le document demandé, s’autoriser de la présente loi pour
refuser la communication du document, est cependant tenu, nonobstant les
autres dispositions de la présente loi, d’en communiquer les parties
dépourvues des renseignements en cause, à condition que le prélèvement de ces
parties ne pose pas de problèmes sérieux.
26. Le responsable d’une institution fédérale peut refuser la
communication totale ou partielle d’un document s’il a des motifs
raisonnables de croire que le contenu du document sera publié en tout ou en
partie par une institution fédérale, un mandataire du gouvernement du Canada
ou un ministre dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la demande ou dans tel
délai supérieur entraîné par les contraintes de l’impression ou de la
traduction en vue de l’impression.
[…]
30. (1) Sous
réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi, le Commissaire à
l’information reçoit les plaintes et fait enquête sur les plaintes :
a)
déposées par des personnes qui se sont vu refuser la communication totale ou
partielle d’un document qu’elles ont demandé en vertu de la présente loi;
b)
déposées par des personnes qui considèrent comme excessif le montant réclamé
en vertu de l’article 11;
c)
déposées par des personnes qui ont demandé des documents dont les délais de
communication ont été prorogés en vertu de l’article 9 et qui considèrent la
prorogation comme abusive;
d)
déposées par des personnes qui se sont vu refuser la traduction visée au
paragraphe 12(2) ou qui considèrent comme contre-indiqué le délai de
communication relatif à la traduction;
d.1)
déposées par des personnes qui se sont vu refuser la communication des
documents ou des parties en cause sur un support de substitution au titre du
paragraphe 12(3) ou qui considèrent comme contre-indiqué le délai de
communication relatif au transfert;
e) portant
sur le répertoire ou le bulletin visés à l’article 5;
f) portant
sur toute autre question relative à la demande ou à l’obtention de documents
en vertu de la présente loi.
(2) Le
Commissaire à l’information peut recevoir les plaintes visées au paragraphe
(1) par l’intermédiaire d’un représentant du plaignant. Dans les autres
articles de la présente loi, les dispositions qui concernent le plaignant
concernent également son représentant.
(3) Le
Commissaire à l’information peut lui-même prendre l’initiative d’une plainte
s’il a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’une enquête devrait être menée
sur une question relative à la demande ou à l’obtention de documents en vertu
de la présente loi.
[…]
38.
Dans
les trois mois suivant la fin de chaque exercice, le Commissaire à
l’information présente au Parlement le rapport des activités du commissariat
au cours de l’exercice.
[…]
42. (1) Le Commissaire à
l’information a qualité pour:
a) exercer
lui-même, à l’issue de son enquête et dans les délais prévus à l’article 41,
le recours en révision pour refus de communication totale ou partielle d’un
document, avec le consentement de la personne qui avait demandé le document;
b)
comparaître devant la Cour au nom de la personne qui a exercé un recours
devant la Cour en vertu de l’article 41;
c)
comparaître, avec l’autorisation de la Cour, comme partie à une instance
engagée en vertu des articles 41 ou 44.
(2) Dans le
cas prévu à l’alinéa (1)a), la personne qui a demandé communication du
document en cause peut comparaître comme partie à l’instance.
[…]
48. Dans les procédures
découlant des recours prévus aux articles 41 ou 42, la charge d’établir le
bien-fondé du refus de communication totale ou partielle d’un document
incombe à l’institution fédérale concernée.
[…]
53. (1) Sous
réserve du paragraphe (2), les frais et dépens sont laissés à l’appréciation
de la Cour et suivent, sauf ordonnance contraire de la Cour, le sort du
principal.
(2) Dans les
cas où elle estime que l’objet des recours visés aux articles 41 et 42 a
soulevé un principe important et nouveau quant à la présente loi, la Cour
accorde les frais et dépens à la personne qui a exercé le recours devant
elle, même si cette personne a été déboutée de son recours.
[…]
69. (1) La
présente loi ne s’applique pas aux documents confidentiels du Conseil privé
de la Reine pour le Canada, notamment aux :
a) notes
destinées à soumettre des propositions ou recommandations au Conseil;
b)
documents de travail destinés à présenter des problèmes, des analyses ou des
options politiques à l’examen du Conseil;
c) ordres
du jour du Conseil ou procès-verbaux de ses délibérations ou décisions;
d)
documents employés en vue ou faisant état de communications ou de discussions
entre ministres sur des questions liées à la prise des décisions du gouvernement
ou à la formulation de sa politique;
e)
documents d’information à l’usage des ministres sur des questions portées ou
qu’il est prévu de porter devant le Conseil, ou sur des questions qui font
l’objet des communications ou discussions visées à l’alinéa d);
f)
avant-projets de loi ou projets de règlement;
g)
documents contenant des renseignements relatifs à la teneur des documents
visés aux alinéas a) à f).
(2) Pour
l’application du paragraphe (1), «Conseil» s’entend du Conseil privé de la
Reine pour le Canada, du Cabinet et de leurs comités respectifs.
(3) Le
paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas:
a) aux
documents confidentiels du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada dont
l’existence remonte à plus de vingt ans;
b) aux
documents de travail visés à l’alinéa (1)b), dans les cas où les
décisions auxquelles ils se rapportent ont été rendues publiques ou, à défaut
de publicité, ont été rendues quatre ans auparavant.
|
2. National
Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5
3. There is hereby
established a department of the Government of Canada called the Department of
National Defence over which the Minister of National Defence appointed by
commission under the Great Seal shall preside.
4. The Minister holds
office during pleasure, has the management and direction of the Canadian
Forces and of all matters relating to national defence and is responsible for
(a)
the construction and maintenance of all defence establishments and works for
the defence of Canada; and
(b)
research relating to the defence of Canada and to the development of and
improvements in materiel.
|
3. Est constitué le ministère de la Défense nationale, placé sous
l’autorité du ministre de la Défense nationale. Celui-ci est nommé par
commission sous le grand sceau.
4. Le ministre occupe sa charge à titre amovible et est responsable
des Forces canadiennes; il est compétent pour toutes les questions de défense
nationale, ainsi que pour :
a) la construction et l’entretien
des établissements et ouvrages de défense nationale;
b) la recherche liée à la défense
nationale et à la mise au point et au perfectionnement des matériels.
|
3. Department
of Transport Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-18
3. (1) There is hereby
established a department of the Government of Canada called the Department of
Transport over which the Minister of Transport appointed by commission under
the Great Seal shall preside.
(2) The Minister holds office during
pleasure and has the management and direction of the Department.
|
3. (1) Est
constitué le ministère des Transports, placé sous l’autorité du ministre des
Transports. Celui-ci est nommé par commission sous le grand sceau.
(2) Le
ministre occupe sa charge à titre amovible; il assure la direction et la
gestion du ministère.
|
4. Library
and Archives of Canada Act, S.C. 2004, c. 11
7. The objects of the
Library and Archives of Canada are
(a)
to acquire and preserve the documentary heritage;
(b)
to make that heritage known to Canadians and to anyone with an interest in Canada
and to facilitate access to it;
(c)
to be the permanent repository of publications of the Government of Canada
and of government and ministerial records that are of historical or archival
value;
(d)
to facilitate the management of information by government institutions;
(e)
to coordinate the library services of government institutions; and
(f)
to support the development of the library and archival communities.
|
7. Bibliothèque et Archives du Canada a pour mission:
a) de constituer et de préserver le
patrimoine documentaire;
b) de faire connaître ce patrimoine
aux Canadiens et à quiconque s'intéresse au Canada, et de le rendre
accessible;
c) d'être le dépositaire permanent
des publications des institutions fédérales, ainsi que des documents fédéraux
et ministériels qui ont un intérêt historique ou archivistique;
d) de faciliter la gestion de
l'information par les institutions fédérales;
e) d'assurer la coordination des
services de bibliothèque des institutions fédérales;
f) d'appuyer les milieux des
archives et des bibliothèques.
|
5. Privacy
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21
3. In this Act,
“personal
information” means information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in
any form including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing,
(a)
information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, age or marital status of the individual,
(b)
information relating to the education or the medical, criminal or employment
history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions
in which the individual has been involved,
(c) any
identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual,
(d) the
address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual,
(e) the
personal opinions or views of the individual except where they are about
another individual or about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be
made to another individual by a government institution or a part of a
government institution specified in the regulations,
(f)
correspondence sent to a government institution by the individual that is
implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to
such correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original
correspondence,
(g) the views
or opinions of another individual about the individual,
(h) the views
or opinions of another individual about a proposal for a grant, an award or a
prize to be made to the individual by an institution or a part of an
institution referred to in paragraph (e), but excluding the name of
the other individual where it appears with the views or opinions of the other
individual, and
(i) the name
of the individual where it appears with other personal information relating
to the individual or where the disclosure of the name itself would reveal
information about the individual,
but, for the purposes of sections 7, 8 and 26 and section
19 of the Access to Information Act, does not include
(j)
information about an individual who is or was an officer or employee of a
government institution that relates to the position or functions of the
individual including,
(i) the fact that the individual is or was an officer or
employee of the government institution,
(ii) the title, business address and telephone number of
the individual,
(iii) the classification, salary range and
responsibilities of the position held by the individual,
(iv) the name of the individual on a document prepared by
the individual in the course of employment, and
(v) the personal opinions or views of the individual
given in the course of employment,
(k)
information about an individual who is or was performing services under
contract for a government institution that relates to the services performed,
including the terms of the contract, the name of the individual and the
opinions or views of the individual given in the course of the performance of
those services,
(l)
information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature,
including the granting of a licence or permit, conferred on an individual,
including the name of the individual and the exact nature of the benefit, and
(m)
information about an individual who has been dead for more than twenty years;
|
3. Les définitions qui suivent
s’appliquent à la présente loi.
«renseignements personnels» Les
renseignements, quels que soient leur forme et leur support, concernant un
individu identifiable, notamment :
a) les renseignements relatifs à sa
race, à son origine nationale ou ethnique, à sa couleur, à sa religion, à son
âge ou à sa situation de famille;
b) les renseignements relatifs à
son éducation, à son dossier médical, à son casier judiciaire, à ses
antécédents professionnels ou à des opérations financières auxquelles il a
participé;
c) tout numéro ou symbole, ou toute
autre indication identificatrice, qui lui est propre;
d) son adresse, ses empreintes
digitales ou son groupe sanguin;
e) ses opinions ou ses idées
personnelles, à l’exclusion de celles qui portent sur un autre individu ou
sur une proposition de subvention, de récompense ou de prix à octroyer à un
autre individu par une institution fédérale, ou subdivision de celle-ci visée
par règlement;
f) toute correspondance de nature,
implicitement ou explicitement, privée ou confidentielle envoyée par lui à
une institution fédérale, ainsi que les réponses de l’institution dans la
mesure où elles révèlent le contenu de la correspondance de l’expéditeur;
g) les idées ou opinions d’autrui
sur lui;
h) les idées ou opinions d’un autre
individu qui portent sur une proposition de subvention, de récompense ou de
prix à lui octroyer par une institution, ou subdivision de celle-ci, visée à
l’alinéa e), à l’exclusion du nom de cet autre
individu si ce nom est mentionné avec les idées ou opinions;
i) son nom lorsque celui-ci est
mentionné avec d’autres renseignements personnels le concernant ou lorsque la
seule divulgation du nom révélerait des renseignements à son sujet;
toutefois,
il demeure entendu que, pour l’application des articles 7, 8 et 26, et de
l’article 19 de la Loi sur l’accès à l’information, les renseignements
personnels ne comprennent pas les renseignements concernant:
j) un cadre ou employé, actuel ou
ancien, d’une institution fédérale et portant sur son poste ou ses fonctions,
notamment:
(i) le
fait même qu’il est ou a été employé par l’institution,
(ii) son
titre et les adresse et numéro de téléphone de son lieu de travail,
(iii) la
classification, l’éventail des salaires et les attributions de son poste,
(iv) son
nom lorsque celui-ci figure sur un document qu’il a établi au cours de son
emploi,
(v) les
idées et opinions personnelles qu’il a exprimées au cours de son emploi;
k) un individu qui, au titre d’un
contrat, assure ou a assuré la prestation de services à une institution
fédérale et portant sur la nature de la prestation, notamment les conditions
du contrat, le nom de l’individu ainsi que les idées et opinions personnelles
qu’il a exprimées au cours de la prestation;
l) des avantages financiers
facultatifs, notamment la délivrance d’un permis ou d’une licence accordés à
un individu, y compris le nom de celui-ci et la nature précise de ces
avantages;
m) un individu décédé depuis plus
de vingt ans.
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6. Financial
Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11
2. In this Act,
“public officer” includes a
minister of the Crown and any person employed in the federal public
administration […]
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2. Les définitions qui suivent
s’appliquent à la présente loi.
«fonctionnaire public» Ministre ou
toute autre personne employée dans l’administration publique fédérale. […]
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7. Interpretation
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21
2. (1) In this Act,
“public officer” includes any person in the federal
public administration who is authorized by or under an enactment to do or
enforce the doing of an act or thing or to exercise a power, or on whom a
duty is imposed by or under an enactment […]
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2. (1) Les définitions qui suivent
s’appliquent à la présente loi.
«fonctionnaire public» Agent de l’administration
publique fédérale dont les pouvoirs ou obligations sont prévus par un texte.
[…]
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8. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5
39. (1) Where a minister of
the Crown or the Clerk of the Privy Council objects to the disclosure of
information before a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the
production of information by certifying in writing that the information
constitutes a confidence of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, disclosure
of the information shall be refused without examination or hearing of the
information by the court, person or body.
(2) For the purpose of
subsection (1), “a confidence of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada” includes, without
restricting the generality thereof, information contained in
(a) a
memorandum the purpose of which is to present proposals or recommendations to
Council;
(b) a
discussion paper the purpose of which is to present background explanations,
analyses of problems or policy options to Council for consideration by
Council in making decisions;
(c) an
agendum of Council or a record recording deliberations or decisions of
Council;
(d) a record
used for or reflecting communications or discussions between ministers of the
Crown on matters relating to the making of government decisions or the
formulation of government policy;
(e) a record
the purpose of which is to brief Ministers of the Crown in relation to
matters that are brought before, or are proposed to be brought before,
Council or that are the subject of communications or discussions referred to
in paragraph (d); and
(f) draft
legislation.
(3) For the purposes of
subsection (2), “Council” means the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada,
committees of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, Cabinet and committees of Cabinet.
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply in
respect of
(a) a
confidence of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada that has been in existence for more
than twenty years; or
(b) a
discussion paper described in paragraph (2)(b)
(i) if the decisions to which the discussion paper
relates have been made public, or
(ii) where the decisions have not been made public, if
four years have passed since the decisions were made.
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39. (1) Le
tribunal, l’organisme ou la personne qui ont le pouvoir de contraindre à la
production de renseignements sont, dans les cas où un ministre ou le greffier
du Conseil privé s’opposent à la divulgation d’un renseignement, tenus d’en
refuser la divulgation, sans l’examiner ni tenir d’audition à son sujet, si
le ministre ou le greffier attestent par écrit que le renseignement constitue
un renseignement confidentiel du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada.
(2) Pour
l’application du paragraphe (1), un «renseignement confidentiel du Conseil
privé de la Reine pour le Canada» s’entend notamment d’un renseignement
contenu dans :
a) une
note destinée à soumettre des propositions ou recommandations au Conseil;
b) un
document de travail destiné à présenter des problèmes, des analyses ou des
options politiques à l’examen du Conseil;
c) un
ordre du jour du Conseil ou un procès-verbal de ses délibérations ou
décisions;
d) un
document employé en vue ou faisant état de communications ou de discussions
entre ministres sur des questions liées à la prise des décisions du
gouvernement ou à la formulation de sa politique;
e) un
document d’information à l’usage des ministres sur des questions portées ou
qu’il est prévu de porter devant le Conseil, ou sur des questions qui font
l’objet des communications ou discussions visées à l’alinéa d);
f) un
avant-projet de loi ou projet de règlement.
(3) Pour l’application
du paragraphe (2), «Conseil» s’entend du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le
Canada, du Cabinet et de leurs comités respectifs.
(4) Le
paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas :
a) à un
renseignement confidentiel du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada dont
l’existence remonte à plus de vingt ans;
b) à un
document de travail visé à l’alinéa (2)b), dans les cas où les
décisions auxquelles il se rapporte ont été rendues publiques ou, à défaut de
publicité, ont été rendues quatre ans auparavant.
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