Date: 20080402
Docket: IMM-1447-08
Citation: 2008
FC 416
Toronto, Ontario, April 2, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Barnes
BETWEEN:
MUHAMMAD ASLAM
MAH RUKH ASLAM
MUHAMMAD AWON ASLAM
MUHAMMAD HASEEB ASLAM
MUHAMMAD ZAIN ASLAM
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
There are
two competing motions before the Court in this proceeding. The first is a
motion by the Applicants for a stay of their deportation to Pakistan which is scheduled for April
15, 2008. The Applicants’ underlying application for leave and for judicial
review is a challenge to a decision deemed by the Applicants to have
been made by an Enforcement Officer refusing their request for a deferral of
deportation. Notwithstanding the fact that no decision has actually been made
by the Respondent with respect to this deferral request, the Applicants allege
that it is, or will be, a negative decision made unlawfully and unreasonably
and, inter alia, without appropriate regard to the interests of the affected
children.
[2]
The
Respondent has countered the Applicants’ motion with a motion to strike the
underlying application for leave and for judicial review on the ground that, in
the absence of an actual decision, the application cannot be sustained.
[3]
The facts
which underlie these motions are not in dispute. The Respondent initiated the
process for the removal of the Applicants in 2006. The Applicants applied for
a pre-removal risk assessment in July, 2006 and that application was denied on
September 13, 2006. An application for judicial review from that decision was
denied by this Court on December 19, 2007. On February 27, 2008 the
Applicants were served with a Direction to Report for Removal on April 15, 2008.
[4]
On March
10, 2008, counsel for the Applicants wrote to the Respondent requesting a
deferral of their removal and demanding a decision by noon on March 19, 2008.
The letter went on to state that a failure to respond by the stipulated
deadline would be treated by the Applicants as a “constructive refusal” which
would support a motion for a stay. Apparently, no response was received and
the Applicants’ motion for a stay was filed on March 27, 2008 and argued before
me on March 31, 2008.
[5]
The
Respondent has filed an affidavit by Karen Mendonca indicating that the
Applicants’ deferral request is “sitting in queue” with other outstanding
deferral requests and that “every effort is made to provide a decision in a
timely manner.”
[6]
The
Applicants’ motion was initially framed as a request for a full stay of
deportation on the merits until the final disposition of their application for
leave and for judicial review. When the matter was argued before me the claim
to relief was reduced to a temporary stay of removal for two weeks following
the delivery of the deferral decision. Counsel for the Applicants argued that
this relief was justified by fairness and due process concerns.
[7]
In support
of their claim to relief the Applicants rely on the Order of Justice Frederick Gibson
in Katwaru v. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness, IMM-475-07 (unreported) and the decision of Justice James
Russell in Ragunathan v. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness, 2006 FC 963. In Katwaru, Justice Gibson was dealing
with a motion for a stay where a deferral decision had not been made and where
the deportation was scheduled for the following day. Not surprisingly he
granted a temporary stay for 72 hours following the rendering of the pending
decision and the motion was otherwise adjourned sine die.
[8]
In Ragunathan
the motion for a stay of deportation was brought before the rendering of the
deferral decision but it was argued after the decision was made. Justice
Russell, therefore, had before him an actual decision and relevant submissions
by the parties. In my view, the ruling in Ragunathan should be confined
to its own set of unique facts and it should not be extended to a situation
like this one where no decision has yet been made. Where the Respondent fails
or refuses to make a timely decision, the type of temporary relief granted by
Justice Gibson in Katwaru is available and, of course, this Court has
the resources to deal with such matters on an urgent basis when required. In
my view, however, the Applicants’ motion for temporary relief is premature.
The Applicants’ scheduled deportation is two weeks away. It is a waste of
scarce judicial resources to bring this motion where an expectation remains
that a timely decision will be rendered and where the outcome of that process
is presently unknown.
[9]
The Court
has enough urgent stay motions before it dealing with actual decisions that it
cannot be burdened with premature motions of this sort. In appropriate cases
where fairness and due process require a temporary stay order, the Court has
the authority to preserve the status quo until a decision has been made or to
allow a party enough time to put a proper evidentiary record before the Court.
It is not appropriate for an applicant to deem a decision to have been made
because the Respondent has failed to respond by a deadline which the applicant
unilaterally imposed. The Respondent is under no legal obligation to respond
to such demands and it is entitled to process these types of requests in a fair
and orderly manner. Indeed, the kinds of demands for early deferral decisions
that applicants appear now to be making would, if followed by the Respondent,
create an unfairness for those already in the queue who would thereby have
their deferral requests delayed in favour of those coming later into the
system. In other words, it is up to the Respondent to prioritize these matters
in a way that is fair to all and efficient and it is unreasonable that a few
litigants should seek to elevate their interests over others who may thereby be
adversely affected.
[10]
Although
the Respondent has requested costs, I do not think that this is an appropriate
case for such an award. However, if these types of premature motions continue
to be brought, awards of costs may be an appropriate means of curbing the
practice.
[11]
Having
dismissed the Applicants’ stay motion no utility would be served at this time
by dealing with the Respondent’s dismissal motion and that motion will be
dismissed by separate Order.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that this motion is dismissed.
“R.L.
Barnes”
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS
OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-1447-08
STYLE OF CAUSE: MUHAMMAD ASLAM, MAH RUKH
ASLAM, MUHAMMAD AWON ASLAM, MUHAMMAD HASEEB ASLAM, MUHAMMAD ZAIN ASLAM v.
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto,
Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: March 31, 2008
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER BY: BARNES J.
DATED: April 2, 2008
APPEARANCES:
Lorne Waldman FOR
THE APPLICANTS
Lisa Hutt FOR
THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Waldman & Associates
Toronto, Ontario FOR
THE APPLICANTS
John H. Sims, Q.C.
Deputy
Attorney General of Canada FOR
THE RESPONDENT