Date: 20081118
Docket: IMM-1299-08
Citation: 2008 FC 1286
Ottawa,
Ontario, November 18, 2008
Present:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Beaudry
BETWEEN:
JOSE CARLOS HERMIDA GONZALEZ
RITA MONTERO HERMIDA FERNANDEZ
LUIS ALBERTO HERMIDA MONTERO
CARLOS OMAR HERMIDA MONTERO
Applicants
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act), against a
decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board
(the panel) rendered by Member Girard Landry on February 20,
2008.
According to that decision, the principal applicant, Jose Carlos Hermida
Gonzalez, was excluded from the definition of refugee within the meaning of paragraphs
1F(a) and 1F(c) of Article 1 of the United Nations’ Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (the Convention). The panel also concluded
that the female applicant and her two children were not Convention refugees or “persons
in need of protection”.
I. Issues
[2]
The
following issues are relevant:
1.
Did the panel err in concluding that the principal applicant is
excluded under the Convention?
2.
Did the panel err in finding that the testimonies of the other
applicants were not credible?
II. Facts
[3]
The
principal applicant, Jose Carlos Hermida Gonzalez, 43 years old, and his
spouse, Rita Montero Fernandez, 42 years old, have two children: Luis Alberto
Hermida Montero and Carlos Omar Hermida Montero, aged 12 and 17 years respectively,
all of them Mexican citizens.
[4]
Rita
Montero Fernandez and her children based their claim for refugee protection on
that of the principal applicant.
[5]
The
principal applicant is a professor and worked for the Mexican army from January
17, 1992, to May
30, 1997,
as an infiltrator (mole).
[6]
He
worked as a chief petty officer in the naval infantry, Special Service
Operations, and carried out secret operations against drug traffickers. The
applicant would draft reports and hand them in to his Dependency, which then
forwarded them to the Third Naval Zone. This could lead to arrests and
detention.
[7]
According
to him, municipal police and federal highway police arrested and jailed
subjects on the basis of the reports he completed, and his role was restricted
to infiltrating the criminal underworld.
[8]
Following
the applicant’s transfer to the 4th Dependency, north of Veracruz, he was told
by a mole that the captain was one of the heads of a gang of drug traffickers
in that region. The captain had allegedly asked him to gather intelligence on
his own gang.
[9]
On
May 30, 1997, on his way home, the applicant was attacked by a group of armed
persons. He was injured, and one of his friends, a veterinarian, obtained
medicine for him because the applicant did not want to be traced to a hospital.
[10]
Next,
he learned that two of his co-workers, as well as a corporal who received the
reports, had been tortured and murdered. He then decided to desert the army.
[11]
Fearing
that he would be spied on, and in order to save his life, he settled illegally
in the United
States
from March
3, 1998.
Following the events of September 11, 2001, and seeing that his chances of
obtaining legal status were minimal, he returned to Mexico on September 4, 2003. He arrived
in Canada on July 21,
2004, and claimed refugee protection.
[12]
The
wife and children lived in hiding at her parent’s home in Mexico before
leaving the country on August 16,
2005,
to join the principal applicant, claiming refugee protection that same day.
III. Impugned
decision
[13]
The
panel concluded that the principal applicant is excluded under paragraphs 1F(a)
and 1F(c) of Article 1 of the Convention. The panel also rejected the claims of
the other applicants, finding them not to be credible.
[14]
During
the period in which the applicant did his infiltration work and supplied lists
of persons to arrest, the documentary evidence shows that police forces, the
army and security services committed abuses and torture. The panel cites
excerpts from this documentary evidence and concludes that all services and the
army and navy corps have committed abuses, torture, kidnappings and murders.
[15]
At
the hearing, the applicant testified to the fact that he had no knowledge of
these crimes committed by the Mexican army. However, considering the period
from 1992 to 1997 during which the applicant wrote his reports and gave names,
the panel is of the opinion that it had serious reasons for considering that he
was an accomplice in the crimes mentioned in the documentary evidence.
[16]
Quoting
Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (F.C.A.), the panel applied the six
criteria mentioned.
[17]
Regarding
the first criterion, that is, the method of recruitment, the panel considers
that the applicant voluntarily enlisted out of altruism and worked for five
years. Next, the nature of the organization: the applicant conducted secret
investigations by infiltrating drug trafficking gangs to dismantle distribution
networks. Then, he held the rank of chief petty officer in the organization. According
to the panel, because of this rank and the time spent in the organization, it
was implausible that the applicant was not aware of the abuses committed by the
organization. He could have resigned at any time without risk to himself, but
he left only when he had no choice.
[18]
Therefore,
the panel determined that there were serious reasons for considering that the
applicant had been an accomplice to crimes against humanity because of his
continuous participation over a period of several years in the activities of
the Third Naval Military Zone of Mexico.
[19]
Regarding
the spouse and children, the panel did not believe the female applicant’s
testimony to the effect that they remained in hiding for seven years without
leaving the house and that the children did not go to school. When the panel
asked the spouse what she was afraid of, she was unable to answer. The children
told the immigration officer that they were students, thus contradicting their
mother, who claimed that they never left the house and that she sometimes gave
them courses.
[20]
At
the hearing, the spouse acknowledged that she had never known what her husband
did or why they had fled Mexico. It was only at the hearing on October 10,
2006, that she learned the name of their persecutor. The panel concluded that
the spouse’s attitude was contrary to that of a person who feared for her life.
IV. Relevant
legislation
[21]
Article
1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees reads as
follows:
|
Article
1. Definition of the term “refugee”
F. The provisions of this
Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are
serious reasons for considering that.
(a) He has committed a crime
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes;
(c) He has been guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
|
Article
premier. -- Définition du terme « réfugié »
F. Les dispositions de cette
Convention ne seront pas applicables aux personnes dont on aura des raisons
sérieuses de penser :
a) Qu’elles ont commis un
crime contre la paix, un crime de guerre ou un rime contre l’humanité, au
sens des instruments internationaux élaborés pour prévoir des dispositions
relatives à ces crimes;
c) Qu’elles se sont rendues
coupables d’agissements contraires aux buts et aux principes des Nations
Unies.
|
V. Analysis
A. Standard of review
[22]
The
applicant’s complicity in acts committed by the Mexican army and his exclusion
under Article 1 of the Convention is a question of mixed fact and law (Mankoto
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 294, 149
A.C.W.S. (3d) 1107, at paragraph 16; Harb v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2003 FCA 39, 238 F.T.R. 194, at paragraph 14). The
applicable standard of review was reasonableness simpliciter.
[23]
Following
the recent judgement in Dunsmuir v. New-Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
190, the applicable standard is the new reasonableness standard. Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making
process, but it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range
of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts
and law (Dunsmuir,
at paragraph 47). The Court must not intervene so long as the decision of the
administrative tribunal is reasonable, and it cannot replace that decision with
its own opinion simply because it would have reached another conclusion.
[24]
Case
law before Dunsmuir was to the effect that purely factual questions were
subject to the patent unreasonableness standard (Mugesera v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, at
paragraph 38; Aguebor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Citizenship),
(1994) 160 N.R. 315, 42 A.C.W.S. (3d) 886 (F.C.A.), at paragraph 4).
[25]
As
regards the second issue, that is, whether the testimonies of the other
applicants were credible, the assessment is a question that is part of the
expertise of the panel and is subject to the reasonableness standard according
to Dunsmuir.
1.
Did the panel err in concluding that the principal applicant is excluded under
the Convention?
[26]
The
applicant cites several decisions and submits that the panel misinterpreted the
facts and law in this case (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
v. Nagra (1999), 93 A.C.W.S. (3d) 130, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1643 (F.C.T.D.)
(QL); Salazar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
(1999) 166 F.T.R. 109, 89 A.C.W.S. (3d) 120 (F.C.T.D.); Musansi v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2001), 105 A.C.W.S. (3d) 727,
[2001] F.C.J. No. 65 (F.C.T.D.) (QL); Alwan v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 109, 120 A.C.W.S. (3d) 276).
[27]
In
Ramirez, the Federal Court of Appeal established six criteria for
determining whether an individual is to be considered as an accomplice to a
crime against humanity. Those factors are as follows: method of recruitment,
the applicant’s position and rank in the organization, his knowledge of
atrocities, length of time in the organization and the opportunity to leave the
organization.
[28]
Regarding
the first criterion, the applicant submits that he voluntarily enlisted in the
Mexican army on January 17, 1992, but this, according to the documentary
evidence, was one year before the army committed human rights abuses. His work was
limited to obtaining names and addresses. He was not involved in arresting drug
traffickers.
[29]
Regarding
the second and third criteria, the applicant submits that the panel did not
determine that the army was an organization with a limited and brutal purpose.
The applicant states that he never had any knowledge of the alleged abuses.
[30]
The
applicant submits that he was only a “mole” and that had no decision-making
power in the organization; therefore, he was not an accomplice because of the
position he held.
[31]
Regarding
the fourth criterion, he submits that he had little knowledge of the
organization as such. He adds that his work was limited to giving names of
individuals to the municipal or federal police forces, which then made arrests.
Before 1997, he never had any knowledge of murders or torture. He did not have
access to the documentation mentioned by the panel in its decision and, at that
time, did not use Internet.
[32]
As
for the last two criteria, the applicant claims that he deserted the Mexican
army as soon as he learned about the human rights violations committed by
persons linked to the organization.
[33]
The
respondent submits that the panel ruled on the issue as to whether the
organization to which the applicant belonged had committed crimes against
humanity but did not determine that the organization had a cruel and brutal
purpose. This is why the panel analyzed the Ramirez criteria.
[34]
The
respondent submits that the panel did not err when it considered the six
criteria in Ramirez.
[35]
The
respondent also notes that the panel was warranted in drawing inferences from
the evidence based on rationality and common sense (Shahamati v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 415 (F.C.A) (QL)).
[36]
The
respondent is of the view that it was not unreasonable for the panel to conclude
that the applicant’s lack of knowledge of the crimes committed by the
organization was implausible.
[37]
According
to the respondent, in order to determine there was complicity by association,
case law never required that the claimant must be linked to specific crimes or
must be the actual perpetrator, or that the crimes be directly or indirectly attributable
to specific acts or omissions of the refugee claimant himself (Sumaida v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 3 F.C. 66 (F.C.A)).
[38]
The
respondent states that in applying paragraphs 1F(a) and 1F(b) of the Convention,
the Federal Court of Appeal has already decided that the Minister need only comply
with the standard of proof implicit in the expression “serious reasons for
considering”. This standard is less than what is required in criminal law
(beyond a reasonable doubt) or in civil law (balance of probabilities) (Moreno
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298
(F.C.A.)).
[39]
Complicity
by association was explained in Bazargan v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), (1996) 205 N.R. 282, 67 A.C.W.S. (3d) 132
(F.C.A.), at paragraphs 11 and 12:
In our view, it goes without saying that “personal
and knowing participation” can be direct or indirect and does not require
formal membership in the organization that is ultimately engaged in the
condemned activities. It is not working within an organization that makes
someone an accomplice to the organization’s activities, but knowingly
contributing to those activities in any way or making them possible, whether
from within or from outside the organization. At p. 318, MacGuigan J.A. said
that “[a]t bottom, complicity rests . . . on the existence of a
shared common purpose and the knowledge that all of the parties in question may
have of it”. Those who become involved in an operation that is not theirs, but
that they know will probably lead to the commission of an international
offence, lay themselves open to the application of the exclusion clause in the
same way as those who play a direct part in the operation.
That being said, everything becomes a
question of fact. The Minister does not have to prove the respondent’s guilt.
He merely has to show - and the burden of proof resting on him is “less than the
balance of probabilities” - that there are serious reasons for considering that
the respondent is guilty. . . .
[40]
In
Harb, at paragraph 11, it was explained how complicity by association
could be the basis of an exclusion under paragraph 1F(a) of the Convention:
. . . It is not the nature of the crimes
with which the appellant was charged that led to his exclusion, but that of the
crimes alleged against the organizations with which he was supposed to be
associated. Once those organizations have committed crimes against humanity and
the appellant meets the requirements for membership in the group, knowledge,
participation or complicity imposed by precedent (see inter alia, Ramirez
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C.
306 (C.A.); Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1994]
1 F.C. 298 (C.A.); Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.); Sumaida v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 66 (C.A.); and Bazargan v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration (1996), 205 N.R. 232 (F.C.A.)), the
exclusion applies even if the specific acts committed by the appellant himself
are not crimes against humanity as such. In short, if the organization
persecutes the civilian population the fact that the appellant himself
persecuted only the military population does not mean that he will escape the
exclusion, if he is an accomplice by association as well.
[41]
In
this case, I am of the opinion that the impugned decision raises some problems.
The panel noted from the documentary evidence that numerous abuses had been
committed by the Mexican army. However, mere membership in an organization
responsible for crimes against humanity is not sufficient to constitute
complicity. In Sivakumar, the Court stated that the more important an
individual’s position within the organization is, the more likely it will be
that he or she was complicit in that organization’s crimes.
[42]
In
the case at bar, the title of the position held by the applicant appears to
show that he held an important position, but in reality he only gathered names
and addresses and did not hold a decision-making position in management. The
evidence does not show that he participated either directly or indirectly or that
he approved of or influenced the crimes that were committed. In addition, the
applicant reported to a corporal who did not have an officer’s title. The
applicant was given the title of petty officer, the lowest title on the scale
for the officers’ category, for pay purposes (panel record, page 861).
[43]
Nothing
shows that the applicant had a shared common purpose. In his testimony, he
stated that when he enlisted in the army, he was a professor, and his
intentions were highly laudable: he wanted to help young people to stay away
from taking drugs (panel record, page 859).
[44]
I
consider the evidence to be too tenuous and flimsy to allow the applicant’s
exclusion. Apart from the documentary evidence about Mexico and the
position held by the applicant, I am of the opinion that the panel did not have
sufficient evidence to show that the applicant was an accomplice by association.
2.
Did the panel err in finding that the testimonies of the other applicants were not
credible?
[45]
In
her memorandum, the female applicant states that her children were not locked
up as such: they were at home and did not go out in public except to see the
doctor or in case of an emergency. According to her, nothing contradicted her
testimony.
[46]
The
testimony of the eldest son confirms the female applicant’s testimony to the
effect that he stopped going to school after Grade 3 and did not know why he
could not finish elementary school (panel record, pages 926 and 927). He
corroborates his mother’s testimony about the courses she gave him to help him
read.
[47]
The
applicant explained that she went into hiding on orders from her husband, who
did not want to tell her who the persecutor was because he wanted the family to
know as little as possible so as to protect them. However, she had feared being
killed ever since the attack on her husband on May 30, 1997.
[48]
After
attentively reading the stenographic notes, I consider that the panel
misinterpreted the testimonies given by the applicants. It is true that at
first sight there seems to be some inconsistencies. However, when comparing
testimonies, no flagrant contradictions may be found.
[49]
For
example, it is not unreasonable for the children to consider themselves to be students
because their mother, their Uncle Sergio and their Aunt Flore gave them lessons
(panel record, page 928).
[50]
The
female applicant testified to the fact that she had to take refuge at her
mother’s home even though she did not know who the persecutor was. However, she
did know that it had something to do with her husband’s work. The family home
was ransacked in 2004, which makes her testimony more credible.
[51]
The
Court’s intervention is warranted because the reasons for the decision are not
supported by the evidence.
[52]
No
question was proposed for certification, and there is none in the record.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT
ORDERS that the application for
judicial review be allowed. The matter is referred back to a differently
constituted panel for rehearing and redetermination. No question is certified.
“Michel
Beaudry”
Certified
true translation
Michael
Palles
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